| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: fix bounds checker error in nl80211_parse_sched_scan
The channels array in the cfg80211_scan_request has a __counted_by
attribute attached to it, which points to the n_channels variable. This
attribute is used in bounds checking, and if it is not set before the
array is filled, then the bounds sanitizer will issue a warning or a
kernel panic if CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP is set.
This patch sets the size of allocated memory as the initial value for
n_channels. It is updated with the actual number of added elements after
the array is filled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: fix false positive warning in extack during dumps
Commit under fixes extended extack reporting to dumps.
It works under normal conditions, because extack errors are
usually reported during ->start() or the first ->dump(),
it's quite rare that the dump starts okay but fails later.
If the dump does fail later, however, the input skb will
already have the initiating message pulled, so checking
if bad attr falls within skb->data will fail.
Switch the check to using nlh, which is always valid.
syzbot found a way to hit that scenario by filling up
the receive queue. In this case we initiate a dump
but don't call ->dump() until there is read space for
an skb.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5845 at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2210 netlink_ack_tlv_fill+0x1a8/0x560 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2209
RIP: 0010:netlink_ack_tlv_fill+0x1a8/0x560 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2209
Call Trace:
<TASK>
netlink_dump_done+0x513/0x970 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2250
netlink_dump+0x91f/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2351
netlink_recvmsg+0x6bb/0x11d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1983
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1051 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1073
__sys_recvfrom+0x246/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2267
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2285 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2281 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2281
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff37dd17a79 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/l2tp: fix warning in l2tp_exit_net found by syzbot
In l2tp's net exit handler, we check that an IDR is empty before
destroying it:
WARN_ON_ONCE(!idr_is_empty(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_idr));
idr_destroy(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_idr);
By forcing memory allocation failures in idr_alloc_32, syzbot is able
to provoke a condition where idr_is_empty returns false despite there
being no items in the IDR. This turns out to be because the radix tree
of the IDR contains only internal radix-tree nodes and it is this that
causes idr_is_empty to return false. The internal nodes are cleaned by
idr_destroy.
Use idr_for_each to check that the IDR is empty instead of
idr_is_empty to avoid the problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/stacktrace: Use break instead of return statement
arch_stack_walk_user_common() contains a return statement instead of a
break statement in case store_ip() fails while trying to store a callchain
entry of a user space process.
This may lead to a missing pagefault_enable() call.
If this happens any subsequent page fault of the process won't be resolved
by the page fault handler and this in turn will lead to the process being
killed.
Use a break instead of a return statement to fix this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rcu/nocb: Fix missed RCU barrier on deoffloading
Currently, running rcutorture test with torture_type=rcu fwd_progress=8
n_barrier_cbs=8 nocbs_nthreads=8 nocbs_toggle=100 onoff_interval=60
test_boost=2, will trigger the following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 100 at kernel/rcu/tree_nocb.h:1061 rcu_nocb_rdp_deoffload+0x292/0x2a0
RIP: 0010:rcu_nocb_rdp_deoffload+0x292/0x2a0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x7e/0x120
? rcu_nocb_rdp_deoffload+0x292/0x2a0
? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? rcu_nocb_rdp_deoffload+0x292/0x2a0
rcu_nocb_cpu_deoffload+0x70/0xa0
rcu_nocb_toggle+0x136/0x1c0
? __pfx_rcu_nocb_toggle+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xd1/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
CPU0 CPU2 CPU3
//rcu_nocb_toggle //nocb_cb_wait //rcutorture
// deoffload CPU1 // process CPU1's rdp
rcu_barrier()
rcu_segcblist_entrain()
rcu_segcblist_add_len(1);
// len == 2
// enqueue barrier
// callback to CPU1's
// rdp->cblist
rcu_do_batch()
// invoke CPU1's rdp->cblist
// callback
rcu_barrier_callback()
rcu_barrier()
mutex_lock(&rcu_state.barrier_mutex);
// still see len == 2
// enqueue barrier callback
// to CPU1's rdp->cblist
rcu_segcblist_entrain()
rcu_segcblist_add_len(1);
// len == 3
// decrement len
rcu_segcblist_add_len(-2);
kthread_parkme()
// CPU1's rdp->cblist len == 1
// Warn because there is
// still a pending barrier
// trigger warning
WARN_ON_ONCE(rcu_segcblist_n_cbs(&rdp->cblist));
cpus_read_unlock();
// wait CPU1 to comes online and
// invoke barrier callback on
// CPU1 rdp's->cblist
wait_for_completion(&rcu_state.barrier_completion);
// deoffload CPU4
cpus_read_lock()
rcu_barrier()
mutex_lock(&rcu_state.barrier_mutex);
// block on barrier_mutex
// wait rcu_barrier() on
// CPU3 to unlock barrier_mutex
// but CPU3 unlock barrier_mutex
// need to wait CPU1 comes online
// when CPU1 going online will block on cpus_write_lock
The above scenario will not only trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(), but also
trigger a deadlock.
