| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: take a reference on the socket found in afiucv_hs_rcv()
afiucv_hs_rcv() looks up the destination socket under iucv_sk_list.lock,
drops the lock, and then passes the socket to the afiucv_hs_callback_*()
handlers without holding a reference. AF_IUCV sockets are not
RCU-protected and are freed synchronously by iucv_sock_kill() ->
sock_put(), so a concurrent close can free the socket in the window
between read_unlock() and the handler, which then dereferences freed
memory (for example sk->sk_data_ready() in afiucv_hs_callback_syn()).
Take a reference with sock_hold() while the socket is still on the list
and release it with sock_put() once the handler has run. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_tunnel_key: Defer dst_release to RCU callback
Fix a race-condition use-after-free in tunnel_key_release_params().
The function releases the metadata_dst of the old params synchronously
via dst_release() while deferring the params struct free with
kfree_rcu(). A concurrent tunnel_key_act() reader on the datapath may
still hold the old params pointer (under rcu_read_lock_bh) and proceed
to call dst_clone(¶ms->tcft_enc_metadata->dst) after the writer's
dst_release has already pushed the dst's rcuref to RCUREF_DEAD.
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com produced a poc which i (and Victor) verified
that KASAN reports:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88806158de40 by task poc/9388
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9388 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.1.0-rc7 #7 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186
kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112
atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326
__rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109
rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173
dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168
refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:272
skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:284
skb_release_head_state+0x293/0x400 net/core/skbuff.c:1163
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1187
[..]
Allocated by task 9391:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398
__kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2f1/0x830 mm/slub.c:5308
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188
offload_action_alloc+0x2f/0x130 net/core/flow_offload.c:35
tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x1ba/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:258
tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293
tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547
tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101
[..]
Freed by task 9391:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253
__kasan_slab_free+0x6b/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:285
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2689
slab_free mm/slub.c:6251
kfree+0x21f/0x6b0 mm/slub.c:6566
tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x4ad/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:284
tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293
tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547
tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806158de00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of
freed 256-byte region [ffff88806158de00, ffff88806158df00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88806158d600 pfn:0x6158c
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_map
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: prevent fifo_req reuse during giveback
dummy_hcd embeds a single shared usb_request (dum->fifo_req) that the
"emulated single-request FIFO" fast-path in dummy_queue() reuses for
small IN transfers: it copies the caller's request into it
(req->req = *_req) and queues it, treating list_empty(&fifo_req.queue)
as "the slot is free".
The completion side (dummy_timer/transfer/nuke/dummy_dequeue) follows
the standard pattern: list_del_init(&req->queue) unlinks the request,
then the lock is dropped and usb_gadget_giveback_request() invokes
req->complete(). But list_del_init() makes fifo_req.queue look empty
*before* the completion callback returns, so a concurrent dummy_queue()
on another CPU sees the slot as free, reuses fifo_req and runs
req->req = *_req -- overwriting req->complete while dummy_timer is
mid-calling it. The indirect call then jumps to a clobbered pointer,
causing a general protection fault / page fault in dummy_timer
(syzkaller extid faf3a6cf579fc65591ca). The clobbering write is an
in-bounds memcpy on a live shared object, so KASAN cannot flag it.
Add a fifo_req_busy bit covering the shared request's whole lifetime:
set it in dummy_queue() when the FIFO fast-path takes fifo_req (making
it the fast-path guard, replacing the list_empty(&fifo_req.queue)
test), and clear it after the completion callback has returned, via a
dummy_giveback() helper used at all four gadget-request giveback
sites. The shared slot can no longer be reused until its completion
callback has finished. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: printer: fix infinite loop in printer_read()
printer_read() uses the same variable for the requested copy size and
the number of bytes actually copied to user space. copy_to_user()
returns the number of bytes not copied, so when it fails to copy
anything, the computed copied length becomes zero.
In that case len, buf, current_rx_bytes and current_rx_buf are left
unchanged. If RX data is available and the user buffer remains
unwritable, the read loop can repeat indefinitely.
