| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()
remove_waiter() is used by the slowlock paths, but it is also used for
proxy-lock rollback in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() when invoked from
futex_requeue().
In the latter case waiter::task is not current, but remove_waiter()
operates on current for the dequeue operation. That results in several
problems:
1) the rbtree dequeue happens without waiter::task::pi_lock being held
2) the waiter task's pi_blocked_on state is not cleared, which leaves a
dangling pointer primed for UAF around.
3) rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain() operates on the wrong top priority waiter
task
Use waiter::task instead of current in all related operations in
remove_waiter() to cure those problems.
[ tglx: Fixup rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(), add a comment and amend the
changelog ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2306!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0xa08/0xfe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2306
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004aff760 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88807e3c8780 RCX: ffffffff89593e0e
RDX: ffff88807b7c4900 RSI: ffffffff89594747 RDI: ffff88807b7c4900
RBP: 0000000000000820 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000961a63e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88807e3c8780
R13: 00000000961a6560 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000961a63e0
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe1a0ed8df0 CR3: 000000002d816000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ipgre_header+0xdd/0x540 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:900
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3439 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3028 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x3ae5/0x53c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa54/0xc30 net/socket.c:2592
___sys_sendmsg+0x190/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2646
__sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x220 net/socket.c:2678
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x106/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe1a0e6c1a9
When a non-Ethernet device (e.g. GRE tunnel) is enslaved to a bond,
bond_setup_by_slave() directly copies the slave's header_ops to the
bond device:
bond_dev->header_ops = slave_dev->header_ops;
This causes a type confusion when dev_hard_header() is later called
on the bond device. Functions like ipgre_header(), ip6gre_header(),all use
netdev_priv(dev) to access their device-specific private data. When
called with the bond device, netdev_priv() returns the bond's private
data (struct bonding) instead of the expected type (e.g. struct
ip_tunnel), leading to garbage values being read and kernel crashes.
Fix this by introducing bond_header_ops with wrapper functions that
delegate to the active slave's header_ops using the slave's own
device. This ensures netdev_priv() in the slave's header functions
always receives the correct device.
The fix is placed in the bonding driver rather than individual device
drivers, as the root cause is bond blindly inheriting header_ops from
the slave without considering that these callbacks expect a specific
netdev_priv() layout.
The type confusion can be observed by adding a printk in
ipgre_header() and running the following commands:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev dummy0
ip link set dummy0 up
ip link add gre1 type gre local 10.0.0.1
ip link add bond1 type bond mode active-backup
ip link set gre1 master bond1
ip link set gre1 up
ip link set bond1 up
ip addr add fe80::1/64 dev bond1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Drop the lock in skb_may_tx_timestamp()
skb_may_tx_timestamp() may acquire sock::sk_callback_lock. The lock must
not be taken in IRQ context, only softirq is okay. A few drivers receive
the timestamp via a dedicated interrupt and complete the TX timestamp
from that handler. This will lead to a deadlock if the lock is already
write-locked on the same CPU.
Taking the lock can be avoided. The socket (pointed by the skb) will
remain valid until the skb is released. The ->sk_socket and ->file
member will be set to NULL once the user closes the socket which may
happen before the timestamp arrives.
If we happen to observe the pointer while the socket is closing but
before the pointer is set to NULL then we may use it because both
pointer (and the file's cred member) are RCU freed.
Drop the lock. Use READ_ONCE() to obtain the individual pointer. Add a
matching WRITE_ONCE() where the pointer are cleared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: annotate data-races around hdev->req_status
__hci_cmd_sync_sk() sets hdev->req_status under hdev->req_lock:
hdev->req_status = HCI_REQ_PEND;
However, several other functions read or write hdev->req_status without
holding any lock:
- hci_send_cmd_sync() reads req_status in hci_cmd_work (workqueue)
- hci_cmd_sync_complete() reads/writes from HCI event completion
- hci_cmd_sync_cancel() / hci_cmd_sync_cancel_sync() read/write
- hci_abort_conn() reads in connection abort path
Since __hci_cmd_sync_sk() runs on hdev->req_workqueue while
hci_send_cmd_sync() runs on hdev->workqueue, these are different
workqueues that can execute concurrently on different CPUs. The plain
C accesses constitute a data race.
