| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in fastschema through v0.15.1 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash the server process with a single HTTP request. The sendOTPEmail function in pkg/auth/local.go dereferences a pointer obtained from an unchecked error path without validating it is non-nil, causing a fatal panic that terminates the entire server when a recovery request is sent to the /api/auth/local/recover endpoint. |
| The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr's new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_dfu.c). The handler computes MIN(setup->wLength, buf->len) and passes buf->data to the image write callback without checking that the buf net_buf pointer is non-NULL.
The handler is reached over the USB control endpoint, driven by the USB host. For a DFU_DNLOAD (download) request with no Data OUT stage — notably the zero-length terminating download that the DFU protocol uses to end a firmware transfer — the USB core invokes the class handler with a NULL buffer. After the device has been advanced to the DFU_DNLOAD_IDLE state (by sending one valid download block and a GET_STATUS), a zero-length DFU_DNLOAD reaches handle_download() with buf == NULL, dereferencing it.
The result is a NULL+offset read that triggers a fatal CPU fault, i.e. a denial of service (device crash/reset). The attacker is whatever controls the USB host the device is attached to; DFU download support must be enabled with a registered image. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure — impact is limited to availability. The fix adds an explicit if (buf != NULL) guard so the callback receives a zero-length, NULL-data transfer instead of crashing. |
| A NULL pointer vulnerability has been found in the the shim application of dp.c library. A missing NULL pointer could allow attackers to perform a denial of service attack on a system that uses shim application for UEFI bootloader. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Prevent user-triggered null deref on QP create
Previously, the user QP creation path would only attempt to
populate iwqp->iwpbl if the user-provided req.user_wqe_bufs
field was non-zero. The problem is that iwqp->iwpbl is
unconditionally dereferenced later on in irdma_setup_virt_qp.
While there was a check for iwqp->iwpbl != NULL, this check
would only occur if req.user_wqe_bufs was non-zero. The end
result is that a user could send a zero user_wqe_bufs value
and trigger a null ptr deref.
Fix this by unconditionally calling irdma_get_pbl and bailing
if it fails, similar to the CQ and SRQ paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix crash in reset link replay
During reset recovery, mt7925_vif_connect_iter() replays firmware state
for links tracked in mvif->valid_links. After MLO link changes or MCU
timeout recovery, the driver bitmap can temporarily contain a link whose
mac80211 bss_conf has already gone away.
This can pass a NULL bss_conf to mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev(), matching
the crash where x1, the second argument, is NULL:
pc : mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x8c/0x1f8 [mt76_connac_lib]
lr : mt7925_vif_connect_iter+0x9c/0x168 [mt7925_common]
x2 : ffffff80a77f6018 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8099402080
Call trace:
mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_dev+0x8c/0x1f8 [mt76_connac_lib]
mt7925_vif_connect_iter+0x9c/0x168 [mt7925_common]
mt7925_mac_reset_work+0x264/0x2f8 [mt7925_common]
Skip missing bss_conf entries before replaying the link. Non-MLO AP/STA
reset replay is unchanged because the helper still returns &vif->bss_conf
for the legacy link. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Handle partially initialized auxiliary devices
bnxt_aux_devices_init() calls auxiliary_device_init() before all fields
used by bnxt_aux_dev_release() are initialized. After
auxiliary_device_init() succeeds, later errors must unwind with
auxiliary_device_uninit(), which invokes the release callback.
The release callback assumes that aux_priv->id, aux_priv->edev,
edev->net and edev->ulp_tbl are all populated. If allocation fails
after auxiliary_device_init(), the release path can otherwise dereference
or clear partially initialized state.
Allocate and attach the bnxt_en_dev and ULP table before calling
auxiliary_device_init(), so the release callback only sees a fully
initialized auxiliary private object. If auxiliary_device_init() itself
fails, free those allocations directly because device_initialize() has not
run and the release callback will not be invoked.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual
source review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpll: fix NULL pointer dereference in dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync()
When a dpll_pin is shared across multiple dpll_device instances and
those devices are being unregistered (e.g. during driver module removal),
a NULL pointer dereference can occur in dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync().
