| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ac97: Fix possible NULL dereference in snd_ac97_mixer
smatch error:
sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c:2354 snd_ac97_mixer() error:
we previously assumed 'rac97' could be null (see line 2072)
remove redundant assignment, return error if rac97 is NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't dereference ACPI root object handle
Since the commit referenced in the Fixes: tag below the VMBus client driver
is walking the ACPI namespace up from the VMBus ACPI device to the ACPI
namespace root object trying to find Hyper-V MMIO ranges.
However, if it is not able to find them it ends trying to walk resources of
the ACPI namespace root object itself.
This object has all-ones handle, which causes a NULL pointer dereference
in the ACPI code (from dereferencing this pointer with an offset).
This in turn causes an oops on boot with VMBus host implementations that do
not provide Hyper-V MMIO ranges in their VMBus ACPI device or its
ancestors.
The QEMU VMBus implementation is an example of such implementation.
I guess providing these ranges is optional, since all tested Windows
versions seem to be able to use VMBus devices without them.
Fix this by explicitly terminating the lookup at the ACPI namespace root
object.
Note that Linux guests under KVM/QEMU do not use the Hyper-V PV interface
by default - they only do so if the KVM PV interface is missing or
disabled.
Example stack trace of such oops:
[ 3.710827] ? __die+0x1f/0x60
[ 3.715030] ? page_fault_oops+0x159/0x460
[ 3.716008] ? exc_page_fault+0x73/0x170
[ 3.716959] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 3.717957] ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x7a/0x4b0
[ 3.718898] ? acpi_ns_internalize_name+0x79/0xc0
[ 3.720018] acpi_ns_get_node_unlocked+0xb5/0xe0
[ 3.721120] ? acpi_ns_check_object_type+0xfe/0x200
[ 3.722285] ? acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource+0x37/0x6e0
[ 3.723559] ? down_timeout+0x3a/0x60
[ 3.724455] ? acpi_ns_get_node+0x3a/0x60
[ 3.725412] acpi_ns_get_node+0x3a/0x60
[ 3.726335] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1c3/0x2c0
[ 3.727295] acpi_ut_evaluate_object+0x64/0x1b0
[ 3.728400] acpi_rs_get_method_data+0x2b/0x70
[ 3.729476] ? vmbus_platform_driver_probe+0x1d0/0x1d0 [hv_vmbus]
[ 3.730940] ? vmbus_platform_driver_probe+0x1d0/0x1d0 [hv_vmbus]
[ 3.732411] acpi_walk_resources+0x78/0xd0
[ 3.733398] vmbus_platform_driver_probe+0x9f/0x1d0 [hv_vmbus]
[ 3.734802] platform_probe+0x3d/0x90
[ 3.735684] really_probe+0x19b/0x400
[ 3.736570] ? __device_attach_driver+0x100/0x100
[ 3.737697] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x160
[ 3.738746] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[ 3.739743] __driver_attach+0xc2/0x1b0
[ 3.740671] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0
[ 3.741601] bus_add_driver+0x10e/0x210
[ 3.742527] driver_register+0x55/0xf0
[ 3.744412] ? 0xffffffffc039a000
[ 3.745207] hv_acpi_init+0x3c/0x1000 [hv_vmbus] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/perf: add sentinel to xehp_oa_b_counters
Arrays passed to reg_in_range_table should end with empty record.
The patch solves KASAN detected bug with signature:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in xehp_is_valid_b_counter_addr+0x2c7/0x350 [i915]
Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffa1555d90 by task perf/1518
CPU: 4 PID: 1518 Comm: perf Tainted: G U 6.4.0-kasan_438-g3303d06107f3+ #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation Meteor Lake Client Platform/MTL-P DDR5 SODIMM SBS RVP, BIOS MTLPFWI1.R00.3223.D80.2305311348 05/31/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
xehp_is_valid_b_counter_addr+0x2c7/0x350 [i915]
(cherry picked from commit 2f42c5afb34b5696cf5fe79e744f99be9b218798) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs
This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.
Consider the following program:
n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&mapval, NULL);
/* skip error checking */
bpf_spin_lock(&l);
if(bpf_rbtree_add(&t, &n->rb, less)) {
bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
/* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
}
bpf_spin_unlock(&l);
It's incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn't
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node's lifetime. Therefore
the node's refcount can be decr'd to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free'd, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.
Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complaint from the kernel (without this patch's changes):
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 207 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
CPU: 1 PID: 207 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O 6.3.0-rc7-02231-g723de1a718a2-dirty #371
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
Code: 6f 64 f6 02 01 e8 84 a3 5c ff 0f 0b eb 9d 80 3d 5e 64 f6 02 00 75 94 48 c7 c7 e0 13 d2 82 c6 05 4e 64 f6 02 01 e8 64 a3 5c ff <0f> 0b e9 7a ff ff ff 80 3d 38 64 f6 02 00 0f 85 6d ff ff ff 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffff88810b9179b0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000202 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff857c3680
RBP: ffff88810027d3c0 R08: ffffffff8125f2a4 R09: ffff88810b9176e7
R10: ffffed1021722edc R11: 746e756f63666572 R12: ffff88810027d388
R13: ffff88810027d3c0 R14: ffffc900005fe030 R15: ffffc900005fe048
FS: 00007fee0584a700(0000) GS:ffff88811b280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005634a96f6c58 CR3: 0000000108ce9002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_refcount_acquire_impl+0xb5/0xc0
(rest of output snipped)
The patch addresses this by changing bpf_refcount_acquire_impl to use
refcount_inc_not_zero instead of refcount_inc and marking
bpf_refcount_acquire KF_RET_NULL.
For owning references, though, we know the above scenario is not possible
and thus that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed. Some verifier
bookkeeping is added to track "is input owning ref?" for bpf_refcount_acquire
calls and return false from is_kfunc_ret_null for bpf_refcount_acquire on
owning refs despite it being marked KF_RET_NULL.
Existing selftests using bpf_refcount_acquire are modified where
necessary to NULL-check its return value.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230415201811.343116-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: radio-shark: Add endpoint checks
The syzbot fuzzer was able to provoke a WARNING from the radio-shark2
driver:
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3271 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3271 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Code: 7c 24 18 e8 00 36 ea fb 48 8b 7c 24 18 e8 36 1c 02 ff 41 89 d8 44 89 e1 4c 89 ea 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 a0 b6 90 8a e8 9a 29 b8 03 <0f> 0b e9 58 f8 ff ff e8 d2 35 ea fb 48 81 c5 c0 05 00 00 e9 84 f7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003876dd0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880750b0040 RSI: ffffffff816152b8 RDI: fffff5200070edac
RBP: ffff8880172d81e0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8880285c5040 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff888017158200
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe03235b90 CR3: 000000000bc8e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usb_start_wait_urb+0x101/0x4b0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:58
usb_bulk_msg+0x226/0x550 drivers/usb/core/message.c:387
shark_write_reg+0x1ff/0x2e0 drivers/media/radio/radio-shark2.c:88
...
The problem was caused by the fact that the driver does not check
whether the endpoints it uses are actually present and have the
appropriate types. This can be fixed by adding a simple check of
these endpoints (and similarly for the radio-shark driver). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during error recovery
While the error recovery work is temporarily failing reconnect attempts,
running the 'nvme list' command causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference
by calling getsockname() with a released socket.
During error recovery work, the nvme tcp socket is released and a new one
created, so it is not safe to access the socket without proper check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: fix clear_user_rep_good() exception handling annotation
This code no longer exists in mainline, because it was removed in
commit d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory
clearing") upstream.
However, rather than backport the full range of x86 memory clearing and
copying cleanups, fix the exception table annotation placement for the
final 'rep movsb' in clear_user_rep_good(): rather than pointing at the
actual instruction that did the user space access, it pointed to the
register move just before it.
That made sense from a code flow standpoint, but not from an actual
usage standpoint: it means that if user access takes an exception, the
exception handler won't actually find the instruction in the exception
tables.
As a result, rather than fixing it up and returning -EFAULT, it would
then turn it into a kernel oops report instead, something like:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000020081000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
...
RIP: 0010:clear_user_rep_good+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S:147
...
