| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, an off-by-one out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bacnet-stack's ReadPropertyMultiple service decoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read one byte past an allocated buffer boundary by sending a crafted RPM request with a truncated object identifier. The vulnerability is in rpm_decode_object_id(), which checks apdu_len < 5 but then accesses all 6 byte positions (indices 0-5) — consuming 1 byte for the context tag, 4 bytes for the object ID, then reading apdu[5] for the opening tag check. A 5-byte input passes the length check but causes a 1-byte OOB read, leading to crashes on embedded BACnet devices. The vulnerability exists in src/bacnet/rpm.c and affects any deployment that enables the ReadPropertyMultiple confirmed service handler (enabled by default in the reference server). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3. |
| In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.22.3, there is an integer underflow and resultant out-of-bounds read if an application calls gss_accept_sec_context() on a system with a NegoEx mechanism registered in /etc/gss/mech. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger this, possibly causing the process to terminate in parse_message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Harden depth calculation functions
An issue was exposed where OS can pass in U32_MAX for SQ/RQ/SRQ size.
This can cause integer overflow and truncation of SQ/RQ/SRQ depth
returning a success when it should have failed.
Harden the functions to do all depth calculations and boundary
checking in u64 sizes. |
| An integer overflow was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.4 and iPadOS 18.4, iPadOS 17.7.6, macOS Sequoia 15.4, macOS Sonoma 14.7.5, tvOS 18.4, visionOS 2.4, watchOS 11.4. An attacker on the local network may be able to cause a denial-of-service. |
| An integer overflow was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.5 and iPadOS 18.5, iPadOS 17.7.7, macOS Sequoia 15.5, macOS Sonoma 14.7.6, macOS Ventura 13.7.6, tvOS 18.5, visionOS 2.5, watchOS 11.5. A remote attacker may be able to leak memory. |
| SWUpdate contains an integer underflow vulnerability in the multipart upload parser in mongoose_multipart.c that allows unauthenticated attackers to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted HTTP POST request to /upload with a malformed multipart boundary and controlled TCP stream timing. Attackers can trigger an integer underflow in the mg_http_multipart_continue_wait_for_chunk() function when the buffer length falls within a specific range, causing an out-of-bounds heap read that writes data beyond the allocated receive buffer to a local IPC socket. |
| go-ntlmssp is a Go package that provides NTLM/Negotiate authentication over HTTP. Prior to version 0.1.1, a malicious NTLM challenge message can causes an slice out of bounds panic, which can crash any Go process using `ntlmssp.Negotiator` as an HTTP transport. Version 0.1.1 patches the issue. |
| An integer overflow was addressed through improved input validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.3, macOS Sonoma 14.7.3, macOS Ventura 13.7.3. An app may be able to elevate privileges. |
| An integer overflow was addressed by adopting 64-bit timestamps. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.3 and iPadOS 18.7.3, iOS 26.2 and iPadOS 26.2, macOS Sequoia 15.7.3, macOS Sonoma 14.8.3, macOS Tahoe 26.2, tvOS 26.2, visionOS 26.2, watchOS 26.2. An app may be able to gain root privileges. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response()
In rxgk_verify_response(), there's a potential integer overflow due to
rounding up token_len before checking it, thereby allowing the length check to
be bypassed.
Fix this by checking the unrounded value against len too (len is limited as
the response must fit in a single UDP packet). |
| A flaw was found in GNU Emacs. This vulnerability, a memory corruption issue, occurs when Emacs processes specially crafted SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) data. A local user could exploit this by convincing a victim to open a malicious SVG file, which may lead to a denial of service (DoS) or potentially information disclosure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds
rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation. When the raw
length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.
Fix this by:
(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.
(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.
(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
TOCTOU re-parse.
The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG
The GRP_ACK_MSG handler in tipc_group_proto_rcv() currently decrements
bc_ackers on every inbound group ACK, even when the same member has
already acknowledged the current broadcast round.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, a duplicate ACK received after the last
legitimate ACK wraps the counter to 65535. Once wrapped,
tipc_group_bc_cong() keeps reporting congestion and later group
broadcasts on the affected socket stay blocked until the group is
recreated.
Fix this by ignoring duplicate or stale ACKs before touching bc_acked or
bc_ackers. This makes repeated GRP_ACK_MSG handling idempotent and
prevents the underflow path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a
global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator
advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN
header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc().
The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when
it fills tt_change, so the wrapped allocation is too small and
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() writes past the end of the heap object
before the later packet-size check runs.
Fix this by rejecting TT responses whose TVLV value length cannot fit in
the 16-bit TVLV payload length field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat
A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat
worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same
engine->heartbeat.systole request.
The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls
i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears
the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request
retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering
__engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat
timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and
intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer
and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow:
```
<4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915]
<4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0
...
<4> [487.222707] Call Trace:
<4> [487.222711] <TASK>
<4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915]
<4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
<4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915]
<4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915]
<4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915]
<4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915]
<4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760
<4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
<4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150
<4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480
<4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
<4> [487.227141] </TASK>
```
Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with
xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware
instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This
guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL
pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it.
(cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: Fix static_branch_dec() underflow for aql_disable.
syzbot reported static_branch_dec() underflow in aql_enable_write(). [0]
The problem is that aql_enable_write() does not serialise concurrent
write()s to the debugfs.
aql_enable_write() checks static_key_false(&aql_disable.key) and
later calls static_branch_inc() or static_branch_dec(), but the
state may change between the two calls.
aql_disable does not need to track inc/dec.
Let's use static_branch_enable() and static_branch_disable().
