| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: Avoid buffer overread in ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx()
Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx(), the firmware buffer is read
without first verifying that the buffer has enough data to hold a
header. This could result in a buffer overread.
Add an upfront length check before dereferencing skb->data as a
wmi_cmd_hdr. The check is placed before the trace_ath11k_wmi_event()
call to preserve the existing trace semantics (tracing the full raw
WMI event including the header), unlike the analogous ath12k fix which
could use skb_pull_data() directly.
Compile tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: clear stale xarray tags on folios skipped during writeback
In data=journal mode, the writeback thread can hit the
WARN_ON_ONCE(sb_rdonly(sb)) in ext4_journal_check_start() while the
superblock is being remounted read-only during reboot:
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
RIP: 0010:ext4_journal_check_start+0x8b/0xd0
Call Trace:
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x3c/0x1e0
mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x4af/0x580
ext4_do_writepages+0x3c0/0x1080
ext4_writepages+0xc8/0x1a0
do_writepages+0xc4/0x180
__writeback_single_inode+0x45/0x2f0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x26b/0x5d0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x54/0x100
wb_writeback+0x1ac/0x320
wb_workfn+0x394/0x470
And followed by the warning:
EXT4-fs warning (device vda1): ext4_evict_inode:195: inode #6263:
comm (sd-umount): data will be lost
This issue is not reproduced every time, but frequently.
The reproduction step is to create a VM with 8 CPUs, 16G memory and
setup data=journal:
sudo tune2fs -o journal_data /dev/vda1
Run fio:
rm -f fiotest
fio --name=fiotest --rw=randwrite --bs=4k --runtime=6 --ioengine=libaio
--iodepth=256 --numjobs=8 --filename=fiotest --filesize=30G
--group_reporting
Reboot the VM, and check the console output from:
virsh console testvm
But there is no dirty inode, folio_clear_dirty_for_io clears PG_dirty
but leaves tags PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY and PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE set which
are only cleared by __folio_start_writeback.
In data=journal mode, jbd2 checkpoints the journalled data to its final
location and clears its own dirty flag without touching folio PG_dirty
or xarray dirty flags.
The commit f4a2b42e7891 ("ext4: fix stale xarray tags after writeback")
fixes when PG_dirty is still set but there is no dirty page.
Another case is PG_dirty is cleared, but PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY and
PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE is still set. In this case, writeback thread
checks clean folio and skips it in mpage_prepare_extent_to_map:
if (!folio_test_dirty(folio) ||
...
folio_unlcok(folio);
continue
And never reaches ext4_bio_write_folio where the commit f4a2b42e7891
clears the stale xarray tags. Print debug logs after the filesystem
is remounted read-only:
writepages RDONLY nrpages=2048 dirtytag=1 wbtag=0 towrite=1 sync=0
And all folios are actually clean:
folio idx=3 dirty=0 wb=0 checked=0 dirtybuf=0 jbddirty=0 mapped=1
...
We need to clear the xarray stale tags for such clean folios by
cycling them through writeback in the skip path, the same way
f4a2b42e7891 does in ext4_bio_write_folio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix ABBA deadlock in ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find()
Syzbot/stress-ng reported an ABBA deadlock in ext4 when exercising
concurrent xattr workloads (using the ea_inode mount/format option).
The deadlock occurs between the running transaction and the eviction
thread:
- Task 1 (stress-ng): Holds a reference to a shared mbcache_entry (ce)
and calls ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find() -> ext4_iget() to retrieve
the corresponding EA inode. Since the EA inode is currently being
evicted, ext4_iget() blocks in __wait_on_freeing_inode() waiting for
eviction to complete.
- Task 2 (eviction thread): Currently evicting the same EA inode in
ext4_evict_ea_inode(). It calls mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe) which
blocks waiting for Task 1 to release the reference to the mbcache_entry.
To break this deadlock, implement a new ext4_iget() configuration flag
named EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT. When set, perform a non-blocking lookup of the
inode via VFS's find_inode_nowait() API.
If the inode is currently being evicted (marked with I_FREEING or
I_WILL_FREE) or created (I_CREATING), or if it is not present in the VFS
inode cache (cache miss), simply skip it (returning -ENOENT) rather than
waiting for eviction/creation to complete, breaking the ABBA cycle.
Since we return -ENOENT immediately on a cache miss, we never attempt to
allocate a new inode or call iget_locked(), completely eliminating any
TOCTOU race window.
