| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: don't read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()
macsec_encrypt() reads the Ethernet header via eth_hdr(skb)
(skb->head + skb->mac_header) to memmove() the 12 source/destination MAC
bytes forward and make room for the SecTAG.
On the AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW + PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS transmit path the skb
reaches the macsec ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset, so
eth_hdr(skb) resolves to skb->head + (u16)~0 and the read is out of
bounds: a 12-byte heap over-read that is also emitted on the wire as the
frame's outer source/destination MAC. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds
read in macsec_start_xmit() on 6.0; on current mainline a CONFIG_DEBUG_NET
build flags it as an unset mac header in skb_mac_header().
On the TX path the L2 header is at skb->data, so use skb_eth_hdr(), added
by commit 96cc4b69581d ("macvlan: do not assume mac_header is set in
macvlan_broadcast()") for exactly this purpose. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dibs: loopback: validate offset and size in move_data()
The loopback move_data() performs a memcpy into the registered DMB
without checking whether offset + size exceeds the DMB length. Unlike
real ISM hardware, which enforces memory region bounds natively, the
software loopback has no such protection.
A peer-supplied out-of-bounds offset or oversized write would result in
an OOB write past the allocated kernel buffer. Add an explicit bounds
check before the memcpy to reject such requests with -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: drop in-flight Tx SKBs on close
The MACB driver has since forever leaked the outgoing SKBs that
have not yet been marked as completed. They live in queue->tx_skb
which gets freed without remorse nor checking.
macb_free_consistent() gets called in a few codepaths, but only close will
trigger the added expressions. In macb_open() and macb_alloc_consistent()
failure cases, queues' tx_skb just got allocated and are empty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpu/hotplug: Fix NULL kobject warning in cpuhp_smt_enable()
On arm64, when booting with `maxcpus` greater than the number of present
CPUs (e.g., QEMU -smp cpus=4,maxcpus=8), some CPUs are marked as 'present'
but have not yet been registered via register_cpu(). Consequently,
the per-cpu device objects for these CPUs are not yet initialized.
In cpuhp_smt_enable(), the code iterates over all present CPUs. Calling
_cpu_up() for these unregistered CPUs eventually leads to
sysfs_create_group() being called with a NULL kobject (or a kobject
without a directory), triggering the following warning in
fs/sysfs/group.c:
WARNING: fs/sysfs/group.c:137 at internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc, CPU#2: sh/181
[...]
Call trace:
internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc (P)
sysfs_create_group+0x18/0x24
topology_add_dev+0x1c/0x28
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x104/0x20c
__cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x94/0x11c
_cpu_up+0x200/0x37c
When booting with ACPI, arm64 smp_prepare_cpus() currently sets all
enumerated CPUs as "present" regardless of their status in the MADT. This
causes issues with SMT hotplug control. For instance, with QEMU's
"-smp 4,maxcpus=8" configuration, the MADT GICC entries are populated as
follows:
1. The first four CPUs: `Enabled` set but `Online Capable` not set.
2. The remaining four CPUs: `Online Capable` set but `Enabled` not set
to support potential hot-plugging.
Fix this by:
1. When booting with ACPI, checking the ACPI_MADT_ENABLED flag in the GICC
entry before calling set_cpu_present() during SMP initialization.
2. Properly managing the present mask in acpi_map_cpu() and
acpi_unmap_cpu() to support actual CPU hotplug events, This aligns with
other architectures like x86 and LoongArch.
3. Update the arm64 CPU hotplug documentation to no longer state that all
online-capable vCPUs are marked as present by the kernel at boot time.
This ensures that only physically available or explicitly enabled CPUs
are in the present mask, keeping the SMT control logic consistent with
the actual hardware state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Fix double-add of pseudo-locked region's RMID to free list
A pseudo-locked group's RMID is freed when it is created. On unmount
rmdir_all_sub() unconditionally frees all RMID of all groups, resulting
in a double-free of the pseudo-locked group's RMID. The consequence of this
is that the original free results in the pseudo-locked group's RMID being
added to the rmid_free_lru linked list and the second free then attempts
to add the same RMID entry to the rmid_free_lru again.
Do not double-free a pseudo-locked group's RMID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drbd: reject data replies with an out-of-range payload size
recv_dless_read() receives a P_DATA_REPLY from a peer into the bio of an
outstanding read request. The peer-supplied payload length reaches it as
the signed int data_size, and two peer-controlled inputs can make it
negative. With a negotiated data-integrity-alg the digest length is
subtracted first, so a reply whose payload is smaller than the digest
underflows data_size. With no integrity algorithm (the default) data_size
is assigned from the unsigned h95/h100 wire length and drbdd() never
bounds it for a payload-carrying command, so a length above INT_MAX casts
it negative; this path needs no non-default feature. The bio receive loop
then computes expect = min_t(int, data_size, bv_len), which is negative,
and drbd_recv_all_warn(mapped, expect) receives with a size_t of SIZE_MAX
into the first mapped page.