Track the copied length separately and return -EFAULT, or the number of
bytes already copied, if an iteration makes no progress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: don't dereference hif_dev after re-arming firmware request
ath9k_hif_request_firmware() re-arms an asynchronous firmware load via
request_firmware_nowait(), passing hif_dev as the completion context, and
then still dereferences hif_dev:
dev_info(&hif_dev->udev->dev, "ath9k_htc: Firmware %s requested\n",
hif_dev->fw_name);
The re-armed callback ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb() runs on the "events"
workqueue and, when the firmware is missing, walks the retry chain into
ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_fail() -> complete_all(&hif_dev->fw_done). That
releases the wait_for_completion(&hif_dev->fw_done) in a concurrent
ath9k_hif_usb_disconnect(), which then kfree()s hif_dev. The trailing
dev_info() in the frame that re-armed the request can therefore read freed
memory (hif_dev->udev, the first field of struct hif_device_usb):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath9k_hif_request_firmware
Read of size 8 ... by task kworker/...
ath9k_hif_request_firmware
ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1247
request_firmware_work_func
Allocated by ...:
ath9k_hif_usb_probe drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c
Freed by ...:
ath9k_hif_usb_disconnect -> kfree drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c
The fw_done barrier only makes disconnect wait for the firmware chain to
*terminate*; it does not protect the outer ath9k_hif_request_firmware()
frame that re-armed the request and keeps touching hif_dev afterwards.
Drop the post-request dev_info(): it is the only use of hif_dev after the
async request is armed, and it is purely informational (the dev_err() on the
failure path runs only when request_firmware_nowait() did not arm a callback,
so hif_dev is still alive there).
This was first reported by syzbot as a single, non-reproduced crash that was
later auto-obsoleted, and was independently rediscovered by the reFuzz fuzzer,
which produced a C reproducer (USB-gadget connect/disconnect of an ath9k_htc
device whose firmware download fails). The vulnerable code is unchanged and
still present in v7.1-rc6, where the slab-use-after-free reproduces under KASAN
once the (sub-microsecond) race window is widened. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix NULL pointer dereference in ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin
In ATH11K_QMI_EVENT_FW_READY, ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED is set
unconditionally even when ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready() fails.
This leaves the driver in an inconsistent state where
initialization is considered complete although the firmware ready
handling did not finish successfully. During the subsequent SSR,
the driver enters the restart path based on this incorrect state
and dereferences uninitialized srng members, resulting in a NULL
pointer dereference.
Call trace:
ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin+0xc/0x60 [ath11k] (P)
ath11k_ce_cleanup_pipes+0x17c/0x180 [ath11k]
ath11k_core_restart+0x40/0x168 [ath11k]
Fix this by:
- skipping firmware_ready if ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED is already set
- setting ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED only when firmware_ready succeeds
- setting ATH11K_FLAG_QMI_FAIL and aborting the FW_READY handling
on error
Tested-on: WCN6750 hw1.0 AHB WLAN.MSL.2.0.c2-00204-QCAMSLSWPLZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (corsair-cpro) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop
Calling hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO.
This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point
immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within
the driver probe function. If the probe operation fails after "io start"
has been initiated, this race condition will result in a UAF vulnerability.
Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling
hid_hw_stop(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nzxt-smart2) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop
Calling hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO.
This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point
immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within
the driver probe function. If the probe operation fails after "io start"
has been initiated, this race condition will result in a UAF vulnerability.
Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling
hid_hw_stop(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watchdog: pretimeout: Fix UAF in watchdog_unregister_governor()
When a watchdog governor is unregistered, it updates existing watchdog
devices that were using this governor by falling back to `default_gov`.
If the governor being unregistered is currently set as `default_gov`,
the `default_gov` is never cleared. This leads to 2 use-after-free
issues:
1. New watchdog devices registered after this point will inherit the
dangling `default_gov`.
2. Existing watchdog devices using the unregistered governor will have
their `wdd->gov` reassigned to the dangling `default_gov`.
Fix the UAF by clearing `default_gov` if it matches the governor being
unregistered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware IE lengths in connect event
The firmware-controlled beacon_ie_len, assoc_req_len, and assoc_resp_len
fields in ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx() are not validated against the
buffer length. Their sum (up to 765) can exceed the actual WMI event
data, causing out-of-bounds reads during IE parsing and state corruption
of wmi->is_wmm_enabled.