If the returned inode is I_NEW, wait for its initialization to clear via
wait_on_new_inode(). If initialization fails and the inode is unhashed
during wait_on_new_inode() waking up (e.g., due to an I/O read error in
another thread), safely drop the reference and return -ENOENT. This
unhashed check is executed unconditionally on all cache-hit pathways to
properly handle concurrent initialization failures.
Finally, standard validation checks (including is_bad_inode,
EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, file_acl, and xattr flags) are executed as normal inside
check_igot_inode() to fully guarantee VFS-layer safety.
In ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find(), invoke ext4_iget() with the new
EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT flag to perform the non-blocking cache search. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix requested device removal race
scmi_protocol_device_unrequest() drops scmi_requested_devices_mtx while
notifying listeners but continues to retain the per-protocol list head.
When two SCMI drivers for the same protocol unregister concurrently, one
thread can remove the final request and free the list head while the other
is running its notifier. The latter then dereferences the freed list head
after reacquiring the mutex and can free it a second time.
Complete the list and IDR updates, including freeing an empty list head,
before dropping the mutex. Keep the blocking notifier outside the critical
section and retain only the detached request across the callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Fix potential use after free in ib_destroy_cq_user()
When accessing a CQ via the netlink path the only synchronization
mechanism for the said CQ is rdma_restrack_get().
Currently, rdma_restrack_del() is invoked at the end of
ib_destroy_cq_user(), which is too late, since by that point
vendor-specific resources associated with the CQ might already be
freed. This can leave a short window where the CQ remains accessible
through restrack, leading to a potential use-after-free.
Fix this by moving the rdma_restrack_begin_del() call to the start of
ib_destroy_cq_user(), ensuring that the CQ is removed from restrack
before its internal resources are released. This guarantees that no new
users hold references to a CQ that is in the process of destruction.
In addition, this change preserves the intended inverted order
between create and destroy routines: resources are added to
restrack at the end of successful creation, and hence shall be removed
from the restrack first thing during the destruction flow, which keeps
the lifecycle management consistent and predictable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Fix use after free in ib_query_qp()
When querying a QP via the netlink flow the only synchronization
mechanism for the said QP is rdma_restrack_get(), meanwhile during the
QP destroy path rdma_restrack_del() is called at the end of the
ib_destroy_qp_user() function which is too late, since by then the
vendor specific resources for said QP would already be destroyed, and
till the rdma_restrack_del() is called this QP can still be accessed,
which could cause the use after free below.
Fix this by moving the rdma_restrack_begin_del() to the start of the
ib_destroy_qp_user(), which in turn waits for all usages of the QP to be
done then removes it from the database to prevent access to it while it
is being destroyed.
RIP: 0010:ib_query_qp+0x15/0x50 [ib_core]
Code: 48 83 05 5d 8e b9 ff 01 eb b5 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c7 46 40 00 00 00 00 48 c7 46 78 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 88 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 1a 48 83 05 54 91 b9 ff
RSP: 0018:ff11000108a8f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff11000108a8f370 RCX: ff11000108a8f370
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff11000108a8f3d8 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ff1100010de5a000 R08: 0000000000000e80 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ff110001057a604c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff11000108a8f370
R13: ff110001090e8000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff110001057a602c
FS: 00007f2ffd8db6c0(0000) GS:ff110008dc90b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010b9a7004 CR4: 0000000000373eb0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_ib_gsi_query_qp+0x21/0x50 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_query_qp+0x689/0x9d0 [mlx5_ib]
ib_query_qp+0x35/0x50 [ib_core]
fill_res_qp_entry_query.isra.0+0x47/0x280 [ib_core]
? __wake_up+0x40/0x50
? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x15a/0x550
? kobject_uevent_env+0x562/0x710
? ep_poll_callback+0x242/0x270
? __nla_put+0xc/0x20
? nla_put+0x28/0x40
? nla_put_string+0x2e/0x40 [ib_core]
fill_res_qp_entry+0x138/0x190 [ib_core]
res_get_common_dumpit+0x4a5/0x800 [ib_core]
? fill_res_qp_entry_query.isra.0+0x280/0x280 [ib_core]
nldev_res_get_qp_dumpit+0x1e/0x30 [ib_core]
netlink_dump+0x16f/0x450
__netlink_dump_start+0x1ce/0x2e0
rdma_nl_rcv_msg+0x1d3/0x330 [ib_core]
? nldev_res_get_qp_raw_dumpit+0x30/0x30 [ib_core]
rdma_nl_rcv_skb.constprop.0.isra.0+0x108/0x180 [ib_core]
rdma_nl_rcv+0x12/0x20 [ib_core]
netlink_unicast+0x255/0x380
? __alloc_skb+0xfa/0x1e0
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f3/0x420
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x230
? copy_msghdr_from_user+0xea/0x170
___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xb0
? __futex_wait+0x95/0xf0
? __futex_wake_mark+0x40/0x40
? futex_wait+0x67/0x100
? futex_wake+0xac/0x1b0
__sys_sendmsg+0x5f/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0xb90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana_ib: drain QP references after partial table insertion
mana_table_store_ud_qp() publishes a QP at its send-queue id before
inserting the receive-queue id, dropping the XArray lock between the two
xa_insert_irq() calls. A concurrent completion handler can look up the QP
and take a transient reference. When the second insertion fails, the
rollback erased only the send-queue entry and returned, leaving both the
initial table reference and the transient reference outstanding while RDMA
core frees the QP, causing a use-after-free.
