| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and
post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final
attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a failed
replacement leaves it at -1.
The current !retry test reverses both outcomes. It returns an error after
a successful final replacement, leaving the link update complete but the
reader bookkeeping unfinished. After a failed final replacement, it
falls through and updates the head and reader pointers as though the
replacement succeeded, which can corrupt the ring.
Treat only a negative counter as exhaustion and return the documented
-EBUSY error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: sensor-hub: Fix out-of-bounds write in sensor_hub_get_feature
sensor_hub_get_feature() clamps its return value to the caller's buffer
size, but the copy loop still copies field->report_size / 8 bytes for
each report value. A malicious HID descriptor can advertise a large
feature field size while an IIO caller supplies a small stack buffer,
such as a single s32, causing an out-of-bounds write.
HID core stores parsed report values in __s32 slots and clamps extracted
values to 32 bits. Reject feature fields that require more than one slot
per value, guard the total byte count calculation, and clamp each
per-value copy to the remaining caller buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: cec: stm32: prevent out-of-bounds write on RX overflow
stm32_rx_done() appends each received CEC byte to rx_msg.msg[] using
rx_msg.len as the write index, incrementing it on every RXBR
(receive-byte-ready) interrupt without checking it against the buffer
size:
cec->rx_msg.msg[cec->rx_msg.len++] = val & 0xFF;
rx_msg.msg[] is a fixed CEC_MAX_MSG_SIZE (16) byte array in struct
cec_msg, and rx_msg.len is only reset on RXACKE/RXOVR or after a
completed message (RXEND). The number of bytes received before RXEND is
decided by the remote CEC device (it sets EOM), not by the driver. A
peer that keeps sending bytes without ending the message drives RXBR
repeatedly, pushing rx_msg.len past 16 and writing peer-controlled bytes
out of bounds into the surrounding memory. This is reachable in normal
operation once the driver has probed and receiving is enabled, from the
IRQ thread, without any local privilege.
The length check in the CEC core runs on the consumer side, after the
byte has been stored, so it does not prevent the overflow. Bound the
index in the driver before the store, as the other platform CEC drivers
already do (e.g. tegra_cec), dropping the excess bytes of an overlong
frame.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vicodec: fix out-of-bounds write in FWHT encoder
vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out() sizes the encoder CAPTURE buffer from the
compressed descriptor pixfmt_fwht, whose sizeimage_mult is 3:
coded_w * coded_h * 3 + sizeof(struct fwht_cframe_hdr). fwht_encode_frame()
encodes one plane per component, and an incompressible plane takes the
FWHT_FRAME_UNENCODED path in encode_plane(), copying the plane verbatim.
For a 4-component pixel format all four planes are full resolution
(width_div == height_div == 1), so a frame that forces every plane
through the unencoded fallback writes
sizeof(struct fwht_cframe_hdr) + 4 * coded_w * coded_h bytes, overrunning
the plane by coded_w * coded_h, which can result in corruption
of adjacent kernel heap memory.
Bump pixfmt_fwht.sizeimage_mult from 3 to 4, matching the largest
components_num among the supported raw formats, so the capture buffer is
always large enough for the unencoded fallback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix slab-out-of-bounds in nilfs_direct_propagate after truncation
Shuangpeng Bai reported that KASAN detected a slab-out-of-bounds error
in nilfs_direct_propagate() during testing.
Analysis revealed that after truncating a file, a node block immediately
below the B-tree root was not deleted. Instead, it remained in the B-tree
node cache in a dirty state. The log writer subsequently detected this
block and incorrectly invoked nilfs_direct_propagate() on it, which is
designed to handle only data blocks in direct mapping.
B-tree nodes in the cache are managed by virtual block numbers, and their
logical keys typically exceed the range expected by direct mapping.
Consequently, processing such a node as a direct mapping entry triggers
a slab-out-of-bounds access.
The root cause is that when a B-tree mapping collapses into a direct
mapping during truncation, an intermediate node block pointed to by the
root node is left behind as garbage instead of being explicitly deleted.
This resolves the issue by adding a nilfs_btree_discard() operation
to delete the remaining intermediate node block during the conversion.
A 'deform' flag is added to the bop_delete interface to explicitly signal
that the deletion is part of a mapping transformation. This allows the
B-tree mapping implementation to perform the necessary cleanup and
discarding of the residual node structure that would be otherwise be left
orphaned after the transition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: size fh_verify server sockaddr slot by xpt_locallen
The nfsd_fh_verify and nfsd_fh_verify_err tracepoints declare the
server sockaddr slot sized by xpt_remotelen but fill it from
xpt_local using xpt_locallen:
TP_STRUCT__entry(
...
