| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfp: clean mc addresses in application firmware when closing port
When moving devices from one namespace to another, mc addresses are
cleaned in software while not removed from application firmware. Thus
the mc addresses are remained and will cause resource leak.
Now use `__dev_mc_unsync` to clean mc addresses when closing port. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix double free of qgroup record after failure to add delayed ref head
In the previous code it was possible to incur into a double kfree()
scenario when calling add_delayed_ref_head(). This could happen if the
record was reported to already exist in the
btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_nolock() call, but then there was an error
later on add_delayed_ref_head(). In this case, since
add_delayed_ref_head() returned an error, the caller went to free the
record. Since add_delayed_ref_head() couldn't set this kfree'd pointer
to NULL, then kfree() would have acted on a non-NULL 'record' object
which was pointing to memory already freed by the callee.
The problem comes from the fact that the responsibility to kfree the
object is on both the caller and the callee at the same time. Hence, the
fix for this is to shift the ownership of the 'qrecord' object out of
the add_delayed_ref_head(). That is, we will never attempt to kfree()
the given object inside of this function, and will expect the caller to
act on the 'qrecord' object on its own. The only exception where the
'qrecord' object cannot be kfree'd is if it was inserted into the
tracing logic, for which we already have the 'qrecord_inserted_ret'
boolean to account for this. Hence, the caller has to kfree the object
only if add_delayed_ref_head() reports not to have inserted it on the
tracing logic.
As a side-effect of the above, we must guarantee that
'qrecord_inserted_ret' is properly initialized at the start of the
function, not at the end, and then set when an actual insert
happens. This way we avoid 'qrecord_inserted_ret' having an invalid
value on an early exit.
The documentation from the add_delayed_ref_head() has also been updated
to reflect on the exact ownership of the 'qrecord' object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtl818x: rtl8187: Fix potential buffer underflow in rtl8187_rx_cb()
The rtl8187_rx_cb() calculates the rx descriptor header address
by subtracting its size from the skb tail pointer.
However, it does not validate if the received packet
(skb->len from urb->actual_length) is large enough to contain this
header.
If a truncated packet is received, this will lead to a buffer
underflow, reading memory before the start of the skb data area,
and causing a kernel panic.
Add length checks for both rtl8187 and rtl8187b descriptor headers
before attempting to access them, dropping the packet cleanly if the
check fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
There is one use-after-free warning when running NBD_CMD_CONNECT and
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK:
nbd_genl_connect
nbd_alloc_and_init_config // config_refs=1
nbd_start_device // config_refs=2
set NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF open nbd // config_refs=3
recv_work done // config_refs=2
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // config_refs=1
close nbd // config_refs=0
refcount_inc -> uaf
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 1014 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12e/0x290
nbd_genl_connect+0x16d0/0x1ab0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f3/0x310
genl_rcv_msg+0x44a/0x790
The issue can be easily reproduced by adding a small delay before
refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs) in nbd_genl_connect():
mutex_unlock(&nbd->config_lock);
if (!ret) {
set_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF, &config->runtime_flags);
+ printk("before sleep\n");
+ mdelay(5 * 1000);
+ printk("after sleep\n");
refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs);
nbd_connect_reply(info, nbd->index);
} |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macintosh/mac_hid: fix race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse
The following warning appears when running syzkaller, and this issue also
exists in the mainline code.
------------[ cut here ]------------
list_add double add: new=ffffffffa57eee28, prev=ffffffffa57eee28, next=ffffffffa5e63100.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1491 at lib/list_debug.c:35 __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1491 Comm: syz.1.28 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
RSP: 0018:ff1100010dfb7b78 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa57eee18 RCX: ffffffff97fc9817
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffa0000002383000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffffffa57eee28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c0021bf6f2c
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 6464615f7473696c R12: ffffffffa5e63100
R13: ffffffffa57eee28 R14: ffffffffa57eee28 R15: ff1100010dfb7d48
FS: 00007fb14398b640(0000) GS:ff11000119600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d096005 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
input_register_handler+0xb3/0x210
mac_hid_start_emulation+0x1c5/0x290
mac_hid_toggle_emumouse+0x20a/0x240
proc_sys_call_handler+0x4c2/0x6e0
new_sync_write+0x1b1/0x2d0
vfs_write+0x709/0x950
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
The WARNING occurs when two processes concurrently write to the mac-hid
emulation sysctl, causing a race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse().
Both processes read old_val=0, then both try to register the input handler,
leading to a double list_add of the same handler.
