| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: add sanity check for agwidth in dbMount
The width in dmapctl of the AG is zero, it trigger a divide error when
calculating the control page level in dbAllocAG.
To avoid this issue, add a check for agwidth in dbAllocAG. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: ignore xattrs past end
Once inside 'ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all' we should
ignore xattrs entries past the 'end' entry.
This fixes the following KASAN reported issue:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300
? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260
? _printk+0xc0/0x100
? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10
? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
print_address_description+0x78/0x390
print_report+0x107/0x1f0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0
? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160
? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
kasan_report+0xcc/0x100
? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30
? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0
? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0
? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410
ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30
? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0
? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20
? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670
? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240
? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0
ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0
? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0
? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
evict+0x4ac/0x950
? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310
? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30
? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0
do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0
? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120
? 0xffffffff81000000
? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210
? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250
? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530
__x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x434ffd
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000
which belongs to the cache filp of size 360
The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of
freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888012c12100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
ffff888012c12180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: vlan: don't propagate flags on open
With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock:
[ 1.211455] ============================================
[ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted
[ 1.211823] --------------------------------------------
[ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0
[ 1.212207]
[ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.212487]
[ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1.212626]
[ 1.212751] CPU0
[ 1.212815] ----
[ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 1.213143]
[ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184:
[ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0
[ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0
[ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.213895]
[ 1.213895] stack backtrace:
[ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5
[ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 1.213994] Call Trace:
[ 1.213995] <TASK>
[ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0
[ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0
[ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0
[ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40
[ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI
[ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev
[ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270
[ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0
[ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev
[ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info
[ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120
[ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90
[ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0
[ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230
[ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0
[ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80
[ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490
[ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120
[ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320
[ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0
[ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0
[ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220
[ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0
[ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140
[ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0
[ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56
Device setup:
netdevsim0 (down)
^ ^
bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down)
When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we
propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes
(re)locking on of the real_dev.
Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There
is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate
the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues.
Reproducer:
echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*)
dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev)
ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0
ip link set dev netdevsim0 up
ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100
ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allm
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: vmd: Make vmd_dev::cfg_lock a raw_spinlock_t type
The access to the PCI config space via pci_ops::read and pci_ops::write is
a low-level hardware access. The functions can be accessed with disabled
interrupts even on PREEMPT_RT. The pci_lock is a raw_spinlock_t for this
purpose.
A spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock on PREEMPT_RT, so it cannot be
acquired with disabled interrupts. The vmd_dev::cfg_lock is accessed in
the same context as the pci_lock.
Make vmd_dev::cfg_lock a raw_spinlock_t type so it can be used with
interrupts disabled.
This was reported as:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
Call Trace:
rt_spin_lock+0x4e/0x130
vmd_pci_read+0x8d/0x100 [vmd]
pci_user_read_config_byte+0x6f/0xe0
pci_read_config+0xfe/0x290
sysfs_kf_bin_read+0x68/0x90
[bigeasy: reword commit message]
Tested-off-by: Luis Claudio R. Goncalves <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
[kwilczynski: commit log]
[bhelgaas: add back report info from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241218115951.83062-1-ryotkkr98@gmail.com/] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Acquire SRCU in KVM_GET_MP_STATE to protect guest memory accesses
Acquire a lock on kvm->srcu when userspace is getting MP state to handle a
rather extreme edge case where "accepting" APIC events, i.e. processing
pending INIT or SIPI, can trigger accesses to guest memory. If the vCPU
is in L2 with INIT *and* a TRIPLE_FAULT request pending, then getting MP
state will trigger a nested VM-Exit by way of ->check_nested_events(), and
emuating the nested VM-Exit can access guest memory.
The splat was originally hit by syzkaller on a Google-internal kernel, and
reproduced on an upstream kernel by hacking the triple_fault_event_test
selftest to stuff a pending INIT, store an MSR on VM-Exit (to generate a
memory access on VMX), and do vcpu_mp_state_get() to trigger the scenario.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx/pi_lockdep_false_pos-lock #3 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:1058 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by triple_fault_ev/1256:
#0: ffff88810df5a330 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x9a0 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 11 UID: 1000 PID: 1256 Comm: triple_fault_ev Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x144/0x190
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x156/0x180 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
read_and_check_msr_entry+0x2e/0x180 [kvm_intel]
__nested_vmx_vmexit+0x550/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_check_nested_events+0x1b/0x30 [kvm]
kvm_apic_accept_events+0x33/0x100 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate+0x30/0x1d0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33e/0x9a0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix a suspicious RCU usage warning
I received the following warning while running cthon against an ontap
server running pNFS:
[ 57.202521] =============================
[ 57.202522] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 57.202523] 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 Not tainted
[ 57.202525] -----------------------------
[ 57.202525] net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c:349 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
[ 57.202527]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 57.202528]
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[ 57.202529] no locks held by test5/3567.
