| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| snipe-it before 8.7.0 contains an incorrect calculation vulnerability in checkout request handling that allows authenticated users to corrupt the assets.requests_counter through duplicate submissions and cancellations without active requests. Attackers can repeatedly call cancel endpoints without active requests to drive the counter negative, or submit duplicate checkout requests to inflate the counter, misrepresenting pending demand in the admin queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
liveupdate: Remember FLB retrieve() status
LUO keeps track of successful retrieve attempts on an FLB. It does so
to avoid multiple retrievals of the same FLB. Multiple retrievals cause
problems because once the FLB is retrieved, the serialized data
structures are likely freed and the FLB is likely in a very different
state from what the code expects.
All this works well when retrieve succeeds. When it fails,
luo_flb_retrieve_one() returns the error immediately, without ever
storing anywhere that a retrieve was attempted or what its error code
was. If the user attempts to retrieve another file registered with the
same FLB, LUO will attempt to call the FLB's retrieve() callback again.
The retry is problematic for much of the same reasons listed above. The
FLB is likely in a very different state than what the retrieve logic
normally expects (e.g. some KHO pages may have already been restored and
freed).
There is no sane way of attempting the retrieve again. Remember the
error retrieve returned and directly return it on a retry.
This is done by changing the retrieved bool to a retrieve_status
integer. A value of 0 means retrieve was never attempted, a positive
value means it succeeded, and a negative value means it failed and the
error code is the value.
This is similar to commit f85b1c6af5bc ("liveupdate: luo_file: remember
retrieve() status") which did the same for LUO files. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: dwc: ep: Flush cached MSI write before unmapping the iATU
The MSI-X path already flushes any posted MSI-X write before tearing down
its iATU mapping. That was added by commit c22533c66cca ("PCI: dwc: ep:
Flush MSI-X write before unmapping its ATU entry") to make sure the write
reaches the Root Complex before the outbound window that translates it
disappears.
The MSI path has the same problem but no equivalent flush. When the
Endpoint driver caches an MSI target address and later observes that the
Root Complex has changed it, dw_pcie_ep_raise_msi_irq() unmaps the existing
iATU entry and reprograms it for the new address. Between the last MSI
writel() and the unmap there may still be a posted write sitting in the
fabric, and unmapping the iATU entry can drop or misroute that write.
Fix this by reading back from the mapped MSI window before the unmap. The
readback drains any posted MSI writes through the same iATU entry that
mapped them, which is the same logic the MSI-X path uses.
[mani: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: dw-edma: Serialize channel state checks
pause() and resume() read and update channel state without holding vc.lock,
while the interrupt handlers update the same state under it. Take the same
lock around those state checks so that request, status, and configured stay
consistent.
For example, pause() can observe EDMA_ST_BUSY right before the interrupt
handler completes the final descriptor and moves the channel to
EDMA_ST_IDLE, and then record EDMA_REQ_PAUSE on an already idle channel. No
further interrupt will acknowledge the request, and since issue_pending()
requires EDMA_REQ_NONE, the channel is wedged for good: terminate_all()
leaves the stale request behind, so even reconfiguring the channel does not
recover it.
issue_pending() already runs under vc.lock, but it tests configured before
taking it. Move that test under the lock as well, so configured, request,
and status are evaluated as one channel-state snapshot. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix overflow in update_tg_cfs_runnable()
A divide-by-zero crash is observed when running hackbench:
[14697.488452] CPU: 112 UID: 0 PID: 124791 Comm: hackbench Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2+
[14697.492627] RIP: 0010:propagate_entity_load_avg+0x35f/0x3e0
[14697.506799] <TASK>
[14697.507411] __dequeue_task+0x2b4/0xc70
[14697.508677] dequeue_task_fair+0x36/0x370
[14697.509047] dequeue_task+0x101/0x2f0
[14697.509426] __schedule+0x1b1/0x1a00
[14697.510868] anon_pipe_read+0x3da/0x450
[14697.511400] vfs_read+0x361/0x390
[14697.512053] __x64_sys_read+0x19/0x30
The divide-by-zero happens here:
if (scale_load_down(gcfs_rq->load.weight)) {
load_sum = div_u64(gcfs_rq->avg.load_sum,
scale_load_down(gcfs_rq->load.weight));
}
gcfs_rq->load.weight is an insane large value and is truncated
to the lower 32 bits by div_u64, which happen to be 0.