Thanks to nocb locking, a second racing rcu_barrier() on an offline CPU
will either observe the decremented callback counter down to 0 and spare
the callback enqueue, or rcuo will observe the new callback and keep
rdp->nocb_cb_sleep to false.
Therefore check rdp->nocb_cb_sleep before parking to make sure no
further rcu_barrier() is waiting on the rdp. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Skip Rx TID cleanup for self peer
During peer create, dp setup for the peer is done where Rx TID is
updated for all the TIDs. Peer object for self peer will not go through
dp setup.
When core halts, dp cleanup is done for all the peers. While cleanup,
rx_tid::ab is accessed which causes below stack trace for self peer.
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 12297 at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp_rx.c:851
Call Trace:
__warn+0x7b/0x1a0
ath12k_dp_rx_frags_cleanup+0xd2/0xe0 [ath12k]
report_bug+0x10b/0x200
handle_bug+0x3f/0x70
exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
ath12k_dp_rx_frags_cleanup+0xd2/0xe0 [ath12k]
ath12k_dp_rx_frags_cleanup+0xca/0xe0 [ath12k]
ath12k_dp_rx_peer_tid_cleanup+0x39/0xa0 [ath12k]
ath12k_mac_peer_cleanup_all+0x61/0x100 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_halt+0x3b/0x100 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_reset+0x494/0x4c0 [ath12k]
sta object in peer will be updated when remote peer is created. Hence
use peer::sta to detect the self peer and skip the cleanup.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.0.1-00029-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hyperv: streamline driver probe to avoid devres issues
It was found that unloading 'hid_hyperv' module results in a devres
complaint:
...
hv_vmbus: unregistering driver hid_hyperv
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3983 at drivers/base/devres.c:691 devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? __warn+0xd1/0x1c0
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? report_bug+0x32a/0x3c0
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? devres_release_group+0x90/0x2c0
? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
? __pfx_devres_release_group+0x10/0x10
hid_device_remove+0xf5/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540
? klist_put+0xf3/0x170
bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
device_del+0x33f/0x8c0
? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
? cleanup_srcu_struct+0x337/0x500
hid_destroy_device+0xc8/0x130
mousevsc_remove+0xd2/0x1d0 [hid_hyperv]
device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540
driver_detach+0xc5/0x180
bus_remove_driver+0x11e/0x2a0
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x160/0x5e0
vmbus_driver_unregister+0x62/0x2b0 [hv_vmbus]
...
And the issue seems to be that the corresponding devres group is not
allocated. Normally, devres_open_group() is called from
__hid_device_probe() but Hyper-V HID driver overrides 'hid_dev->driver'
with 'mousevsc_hid_driver' stub and basically re-implements
__hid_device_probe() by calling hid_parse() and hid_hw_start() but not
devres_open_group(). hid_device_probe() does not call __hid_device_probe()
for it. Later, when the driver is removed, hid_device_remove() calls
devres_release_group() as it doesn't check whether hdev->driver was
initially overridden or not.