[0]:
val == 0
WARNING: kernel/jump_label.c:311 at __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311, CPU#0: syz.1.3155/20288
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20288 Comm: syz.1.3155 Tainted: G U L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [U]=USER, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311
Code: f2 c9 ff 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 54 f2 c9 ff 48 89 df e8 ac f9 ff ff eb ad e8 45 f2 c9 ff 90 0f 0b 90 eb a2 e8 3a f2 c9 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 97 48 89 df e8 5c 4b 33 00 e9 36 ff ff ff 0f 1f 80 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b9f7c10 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff9b3e5d40 RCX: ffffffff823c57b4
RDX: ffff8880285a0000 RSI: ffffffff823c5846 RDI: ffff8880285a0000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 1ffff9200173ef88 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc9000b9f7e98
FS: 00007f530dd726c0(0000) GS:ffff8881245e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000001140 CR3: 000000007cc4a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked kernel/jump_label.c:297 [inline]
__static_key_slow_dec kernel/jump_label.c:321 [inline]
static_key_slow_dec+0x7c/0xc0 kernel/jump_label.c:336
aql_enable_write+0x2b2/0x310 net/mac80211/debugfs.c:343
short_proxy_write+0x133/0x1a0 fs/debugfs/file.c:383
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:793 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:801 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:798 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1eb/0x250 fs/read_write.c:798
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xc9/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f530cf9aeb9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f530dd72028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f530d215fa0 RCX: 00007f530cf9aeb9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 00007f530d008c1f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 4200000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f530d216038 R14: 00007f530d215fa0 R15: 00007ffde89fb978
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes
len = nopaged_len - bmax;
where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is
BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit()
decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including
page fragments):
is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc);
When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a
large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the
subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value
(~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute
hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i
pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less
SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel
memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and
potential memory corruption from hardware.
Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to
min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then
always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single
descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally,
and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: filemap: fix nr_pages calculation overflow in filemap_map_pages()
When running stress-ng on my Arm64 machine with v7.0-rc3 kernel, I
encountered some very strange crash issues showing up as "Bad page state":
"
[ 734.496287] BUG: Bad page state in process stress-ng-env pfn:415735fb
[ 734.496427] page: refcount:0 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4cf316 pfn:0x415735fb
[ 734.496434] flags: 0x57fffe000000800(owner_2|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff)
[ 734.496439] raw: 057fffe000000800 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 734.496440] raw: 00000000004cf316 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 734.496442] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
"
After analyzing this page’s state, it is hard to understand why the
mapcount is not 0 while the refcount is 0, since this page is not where
the issue first occurred. By enabling the CONFIG_DEBUG_VM config, I can
reproduce the crash as well and captured the first warning where the issue
appears:
"
[ 734.469226] page: refcount:33 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000bef2d187 index:0x81a0 pfn:0x415735c0
[ 734.469304] head: order:5 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 734.469315] memcg:ffff000807a8ec00
[ 734.469320] aops:ext4_da_aops ino:100b6f dentry name(?):"stress-ng-mmaptorture-9397-0-2736200540"
[ 734.469335] flags: 0x57fffe400000069(locked|uptodate|lru|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff)
......
[ 734.469364] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO((_Generic((page + nr_pages - 1),
const struct page *: (const struct folio *)_compound_head(page + nr_pages - 1), struct page *:
(struct folio *)_compound_head(page + nr_pages - 1))) != folio)
[ 734.469390] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 734.469393] WARNING: ./include/linux/rmap.h:351 at folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x3b8/0x468,
CPU#90: stress-ng-mlock/9430
[ 734.469551] folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x3b8/0x468 (P)
[ 734.469555] set_pte_range+0xd8/0x2f8
[ 734.469566] filemap_map_folio_range+0x190/0x400
[ 734.469579] filemap_map_pages+0x348/0x638
[ 734.469583] do_fault_around+0x140/0x198
......
[ 734.469640] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188
"
The code that triggers the warning is: "VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(page_folio(page +
nr_pages - 1) != folio, folio)", which indicates that set_pte_range()
tried to map beyond the large folio’s size.
By adding more debug information, I found that 'nr_pages' had overflowed
in filemap_map_pages(), causing set_pte_range() to establish mappings for
a range exceeding the folio size, potentially corrupting fields of pages
that do not belong to this folio (e.g., page->_mapcount).
After above analysis, I think the possible race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
filemap_map_pages() ext4_setattr()
//get and lock folio with old inode->i_size
next_uptodate_folio()
.......
//shrink the inode->i_size
i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size);
//calculate the end_pgoff with the new inode->i_size
file_end = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(mapping->host), PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
end_pgoff = min(end_pgoff, file_end);
......
//nr_pages can be overflowed, cause xas.xa_index > end_pgoff
end = folio_next_index(folio) - 1;
nr_pages = min(end, end_pgoff) - xas.xa_index + 1;
......
//map large folio
filemap_map_folio_range()
......
//truncate folios
truncate_pagecache(inode, inode->i_size);
To fix this issue, move the 'end_pgoff' calculation before
next_uptodate_folio(), so the retrieved folio stays consistent with the
file end to avoid
---truncated--- |
| uriparser before 1.0.1 has numeric truncation in text range comparison, if an application accepts URIs with a length in gigabytes. |
| nimiq-block contains block primitives to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. `SkipBlockProof::verify` computes its quorum check using `BitSet.len()`, then iterates `BitSet` indices and casts each `usize` index to `u16` (`slot as u16`) for slot lookup. Prior to version 1.3.0, if an attacker can get a `SkipBlockProof` verified where `MultiSignature.signers` contains out-of-range indices spaced by 65536, these indices inflate `len()` but collide onto the same in-range `u16` slot during aggregation. This makes it possible for a malicious validator with far fewer than `2f+1` real signer slots to pass skip block proof verification by multiplying a single BLS signature by the same factor. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available. |
