| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Mattermost Desktop App versions <=6.1 5.5.13.0 fail to account for attempting to open extremely long URLs in the Mattermost Desktop App which allows a malicious server owner to crash the application via including a script to call window.open on a very large URL. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00652 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Limit bpf program signature size
Practical BPF signatures are significantly smaller than
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE
Allowing larger sizes opens the door for abuse by passing excessive
size values and forcing the kernel into expensive allocation paths (via
kmalloc_large or vmalloc). |
| Deserialization of Untrusted Data and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerabilities in elixir-grpc grpc allow unauthenticated attackers to crash the BEAM node via atom table exhaustion and, when a decoded term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution on the server.
'Elixir.GRPC.Codec.Erlpack':decode/2 (lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex) calls :erlang.binary_to_term/1 on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option, no size bound, and no type guard. Any unauthenticated peer that sends a request with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can send a crafted payload that mints arbitrary new atoms (which are never garbage-collected, exhausting the bounded atom table and crashing the VM) or that encodes a fun term which, if applied anywhere downstream, executes attacker-controlled code inside the server process.
This issue affects grpc from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust the BEAM's memory and crash the server by streaming a large or slow-trickle unary request body.
'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':read_full_body/3 (lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) accumulates every received chunk into a single growing binary with no size cap. Additionally, when the client omits the grpc-timeout header, the per-chunk read timeout resolves to :infinity, allowing a slow-trickle client to keep the connection alive indefinitely while memory grows. A single connection is sufficient to exhaust server memory and crash the node.
This issue affects grpc from 0.3.1 before 1.0.0. |
| daphne before 4.2.2 did not pass maxFramePayloadSize or maxMessagePayloadSize to Autobahn's WebSocketServerFactory. Because Autobahn defaults both values to 0 (unlimited), an unauthenticated remote attacker could send arbitrarily large WebSocket messages or frames, causing excessive memory consumption and a denial of service. |
| Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 1.0.0 to before version 2.2.0, the Nezha dashboard exposes two endpoints that create long-lived WebSocket streams to monitored agents: POST /api/v1/terminal → createTerminal() (terminal.go:27-67) and POST /api/v1/file → createFM() (fm.go:28-67). Both call rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, ...) which inserts a new ioStreamContext into an unbounded map[string]*ioStreamContext (s.ioStreams in io_stream.go:59-67). There is no per-user rate limit, no global semaphore, and no per-server connection cap. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.0. |
| Spring Data Commons, versions 1.13 to 1.13.10, 2.0 to 2.0.5, and older unsupported versions, contain a property path parser vulnerability caused by unlimited resource allocation. An unauthenticated remote malicious user (or attacker) can issue requests against Spring Data REST endpoints or endpoints using property path parsing which can cause a denial of service (CPU and memory consumption). |
| Issue summary: Remote peer may exhaust heap memory of the QUIC
server or client by flooding it with packets containing PATH_CHALLENGE
frames.
Impact summary: A malicious remote peer can cause an unbounded
memory allocation which can lead to an abnormal termination of the
application acting as a QUIC client or server and a Denial of Service.
A remote peer may exhaust heap memory by flooding the local
QUIC stack with PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The local QUIC stack
allocates a PATH_RESPONSE frame for every PATH_CHALLENGE it receives.
The allocated PATH_RESPONSE frame gets freed only when the remote
peer acknowledges reception of the PATH_RESPONSE frame which will
not be done by a malicious peer.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by
this issue. The QUIC stack is outside of OpenSSL FIPS module
boundary. |
| In Apache ActiveMQ Artemis prior to 2.20.0 or 2.19.1, an attacker could partially disrupt availability (DoS) through uncontrolled resource consumption of memory. |
| An uncontrolled allocation of resources without limits or throttling in the e-mail handling in OTRS allows excessive allocation which may lead to the abortion of the webserver.This issue affects OTRS:
* 8.0.X
* 2023.X
* 2024.X
* 2025.X
* 2026.X before 2026.4.X
Please note that ((OTRS)) Community Edition 6.x, OTRS 7.x and products based on the ((OTRS)) Community Edition also very likely to be affected |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Netty HTTP/3 codec allows the creation of an infinite number of blocked streams, which can cause OOM error. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, RedisArrayAggregator pre-allocates ArrayList with initial capacity equal to the RESP array element count declared in an array header. That count is taken from the wire before the corresponding child messages exist. A small malicious header can claim a huge initial capacity. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-redis prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-redis prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without `\r\n`. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions of netty-transport-sctp prior to 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, for each non-complete SctpMessage fragment the handler does `fragments.put(streamId, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(frag, byteBuf))`, wrapping the previous accumulator and the new slice into a *new* CompositeByteBuf every time. After N fragments the accumulator is an N-deep chain of composites, each holding references and component arrays; readableBytes()/getBytes() on the final buffer recurse N levels. There is no limit on N, on total bytes, or on the number of streamIdentifiers an attacker can open (each gets its own map entry). A peer that never sets the `complete` flag can grow this structure indefinitely from tiny 1-byte DATA chunks. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 17.10 before 18.10.8, 18.11 before 18.11.5, and 19.0 before 19.0.2 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to cause denial of service due to uncontrolled resource consumption when processing a specially crafted file upload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix rlimit for posix cpu timers
Posix cpu timers requires an additional step beyond setting the rlimit.
Refactor the code so its clear when what code is setting the
limit and conditionally update the posix cpu timers when appropriate. |
