| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Path Traversal in DIAEnergie.
This issue affects DIAEnergie: before 1.11.00.022. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in DIAEnergie.
This issue affects DIAEnergie: before 1.11.00.022. |
| A remote code execution vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. Insufficient bounds validation in the AV1 encoder's SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control allows an attacker to supply crafted video frame pixels that overlap with internal encoder layer context structures. In fork-based video processing services, an attacker can use this to hijack the cyclic refresh map pointer, brute-force the process base address via a crash oracle, and redirect control flow to achieve arbitrary command execution. Exploitation requires the target service to use libaom with SVC encoding enabled and accept attacker-supplied video frames. |
| A heap-buffer-overflow read vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows setting a spatial_layer_id exceeding the configured number of layers. This causes an out-of-bounds heap read of approximately 40,728 bytes when computing a layer context array index. An attacker who can influence SVC encoder parameters in a network-facing service could exploit this for information disclosure (heap content leak) or denial of service (segmentation fault from hitting unmapped memory). |
| An arbitrary address write vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows an attacker to inject an arbitrary pointer into the cyclic refresh map field via crafted image pixel values. The encoder then writes approximately 1,200 bytes at the attacker-controlled address. This is fully deterministic and does not require a separate information leak. An attacker who can supply frames to a network-facing libaom encoder with SVC enabled could exploit this for denial of service or potential code execution. |
| A heap buffer overflow vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A flaw in the AV1 encoder's Look-Ahead Processing (LAP) mode causes the first-pass stats ring buffer wrap-around guard to be bypassed when g_lag_in_frames is set to 1 or higher. This results in a 232-byte out-of-bounds write on every encoded frame after the second, corrupting adjacent heap objects. An attacker who can influence encoder configuration in a transcoding service or WebRTC session could exploit this to cause a denial of service (process crash) or potentially achieve code execution. |
| A flaw was found in the Level of Authentication enforcement mechanism of Keycloak, an identity and access management solution. The issue occurs when a client specifically requires a higher security level for a user who already has an active session at a lower level. Due to a logic error in how session re-evaluations are handled, Keycloak may incorrectly issue a token at the lower security level instead of enforcing the required higher level, potentially allowing unauthorized access to sensitive resources that rely on these security claims. |
| A flaw was found in the user update mechanism of the Keycloak Admin REST API. When Fine-Grained Admin Permissions are enabled, the system fails to check for specific password reset authorizations during a general user profile update. This allows a delegated administrator, who should be restricted from resetting passwords, to change a user's credentials and take over their account. |
| Out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the graphics module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect availability. |
| LaunchConfigurationBaseSerializer.scm_branch has no
validate_scm_branch() leading-dash check, unlike
Project/JobTemplate/JobLaunch serializers. Schedule and
WFJT Node accept --upload-pack=/bin/id as scm_branch.
Currently blocked at runtime by jobs.py:1502 ValueError
check (defense-in-depth), but the API validation gap
means sole reliance on a task-layer guard. Refactoring
that guard away would promote this to RCE. |
| RunAdHocCommand.build_args() appends limit as bare
positional (args.append(limit)) instead of using
args.extend(['-l', limit]) like RunJob. A limit beginning
with - is parsed as an ansible CLI option. Currently
limited to short-circuit flags (--version, --help) since
injected element displaces required pattern positional.
Would escalate if ansible-core ever defaults pattern. |
| Notification template Jinja AST whitelist only inspects
static Getattr nodes. Dynamic subscripts (job['job'+'_env'])
and {% if job.id > 100 %} conditional gating bypass both
the AST check and the test-render (stub has small job.id).
At runtime, the gated branch executes and exceptions write
full tracebacks into notification body, which is POSTed
to attacker-controlled webhook URL. Leaks install paths,
Python version, source line numbers. |
| A server-side request forgery flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform
automation-controller email notification backend. The email backend passes the user-supplied SMTP
host and port from a notification template directly to the SMTP client without validating that
the target is not an internal, loopback, link-local, or reserved address. An authenticated user
with organization notification-admin permission can create or modify an email notification
template pointing at an arbitrary internal address, trigger a test, and have the controller task
process open a raw TCP connection to that address. The resulting connection error is reflected
back through the notification record, providing a three-state internal port-scan oracle (open,
closed, filtered) over the control-plane's cluster network, including the in-cluster Kubernetes
API. When a shared organization template holds a stored SMTP password, redirecting the host can
also cause that credential to be transmitted to an attacker-controlled server. |
| An argument-injection flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller
system-job subsystem. The system-job template launch endpoint stores a user-supplied "days"
variable without running the integer validation defined elsewhere for that field, and the
dispatcher flattens the management-command argument list into a single string with spaces before
the job runner re-splits it, so spaces in the value become additional command-line arguments.