Call Trace:
__clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:103 [inline]
clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:124 [inline]
iov_iter_zero+0x709/0x1290 lib/iov_iter.c:800
iomap_dio_hole_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:389 [inline]
iomap_dio_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:440 [inline]
__iomap_dio_rw+0xe3d/0x1cd0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:601
iomap_dio_rw+0x40/0xa0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:689
ext4_dio_read_iter fs/ext4/file.c:94 [inline]
ext4_file_read_iter+0x4be/0x690 fs/ext4/file.c:145
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e0/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:733
do_iter_read+0x2f2/0x750 fs/read_write.c:796
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:916
do_preadv+0x1b6/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1008
__do_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1070 [inline]
__se_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1061 [inline]
__x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1061
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
which then looks like a filesystem bug rather than the incorrect
exception annotation that it is.
[ The alternative to this one-liner fix is to take the upstream series
that cleans this all up:
68674f94ffc9 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory copies")
20f3337d350c ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory clearing")
adfcf4231b8c ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory copies")
* d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory clearing")
3639a535587d ("x86: move stac/clac from user copy routines into callers")
577e6a7fd50d ("x86: inline the 'rep movs' in user copies for the FSRM case")
8c9b6a88b7e2 ("x86: improve on the non-rep 'clear_user' function")
427fda2c8a49 ("x86: improve on the non-rep 'copy_user' function")
* e046fe5a36a9 ("x86: set FSRS automatically on AMD CPUs that have FSRM")
e1f2750edc4a ("x86: remove 'zerorest' argument from __copy_user_nocache()")
034ff37d3407 ("x86: rewrite '__copy_user_nocache' function")
with either the whole series or at a minimum the two marked commits
being needed to fix this issue ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: fix memory leak of remain_skbs
hif_dev->remain_skb is allocated and used exclusively in
ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(). It is implied that an allocated remain_skb is
processed and subsequently freed (in error paths) only during the next
call of ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream().
So, if the urbs are deallocated between those two calls due to the device
deinitialization or suspend, it is possible that ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream()
is not called next time and the allocated remain_skb is leaked. Our local
Syzkaller instance was able to trigger that.
remain_skb makes sense when receiving two consecutive urbs which are
logically linked together, i.e. a specific data field from the first skb
indicates a cached skb to be allocated, memcpy'd with some data and
subsequently processed in the next call to ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(). Urbs
deallocation supposedly makes that link irrelevant so we need to free the
cached skb in those cases.
Fix the leak by introducing a function to explicitly free remain_skb (if
it is not NULL) when the rx urbs have been deallocated. remain_skb is NULL
when it has not been allocated at all (hif_dev struct is kzalloced) or
when it has been processed in next call to ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: lpass: Fix for KASAN use_after_free out of bounds
When we run syzkaller we get below Out of Bounds error.
"KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in regcache_flat_read"
Below is the backtrace of the issue:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in regcache_flat_read+0x10c/0x110
Read of size 4 at addr ffffff8088fbf714 by task syz-executor.4/14144
CPU: 6 PID: 14144 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. sc7280 CRD platform (rev5+) (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4ec
show_stack+0x34/0x50
dump_stack_lvl+0xdc/0x11c
print_address_description+0x30/0x2d8
kasan_report+0x178/0x1e4
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x44/0x50
regcache_flat_read+0x10c/0x110
regcache_read+0xf8/0x5a0
_regmap_read+0x45c/0x86c
_regmap_update_bits+0x128/0x290
regmap_update_bits_base+0xc0/0x15c
snd_soc_component_update_bits+0xa8/0x22c
snd_soc_component_write_field+0x68/0xd4
tx_macro_put_dec_enum+0x1d0/0x268
snd_ctl_elem_write+0x288/0x474
By Error checking and checking valid values issue gets rectifies. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: reduce WARN to dev_dbg() in callback
The warn is triggered on a known race condition, documented in the code above
the test, that is correctly handled. Using WARN() hinders automated testing.
Reducing severity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeon_ep: cancel queued works in probe error path
If it fails to get the devices's MAC address, octep_probe exits while
leaving the delayed work intr_poll_task queued. When the work later
runs, it's a use after free.
Move the cancelation of intr_poll_task from octep_remove into
octep_device_cleanup. This does not change anything in the octep_remove
flow, but octep_device_cleanup is called also in the octep_probe error
path, where the cancelation is needed.