This happens under the following conditions:
- A pin is registered with two or more dpll devices (dpll_A, dpll_B)
- The pin has ref_sync pairs with other pins
- During unregistration of dpll_A's pins, a ref_sync partner pin is
unregistered first, removing it from dpll_A->pin_refs
- But since the partner pin is still registered with dpll_B, its
dpll_refs is not empty, so dpll_pin_ref_sync_pair_del() does NOT
run and the partner stays in the pin's ref_sync_pins xarray
- When the pin itself is then unregistered from dpll_A, the delete
notification calls dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync() which finds the
partner in ref_sync_pins, passes dpll_pin_available() (partner is
still registered with dpll_B), but dpll_pin_on_dpll_priv(dpll_A,
partner) returns NULL because partner was already removed from
dpll_A->pin_refs
- The NULL priv pointer is passed to the driver's ref_sync_get
callback, which dereferences it
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:zl3073x_dpll_input_pin_ref_sync_get+0x73/0x80 [zl3073x]
Call Trace:
dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync+0xb8/0x200
dpll_cmd_pin_get_one+0x3b6/0x4b0
dpll_pin_event_send+0x72/0x140
__dpll_pin_unregister+0x5a/0x2b0
dpll_pin_unregister+0x49/0x70
Fix this by skipping ref_sync pins whose priv pointer cannot be resolved
for the current dpll device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject redirect helpers without a bpf_net_context
The bpf_redirect*() helpers and skb_do_redirect() obtain the per-task
bpf_redirect_info via bpf_net_ctx_get_ri(), which dereferences the
current->bpf_net_context unconditionally. That context is established
on the paths that run tc BPF such as sch_handle_{ingress,egress}(),
*except* for the case where {cls,act}_bpf was attached to a proper
qdisc. A program running from there reaches the NULL deref in two ways:
* It calls bpf_redirect() directly, which dereferences the context at
the top of the helper:
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: red limit 1MB min 10KB max 20KB \
avpkt 1000 burst 100 qevent early_drop block 10
tc filter add block 10 pref 1 bpf obj redirect.o
* It simply returns TC_ACT_REDIRECT without helper call: tcf_qevent_handle()
then dispatches to skb_do_redirect(), which dereferences the context
Rather than extending bpf_net_context management into the qdisc path,
make the redirect helpers refuse to operate when no context exists, and
have tcf_qevent_handle() drop a TC_ACT_REDIRECT verdict instead of
calling skb_do_redirect(). Previous behaviour was a crash, so nothing
regresses by not supporting it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm_mpam: guard MBWU state before adding it to garbage
__destroy_component_cfg() adds each RIS mbwu_state object to the MPAM
garbage list when destroying component configuration.
However, mbwu_state is allocated per RIS and only for RISes with MBWU
monitors. A component can therefore have comp->cfg allocated while some
RISes still have ris->mbwu_state set to NULL.
Passing a NULL mbwu_state to add_to_garbage() dereferences the NULL
pointer inside the macro.
Skip RISes that do not have an mbwu_state object before adding them to
the garbage list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: check pointer returned by mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap()
mt76_connac_get_he_phy_cap routine can theoretically return NULL so
check cap pointer before dereferencing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: guard link STA in decap offload
mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload() iterates over the vif valid_links mask
when updating decap offload state for an MLO station. The station may not
have a link STA for every valid link of the vif, so mt792x_sta_to_link()
can return NULL for a link that belongs to the vif but not to the station.
The function currently dereferences mlink before checking whether the
link WCID is ready. If mlink is NULL, setting or clearing
MT_WCID_FLAG_HDR_TRANS dereferences a NULL pointer.
Skip links without a station link before touching mlink->wcid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: fix error checking of pvr_vm_context_lookup()
Since pvr_vm_context_lookup() returns either NULL or a pointer, then stop
using IS_ERR() for checking the return value.
Using IS_ERR() leads to the kernel oops reported below. It can be
reproduced by passing an invalid VM context handle from userspace to the
DRM_IOCTL_PVR_CREATE_CONTEXT ioctl.