__sockaddr(server, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
...
)
TP_fast_assign(
...
__assign_sockaddr(server, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_local,
rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_locallen);
...
)
When xpt_locallen exceeds xpt_remotelen, __assign_sockaddr's memcpy
writes past the reserved ring-buffer slot. In the reverse direction
(xpt_locallen < xpt_remotelen) the slot is oversized and the
unwritten tail leaks prior ring-buffer contents to trace consumers.
The write-past-end case is reachable on NFS/UDP. svc_xprt_set_remote()
is only called from svc_tcp_accept() (net/sunrpc/svcsock.c) and from
the RDMA connect path; svc_create_socket() for UDP calls only
svc_xprt_set_local(), so xpt_remotelen stays 0 for the xprt's
lifetime. Every fh_verify trace for an NFSv2/v3-over-UDP request
then copies 16 or 28 bytes from xpt_local into a zero-byte slot.
The other NFSD tracepoints that record the server address
(NFSD_TRACE_PROC_CALL_FIELDS, NFSD_TRACE_PROC_RES_FIELDS,
SVC_RQST_ENDPOINT_FIELDS) already size the server slot by
xpt_locallen; nfsd_fh_verify and nfsd_fh_verify_err were the only
exceptions.
Fix by sizing the server slot with xpt_locallen so the declared slot
matches the copy length. The client slot and its assignment already
agree on xpt_remotelen and are left untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: reject buckets with mismatched CRUSH ids
crush_decode() stores bucket data by array slot, and the mapper later
derives the per-bucket workspace index from the decoded bucket id. A
malformed map can therefore make one bucket reuse another bucket's
workspace by encoding an id different from -1 - slot.
For uniform buckets, the second replica selection expands the source
bucket's permutation into that aliased workspace buffer. If the source
bucket is larger than the aliased bucket, the write runs past the smaller
permutation array and can escape the kvmalloc'd CRUSH workspace. KASAN
reports a slab OOB write of 4 bytes in bucket_perm_choose().
Reject buckets whose encoded id does not match their array slot. Valid
CRUSH maps already use the canonical negative id corresponding to the
bucket slot, so this restores the invariant expected by
work->work[-1 - in->id] without changing valid map behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: reject export_targets ranks >= CEPH_MAX_MDS in mdsmap decode
MDSMap export_targets entries are monitor controlled. check_new_map()
uses each entry as a bit number in a fixed stack bitmap, so a rank
outside the protocol namespace can make set_bit() write past the end of
the array.
Reject ranks outside CEPH_MAX_MDS while decoding the map. Do not
validate against possible_max_rank here because maps may legitimately
reference ranks beyond a temporarily reduced max_mds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix loff_t underflow in cifs_remap_file_range() when len == 0
With len == 0 (clone to EOF), the effective length is computed as:
len = src_inode->i_size - off;
If off > i_size, this is a negative loff_t, corrupting the ByteCount
in the FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE request and inverting the range
in filemap_write_and_wait_range(). The existing off >= i_size check
fires only after the ioctl has already been sent.
Snapshot i_size_read() once for both the bounds check and the length
calculation, eliminating the TOCTOU and 32-bit torn-read risk. Reject
off > src_size with -EINVAL. Treat off == src_size as a no-op,
consistent with __generic_remap_file_range_prep(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate dirty page table on log replay
Each DIR_PAGE_ENTRY ends in a page_lcns[] array whose length is the on-disk
lcns_follow field. check_rstbl() validates the table bookkeeping but never
checks that this array fits in the entry, so a crafted lcns_follow lets the
v0->v1 conversion memmove and later replay passes run off the entry.
Add check_dp_table() to reject, right after check_rstbl(), any entry larger
than its size claims via struct_size() (the same expression used to allocate
these entries, so the check is overflow-safe by construction). All consumers
can then trust lcns_follow as the real capacity. This covers every
page_lcns[] access whose index is bounded by the entry itself (the
conversion memmove, the HotFix store via find_dp(), and the self-bounded
scan loops). Accesses whose index comes from the log record need a separate
bound and are handled in a follow-up patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound page_lcns[] index by the log record
The copy_lcns loop and the redo shorten loop index page_lcns[] at j + i,
where i runs up to the log record's lcns_follow. That count is checked only
against the record's own length, not the target entry, so check_dp_table()
(which validates the entry's lcns_follow) does not cover it: the copy_lcns
entry may even be freshly allocated after that check, and find_dp() bounds j
but not i. A crafted record thus overflows page_lcns[] of an otherwise valid
entry.
