| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_input: stop callbacks before unregistering input device
virtinput_remove() unregisters the input device before resetting the
virtio device. virtinput_recv_events() drops vi->lock around input_event(),
so clearing vi->ready does not stop a callback that passed the entry check.
It can still use vi->idev, requeue buffers and kick the queue.
Reset first, as virtinput_freeze() already does. With the preceding core
change, reset waits for callbacks before input_unregister_device() can
free vi->idev. Recheck vi->ready after taking the lock again: keep draining
completed events so an input packet is not truncated, but stop requeueing
buffers and kicking the queue.
With evdev attached, input_unregister_handle() currently waits for an RCU
grace period, which also waits out IRQ callbacks. This masks the lifetime
bug on PCI and MMIO, but does not protect sleepable callbacks on other
transports. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: release all action references on NEWACTION failure
When a batched RTM_NEWACTION request replaces an existing action,
tcf_idr_check_alloc() takes a temporary reference on it. If a later
action fails to initialize, tcf_action_destroy() uses strict release
semantics to clean up the actions initialized so far. For an action
bound to a filter, the strict check returns -EPERM without dropping
the temporary reference.
This error also makes tcf_action_destroy() return before releasing
subsequent entries. Any new action initialized between the bound
action and the failing entry is leaked together with its reserved
IDR slot, preventing reuse of its index.
Use tcf_idr_release() to drop each reference held by the batch without
rejecting bound actions. This allows cleanup to continue through all
initialized entries and preserves the module reference release when
an action is destroyed. Explicit action deletion and flushing retain
their separate bind-count checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: don't overconsume buffers when using MSG_TRUNC
When a recv/recvmsg is issued with MSG_TRUNC and the incoming packet is
larger than the provided buffer, the net layer returns the full length
of the packet rather than the number of bytes actually copied into the
buffer. As a result, io_uring advances more of the provided buffer ring
than was actually filled. Use the actual filled region size to consume
the buffer, but still return the full size to preserve MSG_TRUNC
semantics.
Take care with multishot, because that seems to already truncate the
consumption based on the available payload size.
This was reported in https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1619.
[axboe: fold in size_t unsigned fix] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check
Sashiko reported that in get_boot_config_from_initrd(), a crafted initrd
with a huge bootconfig size (such as 0xFFFFFFFF) can cause the pointer
arithmetic:
data = ((void *)hdr) - size;
to wrap around on 32-bit systems (or when pointer subtraction overflows).
Because data wraps around, the subsequent bounds check:
if ((unsigned long)data < initrd_start)
evaluates to false, bypassing the check. The kernel then calls
xbc_calc_checksum(data, size), which attempts to read 4GB of memory,
hitting unmapped pages and triggering a fatal kernel page fault during
early boot. Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, an
unbounded 32-bit size can similarly bypass the initrd_start check.
Fix this by:
1. Ensuring the initrd is at least large enough to contain the bootconfig
footer and verifying hdr is within the initrd bounds.
2. Checking that size does not exceed XBC_DATA_MAX and does not exceed
the available space between initrd_start and hdr before performing
pointer subtraction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: Don't leak return code when parsing firmware format v2
When key_id from chip is zero, rtlbt_parse_firmware_v2() intentionally
ignores all security headers. However, the implementation simply breaks
from a switch statement and leaks uninitialized return code `rc' (if the
first section is a security one) or the previous section's `rc'.
Fix it by really skipping a loop with `continue'. For consistency and
readability, also do the same for the default case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel: ethosu: Fix ethosu_job_open() return value
A WARN_ON() returns a 0 or 1, not the original negative errno. Just drop
the WARN_ON() as the FD open will pass the return code to userspace and
there's only one possible source of the error (drm_sched_entity_init()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
print_entries() uses n_entries both as the number of sort entries and as
its own return value, so the -ENOMEM it stores when the stats allocation
fails overwrites the count that the cleanup still needs:
n_entries = tracing_map_sort_entries(map, ...);
if (n_entries < 0)
return n_entries;
...
if (!stats) {
n_entries = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
...
out:
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries(sort_entries, n_entries);
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries() takes an unsigned int and loops up to
it, so -ENOMEM arrives as 4294967284. It walks an array of at most
map->max_elts pointers and calls destroy_sort_entry(), which dereferences
and frees, on whatever lies past the end.
Reading the hist file of a trigger with a .percent value, with that
allocation forced to fail:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000045000 by task init/1
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
hist_show+0x6f7/0x1df0
seq_read_iter+0x2b8/0x1190
vfs_read+0x176/0xa40
The buggy address belongs to a 4-page vmalloc region starting at
ffffc90000041000 allocated at tracing_map_sort_entries+0x5c/0xd50
A few pages further the fault is fatal. The registers at the oops confirm
the bound: the loop's end pointer less the array start, over the pointer
size, is 4294967284.