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations on all concurrent accesses
to hdev->req_status to prevent potential compiler optimizations that
could affect correctness (e.g., load fusing in the wait_event
condition or store reordering). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
writeback: Fix use after free in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn()
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like:
wb_get(new_wb);
while (1) {
list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs);
/* Nothing to do? */
if (!list)
break;
... process the items ...
}
Now adding of items to the list looks like:
wb_queue_isw()
if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs))
queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work);
Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it
can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is
empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw
items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing
use-after-free issues.
We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that
could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to
wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with
more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid
that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical
benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead.
That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have
added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to
remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix mechToken leak when SPNEGO decode fails after token alloc
The kernel ASN.1 BER decoder calls action callbacks incrementally as it
walks the input. When ksmbd_decode_negTokenInit() reaches the mechToken
[2] OCTET STRING element, ksmbd_neg_token_alloc() allocates
conn->mechToken immediately via kmemdup_nul(). If a later element in
the same blob is malformed, then the decoder will return nonzero after
the allocation is already live. This could happen if mechListMIC [3]
overrunse the enclosing SEQUENCE.
decode_negotiation_token() then sets conn->use_spnego = false because
both the negTokenInit and negTokenTarg grammars failed. The cleanup at
the bottom of smb2_sess_setup() is gated on use_spnego:
if (conn->use_spnego && conn->mechToken) {
kfree(conn->mechToken);
conn->mechToken = NULL;
}
so the kfree is skipped, causing the mechToken to never be freed.
This codepath is reachable pre-authentication, so untrusted clients can
cause slow memory leaks on a server without even being properly
authenticated.
Fix this up by not checking check for use_spnego, as it's not required,
so the memory will always be properly freed. At the same time, always
free the memory in ksmbd_conn_free() incase some other failure path
forgot to free it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports
Similar to commit 950803f72547 ("bonding: fix type confusion in
bond_setup_by_slave()") team has the same class of header_ops type
confusion.
For non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev->header_ops
directly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or
dev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device
instead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as
the wrong private type and can crash.
The syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root
cause is in team: the topology is gre -> bond -> team, and team calls
the inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower
device, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets
netdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash.
Fix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse,
selecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks
with port->dev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device
context.
Also pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so
recursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse
callbacks always run with the correct device context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: prevent potential infinite loop in bond_header_parse()
bond_header_parse() can loop if a stack of two bonding devices is setup,
because skb->dev always points to the hierarchy top.
Add new "const struct net_device *dev" parameter to
(struct header_ops)->parse() method to make sure the recursion
is bounded, and that the final leaf parse method is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: handle attr_set_size() errors when truncating files
If attr_set_size() fails while truncating down, the error is silently
ignored and the inode may be left in an inconsistent state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: quota: create dedicated workqueue for quota_release_work
There is a kernel panic due to WARN_ONCE when panic_on_warn is set.
This issue occurs when writeback is triggered due to sync call for an
opened file(ie, writeback reason is WB_REASON_SYNC). When f2fs balance
is needed at sync path, flush for quota_release_work is triggered.
By default quota_release_work is queued to "events_unbound" queue which
does not have WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag. During f2fs balance "writeback"
workqueue tries to flush quota_release_work causing kernel panic due to
MEM_RECLAIM flag mismatch errors.
