| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows DWM Core Library allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows GDI allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Desktop Window Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Desktop Window Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload
before copying it to userspace.
The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds
check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so
the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared
against the response buffer length.
A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount
to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user()
then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer.
Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as
out of bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atm: reject out-of-range traffic classes in QoS validation
Reject ATM traffic classes above ATM_ANYCLASS in check_tp().
SO_ATMQOS stores the supplied QoS after check_qos() succeeds, so
accepting larger values leaves invalid traffic_class values in
vcc->qos.
That bad state later reaches pvc_info(), which indexes class_name[]
with vcc->qos.{rx,tp}.traffic_class. Values above ATM_ANYCLASS cause
an out-of-bounds read when /proc/net/atm/pvc is read.
Tighten the existing QoS validation so invalid traffic_class values
are rejected at the point where user supplied QoS is accepted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-rdma: handle inline data with a nonzero offset
nvmet_rdma_use_inline_sg() maps the host-controlled inline data offset
into the per-command inline scatterlist. The bounds check admits any
offset with off + len <= inline_data_size, but the mapping still assumes
the data begins in the first inline page:
sg->offset = off;
sg->length = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
When a port is configured with inline_data_size > PAGE_SIZE (settable up
to max(SZ_16K, PAGE_SIZE)), an offset in (PAGE_SIZE, inline_data_size]
makes "PAGE_SIZE - off" underflow, so sg->length is set to ~4 GiB and
the block backend reads far past the first inline page. num_pages(len)
also ignores the offset, so an in-bounds offset whose [off, off+len)
span crosses a page boundary under-counts the scatterlist.
Map the offset properly: split it into a page index and an in-page
offset, start the scatterlist at that page, and size the page count from
page_off + len. Because the request scatterlist may now start at
inline_sg[page_idx] rather than inline_sg[0], generalize the inline-SGL
identity test in nvmet_rdma_release_rsp() to a range test; otherwise the
persistent inline scatterlist is mistaken for an allocated one and
nvmet_req_free_sgls() frees an inline page (and warns in
free_large_kmalloc()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but
stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small
value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry,
reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses
the kernel.
Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then
rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: validate skb length in testmode query
In mt7925_tm_query(), the response skb from mt76_mcu_send_and_get_msg()
is used in a memcpy without validating its length:
memcpy(evt_resp, skb->data + 8, MT7925_EVT_RSP_LEN);
where MT7925_EVT_RSP_LEN is 512. If the firmware returns a response
shorter than 520 bytes (8 + 512), this reads beyond the skb data
buffer. The over-read data is then returned to userspace via nla_put()
in mt7925_testmode_dump().
Add a length check before the memcpy to ensure the skb contains
sufficient data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: adm1275: Prevent reading uninitialized stack
While adding support for the ROHM BD127X0 hot-swap controllers, sashiko
reported an error in device-name comparison, which can lead to reading
uninitialized stack memory.
Quoting Sashiko:
This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed that just before this block in
adm1275_probe(), there might be an out-of-bounds stack read:
ret = i2c_smbus_read_block_data(client, PMBUS_MFR_MODEL, block_buffer);
if (ret < 0) { ... }
for (mid = adm1275_id; mid->name[0]; mid++) {
if (!strncasecmp(mid->name, block_buffer, strlen(mid->name)))
break;
}
Since i2c_smbus_read_block_data() reads up to 32 bytes into the
uninitialized stack array block_buffer without appending a null
terminator, strncasecmp() could read past the valid bytes returned in ret.
For example, if the device returns a shorter string like "adm12", checking
it against "adm1275" up to the length of "adm1275" will continue reading
into uninitialized stack bounds.
Prevent reading uninitialized memory by zeroing the stack array. |