CPU0 CPU1
------------------------- -------------------------
vfs_write() //write 1 vfs_write() //write 1
proc_sys_write() proc_sys_write()
mac_hid_toggle_emumouse() mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()
old_val = *valp // old_val=0
old_val = *valp // old_val=0
mutex_lock_killable()
proc_dointvec() // *valp=1
mac_hid_start_emulation()
input_register_handler()
mutex_unlock()
mutex_lock_killable()
proc_dointvec()
mac_hid_start_emulation()
input_register_handler() //Trigger Warning
mutex_unlock()
Fix this by moving the old_val read inside the mutex lock region. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: init run lock for extend inode
After setting the inode mode of $Extend to a regular file, executing the
truncate system call will enter the do_truncate() routine, causing the
run_lock uninitialized error reported by syzbot.
Prior to patch 4e8011ffec79, if the inode mode of $Extend was not set to
a regular file, the do_truncate() routine would not be entered.
Add the run_lock initialization when loading $Extend.
syzbot reported:
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
assign_lock_key+0x133/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:984
register_lock_class+0x105/0x320 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1299
__lock_acquire+0x99/0xd20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5112
lock_acquire+0x120/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
down_write+0x96/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1590
ntfs_set_size+0x140/0x200 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:860
ntfs_extend+0x1d9/0x970 fs/ntfs3/file.c:387
ntfs_setattr+0x2e8/0xbe0 fs/ntfs3/file.c:808 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: smartpqi: Fix device resources accessed after device removal
Correct possible race conditions during device removal.
Previously, a scheduled work item to reset a LUN could still execute
after the device was removed, leading to use-after-free and other
resource access issues.
This race condition occurs because the abort handler may schedule a LUN
reset concurrently with device removal via sdev_destroy(), leading to
use-after-free and improper access to freed resources.
- Check in the device reset handler if the device is still present in
the controller's SCSI device list before running; if not, the reset
is skipped.
- Cancel any pending TMF work that has not started in sdev_destroy().
- Ensure device freeing in sdev_destroy() is done while holding the
LUN reset mutex to avoid races with ongoing resets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: defer config put in recv_work
There is one uaf issue in recv_work when running NBD_CLEAR_SOCK and
NBD_CMD_RECONFIGURE:
nbd_genl_connect // conf_ref=2 (connect and recv_work A)
nbd_open // conf_ref=3
recv_work A done // conf_ref=2
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // conf_ref=1
nbd_genl_reconfigure // conf_ref=2 (trigger recv_work B)
close nbd // conf_ref=1
recv_work B
config_put // conf_ref=0
atomic_dec(&config->recv_threads); -> UAF
Or only running NBD_CLEAR_SOCK:
nbd_genl_connect // conf_ref=2
nbd_open // conf_ref=3
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // conf_ref=2
close nbd
nbd_release
config_put // conf_ref=1
recv_work
config_put // conf_ref=0
atomic_dec(&config->recv_threads); -> UAF
Commit 87aac3a80af5 ("nbd: call nbd_config_put() before notifying the
waiter") moved nbd_config_put() to run before waking up the waiter in
recv_work, in order to ensure that nbd_start_device_ioctl() would not
be woken up while nbd->task_recv was still uncleared.
However, in nbd_start_device_ioctl(), after being woken up it explicitly
calls flush_workqueue() to make sure all current works are finished.
Therefore, there is no need to move the config put ahead of the wakeup.
Move nbd_config_put() to the end of recv_work, so that the reference is
held for the whole lifetime of the worker thread. This makes sure the
config cannot be freed while recv_work is still running, even if clear
+ reconfigure interleave.