[ 92.733119] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000148
[ 92.742042] Mem abort info:
[ 92.744890] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 92.748686] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 92.754020] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 92.757154] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 92.760337] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 92.765243] Data abort info:
[ 92.768129] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 92.773626] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 92.778763] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 92.784098] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000088ed23000
[ 92.790550] [0000000000000148] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 92.797381] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[ 92.803027] Modules linked in: powervr
[ 92.852533] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 409 Comm: triangle Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-g98b46e693b91 #1 PREEMPT
[ 92.861385] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM68 SK (DT)
[ 92.866766] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 92.873709] pc : pvr_vm_get_fw_mem_context+0x0/0xc [powervr]
[ 92.879376] lr : pvr_queue_create+0x26c/0x440 [powervr]
[ 92.884595] sp : ffff8000837fbb00
[ 92.887895] x29: ffff8000837fbb60 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff8000837fbce8
[ 92.895015] x26: ffff000807f61a40 x25: ffff000807f61a00 x24: ffff000807f64400
[ 92.902135] x23: ffff00080a5ab000 x22: ffff800079b24730 x21: ffff000807f61800
[ 92.909254] x20: ffff00080999e680 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 92.916373] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
[ 92.923492] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: ffff80008145b298
[ 92.930611] x11: ffff8000844e5000 x10: ffff80008165a130 x9 : 0000000000000100
[ 92.937730] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : ffff0008076b27e0 x6 : ffff00080ec43b7c
[ 92.944850] x5 : ffff00080ec43b78 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff00080999e680
[ 92.951968] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 92.959088] Call trace:
[ 92.961521] pvr_vm_get_fw_mem_context+0x0/0xc [powervr] (P)
[ 92.967173] pvr_context_create+0x190/0x410 [powervr]
[ 92.972218] pvr_ioctl_create_context+0x44/0x8c [powervr]
[ 92.977608] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x124 [drm]
[ 92.982127] drm_ioctl+0x1f8/0x4dc [drm]
[ 92.986098] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104
[ 92.990102] invoke_syscall+0x54/0x10c
[ 92.993842] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
[ 92.998532] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 93.001835] el0_svc+0x38/0x11c
[ 93.004969] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
[ 93.009139] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 93.012792] Code: aa1703e0 d2800014 95cb0ba4 17ffffe8 (f940a400)
[ 93.018869] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: check amdgpu_vm_bo_find() result in GET_MAPPING_INFO
The AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO path of amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl() looks
up the bo_va for the buffer object in the caller's VM via
amdgpu_vm_bo_find(), but uses the returned pointer without checking it.
amdgpu_vm_bo_find() returns NULL when the BO has no bo_va in that VM,
which is the normal case for a BO that has never been mapped. The result
is fed straight into amdgpu_vm_bo_va_for_each_valid_mapping(), which
expands to list_for_each_entry(mapping, &(bo_va)->valids, list) and
dereferences bo_va, causing a NULL pointer dereference.
This is reachable by any process able to issue the ioctl (render group)
simply by requesting mapping info for an unmapped BO.
Return -ENOENT when no bo_va is found, jumping to out_exec so the
drm_exec context and GEM object reference are released.
(cherry picked from commit 528b19377affc1cc7362a70a254c1dda793595f9) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix possible NULL-pointer deref in mt7996_mcu_sta_bfer_eht()
mt76_connac_get_eht_phy_cap routine can theoretically return NULL so
check cap pointer before dereferencing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: hvs/v3d: Fix null dereference in unbind
The hvs and v3d drivers use dev_get_drvdata(master) in their unbind
functions. Since the vc4-drm gets removed before its dependent drivers
(vc4_hvs/vc4_v3d) the vc4_hvs_unbind/vc4_v3d_unbind functions try to
get drvdata of its master and fails with a null dereference error.
Use the data pointer passed to the unbind functions directly instead of
dev_get_drvdata(master). This avoids using potentially freed memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Add missing error check for platform_get_resource()
Add missing error check for platform_get_resource() return value to
prevent NULL pointer dereference when memory resource is not available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix max_vport related crash on allocation error during init
Set adapter->max_vports only after successful allocation of vports, netdevs
and vport_config buffers. This fixes possible crashes on reset or rmmod,
following failed allocation on init
[ 305.981402] idpf 0000:83:00.0: enabling device (0100 -> 0102)
[ 305.994464] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Device HW Reset initiated
[ 320.416872] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 320.416918] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 320.416942] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 320.416963] PGD 2099657067 P4D 0
[ 320.416983] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
...
[ 320.417093] RIP: 0010:idpf_remove+0x118/0x200 [idpf]
[ 320.417130] Code: 8b bb 98 09 00 00 e8 17 0f 5b e5 48 8b bb e8 08 00 00 e8 0b 0f 5b e5 66 83 bb 28 06 00 00 00 48 8b bb 20 06 00 00 74 49 31 ed <48> 8b 04 ef 48 85 c0 74 2f 48 8b 78 20 e8 66 58 91 e5 48 8b 83 20
[ 320.417183] RSP: 0018:ff7322212903fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 320.417205] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff4463de40300000 RCX: ff7322212903fd4c
[ 320.417228] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa7f7d100 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 320.417250] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 320.417272] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ff4463de3a638f58 R12: ff4463be89ac7000
[ 320.417294] R13: ff4463be89ac7198 R14: ff4463be94fc7198 R15: ffffffffc0f10f20
[ 320.417317] FS: 00007f963c0e6740(0000) GS:ff4463fdd65d8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 320.417342] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 320.417362] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000020ba674002 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
[ 320.417385] PKRU: 55555554
[ 320.417398] Call Trace:
[ 320.417412] <TASK>
[ 320.417429] pci_device_remove+0x42/0xb0
[ 320.417459] device_release_driver_internal+0x1a9/0x210
[ 320.417492] driver_detach+0x4b/0x90
[ 320.417516] bus_remove_driver+0x70/0x100
[ 320.417539] pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0
[ 320.417564] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x190/0x2f0
[ 320.417592] ? kmem_cache_free+0x31e/0x550
[ 320.417619] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190
[ 320.417644] ? do_syscall_64+0x38/0x6b0
[ 320.417665] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x6b0
[ 320.417683] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
[ 320.417706] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 320.417727] RIP: 0033:0x7f963bb30beb |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: validate CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk size in CS pass1
Add a minimum-length check for the AMDGPU_CHUNK_ID_CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk in
amdgpu_cs_pass1(), matching the gate already present for the IB, FENCE and
BO_HANDLES chunk types.
