| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again.
Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset.
The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels.
If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8.
If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8.
The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data.
We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: Fix memory accounting leak.
Matt Dowling reported a weird UDP memory usage issue.
Under normal operation, the UDP memory usage reported in /proc/net/sockstat
remains close to zero. However, it occasionally spiked to 524,288 pages
and never dropped. Moreover, the value doubled when the application was
terminated. Finally, it caused intermittent packet drops.
We can reproduce the issue with the script below [0]:
1. /proc/net/sockstat reports 0 pages
# cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
UDP: inuse 1 mem 0
2. Run the script till the report reaches 524,288
# python3 test.py & sleep 5
# cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
UDP: inuse 3 mem 524288 <-- (INT_MAX + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT
3. Kill the socket and confirm the number never drops
# pkill python3 && sleep 5
# cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
UDP: inuse 1 mem 524288
4. (necessary since v6.0) Trigger proto_memory_pcpu_drain()
# python3 test.py & sleep 1 && pkill python3
5. The number doubles
# cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:
UDP: inuse 1 mem 1048577
The application set INT_MAX to SO_RCVBUF, which triggered an integer
overflow in udp_rmem_release().
When a socket is close()d, udp_destruct_common() purges its receive
queue and sums up skb->truesize in the queue. This total is calculated
and stored in a local unsigned integer variable.
The total size is then passed to udp_rmem_release() to adjust memory
accounting. However, because the function takes a signed integer
argument, the total size can wrap around, causing an overflow.
Then, the released amount is calculated as follows:
1) Add size to sk->sk_forward_alloc.
2) Round down sk->sk_forward_alloc to the nearest lower multiple of
PAGE_SIZE and assign it to amount.
3) Subtract amount from sk->sk_forward_alloc.
4) Pass amount >> PAGE_SHIFT to __sk_mem_reduce_allocated().
When the issue occurred, the total in udp_destruct_common() was 2147484480
(INT_MAX + 833), which was cast to -2147482816 in udp_rmem_release().
At 1) sk->sk_forward_alloc is changed from 3264 to -2147479552, and
2) sets -2147479552 to amount. 3) reverts the wraparound, so we don't
see a warning in inet_sock_destruct(). However, udp_memory_allocated
ends up doubling at 4).
Since commit 3cd3399dd7a8 ("net: implement per-cpu reserves for
memory_allocated"), memory usage no longer doubles immediately after
a socket is close()d because __sk_mem_reduce_allocated() caches the
amount in udp_memory_per_cpu_fw_alloc. However, the next time a UDP
socket receives a packet, the subtraction takes effect, causing UDP
memory usage to double.
This issue makes further memory allocation fail once the socket's
sk->sk_rmem_alloc exceeds net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min, resulting in packet
drops.
To prevent this issue, let's use unsigned int for the calculation and
call sk_forward_alloc_add() only once for the small delta.
Note that first_packet_length() also potentially has the same problem.
[0]:
from socket import *
SO_RCVBUFFORCE = 33
INT_MAX = (2 ** 31) - 1
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
s.bind(('', 0))
s.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, INT_MAX)
c = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
c.connect(s.getsockname())
data = b'a' * 100
while True:
c.send(data) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: int3472: Check for adev == NULL
Not all devices have an ACPI companion fwnode, so adev might be NULL. This
can e.g. (theoretically) happen when a user manually binds one of
the int3472 drivers to another i2c/platform device through sysfs.
Add a check for adev not being set and return -ENODEV in that case to
avoid a possible NULL pointer deref in skl_int3472_get_acpi_buffer(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: pci: ivtv: Add check for DMA map result
In case DMA fails, 'dma->SG_length' is 0. This value is later used to
access 'dma->SGarray[dma->SG_length - 1]', which will cause out of
bounds access.
Add check to return early on invalid value. Adjust warnings accordingly.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: make __free(kfree) accept error pointers
Currently, if an automatically freed allocation is an error pointer that
will lead to a crash. An example of this is in wm831x_gpio_dbg_show().
171 char *label __free(kfree) = gpiochip_dup_line_label(chip, i);
172 if (IS_ERR(label)) {
173 dev_err(wm831x->dev, "Failed to duplicate label\n");
174 continue;
175 }
The auto clean up function should check for error pointers as well,
otherwise we're going to keep hitting issues like this. |
| A flaw has been found in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component GATT Service. This manipulation of the argument DeviceToken causes information disclosure. The attack is only possible within the local network. A high degree of complexity is needed for the attack. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A vulnerability was detected in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component GATT Service. The manipulation results in improper access controls. The attack can only be performed from the local network. The exploit is now public and may be used. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in Tomofun Furbo Mobile App up to 7.57.0a on Android. This affects an unknown part of the component Authentication Token Handler. The manipulation leads to insecure storage of sensitive information. It is possible to launch the attack on the physical device. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A weakness has been identified in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component UART Interface. Executing manipulation can lead to insecure storage of sensitive information. The physical device can be targeted for the attack. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /squashfs-root/furbo_img of the component MQTT Client Certificate. Performing manipulation results in hard-coded credentials. The attack may be initiated remotely. The attack's complexity is rated as high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A vulnerability was identified in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. Affected is an unknown function of the component Registration Handler. Such manipulation leads to denial of service. The attack can be executed directly on the physical device. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| Out-of-bounds write in fingerprint trustlet prior to SMR Oct-2025 Release 1 allows local privileged attackers to write out-of-bounds memory. |
| Copilot Spoofing Vulnerability |
| Copilot Spoofing Vulnerability |
| M365 Copilot Spoofing Vulnerability |
| Use of a key past its expiration date in Virtual Secure Mode allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Management Services allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