Note that the cancelation of ctrl_mbox_task has to follow
intr_poll_task's, because the ctrl_mbox_task may be queued by
intr_poll_task. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: ov772x: Fix memleak in ov772x_probe()
A memory leak was reported when testing ov772x with bpf mock device:
AssertionError: unreferenced object 0xffff888109afa7a8 (size 8):
comm "python3", pid 279, jiffies 4294805921 (age 20.681s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
80 22 88 15 81 88 ff ff ."......
backtrace:
[<000000009990b438>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000009e32f7d7>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<00000000faf48134>] v4l2_ctrl_handler_init_class+0x11d/0x180 [videodev]
[<00000000da376937>] ov772x_probe+0x1c3/0x68c [ov772x]
[<000000003f0d225e>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<00000000e0b6db89>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<000000001b19fcee>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<0000000048370519>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<000000005ead07a0>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<0000000043f452b8>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000358e5596>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000043f83c5d>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000ee0f3046>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000e0278184>] i2c_new_client_device+0x359/0x4f0
[<0000000070baf34f>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
[<00000000a9f2159d>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160
unreferenced object 0xffff888119825c00 (size 256):
comm "python3", pid 279, jiffies 4294805921 (age 20.681s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 b4 a5 17 81 88 ff ff 00 5e 82 19 81 88 ff ff .........^......
10 5c 82 19 81 88 ff ff 10 5c 82 19 81 88 ff ff .\.......\......
backtrace:
[<000000009990b438>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000009e32f7d7>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<0000000073d88e0b>] v4l2_ctrl_new.cold+0x19b/0x86f [videodev]
[<00000000b1f576fb>] v4l2_ctrl_new_std+0x16f/0x210 [videodev]
[<00000000caf7ac99>] ov772x_probe+0x1fa/0x68c [ov772x]
[<000000003f0d225e>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<00000000e0b6db89>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<000000001b19fcee>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<0000000048370519>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<000000005ead07a0>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<0000000043f452b8>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000358e5596>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000043f83c5d>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000ee0f3046>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000e0278184>] i2c_new_client_device+0x359/0x4f0
[<0000000070baf34f>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
The reason is that if priv->hdl.error is set, ov772x_probe() jumps to the
error_mutex_destroy without doing v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(), and all
resources allocated in v4l2_ctrl_handler_init() and v4l2_ctrl_new_std()
are leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: microchip: fix potential UAF in auxdev release callback
Similar to commit 1c11289b34ab ("peci: cpu: Fix use-after-free in
adev_release()"), the auxiliary device is not torn down in the correct
order. If auxiliary_device_add() fails, the release callback will be
called twice, resulting in a UAF. Due to timing, the auxdev code in this
driver "took inspiration" from the aforementioned commit, and thus its
bugs too!
Moving auxiliary_device_uninit() to the unregister callback instead
avoids the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: fix wrong ct->timeout value
(struct nf_conn)->timeout is an interval before the conntrack
confirmed. After confirmed, it becomes a timestamp.
It is observed that timeout of an unconfirmed conntrack:
- Set by calling ctnetlink_change_timeout(). As a result,
`nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly added to `ct->timeout` twice.
- Get by calling ctnetlink_dump_timeout(). As a result,
`nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly subtracted.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl
ctnetlink_dump_timeout
__ctnetlink_glue_build
ctnetlink_glue_build
__nfqnl_enqueue_packet
nf_queue
nf_hook_slow
ip_mc_output
? __pfx_ip_finish_output
ip_send_skb
? __pfx_dst_output
udp_send_skb
udp_sendmsg
? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag
sock_sendmsg
Separate the 2 cases in:
- Setting `ct->timeout` in __nf_ct_set_timeout().
- Getting `ct->timeout` in ctnetlink_dump_timeout().
Pablo appends:
Update ctnetlink to set up the timeout _after_ the IPS_CONFIRMED flag is
set on, otherwise conntrack creation via ctnetlink breaks.
Note that the problem described in this patch occurs since the
introduction of the nfnetlink_queue conntrack support, select a
sufficiently old Fixes: tag for -stable kernel to pick up this fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function
When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump
back to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function.
For BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually
PACIASP, in this case, it's safe to jump back with BLR. But when
the call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception
is triggered.