The issue seems to be related to the commit 62c68e7cee33 ("HID: ensure
timely release of driver-allocated resources") but the commit itself seems
to be correct.
Fix the issue by dropping the 'hid_dev->driver' override and using
hid_register_driver()/hid_unregister_driver() instead. Alternatively, it
would have been possible to rely on the default handling but
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT implies HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW and it doesn't seem to work
for mousevsc as-is. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: ralink: mtmips: fix clocks probe order in oldest ralink SoCs
Base clocks are the first in being probed and are real dependencies of the
rest of fixed, factor and peripheral clocks. For old ralink SoCs RT2880,
RT305x and RT3883 'xtal' must be defined first since in any other case,
when fixed clocks are probed they are delayed until 'xtal' is probed so the
following warning appears:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/clk/ralink/clk-mtmips.c:499 rt3883_bus_recalc_rate+0x98/0x138
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.43 #0
Stack : 805e58d0 00000000 00000004 8004f950 00000000 00000004 00000000 00000000
80669c54 80830000 80700000 805ae570 80670068 00000001 80669bf8 00000000
00000000 00000000 805ae570 80669b38 00000020 804db7dc 00000000 00000000
203a6d6d 80669b78 80669e48 70617773 00000000 805ae570 00000000 00000009
00000000 00000001 00000004 00000001 00000000 00000000 83fe43b0 00000000
...
Call Trace:
[<800065d0>] show_stack+0x64/0xf4
[<804bca14>] dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x60
[<800218ac>] __warn+0x94/0xe4
[<8002195c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x60/0x94
[<80259ff8>] rt3883_bus_recalc_rate+0x98/0x138
[<80254530>] __clk_register+0x568/0x688
[<80254838>] of_clk_hw_register+0x18/0x2c
[<8070b910>] rt2880_clk_of_clk_init_driver+0x18c/0x594
[<8070b628>] of_clk_init+0x1c0/0x23c
[<806fc448>] plat_time_init+0x58/0x18c
[<806fdaf0>] time_init+0x10/0x6c
[<806f9bc4>] start_kernel+0x458/0x67c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
When this driver was mainlined we could not find any active users of old
ralink SoCs so we cannot perform any real tests for them. Now, one user
of a Belkin f9k1109 version 1 device which uses RT3883 SoC appeared and
reported some issues in openWRT:
- https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/16054
Thus, define a 'rt2880_xtal_recalc_rate()' just returning the expected
frequency 40Mhz and use it along the old ralink SoCs to have a correct
boot trace with no warnings and a working clock plan from the beggining. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix atomic calls in ath12k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask()
When I try to manually set bitrates:
iw wlan0 set bitrates legacy-2.4 1
I get sleeping from invalid context error, see below. Fix that by switching to
use recently introduced ieee80211_iterate_stations_mtx().