Return the error in a separate variable and leave n_entries holding the
count, the way tracing_map_sort_entries() does on its own error path.
The stats block is only entered for a value carrying .percent or .graph,
which __create_val_field() has rejected since v6.3, so this cannot be
reached in mainline as it stands. It becomes reachable again with
"tracing: hist: let values keep the percent and graph modifiers", so it
should be applied first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
create_var_ref() allocates a VAR_REF hist_field and then calls
init_var_ref() to fill it in. When that fails the field is leaked.
commit 656fe2ba85e8 ("tracing: Use hist trigger's var_ref array to destroy
var_refs") made destroy_hist_field() return early for
HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR_REF, since var refs are freed by walking the trigger's
var_refs[] array instead. create_var_ref() adds the field to that array
only after init_var_ref() has succeeded, so on this path the field is in
neither place and nothing frees it. The call was correct when it was
written, before var refs were taken out of destroy_hist_field().
init_var_ref() cannot free it either. The caller owns the field, so
init_var_ref() undoes only its own string allocations and leaves the
field alone. Freeing it there would leave create_var_ref() passing freed
memory to destroy_hist_field(), which reads its flags.
Call __destroy_hist_field(), which frees the field without consulting
the flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking
urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device
would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the
kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible
ctl_snapshot[] array.
Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer,
and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short
transfers while still resubmitting the URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
When a tracer option file is opened, it is passed a descriptor that points
to an element on the trace_array's topts array. This element has
information to find the trace array and other information. It uses this
element to take a reference of the trace_array so that the trace_array
does not get removed while this file is opened.
Unfortunately, there's a race condition where the element itself could be
freed by the removal of the instance the trace_array represents causing a
use-after-free as this element that is used to find the trace_array to
increment its reference counter is also freed when the instance is
removed.
To solve this, add a trace_array_tracer_options_get() helper function that
will take the address of the element that is passed to the open function
by the inode->i_private pointer and search all the trace_arrays under a
lock to find the one that the element's address is in the range of the
trace_arrays topts array elements. When a match happens, that trace_array's
reference would be increased.
Note, there's a race where if an admin was deleting and creating trace
instances at the same time and the memory of the old trace_array's array
matched the memory of the new trace_array that it could in theory open the
option from the wrong trace array. But we do not care because it would be
stupid to perform that kind of action. As long as the only thing that can
happen is that the option from the wrong trace array is used and doesn't
crash the kernel it will only make the user confused. But if they are
doing something stupid like this, they are already confused, so no harm
done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
"cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined
with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them
by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for
backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the
placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL.
create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record
carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc
word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16
bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there
becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is
small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length
is a kernel text address:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger
# echo hello > trace_marker
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x23/0x60
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
event_hist_trigger+0x2e7/0x12c0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Leave the field NULL, which is what the comment above the branch says
the code does and what common_stacktrace already does. FILTER_CPU and
FILTER_COMM are left alone, their create_hist_field() branches never
look at the field. |
| Concrete CMS before 9.5.3 did not validate an anti-CSRF token in the Calendar event duplicate dialog controller (concrete/controllers/dialog/event/duplicate.php) submit() action, which duplicated a calendar event after checking only canAccess() and the per-resource canAddCalendarEvent() permission, so a crafted cross-site request could cause an authenticated user with add-event permission to create duplicate CalendarEvents and CalendarEventVersions records under their own authority. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v4.0 score of 5.3 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Winston Crooker for reporting. |
| A flaw in libmongoc's SCRAM authentication implementation caused the client to continue the authentication handshake and transmit the client proof even when a nonce mismatch was detected in the server's first message. An unauthorized party with a man-in-the-middle position could exploit this by injecting a crafted server-first-message containing a controlled salt and low iteration count, then capturing the resulting client proof to perform offline password cracking. This vulnerability is mitigated by TLS, which is standard in production deployments. |
| A missing lower-bound validation in the bson_new_from_buffer() function of libbson allows an integer underflow when processing BSON data with a zero-length prefix. The function reads a 32-bit document length from the input buffer but does not verify that the value is at least 5 (the minimum valid BSON document size) before using it in an array index calculation. When the length field is zero, the expression used to check the document's null terminator wraps to UINT32_MAX, causing a heap out-of-bounds read that crashes the process. An unauthorized party who can supply crafted BSON input to an application using this API can cause a denial of service. |
| Improper neutralization of special elements used in a command ('command injection') in Microsoft Copilot allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
