| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset.
The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels.
If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8.
If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8.
The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data.
We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding a frame for a SANM file (ANIM v0 variant), the decoded data can be larger than the buffer allocated for it.
Frames encoded with codec 48 can specify their resolution (width x height). A buffer of appropriate size is allocated depending on the resolution.
This codec can encode the frame contents using a run-length encoding algorithm. There are no checks that the decoded frame fits in the allocated buffer, leading to a heap-buffer-overflow.
process_frame_obj initializes the buffers based on the frame resolution:
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When parsing the header for a DHAV file, there's an integer underflow in offset calculation that leads to reading the duration from before the start of the allocated buffer.
If we load a DHAV file that is larger than MAX_DURATION_BUFFER_SIZE bytes (0x100000) for example 0x101000 bytes, then at [0] we have size = 0x101000. At [1] we have end_buffer_size = 0x100000, and at [2] we have end_buffer_pos = 0x1000.
The loop then scans backwards through the buffer looking for the dhav tag; when it is found, we'll calculate end_pos based on a 32-bit offset read from the buffer.
There is subsequently a check [3] that end_pos is within the section of the file that has been copied into end_buffer, but it only correctly handles the cases where end_pos is before the start of the file or after the section copied into end_buffer, and not the case where end_pos is within the the file, but before the section copied into end_buffer. If we provide such an offset, (end_pos - end_buffer_pos) can underflow, resulting in the subsequent access at [4] occurring before the beginning of the allocation.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When calculating the content path in handling of MPEG-DASH manifests, there's an out-of-bounds NUL-byte write one byte past the end of the buffer.When we call xmlNodeGetContent below [0], it returns a buffer precisely allocated to match the string length, using strdup internally. If this buffer is not an empty string, it is assigned to root_url at [1].If the last (non-NUL) byte in this buffer is not '/' then we append '/' in-place at [2]. This will write two bytes into the buffer, starting at the last valid byte in the buffer, writing the NUL byte beyond the end of the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in Tenda AC18 15.03.05.19(6318). This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /goform/SetUpnpCfg. The manipulation of the argument upnpEn leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. |
| A weakness has been identified in Tenda AC18 15.03.05.19(6318). This affects an unknown part of the file /goform/WifiMacFilterSet. Executing manipulation of the argument wifi_chkHz can lead to stack-based buffer overflow. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. |
| The application fails to implement several security headers. These headers help increase the overall security level of the web application by e.g., preventing the application to be displayed in an iFrame (Clickjacking attacks) or not executing injected malicious JavaScript code (XSS attacks). |
| The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it susceptible to brute-force attacks. |
| A remote unauthorized attacker may gather sensitive information of the application, due to missing authorization of configuration settings of the product. |
| A remote, unauthorized attacker can brute force folders and files and read them like private keys or configurations, making the application vulnerable for gathering sensitive information. |
| It's possible to brute force folders and files, what can be used by an attacker to steal sensitve information. |
| When an error occurs in the application a full stacktrace is provided to the user. The stacktrace lists class and method names as well as other internal information. An attacker thus receives information about the technology used and the structure of the application. |
| The application does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it possible for an attacker to guess user credentials. |
| For failed login attempts, the application returns different error messages depending on whether the login failed due to an incorrect password or a non-existing username. This allows an attacker to guess usernames until they find an existing one. |
| Multiple endpoints with sensitive information do not require authentication, making the application susceptible to information gathering. |
| In the HTTP request, the username and password are transferred directly in the URL as parameters. However, URLs can be stored in various systems such as server logs, browser histories or proxy servers. As a result, there is a high risk that this sensitive data will be disclosed unintentionally. |
| The application provides access to a login protected H2 database for caching purposes. The username is prefilled. |
| Due to a lack of authentication, it is possible for an unauthenticated user to request data from this endpoint, making the application vulnerable for user enumeration. |