Here is a fault log:
Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI
CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000
sp : ffff80000c0c3a50
x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a
x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001
Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144
show_stack+0x24/0x7c
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
panic+0x1cc/0x3ec
__el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0
el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c
bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0
__sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0
__arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0
el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab
Memory Limit: none
And the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD,
not PACIASP:
<bpf_fentry_test1>:
bti c
nop
nop
add w0, w0, #0x1
paciasp
For BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled
kernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass
the branch target check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Fix a leak in map_user_pages()
If get_user_pages_fast() allocates some pages but not as many as we
wanted, then the current code leaks those pages. Call put_page() on
the pages before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Take RTNL lock when needed before calling xdp_set_features()
Hold RTNL lock when calling xdp_set_features() with a registered netdev,
as the call triggers the netdev notifiers. This could happen when
switching from uplink rep to nic profile for example.
This resolves the following call trace:
RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (1953)
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 112670 at net/core/dev.c:1953 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
Modules linked in: sch_mqprio sch_mqprio_lib act_tunnel_key act_mirred act_skbedit cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding ib_umad ip_gre rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci ipip tunnel4 ip6_gre gre mlx5_ib vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 ib_uverbs vfio mlx5_core ib_ipoib geneve nf_tables ip6_tunnel tunnel6 iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 6 PID: 112670 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_06_28_17_02 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
Code: 90 ff 80 3d 2d 6b f7 00 00 75 c5 ba a1 07 00 00 48 c7 c6 e4 ce 0b 82 48 c7 c7 c8 f4 04 82 c6 05 11 6b f7 00 01 e8 a4 7c 8e ff <0f> 0b eb a2 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 48 83 e4 f0 48 83 ec
RSP: 0018:ffff8882a21c3948 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82e6f880 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88885f99b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88885f99b5c0
RBP: 0000000000000028 R08: ffff88887ffabaa8 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffff88887fecbac0 R11: ffff88887ff7bac0 R12: ffff8882a21c3968
R13: ffff88811c018940 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881274401a0
FS: 00007fe141c81800(0000) GS:ffff88885f980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f787c28b948 CR3: 000000014bcf3005 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x79/0x120
? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
? report_bug+0x17c/0x190
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
call_netdevice_notifiers+0x2e/0x50
mlx5e_set_xdp_feature+0x21/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_nic_init+0xf1/0x1a0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_init_profile+0x76/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile+0x1f/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x92/0x160 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0xaa/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
__esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x52/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_unload+0x52/0x70 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x34/0x70 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_disable+0x2b/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked+0x1b9/0x210 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0xf5/0x630 [mlx5_core]
? devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x9e/0x110
devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_set_doit+0x60/0xe0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xc2/0x110
genl_rcv_msg+0x17d/0x2b0
? devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x110/0x110
? devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_get_doit+0x290/0x290
? devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0xf0/0xf0
? genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x110/0x110
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x1f6/0x2c0
netlink_sendmsg+0x232/0x4a0
sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x60
__sys_sendto+0x110/0x160
? __count_memcg_events+0x48/0x90
? handle_mm_fault+0x161/0x260
? do_user_addr_fault+0x278/0x6e0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-sysman: Fix reference leak
If a duplicate attribute is found using kset_find_obj(),
a reference to that attribute is returned. This means
that we need to dispose it accordingly. Use kobject_put()
to dispose the duplicate attribute in such a case.
Compile-tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Fix unpinning of pages when an access is present
syzkaller found that the calculation of batch_last_index should use
'start_index' since at input to this function the batch is either empty or
it has already been adjusted to cross any accesses so it will start at the
point we are unmapping from.