This patch creates dedicated workqueue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag
for work quota_release_work.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 14867 at kernel/workqueue.c:3721 check_flush_dependency+0x13c/0x148
Call trace:
check_flush_dependency+0x13c/0x148
__flush_work+0xd0/0x398
flush_delayed_work+0x44/0x5c
dquot_writeback_dquots+0x54/0x318
f2fs_do_quota_sync+0xb8/0x1a8
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x3cc/0x99c
f2fs_gc+0x190/0x750
f2fs_balance_fs+0x110/0x168
f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x474/0x7dc
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x7d0/0xd0c
do_writepages+0xe0/0x2f4
__writeback_single_inode+0x44/0x4ac
writeback_sb_inodes+0x30c/0x538
wb_writeback+0xf4/0x440
wb_workfn+0x128/0x5d4
process_scheduled_works+0x1c4/0x45c
worker_thread+0x32c/0x3e8
kthread+0x11c/0x1b0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Always pass in an error pointer to __sev_platform_shutdown_locked()
When
9770b428b1a2 ("crypto: ccp - Move dev_info/err messages for SEV/SNP init and shutdown")
moved the error messages dumping so that they don't need to be issued by
the callers, it missed the case where __sev_firmware_shutdown() calls
__sev_platform_shutdown_locked() with a NULL argument which leads to
a NULL ptr deref on the shutdown path, during suspend to disk:
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 983 Comm: hib.sh Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-i, BIOS 2.5 09/08/2022
RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold+0x0/0x21 [ccp]
That rIP is:
00000000000006fd <__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold>:
6fd: 8b 13 mov (%rbx),%edx
6ff: 48 8b 7d 00 mov 0x0(%rbp),%rdi
703: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx
Code: 74 05 31 ff 41 89 3f 49 8b 3e 89 ea 48 c7 c6 a0 8e 54 a0 41 bf 92 ff ff ff e8 e5 2e 09 e1 c6 05 2a d4 38 00 01 e9 26 af ff ff <8b> 13 48 8b 7d 00 89 c1 48 c7 c6 18 90 54 a0 89 44 24 04 e8 c1 2e
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005467d00 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 00000000ffffff92 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
and %rbx is nice and clean.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0
sev_dev_destroy
psp_dev_destroy
sp_destroy
pci_device_shutdown
device_shutdown
kernel_power_off
hibernate.cold
state_store
kernfs_fop_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
Pass in a pointer to the function-local error var in the caller.
With that addressed, suspending the ccp shows the error properly at
least:
ccp 0000:47:00.1: sev command 0x2 timed out, disabling PSP
ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV: failed to SHUTDOWN error 0x0, rc -110
SEV-SNP: Leaking PFN range 0x146800-0x146a00
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x146800 unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x146800 - 0x146a00]
...
ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV-SNP firmware shutdown failed, rc -16, error 0x0
ACPI: PM: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5
kvm: exiting hardware virtualization
reboot: Power down
Btw, this driver is crying to be cleaned up to pass in a proper I/O
struct which can be used to store information between the different
functions, otherwise stuff like that will happen in the future again. |
| Bold Reports Standalone Report Designer before 14.1.12 contains a missing filepath validation vulnerability in its database download feature that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem by supplying a crafted request. Attackers can exploit this path traversal weakness to disclose sensitive server files, including authentication credentials, enabling full unauthorized access to the application. The vulnerability is specific to the DataHub module, which was introduced in Bold Reports 6.3. Therefore, versions prior to 6.3 are not affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix dereferencing uninitialized error pointer
Fix below smatch warnings:
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1312 __sev_platform_init_locked()
error: we previously assumed 'error' could be null |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Delay put pmc->idev in mld_del_delrec()
pmc->idev is still used in ip6_mc_clear_src(), so as mld_clear_delrec()
does, the reference should be put after ip6_mc_clear_src() return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex
Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then
doing a
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free.
That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the
code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after
it has unlocked the mutex.
But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody
*else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're
still using the mutex.
Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep
mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership,
even if they guarantee mutual exclusion.
A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still
accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in
and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the
first user is still cleaning up.
See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst,
in particular the section [1] about semantics:
"mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has
internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for
another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the
mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore"
So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the
last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops
_their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all
while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it.
Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex:
the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's
the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently
about object lifetimes). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Ignore too large handle values in BIG
hci_le_big_sync_established_evt is necessary to filter out cases where the
handle value is belonging to ida id range, otherwise ida will be erroneously
released in hci_conn_cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bluetooth/hci: disallow setting handle bigger than HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX
Syzbot hit warning in hci_conn_del() caused by freeing handle that was
not allocated using ida allocator.