The sibling receive path read_in_block() is not affected: it uses an
unsigned size and rejects it against DRBD_MAX_BIO_SIZE before receiving.
Reject a data reply whose size is negative after the optional digest
subtraction, covering both triggers.
Impact: a malicious or man-in-the-middle DRBD peer copies attacker-chosen
bytes past a bio page in the receiver, corrupting kernel memory. A node
that reads from its peer (a diskless node, or read-balancing to the peer)
is exposed in the default configuration; data-integrity-alg is not
required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in machine_kexec_prepare()
A NULL pointer dereference issue is noticed in riscv's
machine_kexec_prepare(), where image->segment[i].buf might be NULL and
copied unchecked.
The NULL buf comes from ima_add_kexec_buffer(), where kbuf is added by
kexec_add_buffer(), but kbuf.buffer is NULL, then it is copied without
a check in machine_kexec_prepare():
kexec_file_load
-> kimage_file_alloc_init()
-> kimage_file_prepare_segments()
-> ima_add_kexec_buffer()
-> kexec_add_buffer()
-> machine_kexec_prepare()
-> memcpy()
Address this by adding a check before the data copy attempt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Call synchronize_rcu() when unregistering
This ensures that any RCU readers traversing the instance list
have finished, before releasing the reference on the tracer that
the instance points to. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/diag: Add missing array_index_nospec() call to memtop_get_page_count()
'level' is user space controlled and used to read from an array. Add the
missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: rebind mm mempolicy to effective_mems, not mems_allowed
Creating a child cpuset where cpuset.mems is never set leads to a div/0
when a VMA mempolicy with MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES rebinds in response to a
CPU hotplug event.
Reproduction steps:
1) Create a cgroup w/ cpuset controls (do not set cpuset.mems)
2) Move the task into the child cpuset
3) Create a VMA mempolicy for that task with MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES
4) unplug and hotplug a cpu
echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
5) mempolicy rebind does a div/0 in mpol_relative_nodemask on the
call to __nodes_fold()
The cpuset code passes (cs->mems_allowed) which is not guaranteed to have
nodes to the rebind routine. Use cs->effective_mems instead, which is
guaranteed to have a non-empty nodemask once we reach that code path.
[ david: add a comment, slightly rephrase description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx93-blk-ctrl: Extract PHY as shared domain for DSI/CSI
The MIPI DSI and CSI domains share control bits for clock and reset, which
can lead to incorrect behavior if one domain disables the shared resource
while the other is still active.
To fix the issue, introduce a shared MIPI PHY power domain to own the
common resources and make DSI and CSI its subdomains. This ensures the
shared bits are properly managed and not disabled while still in use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: mediatek: Fix possible nullptr KP in HWV cleanup/on-check
Should probe fail for HW_VOTER type power domains, this driver was
unconditionally trying to perform cleanup for DIRECT_CTL domains,
but only after checking if the target domain is powered on... with
the DIRECT_CTL scpsys_domain_is_on() code again.
And there's more: the scpsys_domain_is_on() function is also being
unconditionally used in the probe path, for any power domain that
has flag MTK_SCPD_KEEP_DEFAULT_OFF!
This bug was never experienced by anyone because the HWV domains
never failed probe, and because none of those is declared with the
aforementioned flag - but it's still something critical.
In order to fix this, add a check for MTCMOS Type and, based on
that, call the correct functions for an "is on" check, and also
do the same for the cleanup path, calling the correct functions
for the "power off" action.
For the latter, since there's a call to pm_genpd_remove() right
before calling power_off, be cautious and add a variation of the
power off functions (with a _internal suffix) for those to get a
pointer to scpsys_domain instead of one to generic_pm_domain as,
even if that's still working, this is way too much fragile and
would break at some point. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx: Fix i.MX8MP VC8000E power up sequence
Per errata[1]:
ERR050531: VPU_NOC power down handshake may hang during VC8000E/VPUMIX
power up/down cycling.
Description: VC8000E reset de-assertion edge and AXI clock may have a
timing issue.
Workaround: Set bit2 (vc8000e_clk_en) of BLK_CLK_EN_CSR to 0 to gate off
both AXI clock and VC8000E clock sent to VC8000E and AXI clock sent to
VPU_NOC m_v_2 interface during VC8000E power up(VC8000E reset is
de-asserted by HW)
Add a bool variable is_errata_err050531 in
'struct imx8m_blk_ctrl_domain_data' to represent whether the workaround
is needed. If is_errata_err050531 is true, first clear the clk before
powering up gpc, then enable the clk after powering up gpc.