Getting this wrong causes the unmap to run over the end of the pages
which corrupts pages that were never mapped. In most cases this triggers
the num pinned debugging:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 557 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/pages.c:294 __iopt_area_unfill_domain+0x152/0x560
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 557 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-eeac8ede1755 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__iopt_area_unfill_domain+0x152/0x560
Code: d2 0f ff 44 8b 64 24 54 48 8b 44 24 48 31 ff 44 89 e6 48 89 44 24 38 e8 fc d3 0f ff 45 85 e4 0f 85 eb 01 00 00 e8 0e d2 0f ff <0f> 0b e8 07 d2 0f ff 48 8b 44 24 38 89 5c 24 58 89 18 8b 44 24 54
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000108baf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffffff821e3f85
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88800faf0000 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: ffffc9000108bd18 R08: 000000000003ca25 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 000000000003ca00 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000801 R14: 00000000000007ff R15: 0000000000000800
FS: 00007f3499ce1740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000243 CR3: 00000000179c2001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iopt_area_unfill_domain+0x32/0x40
iopt_table_remove_domain+0x23f/0x4c0
iommufd_device_selftest_detach+0x3a/0x90
iommufd_selftest_destroy+0x55/0x70
iommufd_object_destroy_user+0xce/0x130
iommufd_destroy+0xa2/0xc0
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x206/0x330
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x10e/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Also add some useful WARN_ON sanity checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: dlm: fix use after free in midcomms commit
While working on processing dlm message in softirq context I experienced
the following KASAN use-after-free warning:
[ 151.760477] ==================================================================
[ 151.761803] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.763414] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811a980c60 by task lock_torture/1347
[ 151.765284] CPU: 7 PID: 1347 Comm: lock_torture Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #2828
[ 151.766778] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+16134+e5908aa2 04/01/2014
[ 151.768726] Call Trace:
[ 151.769277] <TASK>
[ 151.769748] dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x86
[ 151.770556] print_report+0x180/0x4c8
[ 151.771378] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7c/0x1e0
[ 151.772241] ? dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.773069] kasan_report+0x93/0x1a0
[ 151.773668] ? dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.774514] __asan_load4+0x7e/0xa0
[ 151.775089] dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.775890] ? create_message.isra.29.constprop.64+0x57/0xc0
[ 151.776770] send_common+0x19f/0x1b0
[ 151.777342] ? remove_from_waiters+0x60/0x60
[ 151.778017] ? lock_downgrade+0x410/0x410
[ 151.778648] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[ 151.779421] ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x88/0xc0
[ 151.780292] _convert_lock+0x46/0x150
[ 151.780893] convert_lock+0x7b/0xc0
[ 151.781459] dlm_lock+0x3ac/0x580
[ 151.781993] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.782522] ? torture_stop+0x120/0x120 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.783379] ? dlm_scan_rsbs+0xa70/0xa70
[ 151.784003] ? preempt_count_sub+0xd6/0x130
[ 151.784661] ? is_module_address+0x47/0x70
[ 151.785309] ? torture_stop+0x120/0x120 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.786166] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.786693] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0xc3/0x360
[ 151.787414] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.787947] torture_dlm_lock_sync.isra.3+0xe9/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.789004] ? torture_stop+0x120/0x120 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.789858] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.790392] ? lock_torture_cleanup+0x20/0x20 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.791347] ? delay_tsc+0x94/0xc0
[ 151.791898] torture_ex_iter+0xc3/0xea [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.792735] ? torture_start+0x30/0x30 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.793606] lock_torture+0x177/0x270 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.794448] ? torture_dlm_lock_sync.isra.3+0x150/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.795539] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.796476] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x1e0
[ 151.797152] ? mark_held_locks+0x34/0xb0
[ 151.797784] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x70
[ 151.798581] ? __kthread_parkme+0x79/0x110
[ 151.799246] ? trace_preempt_on+0x2a/0xf0
[ 151.799902] ? __kthread_parkme+0x79/0x110
[ 151.800579] ? preempt_count_sub+0xd6/0x130
[ 151.801271] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 151.801963] ? __kthread_parkme+0xec/0x110
[ 151.802630] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.803569] kthread+0x192/0x1d0
[ 151.804104] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 151.804881] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 151.805480] </TASK>
[ 151.806111] Allocated by task 1347:
[ 151.806681] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 151.807308] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 151.807920] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1e/0x30
[ 151.808609] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x63/0x80
[ 151.809263] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1ad/0x830
[ 151.809916] dlm_allocate_mhandle+0x17/0x20
[ 151.810590] dlm_midcomms_get_mhandle+0x96/0x260
[ 151.811344] _create_message+0x95/0x180
[ 151.811994] create_message.isra.29.constprop.64+0x57/0xc0
[ 151.812880] send_common+0x129/0x1b0
[ 151.813467] _convert_lock+0x46/0x150
[ 151.814074] convert_lock+0x7b/0xc0
[ 151.814648] dlm_lock+0x3ac/0x580
[ 151.815199] torture_dlm_lock_sync.isra.3+0xe9/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.816258] torture_ex_iter+0xc3/0xea [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.817129] lock_t
---truncated--- |