Drain the reference as normal destruction does: drop the initial reference
and wait for qp->free, releasing the QP only after every concurrent lookup
returns its reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve unique-field state across nested structs
btf_find_struct_field() initializes a fresh seen mask for every recursive
descent. Unique special fields in different levels of the same aggregate
therefore do not see one another. The duplicate fields can reach
btf_parse_fields(), where they trigger an invariant WARN_ON_ONCE(). A
crafted user BTF can consequently trigger the warning before map creation
checks capabilities.
Initialize the seen mask once in btf_find_field() and pass the same pointer
through struct, datasec, and nested-struct walks. This gives the entire field
traversal one shared uniqueness state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv, bpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_jit_free
When bpf_int_jit_compile() is called for subprograms, it returns early
during the first pass (!prog->is_func || extra_pass is false), keeping
ctx->offset alive for the subsequent extra pass.
If JIT compilation fails for a later subprogram, the BPF core aborts
and calls bpf_jit_free() to clean up the first subprogram. However,
bpf_jit_free() fails to free jit_data->ctx.offset, which causes a
memory leak of the JIT context offsets array.
Fix this by adding the missing kfree(jit_data->ctx.offset) in
bpf_jit_free(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: processor: validate MADT IOAPIC entry bounds
The IOAPIC hotplug lookup parses both MADT and _MAT records directly.
The MADT walk previously used a subtable's declared length to advance
the cursor after only locating a generic header. The _MAT path likewise
passed a generic header to the IOAPIC helper.
Validate that a current record has a complete generic header, that its
declared length is contained in the available record range, and that a
typed IOAPIC record contains the full fixed IOAPIC body before reading
its fields. Use the same relation for both MADT and _MAT provider
paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in
the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login
PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then
reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in
iscsi_target_locate_portal(),
payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength);
tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);
and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from
iscsi_target_do_login().
login->req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so
an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it,
before authentication and with the length under its control:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180
iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350
Allocated by task 167:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
allocated 8192-byte region
Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the
same buffer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50
Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0
iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470
iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0
iscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the
declared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads
exactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs
how much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled
buffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all.
Reject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was
received, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req():
isert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done()
for the ones after it. dlength <= login_req_len is allowed because the
received count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding.
Once the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in:
the posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot
exceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is
login_req_len.
Like the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in
isert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a
malformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login
timer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an
error and fails straight away.
Reproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an
initiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in
the BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The
reported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440
behave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths,
patched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal
login still completes on the patched build. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:
isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
unsol_data_len);
isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);
Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.
Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:
- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
used here for the inbound check.
- iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is
adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively
raises its own ceiling.
- isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive
descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and
the descriptor size are unrelated.
The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases
the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as
the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap
contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the
backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist
isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was
demonstrated.
Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has
declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that
permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment
length exceeds what was received. With KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25
Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work
Call Trace:
sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390
__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390
ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150
isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout()
(ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode().
Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the
PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short.
Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also
rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise
be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs
shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login
PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared
length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no
length check at all.
isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data()
returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for
an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly
[ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum
against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS
term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: free STAG index when TPT entry write fails
write_tpt_entry() allocates a new STAG index with c4iw_get_resource() and
bumps stats.stag.cur before programming the entry. When
write_adapter_mem() fails, it returns the error without releasing the index
or reversing the statistic. No MR is inserted into rhp->mrs, so
deregistration never reclaims it, leaking the index until device teardown.