Do note that WCN6855 firmware is still crashing, I'm not sure if that firmware
even supports bitrate WMI commands and should we consider disabling
ath12k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask() for WCN6855? But that's for another patch.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/wmi.c:420
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 2236, name: iw
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
3 locks held by iw/2236:
#0: ffffffffabc6f1d8 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x14/0x40
#1: ffff888138410810 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nl80211_pre_doit+0x54d/0x800 [cfg80211]
#2: ffffffffab2cfaa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic+0x2f/0x200 [mac80211]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2236 Comm: iw Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-wt-ath+ #1772
Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xa4/0xe0
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__might_resched+0x363/0x5a0
? __alloc_skb+0x165/0x340
__might_sleep+0xad/0x160
ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0xb1/0x3d0 [ath12k]
? ath12k_wmi_init_wcn7850+0xa40/0xa40 [ath12k]
? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x45/0x7b0
? __asan_memset+0x39/0x40
? ath12k_wmi_alloc_skb+0xf0/0x150 [ath12k]
? reacquire_held_locks+0x4d0/0x4d0
ath12k_wmi_set_peer_param+0x340/0x5b0 [ath12k]
ath12k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate+0xa3/0x110 [ath12k]
? ath12k_mac_vdev_stop+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ath12k]
ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic+0xd4/0x200 [mac80211]
ath12k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask+0x5d2/0x1080 [ath12k]
? ath12k_mac_vif_chan+0x320/0x320 [ath12k]
drv_set_bitrate_mask+0x267/0x470 [mac80211]
ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask+0x4cc/0x8a0 [mac80211]
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
nl80211_set_tx_bitrate_mask+0x2bc/0x530 [cfg80211]
? nl80211_parse_tx_bitrate_mask+0x2320/0x2320 [cfg80211]
? trace_contention_end+0xef/0x140
? rtnl_unlock+0x9/0x10
? nl80211_pre_doit+0x557/0x800 [cfg80211]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f0/0x2e0
? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.0+0x250/0x250
? ns_capable+0x57/0xd0
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x34c/0x600
? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x310/0x310
? __lock_acquire+0xc62/0x1de0
? he_set_mcs_mask.isra.0+0x8d0/0x8d0 [cfg80211]
? nl80211_parse_tx_bitrate_mask+0x2320/0x2320 [cfg80211]
? cfg80211_external_auth_request+0x690/0x690 [cfg80211]
genl_rcv_msg+0xa0/0x130
netlink_rcv_skb+0x14c/0x400
? genl_family_rcv_msg+0x600/0x600
? netlink_ack+0xd70/0xd70
? rwsem_optimistic_spin+0x4f0/0x4f0
? genl_rcv+0x14/0x40
? down_read_killable+0x580/0x580
? netlink_deliver_tap+0x13e/0x350
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
genl_rcv+0x23/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x45e/0x790
? netlink_attachskb+0x7f0/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x7eb/0xdb0
? netlink_unicast+0x790/0x790
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x31/0x40
? netlink_unicast+0x790/0x790
__sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x160
____sys_sendmsg+0x620/0x990
? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30
? __copy_msghdr+0x410/0x410
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? mark_lock+0xe6/0x1470
___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x170
? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x120/0x120
? __lock_acquire+0xc62/0x1de0
? do_fault_around+0x2c6/0x4e0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x8c1/0xde0
? reacquire_held_locks+0x220/0x4d0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x8c1/0xde0
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? __fdget+0x4e/0x1d0
? sockfd_lookup_light+0x1a/0x170
__sys_sendmsg+0xd2/0x180
? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20
? reacquire_held_locks+0x4d0/0x4d0
? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x72/0xb0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
x64_sys_call+0x894/0x9f0
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x130
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Call free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket()
For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the
last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke
bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However,
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock
(raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock
(spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted
-----------------------------
test_maps/4881 is trying to lock:
ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
2 locks held by test_maps/4881:
#0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270
#1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0
lock_acquire+0x182/0x450
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70
bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0
free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380
__sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60
x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for
map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes
idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a
similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is
still a spinlock.
Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking
htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring
the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map
pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion.
Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these
to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map.
There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr:
(1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of
htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(),
because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems.
It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the
invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release
the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer
of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and
releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old
element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old
element as well.
(2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(),
htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch().
For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after
htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just
like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list
and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe
to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these
elements have been removed from the hash llist.
Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation,
__htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept
it as
---truncated--- |
| Improper Authentication (CWE-287) in the LDAP authentication engine in AxxonSoft Axxon One (C-Werk) 2.0.2 and earlier on Windows allows a remote authenticated user to be denied access or misassigned roles via incorrect evaluation of nested LDAP group memberships during login. |
| Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (CWE-200) in the diagnostic dump component in AxxonSoft Axxon One VMS (C-Werk) 2.0.0 through 2.0.1 on Windows allows a local attacker to obtain licensing-related information such as timestamps, license states, and registry values via reading diagnostic export files created by the built-in troubleshooting tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: avoid PMD-size page cache if needed
xarray can't support arbitrary page cache size. the largest and supported
page cache size is defined as MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER by commit 099d90642a71
("mm/filemap: make MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER acceptable to xarray"). However,
it's possible to have 512MB page cache in the huge memory's collapsing
path on ARM64 system whose base page size is 64KB. 512MB page cache is
breaking the limitation and a warning is raised when the xarray entry is
split as shown in the following example.
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# cat /proc/1/smaps | grep KernelPageSize
KernelPageSize: 64 kB
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# cat /tmp/test.c
:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *filename = TEST_XFS_FILENAME;
int fd = 0;
void *buf = (void *)-1, *p;
int pgsize = getpagesize();
int ret = 0;
if (pgsize != 0x10000) {
fprintf(stdout, "System with 64KB base page size is required!\n");
return -EPERM;
}
system("echo 0 > /sys/devices/virtual/bdi/253:0/read_ahead_kb");
system("echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches");
/* Open the xfs file */
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
assert(fd > 0);
/* Create VMA */
buf = mmap(NULL, TEST_MEM_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
assert(buf != (void *)-1);
fprintf(stdout, "mapped buffer at 0x%p\n", buf);
/* Populate VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE);
assert(ret == 0);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_POPULATE_READ);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Collapse VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
assert(ret == 0);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_COLLAPSE);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stdout, "Error %d to madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)\n", errno);
goto out;
}
/* Split xarray entry. Write permission is needed */
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
buf = (void *)-1;
close(fd);
fd = open(filename, O_RDWR);
assert(fd > 0);
fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE,
TEST_MEM_SIZE - pgsize, pgsize);
out:
if (buf != (void *)-1)
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
if (fd > 0)
close(fd);
return ret;
}
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# gcc /tmp/test.c -o /tmp/test
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# /tmp/test
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 7560 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 \
ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon drm fuse \
xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 virtio_net \
sha1_ce net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 25 PID: 7560 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-gavin+ #9
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x780
sp : ffff8000ac32f660
x29: ffff8000ac32f660 x28: ffff0000e0969eb0 x27: ffff8000ac32f6c0
x26: 0000000000000c40 x25: ffff0000e0969eb0 x24: 000000000000000d
x23: ffff8000ac32f6c0 x22: ffffffdfc0700000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0700000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffd5f3708ffc70 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffffffffffffffc0 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : ffffd5f3708e692c
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0000e0969eb8
x5 : ffffd5f37289e378 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000c40
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x780
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x1b4/0x4a8
truncate_pagecache_range+0x84/0xa
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_inner: incorrect percpu area handling under softirq
Softirq can interrupt ongoing packet from process context that is
walking over the percpu area that contains inner header offsets.
Disable bh and perform three checks before restoring the percpu inner
header offsets to validate that the percpu area is valid for this
skbuff:
1) If the NFT_PKTINFO_INNER_FULL flag is set on, then this skbuff
has already been parsed before for inner header fetching to
register.
2) Validate that the percpu area refers to this skbuff using the
skbuff pointer as a cookie. If there is a cookie mismatch, then
this skbuff needs to be parsed again.
3) Finally, validate if the percpu area refers to this tunnel type.
Only after these three checks the percpu area is restored to a on-stack
copy and bh is enabled again.
After inner header fetching, the on-stack copy is stored back to the
percpu area. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: must allocate more bytes for RedBox support
Blamed commit forgot to change hsr_init_skb() to allocate
larger skb for RedBox case.
