| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Reusing a nonce, key pair in encryption issue exists in "FreeFrom - the nostr client" App versions prior to 1.3.5 for Android and iOS. If this vulnerability is exploited, the content of direct messages (DMs) between users may be manipulated by a man-in-the-middle attack. |
| Due to Nonce reuse, attackers can perform reply attack or decrypt captured packets. |
| Use of hard-coded cryptographic key issue exists in "Kura Sushi Official App Produced by EPARK" for Android versions prior to 3.8.5. If this vulnerability is exploited, a local attacker may obtain the login ID and password for the affected product. |
| ### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available.
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:andrewarnott@live.com) |
| The use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm was discovered in firmware version 3.60 of the Click Plus PLC. The vulnerability relies on the fact that the software uses an insecure implementation of the RSA encryption algorithm. |
| Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units. |
| A vulnerability exists in Algo Edge up to 2.1.1 - a previously used (legacy) component of navify® Algorithm Suite. The vulnerability impacts the authentication mechanism of this component and could allow an attacker with adjacent access to the laboratory network and the Algo Edge system to craft valid authentication tokens and access the component. Other components of navify® Algorithm Suite are not affected. |
| An issue was discovered in Kaseya Rapid Fire Tools Network Detective through 2.0.16.0. A vulnerability exists in the EncryptionUtil class because symmetric encryption is implemented in a deterministic and non-randomized fashion. The method Encrypt(byte[] clearData) derives both the encryption key and the IV from a fixed, hardcoded input by using a static salt value. As a result, identical plaintext inputs always produce identical ciphertext outputs. This is true for both FIPS and non-FIPS generated passwords. In other words, there is a cryptographic implementation flaw in the password encryption mechanism. Although there are multiple encryption methods grouped under FIPS and non-FIPS classifications, the logic consistently results in predictable and reversible encrypted outputs due to the lack of per-operation randomness and encryption authentication. |
| A vulnerability was found in Satellite. When running a remote execution job on a host, the host's SSH key is not being checked. When the key changes, the Satellite still connects it because it uses "-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no". This flaw can lead to a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM), denial of service, leaking of secrets the remote execution job contains, or other issues that may arise from the attacker's ability to forge an SSH key. This issue does not directly allow unauthorized remote execution on the Satellite, although it can leak secrets that may lead to it. |
| ZF FROST is a Rust implementation of FROST (Flexible Round-Optimised Schnorr Threshold signatures). In versions 2.0.0 through 2.1.0, refresh shares with smaller min_signers will reduce security of group. The inability to change min_signers (i.e. the threshold) with the refresh share functionality (frost_core::keys::refresh module) was not made clear to users. Using a smaller value would not decrease the threshold, and attempts to sign using a smaller threshold would fail. Additionally, after refreshing the shares with a smaller threshold, it would still be possible to sign with the original threshold, potentially causing a security loss to the participant's shares. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM i800 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i801 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i802 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i803 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC30 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RP110 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600F (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS400 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS401 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS8000 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000A (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000H (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900GP (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS940G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG907R (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG908C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG909R (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG910C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSL910 (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228 (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228P (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916P (All versions < V5.10.0). The affected devices support the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher suite, which uses CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode that is known to be vulnerable to timing attacks. This could allow an attacker to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications. |
| An issue was discovered in Siklu Communications Etherhaul 8010TX and 1200FX devices, Firmware 7.4.0 through 10.7.3 and possibly other previous versions. The rfpiped service listening on TCP port 555 which uses static AES encryption keys hardcoded in the binary. These keys are identical across all devices, allowing attackers to craft encrypted packets that execute arbitrary commands without authentication. This is a failed patch for CVE-2017-7318. This issue may affect other Etherhaul series devices with shared firmware. |
| SmartOS, as used in Triton Data Center and other products, has static host SSH keys in the 60f76fd2-143f-4f57-819b-1ae32684e81b image (a Debian 12 LX zone image from 2024-07-26). |
| The device uses a weak hashing alghorithm to create the password hash. Hence, a matching password can be easily calculated by an attacker. This impacts the security and the integrity of the device. |
| sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Versions of sigstore-python newer than 2.0.0 but prior to 3.6.0 perform insufficient validation of the "integration time" present in "v2" and "v3" bundles during the verification flow: the "integration time" is verified *if* a source of signed time (such as an inclusion promise) is present, but is otherwise trusted if no source of signed time is present. This does not affect "v1" bundles, as the "v1" bundle format always requires an inclusion promise.
Sigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. The impact and severity of this weakness is *low*, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the signature itself such that it fails to verify). Separately, an attacker could upload a *new* entry to the transparency service, and substitute their new entry's time. However, this would still be rejected at validation time, as the new entry's (valid) signed time would be outside the validity window of the original signing certificate and would nonetheless render the attacker auditable. |
| Inadequate encryption strength issue exists in SS1 Ver.16.0.0.10 and earlier (Media version:16.0.0a and earlier). If this vulnerability is exploited, a function that requires authentication may be accessed by a remote unauthenticated attacker. |
| ESPTouch is a connection protocol for internet of things devices. In the ESPTouchV2 protocol, while there is an option to use a custom AES key, there is no option to set the IV (Initialization Vector) prior to versions 5.3.2, 5.2.4, 5.1.6, and 5.0.8. The IV is set to zero and remains constant throughout the product's lifetime. In AES/CBC mode, if the IV is not properly initialized, the encrypted output becomes deterministic, leading to potential data leakage. To address the aforementioned issues, the application generates a random IV when activating the AES key starting in versions 5.3.2, 5.2.4, 5.1.6, and 5.0.8. This IV is then transmitted along with the provision data to the provision device. The provision device has also been equipped with a parser for the AES IV. The upgrade is applicable for all applications and users of ESPTouch v2 component from ESP-IDF. As it is implemented in the ESP Wi-Fi stack, there is no workaround for the user to fix the application layer without upgrading the underlying firmware. |
| itech iLabClient 3.7.1 relies on the hard-coded YngAYdgAE/kKZYu2F2wm6w== key (found in iLabClient.jar) for local users to read or write to the database. |
| Weak encryption vulnerability in Hitachi JP1/IT Desktop Management 2 - Smart Device Manager on Windows.This issue affects JP1/IT Desktop Management 2 - Smart Device Manager: from 12-00 before 12-00-08, from 11-10 through 11-10-08, from 11-00 through 11-00-05, from 10-50 through 10-50-06. |
| A cryptanalytic break in Altcha Proof-of-Work obfuscation mode version 0.8.0 and later allows for remote visitors to recover the Proof-of-Work nonce in constant time via mathematical deduction. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because the product's objective is "to discourage automated scraping / bots, not guarantee resistance to determined attackers." The documentation states “the goal is not to provide a secure cryptographic algorithm but to use a proof-of-work mechanism that allows any capable device to decrypt the hidden data.” |