Using AI for investigation, the cause is a u32 overflow in
update_tg_cfs_runnable(), and flat pickup became a victim when using
tg_tasks():
u32 new_sum, divider;
...
new_sum = se->avg.runnable_avg * divider; <-- boom
The following sequence shows how this triggers the crash:
propagate_entity_load_avg()
update_tg_cfs_runnable() # u32 overflow corrupts runnable_sum
__update_load_avg_cfs_rq()
___update_load_avg() # computes insane runnable_avg
update_tg_load_avg() # propagates to tg->runnable_avg
update_cfs_group()
calc_concur_shares()
tg_tasks() # long-to-int truncation, negative nr
reweight_entity() # corrupted se->load.weight
update_load_add() # corrupted cfs_rq->load.weight
propagate_entity_load_avg()
update_tg_cfs_load()
div_u64() # divide-by-zero
Fix by widening new_sum from u32 to u64 (no need to force tg_tasks()
to return unsigned long after this fix) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: Do not treat master device as a duplicate target
i3c_master_search_i3c_dev_duplicate() searches the bus for another I3C
device with the same PID as the reference device. The search can match
master->this, causing the controller itself to be returned as a
duplicate.
Since the controller is not a target device, it cannot be a duplicate of
one. Exclude master->this from matching so that the function only
returns real duplicate target devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject >8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths
btf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the
fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has
accepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was
introduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer's type size, and the
return-type check only rejected ret < 0.
But the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on
x86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target's return value the
second half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored, so a program
attached to a function returning a 16-byte value corrupts the value seen
by the real caller and itself observes only half of it. struct_ops
trampolines have the same limitation.
This affects the attach types that read the target's return value: fexit,
fmod_ret and fsession (plus the _multi variants of fexit and fsession),
and struct_ops. fentry/fentry_multi run before the target returns and are
unaffected.
Reject a >8 byte return value for these attach types in
bpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi(), and for
struct_ops in bpf_struct_ops_desc_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: dw: avoid shift-out-of-bounds when DAA assigns no devices
On an empty bus ENTDAA assigns nothing, so cmd->rx_len (the count
of addresses left unassigned) equals master->maxdevs.
The GENMASK() index master->maxdevs - cmd->rx_len - 1 then becomes -1,
which trips up UBSAN. This happens every time on boot on a Gigabyte/AMD
server:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/i3c/master/dw-i3c-master.c:905:12
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 963 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.0.11-200.fc44.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Giga Computing E163-Z34-AAH1-000/MZ33-DC1-000, BIOS R32_F45 04/01/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xd7/0x1ab
dw_i3c_master_daa.cold+0x1b/0x96 [dw_i3c_master]
i3c_master_do_daa_ext.part.0+0x3e/0xf0 [i3c]
Skip the mask when no new device was assigned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv, bpf: Fix missing sign-ext for signed 1-byte and 2-byte kfunc args
On RV64, the ABI requires sign-extension for signed 1-byte and 2-byte kfunc
args. However, the RV64 JIT currently does not perform sign-extension for
such kfunc args.
Before commit 7ce090afbf72 ("bpf: Infer zext_dst based on static register
liveness analysis"), state pruning could potentially omit zero-extension
of 32-bit subregisters, which inadvertently masked the above issue by making
the args appear as if they had been properly sign-extended. After that
commit, the problem is exposed, causing the kfunc_call/kfunc_call_test4
selftest to fail.
Fix this by extending the existing sign-extension logic to handle signed
1-byte and 2-byte kfunc args as well. |
| As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Secure Adaptive Security Appliance Software, Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Software and Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Software engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-20335 are related to incorrect calculation issues that are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Pillar CWE-682. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vcn: fix integer overflow in dec_msg buffer count check
If the supplied msg[2] (num_buffers) is 0x3FFFFFFF, the expression
6 + num_buffers * 4 wraps to 2 and the bounds check passes, letting
the parser loop far past the end of the message BO. Triggering it
additionally requires a ~4GiB mapping so that msg[1] survives the
earlier "header does not fit in BO" check.
Rewrite the test in division form, which is overflow-free by
construction. Also update the message to reflect that msg is invalid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Clamp MSI-X derived queue counts to avoid truncation
ha->msix_count is u16, but ha->max_req_queues, ha->max_rsp_queues and
ha->max_qpairs are u8. Deriving the queue count as
"ha->max_req_queues = ha->msix_count - 1" therefore truncates: a board
(or a misconfigured/malicious hot-plugged device) advertising 257 MSI-X
vectors yields msix_count - 1 == 256, which truncates to 0. An MSI-X
count of 1 zeroes it as well, and in target mode the subsequent
"ha->max_req_queues--" then underflows 0 to 255.
When the count is 0, qla2x00_alloc_queues() calls
kzalloc_objs(struct req_que *, 0), which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. That is
not NULL, so the allocation check passes and the following
"ha->req_q_map[0] = req" dereferences ZERO_SIZE_PTR, corrupting memory
or crashing the kernel.