[1] https://www.nxp.com/webapp/Download?colCode=IMX8MP_1P33A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: free mlx5_st_idx_data on final dealloc
Workloads that repeatedly allocate and release mkeys carrying TPH
steering-tag hints (e.g. churning RDMA MRs) leak one
struct mlx5_st_idx_data per cycle; kmemleak flags it as unreferenced
and the kmalloc slab grows over time.
When the last reference to an ST table entry is dropped,
mlx5_st_dealloc_index() removed the entry from idx_xa but the backing
mlx5_st_idx_data allocation was never freed.
Free idx_data after the xa_erase() so the lifetime of the bookkeeping
struct matches the lifetime of the ST entry it tracks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rt2x00: avoid full teardown before work setup in probe
rt2x00lib_probe_dev() uses the full rt2x00lib_remove_dev() teardown for
all probe failures. However, drv_data allocation and workqueue allocation
can fail before intf_work, autowakeup_work and sleep_work have been
initialized.
Do not enter the full remove path until the probe has reached the point
where those work items are set up. Return directly for drv_data allocation
failure, and use a small early cleanup path for workqueue allocation
failure.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by
manual review of rt2x00lib_probe_dev() and rt2x00lib_remove_dev(). The
early probe exits should not call a common teardown path that assumes the
later work setup has already completed.
A QEMU PoC forced alloc_ordered_workqueue() to fail before the work
initializers are reached. The resulting fail path entered
rt2x00lib_remove_dev(), and DEBUG_OBJECTS reported invalid work drains with
rt2x00lib_probe_dev() and rt2x00lib_remove_dev() in the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_register_hw()
If kmemdup() fails while copying supported band structures, the error
path jumps to fail_rate. This skips rate_control_deinitialize() and
leaks the initialized local->rate_ctrl.
Fix this by adding a fail_band label that shares the rate-control cleanup
path before falling through to the remaining teardown.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in
v7.1-rc7.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have a
suitable mac80211 device/driver combination to test with, no runtime
testing was able to be performed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: cyw: fix heap overflow on a short auth frame
brcmf_notify_auth_frame_rx() takes the frame length from the firmware
event and copies the frame body with the management header offset
subtracted:
u32 mgmt_frame_len = e->datalen - sizeof(struct brcmf_rx_mgmt_data);
...
memcpy(&mgmt_frame->u, frame,
mgmt_frame_len - offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u));
The only length check is e->datalen >= sizeof(*rxframe), so mgmt_frame_len
can be anything from 0 up. offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) is 24. When
mgmt_frame_len is below that, the subtraction wraps as an unsigned value to
a huge length. The memcpy then runs far past the kzalloc'd buffer. A
malicious or malfunctioning AP can make the frame short during the
external SAE auth exchange, so this is a remotely triggered heap overflow.
Reject frames shorter than the management header offset before the copy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: validate firmware patch bounds
rtlbt_parse_firmware() copies patch_length - 4 bytes before appending the
firmware version. A malformed firmware patch shorter than the version field
can make this subtraction underflow and turn the copy into an oversized
read and write during Bluetooth setup.
The existing patch_offset + patch_length check can also wrap on 32-bit
architectures. Validate the patch length and range without arithmetic
overflow before allocating or copying the patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: ms_block: reject a card that reports too many blocks
msb_ftl_initialize() computes the zone count from the card block count
with no bound:
msb->zone_count = msb->block_count / MS_BLOCKS_IN_ZONE;
...
for (i = 0; i < msb->zone_count; i++)
msb->free_block_count[i] = MS_BLOCKS_IN_ZONE;
msb->block_count is a card value. msb_read_boot_blocks() reads
number_of_blocks from the card boot page and byte swaps it.
free_block_count is a fixed int[MS_MAX_ZONES]. MS_MAX_ZONES is 16, so the
valid indices are 0 to 15. The init loop above indexes it by zone_count.
msb_mark_block_used() and msb_mark_block_unused() index it by
pba / MS_BLOCKS_IN_ZONE, for pba up to block_count - 1. A card may report
up to 65535 blocks. A block_count above 8192 (MS_MAX_ZONES *
MS_BLOCKS_IN_ZONE) lets the pba index reach 16. That writes past
free_block_count[] and corrupts struct msb_data. A larger count runs the
init loop past the end too.
A real Memory Stick has at most 16 zones. So it has at most 8192 blocks.
msb_ftl_initialize() now rejects a card that reports more than
MS_MAX_ZONES * MS_BLOCKS_IN_ZONE blocks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix more places with wrong ipv6 transport offsets
Sashiko reports for more incorrect IPv6 transport offsets.
The app code for TCP was assuming IPv4 network header
even after the ipvsh argument was provided. This can
cause problems with apps over IPv6. As for the only
official app in the kernel tree (FTP) this problem is
harmless because we use Netfilter to mangle the FTP
ports and we do not adjust the TCP seq numbers.
Also, provide correct offset of the ICMPV6 header in
ip_vs_out_icmp_v6() for correct checksum checks when
the IPv6 packet has extension headers. |