[ 57.202530]
stack backtrace:
[ 57.202532] CPU: 0 PID: 3567 Comm: test5 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 5b09971b4965c0aceba19f3eea324a4a806e227e
[ 57.202534] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[ 57.202536] Call Trace:
[ 57.202537] <TASK>
[ 57.202540] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 57.202551] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0
[ 57.202556] rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr+0x17c/0x190 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]
[ 57.202596] rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x50/0x180 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]
[ 57.202621] ? rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x254/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]
[ 57.202646] rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x27a/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]
[ 57.202671] ? __pfx_rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x10/0x10 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]
[ 57.202696] nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect+0x345/0x760 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]
[ 57.202728] ? __pfx_nfs4_test_session_trunk+0x10/0x10 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]
[ 57.202754] nfs4_fl_prepare_ds+0x75/0xc0 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a]
[ 57.202760] filelayout_write_pagelist+0x4a/0x200 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a]
[ 57.202765] pnfs_generic_pg_writepages+0xbe/0x230 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]
[ 57.202788] __nfs_pageio_add_request+0x3fd/0x520 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202813] nfs_pageio_add_request+0x18b/0x390 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202831] nfs_do_writepage+0x116/0x1e0 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202849] nfs_writepages_callback+0x13/0x30 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202866] write_cache_pages+0x265/0x450
[ 57.202870] ? __pfx_nfs_writepages_callback+0x10/0x10 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202891] nfs_writepages+0x141/0x230 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202913] do_writepages+0xd2/0x230
[ 57.202917] ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x5c/0x80
[ 57.202921] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x67/0x80
[ 57.202924] filemap_write_and_wait_range+0xd9/0x170
[ 57.202930] nfs_wb_all+0x49/0x180 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]
[ 57.202947] nfs4_file_flush+0x72/0xb0 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]
[ 57.202969] __se_sys_close+0x46/0xd0
[ 57.202972] do_syscall_64+0x68/0x100
[ 57.202975] ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100
[ 57.202976] ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100
[ 57.202979] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 57.202982] RIP: 0033:0x7fe2b12e4a94
[ 57.202985] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 18 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 44 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3
[ 57.202987] RSP: 002b:00007ffe857ddb38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ 57.202989] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe857dfd68 RCX: 00007fe2b12e4a94
[ 57.202991] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007ffe857ddc40 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 57.202992] RBP: 00007ffe857dfc50 R08: 7fffffffffffffff R09: 0000000065650f49
[ 57.202993] R10: 00007f
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: allow exp not to be removed in nf_ct_find_expectation
Currently nf_conntrack_in() calling nf_ct_find_expectation() will
remove the exp from the hash table. However, in some scenario, we
expect the exp not to be removed when the created ct will not be
confirmed, like in OVS and TC conntrack in the following patches.
This patch allows exp not to be removed by setting IPS_CONFIRMED
in the status of the tmpl. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Fix a fence leak in submit error path
In error paths, we could unref the submit without calling
drm_sched_entity_push_job(), so msm_job_free() will never get
called. Since drm_sched_job_cleanup() will NULL out the
s_fence, we can use that to detect this case.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/653584/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Fix another leak in the submit error path
put_unused_fd() doesn't free the installed file, if we've already done
fd_install(). So we need to also free the sync_file.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/653583/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: displayport: Fix potential deadlock
The deadlock can occur due to a recursive lock acquisition of
`cros_typec_altmode_data::mutex`.
The call chain is as follows:
1. cros_typec_altmode_work() acquires the mutex
2. typec_altmode_vdm() -> dp_altmode_vdm() ->
3. typec_altmode_exit() -> cros_typec_altmode_exit()
4. cros_typec_altmode_exit() attempts to acquire the mutex again
To prevent this, defer the `typec_altmode_exit()` call by scheduling
it rather than calling it directly from within the mutex-protected
context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/vmci: Clear the vmci transport packet properly when initializing it
In vmci_transport_packet_init memset the vmci_transport_packet before
populating the fields to avoid any uninitialised data being left in the
structure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtk-sd: Prevent memory corruption from DMA map failure
If msdc_prepare_data() fails to map the DMA region, the request is
not prepared for data receiving, but msdc_start_data() proceeds
the DMA with previous setting.