Add qla_calc_queue_count() to clamp the derived value into
[1, QLA_MAX_QUEUES - 1] so it always fits in u8 and is never zero, and
use it at all three derivation sites (qla25xx_iospace_config(),
qla83xx_iospace_config() and qla24xx_enable_msix()). Also guard the
target-mode decrement so it cannot reintroduce a zero (which would in
turn underflow max_qpairs). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: sgp30: Handle IAQ thread creation failure
kthread_run() can fail and return an error pointer, but sgp_probe() stores
it and returns success, so the device is registered without its IAQ thread
and sgp_remove() later passes the error pointer to kthread_stop(). Return
the error from probe instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: s2255: check firmware size before reading trailing marker
s2255_probe() reads a 4-byte marker and version from the last 8 bytes
of the firmware blob (fw->data[fw_size - 8] and [fw_size - 4]). If the
firmware file is shorter than 8 bytes, fw_size - 8 underflows and the
access reads out of bounds. Validate the firmware size before indexing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Always flush vpid02 on first use
Make sure vpid02 is always flushed on first use by setting last_vpid=0
when allocating vpid02. nested_vmx_transition_tlb_flush() will always
detect a VPID change on first VM-Enter after VMXON, because VPID=0 in
vmcs12 is not allowed if L1 enables VPID.
This avoids using stale TLB entries from a previous lifetime of the
VPID, that might have been associated with a different vCPU (or a
completely different VM).
Note that last_vpid is already being initialized as 0 when the vCPU is
created, but it is not reset when vpid02 is freed on VMXOFF. Hence, the
problem can only occur if L1 does VMXOFF -> VMXON, runs an L2, and KVM
happens to reuse a VPID that has TLB entries on the physical CPU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: hdac_hda: Fix hlink refcount leak on component registration failure
hdac_hda_dev_probe() gets the HDA link with snd_hdac_ext_bus_link_get()
before registering the ASoC component. If component registration fails,
the function returns without dropping the link reference.
Always call snd_hdac_ext_bus_link_put() after the registration attempt so
the reference taken during probe is balanced on both success and failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers
The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its
requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However,
the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages,
which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when
physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc().
The various callers of ceph_fname_to_usr() directly pass (slices of) raw
messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in
vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms
(see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer).
Make ceph_fname_to_usr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated
fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using `tname`
(which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly
allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any
inappropriate addresses to fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr().
Additionally change parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only function to
supply its own `tname` -- to follow the new "tname must never come from
vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear
region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead
exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into
vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir
messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it
is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce
buffer in parse_reply_info_readdir() and use that as `tname` instead. |
| RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, readField in read.go reads the length of an AMQP byte-array field with type tag x into a signed int32 and passes the value directly to make when allocating the field buffer. A malicious or compromised broker can encode a value such as 0xFFFFFFFF, which becomes -1 and causes a len out of range runtime panic. The panic escapes the network reader goroutine and terminates the client process, including during connection.start server properties or message header table parsing. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/kexec_file: Prevent kexec range truncation
Sashiko AI review pointed out the following issue.
The __merge_memory_ranges() function incorrectly handles overlapping
memory ranges when merging them. Although sort_memory_ranges() sorts all
ranges by their start address in ascending order beforehand, the merge
logic remains defective in two ways:
1. It compares the current range's start against the previous element (i-1)
instead of the running target index (idx)
2. It unconditionally overwrites 'ranges[idx].end' with 'ranges[i].end'.
This logic flaw leads to critical memory truncation when a larger memory
range completely subsumes subsequent smaller ranges.
For example, consider a sorted input array with three ranges:
Range A (idx=0): [0x1000 - 0x9000]
Range B (i=1): [0x2000 - 0x5000] (completely inside Range A)
Range C (i=2): [0x6000 - 0x8000] (completely inside Range A)
1. When i=1 (Range B):
ranges[1].start (0x2000) <= ranges[0].end + 1 (0x9001) is TRUE.
The code executes: ranges[0].end = ranges[1].end, which erroneously
shrinks Range A's end from 0x9000 down to 0x5000.
2. When i=2 (Range C):
ranges[2].start (0x6000) <= ranges[1].end + 1 (0x5001) is FALSE.
The code falls into the else block, creating a broken new range.
As a result, valid memory fragments [0x5001 - 0x5fff] and [0x8001 - 0x9000]
are completely lost from the kexec exclude lists, potentially allowing
the crash kernel to overwrite active memory, causing data corruption
or crashes.
Fix this by ensuring the start of the current range is compared against the
end of the active merged range (idx), and use max() to safely prevent the
outer boundary from being truncated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped
Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE'd. Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU's control structure:
1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.
Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM's retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives. If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN. If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the "outer" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).
Note #2! Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn't know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding). And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of
the state of the underlying guest_memfd inode.
Failure to invalidate the vCPU's control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by
pre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware
will reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU
is actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use. That in turn leads to an
RMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM.
SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140
rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60
sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd]
delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0
kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]
vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x496c7e
</TASK>
------------[ cut here ]------------
SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0
kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]
vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x496c7e
</TASK>
irq event stamp: 20689
hardirqs last enabled at (20699): [<ffffffff8e76092c>] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60
hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [<ffffffff8e760911>] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60
softirqs last enabled at (20722): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140
softirqs last disabled at (20717): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99
---truncated--- |