Indeed, send_hsr_supervision_frame() will add
two additional components (struct hsr_sup_tlv
and struct hsr_sup_payload)
syzbot reported the following crash:
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8afd4b0a len:34 put:6 head:ffff88802ad29e00 data:ffff88802ad29f22 tail:0x144 end:0x140 dev:gretap0
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 7611 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
Code: b6 04 01 84 c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 21 8b 4b 70 41 56 45 89 e8 48 c7 c7 a0 7d 9b 8c 41 57 56 48 89 ee 52 4c 89 e2 e8 9a 76 79 f8 90 <0f> 0b 4c 89 4c 24 10 48 89 54 24 08 48 89 34 24 e8 94 76 fb f8 4c
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000858ab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: ffff8880598c08c0 RCX: ffffffff816d3e69
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff816de786 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffffffff8c9b91c0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000302 R11: ffffffff961cc1d0 R12: ffffffff8afd4b0a
R13: 0000000000000006 R14: ffff88804b938130 R15: 0000000000000140
FS: 000055558a3d6500(0000) GS:ffff88806a800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1295974ff8 CR3: 000000002ab6e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:211 [inline]
skb_put+0x174/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:2617
send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x6fa/0x9e0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:342
hsr_proxy_announce+0x1a3/0x4a0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:436
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x610 kernel/time/timer.c:1794
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1845 [inline]
__run_timers+0x6e8/0x930 kernel/time/timer.c:2419
__run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2430 [inline]
__run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2423 [inline]
run_timer_base+0x111/0x190 kernel/time/timer.c:2439
run_timer_softirq+0x1a/0x40 kernel/time/timer.c:2449
handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:554
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:637 [inline]
irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:649
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ena: Add validation for completion descriptors consistency
Validate that `first` flag is set only for the first
descriptor in multi-buffer packets.
In case of an invalid descriptor, a reset will occur.
A new reset reason for RX data corruption has been added. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix responder length checking for UD request packets
According to the IBA specification:
If a UD request packet is detected with an invalid length, the request
shall be an invalid request and it shall be silently dropped by
the responder. The responder then waits for a new request packet.
commit 689c5421bfe0 ("RDMA/rxe: Fix incorrect responder length checking")
defers responder length check for UD QPs in function `copy_data`.
But it introduces a regression issue for UD QPs.
When the packet size is too large to fit in the receive buffer.
`copy_data` will return error code -EINVAL. Then `send_data_in`
will return RESPST_ERR_MALFORMED_WQE. UD QP will transfer into
ERROR state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: skip reserved bytes warning on unmount after log cleanup failure
After the recent changes made by commit c2e39305299f01 ("btrfs: clear
extent buffer uptodate when we fail to write it") and its followup fix,
commit 651740a5024117 ("btrfs: check WRITE_ERR when trying to read an
extent buffer"), we can now end up not cleaning up space reservations of
log tree extent buffers after a transaction abort happens, as well as not
cleaning up still dirty extent buffers.
This happens because if writeback for a log tree extent buffer failed,
then we have cleared the bit EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE from the extent buffer
and we have also set the bit EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR on it. Later on,
when trying to free the log tree with free_log_tree(), which iterates
over the tree, we can end up getting an -EIO error when trying to read
a node or a leaf, since read_extent_buffer_pages() returns -EIO if an
extent buffer does not have EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE set and has the
EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR bit set. Getting that -EIO means that we return
immediately as we can not iterate over the entire tree.
In that case we never update the reserved space for an extent buffer in
the respective block group and space_info object.
When this happens we get the following traces when unmounting the fs:
[174957.284509] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in cleanup_transaction:1913: errno=-5 IO failure
[174957.286497] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in free_log_tree:3420: errno=-5 IO failure
[174957.399379] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[174957.402497] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:127 btrfs_put_block_group+0x77/0xb0 [btrfs]
[174957.407523] Modules linked in: btrfs overlay dm_zero (...)
[174957.424917] CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.16.0-rc5-btrfs-next-109 #1
[174957.426689] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[174957.428716] RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_block_group+0x77/0xb0 [btrfs]
[174957.429717] Code: 21 48 8b bd (...)