Because system jobs are executed in-process on the control node without the container isolation
applied to all other job types, an authenticated user with superuser privileges can inject
arbitrary arguments — including Python's path option — into the control-plane awx-manage process,
controlling its argument vector and the first entry of its module search path. Full remote code
execution requires an additional import gadget that is not present in the current management
commands, so the demonstrated impact is argument injection with control of the process search
path rather than confirmed code execution. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The
WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, which stores the raw merged set_stats
artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is therefore
accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from
the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied,
a user with only read access to a workflow — or, via a regular-expression lookup that bypasses
the JSON cross-relation filter guard through the world-readable credential-types endpoint, any
authenticated user with no roles — can use the result count as a boolean/count oracle to recover,
character by character, secret values that a playbook author explicitly marked no_log, including
across organizations. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. In the shipped
production configuration, the Controller trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header as
the request's client IP without verifying that it originated from a trusted proxy, and selects
the leftmost (attacker-controlled) header value. As a result, an attacker can forge the source
IP address recorded for their requests in the Controller's audit and access logs, degrading
the integrity of forensic and SIEM attribution. The flaw does not grant additional access. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The unauthenticated
Bitbucket Data Center webhook receiver skips HMAC signature verification for diagnostics:ping
events after it has already looked up the target template, causing the endpoint to return HTTP
200 for a template that has a Bitbucket DC webhook configured and HTTP 403 otherwise. An
unauthenticated remote attacker can use this response discrepancy as an oracle to enumerate
which Job Template and Workflow Job Template IDs have Bitbucket DC webhooks configured, without
knowing the secret webhook_key. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller instance
install-bundle endpoint. When a System Administrator downloads
an execution/hop node's install bundle, the controller signs an
X.509 certificate with the receptor mesh certificate authority
in which the Common Name, DNS subject-alternative-name, and
receptor node-id are taken verbatim from the caller-chosen
instance hostname, with a hard-coded ten-year validity, a random
serial, and no issuance log or revocation list. Because the
hostname charset validator is case-insensitive while the
uniqueness validator is case-sensitive, an administrator can
register a case variant of an existing control node's hostname
and obtain a mesh-CA-signed certificate that TLS peers, which
match hostnames case-insensitively, accept as that control node.
In managed/hosted deployments — where the customer holds
controller superuser but the platform operator runs the mesh —
this yields a long-lived, non-revocable mesh peer credential and,
with an on-path position, TLS impersonation or interception of
control/hybrid mesh nodes. It does not grant direct remote code
execution, because receptor work submission is gated by a
separate signing key not included in the bundle. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller notification
subsystem. Although NotificationTemplate.notification_
configuration is protected from API filtering, its recipient
value is copied in clear text into the unprotected
Notification.recipients field on every send. Because the
credential-types endpoint is listable by any authenticated
user and the API filter backend traverses object relations
without per-hop authorization, a user with no privileges can
use a relational filter as a boolean count-oracle to recover,
character by character and across organizations, the secret
recipient values of other tenants' notifications — including
PagerDuty service keys and Slack/Mattermost/RocketChat/Webhook
bearer-token URLs. This flaw affects confidentiality. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller API. The
unauthenticated health-check endpoint /api/v2/ping/
(ApiV2PingView, AllowAny) over-serializes RBAC-gated
automation-mesh data into its anonymous response, exposing the
full instance inventory (node hostnames, node types, UUIDs,
heartbeats, capacities, and exact versions), all instance-group
names and membership, the deployment install UUID, and the
active control node. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use
this to map the control plane and fingerprint software versions
for targeted attacks. This flaw affects confidentiality only;
it does not expose secrets, credentials, or tenant data. |