In addition, we don't need to worry about recv_work dropping the last
nbd_put (which causes deadlock):
path A (netlink with NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT):
connect // nbd_refs=1 (trigger recv_work)
open nbd // nbd_refs=2
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK
close nbd
nbd_release
nbd_disconnect_and_put
flush_workqueue // recv_work done
nbd_config_put
nbd_put // nbd_refs=1
nbd_put // nbd_refs=0
queue_work
path B (netlink without NBD_CFLAG_DESTROY_ON_DISCONNECT):
connect // nbd_refs=2 (trigger recv_work)
open nbd // nbd_refs=3
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // conf_refs=2
close nbd
nbd_release
nbd_config_put // conf_refs=1
nbd_put // nbd_refs=2
recv_work done // conf_refs=0, nbd_refs=1
rmmod // nbd_refs=0
Depends-on: e2daec488c57 ("nbd: Fix hungtask when nbd_config_put") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: avoid repeated calls to del_gendisk
There is a uaf problem which is found by case 23rdev-lifetime:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122
RIP: 0010:bdi_unregister+0x4b/0x170
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__del_gendisk+0x356/0x3e0
mddev_unlock+0x351/0x360
rdev_attr_store+0x217/0x280
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14a/0x210
vfs_write+0x29e/0x550
ksys_write+0x74/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x380
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff5250a177e
The sequence is:
1. rdev remove path gets reconfig_mutex
2. rdev remove path release reconfig_mutex in mddev_unlock
3. md stop calls do_md_stop and sets MD_DELETED
4. rdev remove path calls del_gendisk because MD_DELETED is set
5. md stop path release reconfig_mutex and calls del_gendisk again
So there is a race condition we should resolve. This patch adds a
flag MD_DO_DELETE to avoid the race condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix null deref on srq->rq.queue after resize failure
A NULL pointer dereference can occur in rxe_srq_chk_attr() when
ibv_modify_srq() is invoked twice in succession under certain error
conditions. The first call may fail in rxe_queue_resize(), which leads
rxe_srq_from_attr() to set srq->rq.queue = NULL. The second call then
triggers a crash (null deref) when accessing
srq->rq.queue->buf->index_mask.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rxe_modify_srq+0x170/0x480 [rdma_rxe]
? __pfx_rxe_modify_srq+0x10/0x10 [rdma_rxe]
? uverbs_try_lock_object+0x4f/0xa0 [ib_uverbs]
? rdma_lookup_get_uobject+0x1f0/0x380 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_modify_srq+0x204/0x290 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_ib_uverbs_modify_srq+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? tryinc_node_nr_active+0xe6/0x150
? uverbs_fill_udata+0xed/0x4f0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x2c0/0x470 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_fill_udata+0xed/0x4f0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_run_method+0x55a/0x6e0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x54d/0x800 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx___raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_vfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? ioctl_has_perm.constprop.0.isra.0+0x2c7/0x4c0
? __pfx_ioctl_has_perm.constprop.0.isra.0+0x10/0x10
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x13e/0x220 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x250
? fdget_pos+0x58/0x4c0
? ksys_write+0xf3/0x1c0
? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
? do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x250
? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10
? fget+0x173/0x230
? fput+0x2a/0x80
? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x224/0x4c0
? do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x250
? do_user_addr_fault+0x37b/0xfe0
? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix peer HE MCS assignment
In ath11k_wmi_send_peer_assoc_cmd(), peer's transmit MCS is sent to
firmware as receive MCS while peer's receive MCS sent as transmit MCS,
which goes against firmwire's definition.
While connecting to a misbehaved AP that advertises 0xffff (meaning not
supported) for 160 MHz transmit MCS map, firmware crashes due to 0xffff
is assigned to he_mcs->rx_mcs_set field.
Ext Tag: HE Capabilities
[...]
Supported HE-MCS and NSS Set
[...]
Rx and Tx MCS Maps 160 MHz
[...]
Tx HE-MCS Map 160 MHz: 0xffff
Swap the assignment to fix this issue.
As the HE rate control mask is meant to limit our own transmit MCS, it
needs to go via he_mcs->rx_mcs_set field. With the aforementioned swapping
done, change is needed as well to apply it to the peer's receive MCS.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.1 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.41
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do not let BPF test infra emit invalid GSO types to stack
Yinhao et al. reported that their fuzzer tool was able to trigger a
skb_warn_bad_offload() from netif_skb_features() -> gso_features_check().
When a BPF program - triggered via BPF test infra - pushes the packet
to the loopback device via bpf_clone_redirect() then mentioned offload
warning can be seen. GSO-related features are then rightfully disabled.
We get into this situation due to convert___skb_to_skb() setting
gso_segs and gso_size but not gso_type. Technically, it makes sense
that this warning triggers since the GSO properties are malformed due
to the gso_type. Potentially, the gso_type could be marked non-trustworthy
through setting it at least to SKB_GSO_DODGY without any other specific
assumptions, but that also feels wrong given we should not go further
into the GSO engine in the first place.
The checks were added in 121d57af308d ("gso: validate gso_type in GSO
handlers") because there were malicious (syzbot) senders that combine
a protocol with a non-matching gso_type. If we would want to drop such
packets, gso_features_check() currently only returns feature flags via
netif_skb_features(), so one location for potentially dropping such skbs
could be validate_xmit_unreadable_skb(), but then otoh it would be
an additional check in the fast-path for a very corner case. Given
bpf_clone_redirect() is the only place where BPF test infra could emit
such packets, lets reject them right there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Fix MSDU buffer types handling in RX error path
Currently, packets received on the REO exception ring from
unassociated peers are of MSDU buffer type, while the driver expects
link descriptor type packets. These packets are not parsed further due
to a return check on packet type in ath12k_hal_desc_reo_parse_err(),
but the associated skb is not freed. This may lead to kernel
crashes and buffer leaks.