Add a check that the total IE length fits within the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: ueagle-atm: reject descriptors that confuse probe and disconnect
uea_probe() distinguishes a pre-firmware device from a post-firmware one
using the USB id (UEA_IS_PREFIRM()), and stores a different object as the
interface data in each case: a 'struct completion' for a pre-firmware
device (to be waited on in .disconnect()), or a 'struct usbatm_data' for a
post-firmware one.
uea_disconnect() instead tells the two apart by the number of interfaces
of the active configuration (a pre-firmware device exposes a single
interface, ADI930 has 2 and eagle has 3), and casts the interface data
accordingly.
Because the two handlers use different criteria, a crafted device that
advertises a pre-firmware id together with a multi-interface descriptor
(or a post-firmware id with a single interface) makes them disagree: the
small 'struct completion' stored by uea_probe() is then passed to
usbatm_usb_disconnect(), which casts it to 'struct usbatm_data' and takes
instance->serialize, reading past the end of the allocation:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880470e2c60 by task kworker/1:2/982
...
__mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80
usbatm_usb_disconnect+0x70/0x820
uea_disconnect+0x133/0x2c0
usb_unbind_interface+0x1dd/0x9e0
...
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 96-byte region [ffff8880470e2c00, ffff8880470e2c60)
Reject such inconsistent descriptors in uea_probe() so that both handlers
always make the same pre/post-firmware decision. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate DFS referral PathConsumed
parse_dfs_referrals() validates that the response contains the fixed
referral entry array and, on for-next, the per-referral string offsets.
However, the response also contains a PathConsumed value that is later
used for DFS path parsing.
If a malformed response provides a PathConsumed value larger than the
search name, later DFS parsing can advance beyond the end of the path.
Validate PathConsumed against the search name length before storing it in
the parsed referral. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: drop incoming messages that cross network namespace boundaries
rds_find_bound() looks up the destination socket using a global
rhashtable keyed solely on (addr, port, scope_id). Network namespaces
are not part of the key, so a sender in netns A can deliver an incoming
message (inc) to a socket that lives in a different netns B.
When this happens, inc->i_conn points to an rds_connection whose c_net
is netns A, but the receiving rs lives in netns B. Once the child
process that created netns A exits, cleanup_net() calls
rds_loop_exit_net() -> rds_loop_kill_conns() -> rds_conn_destroy(),
freeing that connection. If the survivor socket in netns B still holds
the inc, any subsequent dereference of inc->i_conn is a use-after-free.
There are two dangerous sites in rds_clear_recv_queue():
1. inc->i_conn->c_lcong (offset 88 of freed rds_connection, size 200)
read via rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() -- confirmed by KASAN.
2. inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_free(inc) (function pointer at offset 80)
called via rds_inc_put() when the inc refcount reaches zero -- same
race window, potential call-through-freed-object primitive.
The bug is reachable from unprivileged user namespaces
(CLONE_NEWUSER + CLONE_NEWNET), available since Linux 3.8.
Fix this by rejecting the delivery in rds_recv_incoming() when the
socket returned by rds_find_bound() belongs to a different network
namespace than the connection that carried the message. Use the
existing rds_conn_net() / sock_net() helpers and net_eq() for the
comparison. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix infinite loop in __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit
cmd->dumpit callback can return a negative errno, causing an infinite
loop due to the while(len) condition. As the loop never terminates,
genl_mutex is never released, and other tasks waiting on it starve in D
state.
Check dumpit's return value, propagate it and jump to err_out on error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amt: re-read skb header pointers after every pull
Several AMT receive and transmit paths cache a pointer into the skb head
(ip_hdr(), ipv6_hdr(), eth_hdr() or the AMT message header) and then call
a helper that can reallocate that head before the cached pointer is used
again. pskb_may_pull(), ip_mc_may_pull(), ipv6_mc_may_pull(),
iptunnel_pull_header(), ip_mc_check_igmp() and ipv6_mc_check_mld() can all
free the old head and move the data, so a pointer taken before the call
dangles afterwards and the later access is a use-after-free of the freed
head.
