| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: iris: Fix use-after-free in iris_release_internal_buffers()
The recent change in commit 1dabf00ee206 ("media: iris: gen1: Destroy
internal buffers after FW releases") introduced a regression where
session_release_buf() may free the buffer. The caller,
iris_release_internal_buffers(), continued to access `buffer` after the
call, leading to a potential use-after-free.
Fix this by setting BUF_ATTR_PENDING_RELEASE before calling
session_release_buf(), and reverting the flag if the call fails. This
ensures no dereference occurs after potential freeing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: mpc52xx: fix use-after-free on registration failure
Make sure to disable and free the interrupts in case controller
registration fails to avoid a potential use-after-free and resource
leak.
This issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing a controller
deregistration fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Remove user triggerable WARN_ON() in mana_ib_create_qp_rss()
Sashiko points out that the user can specify WQs sharing the same CQ as a
part of the uAPI and this will trigger the WARN_ON() then go on to corrupt
the kernel.
Just reject it outright and fail the QP creation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix slab-out-of-bounds access in auth message processing
If a (potentially corrupted) message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY
contains a positive value in its result field, it is treated as an
error code by ceph_handle_auth_reply() and returned to
handle_auth_reply(). Thereafter, an attempt is made to send the
preallocated message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH, where the returned value is
interpreted as the size of the front segment to send. If the result
value in the message is greater than the size of the memory buffer
allocated for the front segment, an out-of-bounds access occurs, and
the content of the memory region beyond this buffer is sent out.
This patch fixes the issue by treating only negative values in the
result field as errors. Positive values are therefore treated as success
in the same way as a zero value. Additionally, a BUG_ON is added to
__send_prepared_auth_request() comparing the len parameter to
front_alloc_len to prevent sending the message if it exceeds the bounds
of the allocation and to make it easier to catch any logic flaws leading
to this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ocrdma: Don't NULL deref uctx on errors in ocrdma_copy_pd_uresp()
Sashiko points out that pd->uctx isn't initialized until late in the
function so all these error flow references are NULL and will crash. Use
the uctx that isn't NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing
Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC
before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet
can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only
for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown
opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit
and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.
The check added there reads
pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The
rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB
opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so
length == 0 and the check degenerates to
pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes
rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES
which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(),
causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.
Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with
CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after
rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0
A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and
QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170
Read of size 1 at addr ...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region
Call Trace:
crc32_le+0x115/0x170
rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300
rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0
rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0
rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0
Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic
the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no
QP, no connection, and no authentication.
Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry,
detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for
a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each
iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis
before the array access.
When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer
bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG,
or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex
array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values
typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle()
rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same
connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(),
creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held.
Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup
properly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: use kzalloc to zero-initialize security descriptor buffer
Commit 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces
to le16") split struct smb_acl's __le32 num_aces field into __le16
num_aces and __le16 reserved. The reserved field corresponds to Sbz2
in the MS-DTYP ACL wire format, which must be zero [1].
When building an ACL descriptor in build_sec_desc(), we are using a
kmalloc()'ed descriptor buffer and writing the fields explicitly using
le16() writes now. This never writes to the 2 byte reserved field,
leaving it as uninitialized heap data.
When the reserved field happens to contain non-zero slab garbage,
Samba rejects the security descriptor with "ndr_pull_security_descriptor
failed: Range Error", causing chmod to fail with EINVAL.
Change kmalloc() to kzalloc() to ensure the entire buffer is
zero-initialized.
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/20233ed8-a6c6-4097-aafa-dd545ed24428 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: use safe list iteration in radar detect work
The call to ieee80211_dfs_cac_cancel can cause the iterated chanctx to
be freed and removed from the list. Guard against this to avoid a
slab-use-after-free error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests
The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the
BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are
done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time.
In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the
hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver
needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn
bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between
flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck.
This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad
BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop
saying it has data.
This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug
per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq()
Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error
unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in symlink_data()
Since smb2_check_message() returns success without length validation for
the symlink error response, in symlink_data() it is possible for
iov->iov_len to be smaller than sizeof(struct smb2_err_rsp). If the buffer
only contains the base SMB2 header (64 bytes), accessing
err->ErrorContextCount (at offset 66) or err->ByteCount later in
symlink_data() will cause an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: fix integer overflow on buff_pos
Fixing an integer overflow present in batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if. The size
check is done using the int type in batadv_iv_ogm_aggr_packet whereas the
buff_pos variable uses the s16 type. This could lead to an out-of-bound
read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()
drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions
using plain integer division:
unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1);
unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1);
However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses
drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via
DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object
size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations.