Add dp_range_ok() and reject, before each loop, any record whose run does
not fit the entry. These are the only two page_lcns[] accesses indexed by
the record rather than the entry, so together with the entry validation
every access is now bounded.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: original patch contained changes to the problem already handled, applied partly] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: reject invalid MFT LCNs from boot sector
The NTFS boot sector stores the MFT and MFTMirr locations as unsigned
64-bit LCNs, but parse_ntfs_boot_sector() decoded them into an s64.
A crafted high-bit value could therefore become negative and pass
the existing upper-bound check. The invalid value then propagated into
the MFT zone allocator and could result in an out-of-bounds access to
lcn_empty_bits_per_page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate non-resident attribute offsets
ntfs_attr_update_meta() shifts the attribute name when converting between
non-sparse and sparse attributes. Converting to sparse also adds the
compressed_size field before the name and mapping pairs, requiring eight
additional bytes in the attribute record.
However, the validator does not check that name_offset is within safe
boundaries for these operations or that the additional space is available.
A malicious MFT record could set name_offset such that:
1. The name is positioned at the very end of a non-sparse attribute.
Converting to sparse would shift the name forward by 8 bytes,
writing beyond the attribute boundary.
2. The name overlaps with the mapping pairs, causing corruption during
conversion.
Add validation to ensure:
- For named attributes, name_offset is within valid bounds
- Name does not extend beyond the attribute or overlap with mapping pairs
- For non-sparse, non-compressed attributes, eight bytes are available
after mapping_pairs_offset for the compressed_size field
The space check also covers unnamed attributes, for which name_offset = 0
is valid and no name range needs to be checked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: verify run length exceeding volume boundary
The mapping pairs decoder validates that the starting LCN is within the
volume but does not check if the run extends beyond the volume boundary.
A malformed NTFS image with a crafted mapping pairs array could cause
the kernel to access memory beyond the volume boundary, potentially leading
to memory corruption and privilege escalation.
Add validation to ensure lcn + length stays within nr_clusters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ecryptfs: reject oversized encrypted_key_size in parse_tag_3_packet
parse_tag_3_packet() set encrypted_key_size from the Tag 3 packet body
without bounding it against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64). When
encrypted_key_size > 64, decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key()
sets decrypted_key_size = encrypted_key_size and performs two
out-of-bounds writes:
1. crypto_skcipher_decrypt() writes encrypted_key_size bytes into
decrypted_key[64] via scatterlist, overflowing into the parent
ecryptfs_auth_tok struct.
2. memcpy(crypt_stat->key, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size) writes
into crypt_stat->key[64], corrupting root_iv, keysig_list, and
mutexes in ecryptfs_crypt_stat.
Only AES-192 (cipher code 0x08) enables this because it sets
crypt_stat->key_size = 24 independently of encrypted_key_size,
allowing crypto_skcipher_setkey() to succeed while encrypted_key_size
exceeds ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES.
The PKI decryption path (parse_tag_65_packet) already validates
decrypted_key_size <= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES; the passphrase path
omits this check.
Bound encrypted_key_size against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64) rather
than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES (512). The 64-byte limit also
protects the 512-byte encrypted_key[] buffer, so the former 512-byte
check is removed as redundant.
[tyhicks: Adjust the code comment to refer to macros representing the
buffer sizes rather than mentioning the buffer size values since they
may change in the future] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: skip sufficiently large global buffers when resizing
z_erofs_gbuf_nrpages is advanced only after every global buffer has been
grown. If a resize fails after some buffers were enlarged, a retry
revisits those enlarged buffers.
Retrying the same size then returns -ENOMEM because alloc_pages_bulk()
has no pages to add and the unchanged return value is treated as a
failure. Retrying an intermediate size allocates a temporary pointer
array smaller than gbuf->nrpages and copies more existing pointers than
the array can hold.
Skip buffers that already satisfy the request. Once all remaining
buffers have caught up, advancing z_erofs_gbuf_nrpages again describes
the guaranteed minimum size across the pool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Disable preemption in __bpf_get_stack
get_perf_callchain() returns a per-CPU perf_callchain_entry buffer and
releases its recursion slot via put_callchain_entry() before returning,
so nothing keeps the entry reserved while __bpf_get_stack() consumes
it below.
A preemptible BPF program (e.g. a non-sleepable raw tracepoint program
on a PREEMPT kernel, which runs under migrate_disable() but not
preempt_disable()) can be scheduled out between obtaining the entry
and the copy. Another task scheduled on the same CPU then reuses the
same per-CPU buffer and overwrites trace->nr with a larger value.
copy_len is then computed from the inflated trace->nr and can exceed
the caller's buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write in the memcpy()
and in the build_id path.