Record whether this call allocated the index and, on a failed write, return
it to tpt_table and decrement stats.stag.cur. Key the rollback on both the
write error and that flag, not the error alone: a non-reset update carries
a caller-owned STAG that this call did not allocate and must not free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: dw-edma: Serialize abort state updates
dw_edma_abort_interrupt() drops vc.lock before changing request and
status. issue_pending() can acquire the lock in that small window,
observe the old busy state, and skip starting queued descriptors. Then
the abort handler overwrites the channel status as idle, leaving the new
descriptors stranded for good.
Keep descriptor completion and the state transition in the same critical
section. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix UAF in ODP init error-handling path
rxe_odp_mr_init_user() stores &umem_odp->umem in mr->umem before
calling rxe_odp_init_pages(). If rxe_odp_init_pages() fails,
rxe_odp_mr_init_user() releases umem_odp and returns an error.
rxe_reg_user_mr() then unwinds the error through rxe_cleanup(),
rxe_mr_cleanup(), ib_umem_release(mr->umem). There is an
IS_ERR_OR_NULL(umem) check at the start of ib_umem_release().
But since mr->umem is NOT reset to NULL in the error handling
path of rxe_odp_mr_init_user(), the check passes and it reads
already-freed fields like umem->is_dmabuf, causing UAF.
Fix the UAF by clearing mr->umem after releasing the failed
ODP umem so the MR cleanup path does not release it again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Free the error IRQ before tearing down VINTFs
tegra241_cmdqv_remove() tears each VINTF down first, then calls free_irq().
Tearing a VINTF down frees vintf0 and clears cmdqv->vintfs[0]. An error in
that window makes tegra241_cmdqv_isr() read the stale slot and hand it to
tegra241_vintf0_handle_error(), which dereferences a NULL or freed pointer.
Free the IRQ before tearing the VINTFs down. free_irq() waits for in-flight
handlers to finish and blocks new ones, so no ISR can observe a VINTF as it
is torn down.
Note: a user-owned VINTF (viommu) could outlive this teardown, which unmaps
cmdqv->base and frees cmdqv->vintfs, so a later viommu close then touches
freed memory. This is neither introduced nor fixed here: a physical IOMMU
is not a pluggable device, so iommufd by design holds no reference on the
one behind a viommu, and this teardown is not expected while that viommu is
still alive. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Don't run the error ISR before probe sets up vintfs
__tegra241_cmdqv_probe() requests the error IRQ before it has allocated the
cmdqv->vintfs array and set cmdqv->num_vintfs. A CMDQV left enabled with a
latched error across a kexec fires the IRQ as soon as it is requested, and
tegra241_cmdqv_isr() then walks the uninitialized cmdqv->vintfs array.
Request the IRQ only after cmdqv->vintfs is allocated and zeroed, so that
a latched interrupt firing early runs the ISR against a valid array of NULL
slots that it safely skips. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Validate connected lane counts
The connected lane count is used by TX equalization code to index arrays
sized by UFS_MAX_LANES. Reject zero and out-of-range RX or TX lane counts
before they can be propagated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Validate string descriptors
The string descriptor length includes a two-byte header while the UTF-16
payload starts after it. utf16s_to_utf8s() expects a count of UTF-16 code
units, not bytes. Passing the payload byte count can make it read beyond
the descriptor buffer.
Validate that the payload has an even byte count, pass a code-unit count to
the converter, and allocate sufficient UTF-8 output space.
The raw string buffer starts after the descriptor header but its size is
bLength. Copying bLength bytes from that pointer can read beyond the
response buffer.
Allocate a zeroed bLength-sized buffer and copy only the UTF-16
payload. This preserves the raw buffer size consumed by the RPMB device-ID
ABI while avoiding the overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: mediatek: free EINT resources on unbind
mtk_eint_do_init() creates an IRQ domain, populates it with a mapping for
every EINT line and installs a chained handler on the parent interrupt,
but none of these are ever released. This was harmless while the drivers
were built-in, but now that they can be built as modules and
unbound/rmmod'd it leaves behind a dangling IRQ domain, interrupt mappings
whose chip data points at freed memory, and a chained handler that keeps
firing into that freed data.
The plain allocations in mtk_eint_do_init() already use the device-managed
devm_*() helpers, so tear the remaining resources down the same way:
register a devm action that detaches the chained handler, waits for any
in-flight handler to finish, disposes of the per-line mappings and removes
the IRQ domain. This mirrors the device-managed lifecycle adopted for the
GPIO chip and keeps the whole EINT setup self-cleaning on unbind. |