The affected sites are:
amt_rcv() caches ip_hdr() before amt_parse_type() pulls, then reads
iph->saddr.
amt_dev_xmit() caches ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() before ip_mc_check_igmp()/
ipv6_mc_check_mld() and pskb_may_pull(), then reads the group address.
amt_multicast_data_handler() caches eth_hdr() before pskb_may_pull(),
then writes the L2 header.
amt_membership_query_handler() caches the AMT header, the outer and
inner eth_hdr() and ip_hdr() before iptunnel_pull_header() and several
pulls, then reads and writes them.
amt_igmpv3_report_handler() and amt_mldv2_report_handler() cache
ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() and the current group record and read the record
count from the report header inside the record loop, across the
*_mc_may_pull() calls.
amt_update_handler() caches ip_hdr() and the AMT membership-update
header before pskb_may_pull(), iptunnel_pull_header(),
ip_mc_check_igmp() and the report handler, then reads iph->daddr and
amtmu->nonce / amtmu->response_mac.
Fix each site by either snapshotting the scalar that is used after the
pull before the first pull runs, or re-deriving the header pointer from
the skb after the last pull that can move the head. Values that are
stable across the pull (source and group address, the response MAC and
nonce, the record count, the outer source MAC) are snapshotted; pointers
that are written through or read repeatedly are re-derived. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 19.1 before 19.1.4 and 19.2 before 19.2.2 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to read policy configuration belonging to a namespace they were not authorized to access, due to incorrect authorization checks in a GraphQL query. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix cork use-after-free in tcp_bpf_sendmsg()
tcp_bpf_sendmsg() keeps msg_tx across sk_stream_wait_memory(), which
drops and reacquires the socket lock. Its error path tries to decide
whether msg_tx names the local temporary message by comparing it with
the current value of psock->cork.
This comparison is unsafe when two threads send on the same socket:
Thread A Thread B
msg_tx = psock->cork
sk_msg_alloc() fails
sk_stream_wait_memory()
releases the socket lock acquires the socket lock
completes the cork
psock->cork = NULL
frees the cork
reacquires the socket lock
msg_tx != psock->cork
sk_msg_free(msg_tx)
The stale cork is therefore mistaken for the local temporary message
and freed again. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_free+0x49/0x50
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810c908800 by task poc/90
Call Trace:
sk_msg_free+0x49/0x50
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x14f5/0x1cc0
__sys_sendto+0x32c/0x3a0
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdb/0x1b0
Allocated by task 89:
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x16b3/0x1cc0
Freed by task 91:
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0xec3/0x1cc0
msg_tx can only name the stack-local tmp or the shared cork. Check for
tmp directly so a changed psock->cork cannot turn a shared message into
an apparent local one. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 19.1 before 19.1.4 and 19.2 before 19.2.2 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to modify project settings restricted to higher-privileged roles, due to missing authorization checks on a project update endpoint. |
| Incorrect authorization in Samsung Health prior to version 7.0.0 allows local attackers to access sensitive information. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect UUID list traversal
The hci_sync conversion moved class-of-device and EIR generation from an
HCI request built under hdev->lock to asynchronous command sync work.
The worker holds hdev->req_lock, but that lock does not serialize access
to hdev->uuids against add_uuid() and remove_uuid(), which update the
list under hdev->lock.
The following interleaving can therefore occur:
CPU0 (command sync work) CPU1 (management socket)
fetch uuid from the list
list_del(&uuid->list)
kfree(uuid)
read uuid->size
KASAN reports the resulting use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810dbd8620 by task kworker/u17:0/87
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0
hci_update_eir_sync+0x1c0/0x330
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290
process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
Allocated by task 86:
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
add_uuid+0x18a/0x4b0
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0
Freed by task 92:
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
remove_uuid+0x25e/0x560
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0
Hold hdev->lock while generating and committing the class-of-device and
EIR snapshots. Release it before sending an HCI command, so controller
waits do not happen under the device lock. This protects all UUID list
walks in these paths and restores the serialization lost in the command
sync conversion. |