The CP_GFX_SHADOW case previously shared a bare break with the dependency
and syncobj chunk types, which do not dereference a fixed-size struct. When
userspace submits this chunk with length_dw == 0, vmemdup_array_user() is
called with size 0 and returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the IS_ERR()
check. amdgpu_cs_p2_shadow() then dereferences chunk->kdata as a struct
drm_amdgpu_cs_chunk_cp_gfx_shadow (reading shadow->flags), faulting on the
ZERO_SIZE_PTR and causing a NULL-pointer dereference.
This is reachable by an unprivileged process in the render group. Reject
undersized chunks with -EINVAL during pass1 so the bad submission is
rejected before pass2 ever dereferences the data.
(cherry picked from commit 7f61b2eef7415eccdb40850aca0de94211948657) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use sender devcom for MPV master-up
After PCIe DPC recovery, mlx5 reloads the affected functions and
replays multiport affiliation events. In the reported failure, the
first relevant device error was:
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: DPC: containment event
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Fatal)
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: [ 5] SDES (First)
mlx5 recovered the PCI functions and resumed 0000:11:00.1. During
that resume, RDMA multiport binding replayed
MLX5_DRIVER_EVENT_AFFILIATION_DONE and mlx5e sent
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP. The host then panicked with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready+0x5/0x40 [mlx5_core]
RDI: 0000000000000000
Call trace included:
mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready
mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv
mlx5_devcom_send_event
mlx5_ib_bind_slave_port
mlx5r_mp_probe
mlx5_pci_resume
MPV devcom registration publishes mlx5e private data to the component
peer list before mlx5e_devcom_init_mpv() stores the returned component
device in priv->devcom. A concurrent master-up event can therefore
reach a peer whose private data is visible but whose priv->devcom
backpointer is still NULL.
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP already carries the sender/master mlx5e private
data as event_data. The ready bit is stored on the shared devcom
component, not on an individual peer. Use the sender devcom when
marking the MPV component ready.
This preserves the readiness transition while avoiding a NULL
dereference of the peer devcom pointer during affiliation replay after
PCI error recovery. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix kernel panic during driver load failure
Avoid kernel panic if MES init fails during driver load. The KIQ ring is
falsely marked as ready as ASICs that use MES, KIQ is owned by MES.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:gfx_v12_1_wait_reg_mem+0x5a/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
Call Trace:
gfx_v12_1_ring_emit_reg_write_reg_wait+0x1f/0x30 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gmc_fw_reg_write_reg_wait+0xb2/0x190 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb+0x1cc/0x230 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gart_invalidate_tlb+0x81/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gart_unbind+0x72/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind+0xa4/0xb0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ttm_tt_unpopulate+0x13/0xd0 [amdgpu]
amdttm_tt_unpopulate+0x29/0x70 [amdttm]
ttm_bo_put+0x1eb/0x360 [amdttm]
amdgpu_bo_free_kernel+0xf9/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ih_ring_fini+0x5a/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_irq_fini_hw+0x58/0x80 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x4e0/0x5b0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x60/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_pci_probe+0x28e/0x6d0 [amdgpu]
pci_device_probe+0x19f/0x220
really_probe+0x1ed/0x340
driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x80
__driver_attach+0xd3/0x1a0
bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xa0
bus_add_driver+0x19f/0x270
driver_register+0x5d/0xf0
do_one_initcall+0xac/0x200
do_init_module+0x1ec/0x280
__se_sys_finit_module+0x2de/0x310
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x250
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
(cherry picked from commit 4623b958dd6da0f4c3026afdf330626a09ecb0f0) |