For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the
GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The
expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int,
causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny
GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses
the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object's
bounds.
Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width()
and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match
the calculation already used in framebuffer_check(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/gem: fix error handling in msm_ioctl_gem_info_get_metadata()
msm_ioctl_gem_info_get_metadata() always returns 0 regardless of
errors. When copy_to_user() fails or the user buffer is too small,
the error code stored in ret is ignored because the function
unconditionally returns 0. This causes userspace to believe the
ioctl succeeded when it did not.
Additionally, kmemdup() can return NULL on allocation failure, but
the return value is not checked. This leads to a NULL pointer
dereference in the subsequent copy_to_user() call.
Add the missing NULL check for kmemdup() and return ret instead of 0.
Note that the SET counterpart (msm_ioctl_gem_info_set_metadata)
correctly returns ret.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/714478/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path
Commit 38224c472a03 ("HID: appletb-kbd: fix slab use-after-free bug in
appletb_kbd_probe") added timer_delete_sync(&kbd->inactivity_timer) to
both the probe close_hw error path and appletb_kbd_remove(), but the
way it was wired in left the inactivity timer reachable during driver
tear-down via two distinct windows.
Window A -- put_device() before timer_delete_sync():
put_device(&kbd->backlight_dev->dev);
timer_delete_sync(&kbd->inactivity_timer);
The inactivity_timer softirq reads kbd->backlight_dev and calls
backlight_device_set_brightness() -> mutex_lock(&ops_lock). If a
concurrent hid_appletb_bl unbind drops the last devm reference
between these two calls, the backlight_device is freed and the
mutex_lock() touches freed memory.
Window B -- backlight cleanup before hid_hw_stop():
if (kbd->backlight_dev) {
timer_delete_sync(...);
put_device(...);
}
hid_hw_close(hdev);
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
Even after Window A is closed, hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() still run
afterwards, so a late ".event" callback from the HID core (USB URB
completion on real Apple hardware) can arrive after
timer_delete_sync() drained the softirq but before put_device() drops
the reference. That callback reaches reset_inactivity_timer(), which
calls mod_timer() and re-arms the timer. The freshly re-armed timer
can then fire on the about-to-be-freed backlight_device.
Both windows produce the same KASAN slab-use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x1aab/0x21c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88803ee9a108 by task swapper/0/0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__mutex_lock
backlight_device_set_brightness
appletb_inactivity_timer
call_timer_fn
run_timer_softirq
handle_softirqs
Allocated by task N:
devm_backlight_device_register
appletb_bl_probe
Freed by task M:
(concurrent hid_appletb_bl unbind path)
Close both windows at once by reworking the tear-down in
appletb_kbd_remove() and in the probe close_hw error path so that
1) hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() run before the backlight cleanup,
guaranteeing no further .event callback can fire and re-arm the
timer, and
2) inside the "if (kbd->backlight_dev)" block, timer_delete_sync()
runs before put_device(), so the softirq is drained before the
final reference is dropped. |
| Insufficient validation of untrusted input in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: Fix stack-out-of-bounds in is_bprm_creds_for_exec()
KASAN reported a stack-out-of-bounds access in ima_appraise_measurement
from is_bprm_creds_for_exec:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ima_appraise_measurement+0x12dc/0x16a0
Read of size 1 at addr ffffc9000160f940 by task sudo/550
The buggy address belongs to stack of task sudo/550
and is located at offset 24 in frame:
ima_appraise_measurement+0x0/0x16a0
This frame has 2 objects:
[48, 56) 'file'
[80, 148) 'hash'
This is caused by using container_of on the *file pointer. This offset
calculation is what triggers the stack-out-of-bounds error.
In order to fix this, pass in a bprm_is_check boolean which can be set
depending on how process_measurement is called. If the caller has a
linux_binprm pointer and the function is BPRM_CHECK we can determine
is_check and set it then. Otherwise set it to false. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()
Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all
circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making
all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go
through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all
the releases skip on a NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly. |