Since this will lead a memory corruption, we have to stop the
request operation soon after the msdc_prepare_data() fails to
prepare it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Fix NULL pointer dereference in core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port()
The function core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port(), in its error code path,
unconditionally calls core_scsi3_lunacl_undepend_item() passing the
dest_se_deve pointer, which may be NULL.
This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference if dest_se_deve remains
unset.
SPC-3 PR SPEC_I_PT: Unable to locate dest_tpg
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000012
Call trace:
core_scsi3_lunacl_undepend_item+0x2c/0xf0 [target_core_mod] (P)
core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port+0x120c/0x1c30 [target_core_mod]
core_scsi3_emulate_pro_register+0x6b8/0xcd8 [target_core_mod]
target_scsi3_emulate_pr_out+0x56c/0x840 [target_core_mod]
Fix this by adding a NULL check before calling
core_scsi3_lunacl_undepend_item() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass
Export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to allow KVM guest_memfd to create
anonymous inodes with proper security context. This replaces the current
pattern of calling alloc_anon_inode() followed by
inode_init_security_anon() for creating security context manually.
This change also fixes a security regression in secretmem where the
S_PRIVATE flag was not cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing
LSM/SELinux checks to be bypassed for secretmem file descriptors.
As guest_memfd currently resides in the KVM module, we need to export this
symbol for use outside the core kernel. In the future, guest_memfd might be
moved to core-mm, at which point the symbols no longer would have to be
exported. When/if that happens is still unclear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eeprom: at24: fix memory corruption race condition
If the eeprom is not accessible, an nvmem device will be registered, the
read will fail, and the device will be torn down. If another driver
accesses the nvmem device after the teardown, it will reference
invalid memory.
Move the failure point before registering the nvmem device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm/pat: fix VM_PAT handling in COW mappings
PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios. Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.
Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().
In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.
To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.
We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode. We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.
For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.
Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():
<--- C reproducer --->
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <liburing.h>
int main(void)
{
struct io_uring_params p = {};
int ring_fd;
size_t size;
char *map;
ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &p);
if (ring_fd < 0) {
perror("io_uring_setup");
return 1;
}
size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);
/* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
/* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
*map = 0;
pause();
return 0;
}
<--- C reproducer --->
On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:
# ./iouring &
# memhog 16G
# killall iouring
[ 301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g
[ 301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1
[ 301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4
[ 301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000
[ 301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047
[ 301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200
[ 301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000
[ 301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 301.564186] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 301.564773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 301.565725] PKRU: 55555554
[ 301.565944] Call Trace:
[ 301.566148] <TASK>
[ 301.566325] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.566618] ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[ 301.566876] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 3
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: gpio: Fix the out-of-bounds access to drvdata::gpiods
drvdata::gpiods is supposed to hold an array of 'gpio_desc' pointers. But
the memory is allocated for only one pointer. This will lead to
out-of-bounds access later in the code if 'config::ngpios' is > 1. So
fix the code to allocate enough memory to hold 'config::ngpios' of GPIO
descriptors.
While at it, also move the check for memory allocation failure to be below
the allocation to make it more readable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pNFS: Fix a race to wake on NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN
We found a few different systems hung up in writeback waiting on the same
page lock, and one task waiting on the NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN bit in
pnfs_update_layout(), however the pnfs_layout_hdr's plh_outstanding count
was zero.
It seems most likely that this is another race between the waiter and waker
similar to commit ed0172af5d6f ("SUNRPC: Fix a race to wake a sync task").
Fix it up by applying the advised barrier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of: dynamic: Synchronize of_changeset_destroy() with the devlink removals
In the following sequence:
1) of_platform_depopulate()
2) of_overlay_remove()
During the step 1, devices are destroyed and devlinks are removed.
During the step 2, OF nodes are destroyed but
__of_changeset_entry_destroy() can raise warnings related to missing
of_node_put():
ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2 ...
Indeed, during the devlink removals performed at step 1, the removal
itself releasing the device (and the attached of_node) is done by a job
queued in a workqueue and so, it is done asynchronously with respect to
function calls.
When the warning is present, of_node_put() will be called but wrongly
too late from the workqueue job.
In order to be sure that any ongoing devlink removals are done before
the of_node destruction, synchronize the of_changeset_destroy() with the
devlink removals. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel
When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when
being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause
various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by
looking for a matching socket. This is performed in
udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue
with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such
cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various
issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list.
We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such
case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path,
the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs
are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit
skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible
depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to
kernel crashes.
One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the
frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled)
skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list,
although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to
do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues.
Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the
lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances)
but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we
could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current
logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure
we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early.
This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets
lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must
be segmented.
[1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408!
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70
__udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560 |