[174957.432867] RSP: 0018:ffffb70d41cffdd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[174957.433632] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8b09c3848000 RCX: ffff8b0758edd1c8
[174957.434689] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b467e7 RDI: ffff8b0758edd000
[174957.436068] RBP: ffff8b0758edd000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[174957.437114] R10: 0000000000000246 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b09c3848148
[174957.438140] R13: ffff8b09c3848198 R14: ffff8b0758edd188 R15: dead000000000100
[174957.439317] FS: 00007f328fb82800(0000) GS:ffff8b0a2d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[174957.440402] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[174957.441164] CR2: 00007fff13563e98 CR3: 0000000404f4e005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[174957.442117] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[174957.443076] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[174957.443948] Call Trace:
[174957.444264] <TASK>
[174957.444538] btrfs_free_block_groups+0x255/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[174957.445238] close_ctree+0x301/0x357 [btrfs]
[174957.445803] ? call_rcu+0x16c/0x290
[174957.446250] generic_shutdown_super+0x74/0x120
[174957.446832] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[174957.447305] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
[174957.447890] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0xa0
[174957.448440] cleanup_mnt+0x147/0x1c0
[174957.448888] task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0
[174957.449336] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e5/0x1f0
[174957.449934] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x16/0x40
[174957.450512] do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0
[174957.450980] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[174957.451605] RIP: 0033:0x7f328fdc4a97
[174957.452059] Code: 03 0c 00 f7 (...)
[174957.454320] RSP: 002b:00007fff13564ec8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[174957.455262] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f328feea264 RCX: 00007f328fdc4a97
[174957.456131] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: don't deref the syscall args when checking the openat2 open_how::flags
As reported by Jeff, dereferencing the openat2 syscall argument in
audit_match_perm() to obtain the open_how::flags can result in an
oops/page-fault. This patch fixes this by using the open_how struct
that we store in the audit_context with audit_openat2_how().
Independent of this patch, Richard Guy Briggs posted a similar patch
to the audit mailing list roughly 40 minutes after this patch was
posted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Add stag_work to all the vports
Call trace seen when creating NPIV ports, only 32 out of 64 show online.
stag work was not initialized for vport, hence initialize the stag work.
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 645 at kernel/workqueue.c:1635 __queue_delayed_work+0x68/0x80
CPU: 8 PID: 645 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G IOE --------- --
4.18.0-348.el8.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge MX740c/0177V9, BIOS 2.12.2 07/09/2021
Workqueue: events fc_lport_timeout [libfc]
RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x68/0x80
Code: 89 b2 88 00 00 00 44 89 82 90 00 00 00 48 01 c8 48 89 42 50 41 81
f8 00 20 00 00 75 1d e9 60 24 07 00 44 89 c7 e9 98 f6 ff ff <0f> 0b eb
c5 0f 0b eb a1 0f 0b eb a7 0f 0b eb ac 44 89 c6 e9 40 23
RSP: 0018:ffffae514bc3be40 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8d25d6143750 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffff8d2e31383748 RSI: ffff8d25c000d600 RDI: ffff8d2e31383788
RBP: ffff8d2e31380de0 R08: 0000000000002000 R09: ffff8d2e31383750
R10: ffffffffc0c957e0 R11: ffff8d2624800000 R12: ffff8d2e31380a58
R13: ffff8d2d915eb000 R14: ffff8d25c499b5c0 R15: ffff8d2e31380e18
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d2d1fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055fd0484b8b8 CR3: 00000008ffc10006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
queue_delayed_work_on+0x36/0x40
qedf_elsct_send+0x57/0x60 [qedf]
fc_lport_enter_flogi+0x90/0xc0 [libfc]
fc_lport_timeout+0xb7/0x140 [libfc]
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
---[ end trace 008f00f722f2c2ff ]--
Initialize stag work for all the vports. |
