| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A race condition was discovered in ext4_write_inline_data_end in fs/ext4/inline.c in the ext4 subsystem in the Linux kernel through 5.13.13. |
| A use-after-free exists in the Linux Kernel in tc_new_tfilter that could allow a local attacker to gain privilege escalation. The exploit requires unprivileged user namespaces. We recommend upgrading past commit 04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5 |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Arraytics Booktics allows Blind SQL Injection.
This issue affects Booktics: from n/a through 1.0.22. |
| HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to 6.9.11, the JSON utility parser in org.hl7.fhir.utilities.json.parser.JsonParser enforces no maximum nesting depth for arrays or objects. As a result, a small but deeply nested, syntactically valid FHIR JSON document can trigger unbounded readArray() or readObject() recursion, raising a StackOverflowError before structural validation runs. An attacker who can submit JSON resources for validation can thus crash the request thread, and services that do not isolate StackOverflowError safely may experience worker loss or process instability — a denial-of-service condition. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.11. |
| Public-only tokens bypass private-resource restrictions on `/api/v1/user` self routes |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-ep-msi: Fix error unwind and prevent double alloc
pci_epf_alloc_doorbell() stores the allocated doorbell message array in
epf->db_msg/epf->num_db before requesting MSI vectors. If MSI allocation
fails, the array is freed but the EPF state may still point to freed
memory.
Clear epf->db_msg and epf->num_db on the MSI allocation failure path so
that later cleanup cannot double-free the array and callers can retry
allocation.
Also return -EBUSY when doorbells have already been allocated to prevent
leaking or overwriting an existing allocation. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Numeric truncation error in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| A SQL query validation bypass in the Flint extension query handler in the OpenSearch SQL plugin allows a remote authenticated actor with async query access to execute arbitrary code on Apache Spark workers by sending a crafted SQL query to the direct query endpoint. |
| CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for Bitlocker before v7.7.4 fails to properly handle decryption errors and allows encrypted volumes to be mounted as plaintext. |
| amazing-print/amazing_print at commit dc890dfafdf07088ea901df53c19c2710e5c5234 contains a Ruby code injection condition in AwesomeMethodArray#grep. A specially named method containing Ruby interpolation syntax can be interpolated into a dynamically constructed eval string when grep is called with a block, resulting in Ruby code execution in the host process. Exploitation requires an application path that allows an attacker to influence dynamic method names. |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in SureDash <= 1.10.1 versions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init()
Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs
the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()
Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing
freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.
Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched. |