Hence to fix, update the RX error handler to explicitly drop
MSDU buffer type packets received on the REO exception ring.
This prevents further processing of invalid packets and ensures
stability in the RX error handling path.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Fix page fault in ivpu_bo_unbind_all_bos_from_context()
Don't add BO to the vdev->bo_list in ivpu_gem_create_object().
When failure happens inside drm_gem_shmem_create(), the BO is not
fully created and ivpu_gem_bo_free() callback will not be called
causing a deleted BO to be left on the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Fix an integer overflow in aie2_query_ctx_status_array()
The unpublished smatch static checker reported a warning.
drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_pci.c:904 aie2_query_ctx_status_array()
warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow
'args->num_element * args->element_size' '1-u32max(user) * 1-u32max(user)'
Even this will not cause a real issue, it is better to put a reasonable
limitation for element_size and num_element. Add condition to make sure
the input element_size <= 4K and num_element <= 1K. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpu: host1x: Fix race in syncpt alloc/free
Fix race condition between host1x_syncpt_alloc()
and host1x_syncpt_put() by using kref_put_mutex()
instead of kref_put() + manual mutex locking.
This ensures no thread can acquire the
syncpt_mutex after the refcount drops to zero
but before syncpt_release acquires it.
This prevents races where syncpoints could
be allocated while still being cleaned up
from a previous release.
Remove explicit mutex locking in syncpt_release
as kref_put_mutex() handles this atomically. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Initialize allocated memory before use
KMSAN reports: Multiple uninitialized values detected:
- KMSAN: uninit-value in ntfs_read_hdr (3)
- KMSAN: uninit-value in bcmp (3)
Memory is allocated by __getname(), which is a wrapper for
kmem_cache_alloc(). This memory is used before being properly
cleared. Change kmem_cache_alloc() to kmem_cache_zalloc() to
properly allocate and clear memory before use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: init bioset in mddev_init
IO operations may be needed before md_run(), such as updating metadata
after writing sysfs. Without bioset, this triggers a NULL pointer
dereference as below:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
Call Trace:
md_update_sb+0x658/0xe00
new_level_store+0xc5/0x120
md_attr_store+0xc9/0x1e0
sysfs_kf_write+0x6f/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x141/0x2a0
vfs_write+0x1fc/0x5a0
ksys_write+0x79/0x180
__x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x2818/0x2880
do_syscall_64+0xa9/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Reproducer
```
mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n2 /dev/sd[cd]
echo inactive > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
echo 10 > /sys/block/md0/md/new_level
```
mddev_init() can only be called once per mddev, no need to test if bioset
has been initialized anymore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: visconti: Fix memory leak in visconti_register_pll()
@pll->rate_table has allocated memory by kmemdup(), if clk_hw_register()
fails, it should be freed, otherwise it will cause memory leak issue,
this patch fixes it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out
syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]:
[ 38.960489][ C3] ==================================================================
[ 38.963216][ C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[ 38.964950][ C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0
[ 38.966363][ C3]
[ 38.967053][ C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty #18
[ 38.968464][ C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
[ 38.969959][ C3] Call Trace:
[ 38.970841][ C3] <IRQ>
[ 38.971663][ C3] dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174
[ 38.972620][ C3] print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752
[ 38.973626][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[ 38.974644][ C3] kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0
[ 38.975720][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[ 38.976831][ C3] ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[ 38.978412][ C3] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0
[ 38.979755][ C3] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430
[ 38.981266][ C3] dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0
[ 38.982925][ C3] ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0
[ 38.984761][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[ 38.986242][ C3] ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790
[ 38.987323][ C3] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70
[ 38.988483][ C3] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130
[ 38.989621][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[ 38.990777][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[ 38.991919][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[ 38.993138][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[ 38.994890][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[ 38.996266][ C3] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230
[ 38.997670][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[ 38.999116][ C3] call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0
[ 39.000668][ C3] ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0
[ 39.002137][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[ 39.003809][ C3] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0
[ 39.005509][ C3] __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0
[ 39.007025][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[ 39.008716][ C3] ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0
[ 39.010254][ C3] ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10
[ 39.011795][ C3] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40
[ 39.013277][ C3] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0
[ 39.014724][ C3] run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0
[ 39.016196][ C3] __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be
[ 39.017616][ C3] __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190
[ 39.019004][ C3] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20
[ 39.020361][ C3] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0
[ 39.021965][ C3] </IRQ>
[ 39.023237][ C3] <TASK>
In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below
(there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()):
ar5523_probe()
-> ar5523_host_available()
-> ar5523_cmd_read()
-> ar5523_cmd()
If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and
ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb()
might touch the freed structure.
This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted
urb timed out. |