This is caused by handle bigger than HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX passed by
hci_le_big_sync_established_evt(), which makes code think it's unset
connection.
Add same check for handle upper bound as in hci_conn_set_handle() to
prevent warning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect()
Extend a critical section to prevent chan from early freeing.
Also make the l2cap_connect() return type void. Nothing is using the
returned value but it is ugly to return a potentially freed pointer.
Making it void will help with backports because earlier kernels did use
the return value. Now the compile will break for kernels where this
patch is not a complete fix.
Call stack summary:
[use]
l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd
l2cap_connect
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); <- alloc chan
│ __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);
│ l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
│ list_add(&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); ... (1)
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
chan->conf_state ... (4) <- use after free
[free]
l2cap_conn_del
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ foreach chan in conn->chan_l: ... (2)
│ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
│ l2cap_chan_destroy
│ kfree(chan) ... (3) <- chan freed
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read
include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _test_bit
include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect+0xa67/0x11a0
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4260
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bf040a0 by task kworker/u3:1/311 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: remove one synchronize_net() barrier in ipv6_mc_down()
As discussed in the past (commit 2d3916f31891 ("ipv6: fix skb drops
in igmp6_event_query() and igmp6_event_report()")) I think the
synchronize_net() call in ipv6_mc_down() is not needed.
Under load, synchronize_net() can last between 200 usec and 5 ms.
KASAN seems to agree as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: restore set elements when delete set fails
From abort path, nft_mapelem_activate() needs to restore refcounters to
the original state. Currently, it uses the set->ops->walk() to iterate
over these set elements. The existing set iterator skips inactive
elements in the next generation, this does not work from the abort path
to restore the original state since it has to skip active elements
instead (not inactive ones).
This patch moves the check for inactive elements to the set iterator
callback, then it reverses the logic for the .activate case which
needs to skip active elements.
Toggle next generation bit for elements when delete set command is
invoked and call nft_clear() from .activate (abort) path to restore the
next generation bit.
The splat below shows an object in mappings memleak:
[43929.457523] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[43929.457532] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1139 at include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1237 nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[...]
[43929.458014] RIP: 0010:nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458076] Code: 83 f8 01 77 ab 49 8d 7c 24 08 e8 37 5e d0 de 49 8b 6c 24 08 48 8d 7d 50 e8 e9 5c d0 de 8b 45 50 8d 50 ff 89 55 50 85 c0 75 86 <0f> 0b eb 82 0f 0b eb b3 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
[43929.458081] RSP: 0018:ffff888140f9f4b0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[43929.458086] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881434f5288 RCX: dffffc0000000000
[43929.458090] RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffffffffa26d28a7 RDI: ffff88810ecc9550
[43929.458093] RBP: ffff88810ecc9500 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10281f3e8f
[43929.458096] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff0000ffff0000 R12: ffff8881434f52a0
[43929.458100] R13: ffff888140f9f5f4 R14: ffff888151c7a800 R15: 0000000000000002
[43929.458103] FS: 00007f0c687c4740(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[43929.458107] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[43929.458111] CR2: 00007f58dbe5b008 CR3: 0000000123602005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[43929.458114] Call Trace:
[43929.458118] <TASK>
[43929.458121] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0
[43929.458127] ? nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458188] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0
[43929.458196] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[43929.458200] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
[43929.458211] ? nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xd7/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458271] ? nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458332] nft_mapelem_deactivate+0x24/0x30 [nf_tables]
[43929.458392] nft_rhash_walk+0xdd/0x180 [nf_tables]
[43929.458453] ? __pfx_nft_rhash_walk+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[43929.458512] ? rb_insert_color+0x2e/0x280
[43929.458520] nft_map_deactivate+0xdc/0x1e0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458582] ? __pfx_nft_map_deactivate+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[43929.458642] ? __pfx_nft_mapelem_deactivate+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[43929.458701] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x46/0x70
[43929.458709] nft_delset+0xff/0x110 [nf_tables]
[43929.458769] nft_flush_table+0x16f/0x460 [nf_tables]
[43929.458830] nf_tables_deltable+0x501/0x580 [nf_tables] |