The rcu_read_lock() taken here alone does not prevent this. It is
only taken on the may_fault path, and under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU it does
not disable preemption; it merely keeps perf's callchain buffer array
alive (freed via call_rcu()) and does nothing to stop another task
from reusing the entry.
Disable preemption around obtaining the callchain entry and copying
it into the caller's buffer, so the entry cannot be reused underneath
us and trace->nr stays bounded by max_depth. Build ID resolution may
fault and is therefore deferred until after preemption is re-enabled;
by then the instruction pointers have already been copied into buf,
so it operates only on that private copy. Note, preempt_disable() also
subsumes the buffer-lifetime guarantee the rcu_read_lock() provided,
since a preempt-disabled section is an RCU read-side critical section
for the callchain buffers' call_rcu() reclaim.
[ changed Fixes: commit ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels
bloom_map_alloc() has two 32-bit-specific problems when the computed
bitmap reaches the U32_MAX fallback case.
First, BITS_TO_BYTES(U32_MAX) is evaluated with 32-bit arithmetic. The
addition performed by DIV_ROUND_UP wraps, so the map allocates only the
fixed-size bloom filter object while keeping bitset_mask == U32_MAX.
Subsequent updates can then write past the allocated object.
Second, fixing only the allocation size is not sufficient. The bloom hash
is a u32, but set_bit() takes a signed long bit number and x86 test_bit()
eventually feeds the index to variable_test_bit(long, ...). On 32-bit
kernels, hashes in [0x80000000, U32_MAX] therefore become negative bit
offsets. x86 bt/bts with a memory operand interpret those offsets relative
to the supplied base, so a map with bitset_mask == U32_MAX can read or
write before bloom->bitset even after allocating the full 512 MiB bitmap.
Keep the U32_MAX fallback, but split each hash into a word pointer and an
in-word bit number before calling test_bit() or set_bit(). The bitops
argument is then always in [0, BITS_PER_LONG - 1], while BIT_WORD(h) still
selects the intended word in the full bitmap.
Compute the bitset size from (u64)bitset_mask + 1 before passing the final
size to bpf_map_area_alloc(). This fixes the original under-allocation and
keeps the allocated storage consistent with the addressable bitset.
Exploitation note: local privilege escalation is possible on a 32-bit x86
kernel using the under-allocation bug from a binary with CAP_BPF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate()
The on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM
label storage area. __nd_label_validate() bounds it against the config
area size, but sizeof_namespace_label() returns unsigned, so the product
nslot * label_size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before
the comparison. A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the
loop trip count in nd_label_data_init(), whose memset() walks off the end
of the config_size buffer: an out-of-bounds write.
The field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace
via ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA. Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound
check is exact; conforming labels are unaffected.
The check was safe when introduced by commit 4a826c83db4e ("libnvdimm:
namespace indices: read and validate"): it multiplied by sizeof(struct
nd_namespace_label), a size_t, so on a 64-bit build the product did not
wrap. Commit 564e871aa66f ("libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label
definitions") narrowed it to 32 bits when the label size became a runtime
value read via sizeof_namespace_label(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Reject inline replies that overflow the pull-up buffer
An RPC-over-RDMA client can request a reply, such as an NFS READ
payload, without providing a Write list or a Reply chunk to carry
it. When such a reply needs more scatter/gather entries than the
device's Send Queue supports, svc_rdma_pull_up_needed() selects
pull-up and svc_rdma_pull_up_reply_msg() linearizes the whole
reply into sctxt->sc_xprt_buf. That buffer is only sc_max_req_size
bytes, while the reply on this path is bounded only by the client's
request, so svc_rdma_xb_linearize() copies past the end of the
buffer and corrupts adjacent slab memory. The oversized length is
then stored in sc_sges[0].length and posted, so the device also
reads beyond the mapped region.
The SGE-exhaustion branch is the only pull-up path that can exceed
the buffer: the threshold branch pulls up only replies smaller
than RPCRDMA_PULLUP_THRESH, and replies that fit the device's SGE
budget are sent directly without linearization. Make
svc_rdma_pull_up_needed() report -E2BIG when the reply it would
pull up cannot fit sc_max_req_size, and fail the request with
ERR_CHUNK as RFC 8166 Section 4.5.3 directs rather than dropping
the connection.
The helper no longer answers a simple yes/no question: it now
reports pull-up, no pull-up, or -E2BIG for a reply too large to
linearize. Rename svc_rdma_pull_up_needed() to
svc_rdma_check_pull_up() so its name no longer implies a boolean
predicate. |
