| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
caif: fix integer underflow in cffrml_receive()
The cffrml_receive() function extracts a length field from the packet
header and, when FCS is disabled, subtracts 2 from this length without
validating that len >= 2.
If an attacker sends a malicious packet with a length field of 0 or 1
to an interface with FCS disabled, the subtraction causes an integer
underflow.
This can lead to memory exhaustion and kernel instability, potential
information disclosure if padding contains uninitialized kernel memory.
Fix this by validating that len >= 2 before performing the subtraction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid updating zero-sized extent in extent cache
As syzbot reported:
F2FS-fs (loop0): __update_extent_tree_range: extent len is zero, type: 0, extent [0, 0, 0], age [0, 0]
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:678!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5336 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__update_extent_tree_range+0x13bc/0x1500 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:678
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_update_read_extent_cache_range+0x192/0x3e0 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:1085
f2fs_do_zero_range fs/f2fs/file.c:1657 [inline]
f2fs_zero_range+0x10c1/0x1580 fs/f2fs/file.c:1737
f2fs_fallocate+0x583/0x990 fs/f2fs/file.c:2030
vfs_fallocate+0x669/0x7e0 fs/open.c:342
ioctl_preallocate fs/ioctl.c:289 [inline]
file_ioctl+0x611/0x780 fs/ioctl.c:-1
do_vfs_ioctl+0xb33/0x1430 fs/ioctl.c:576
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:595 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x82/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f07bc58eec9
In error path of f2fs_zero_range(), it may add a zero-sized extent
into extent cache, it should be avoided. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query
The ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls:
ETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and
ETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values.
If the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device
reconfiguration), userspace's buffer allocation will be incorrect,
potentially leading to buffer overflow.
Drivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some
drivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making
this scenario possible.
Some drivers try to handle this internally:
- bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not
equal to the driver's stats count.
- micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond
stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer.
However, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value
returned from get_sset_count(), hence won't solve the issue described
here.
Change ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(),
ethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch
between userspace's size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer
overflow.
The returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that
nothing has been returned.
This could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool,
depending on when the size change is detected:
1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings():
# ethtool -S eth2
no stats available
2. When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero.
Both cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call
should succeed.
Other than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no
output/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting
incorrect/shifted stats.
I also considered returning an error instead of a "silent" response, but
that seems more destructive towards userspace apps.
Notes:
- This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure
that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more
predictable behavior.
- RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between
the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released.
- Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that
these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications
which might not fill it. The added code checks that it's not zero,
to prevent any regressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix a job->pasid access race in gpu recovery
Avoid a possible UAF in GPU recovery due to a race between
the sched timeout callback and the tdr work queue.
The gpu recovery function calls drm_sched_stop() and
later drm_sched_start(). drm_sched_start() restarts
the tdr queue which will eventually free the job. If
the tdr queue frees the job before time out callback
completes, the job will be freed and we'll get a UAF
when accessing the pasid. Cache it early to avoid the
UAF.
Example KASAN trace:
[ 493.058141] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amdgpu_device_gpu_recover+0x968/0x990 [amdgpu]
[ 493.067530] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88b0ce3f794c by task kworker/u128:1/323
[ 493.074892]
[ 493.076485] CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 323 Comm: kworker/u128:1 Tainted: G E 6.16.0-1289896.2.zuul.bf4f11df81c1410bbe901c4373305a31 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 493.076493] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 493.076495] Hardware name: TYAN B8021G88V2HR-2T/S8021GM2NR-2T, BIOS V1.03.B10 04/01/2019
[ 493.076500] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-dev drm_sched_job_timedout [gpu_sched]
[ 493.076512] Call Trace:
[ 493.076515] <TASK>
[ 493.076518] dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80
[ 493.076529] print_report+0xce/0x630
[ 493.076536] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x86/0xd0
[ 493.076541] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 493.076545] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover+0x968/0x990 [amdgpu]
[ 493.077253] kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
[ 493.077258] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover+0x968/0x990 [amdgpu]
[ 493.077965] amdgpu_device_gpu_recover+0x968/0x990 [amdgpu]
[ 493.078672] ? __pfx_amdgpu_device_gpu_recover+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 493.079378] ? amdgpu_coredump+0x1fd/0x4c0 [amdgpu]
[ 493.080111] amdgpu_job_timedout+0x642/0x1400 [amdgpu]
[ 493.080903] ? pick_task_fair+0x24e/0x330
[ 493.080910] ? __pfx_amdgpu_job_timedout+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 493.081702] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xc0
[ 493.081708] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081712] drm_sched_job_timedout+0x1b0/0x4b0 [gpu_sched]
[ 493.081721] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081725] process_one_work+0x679/0xff0
[ 493.081732] worker_thread+0x6ce/0xfd0
[ 493.081736] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081739] kthread+0x376/0x730
[ 493.081744] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081748] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081751] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081755] ret_from_fork+0x247/0x330
[ 493.081761] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 493.081764] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 493.081771] </TASK>
(cherry picked from commit 20880a3fd5dd7bca1a079534cf6596bda92e107d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size
'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes
with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst.
Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for
unrecognized values.
Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so
that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic.
End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as
the session state would be then by definition corrupted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: missing copy_finish in fuse-over-io-uring argument copies
Fix a possible reference count leak of payload pages during
fuse argument copies.
[Joanne: simplified error cleanup] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix double unregister of HCA_PORTS component
Clear hca_devcom_comp in device's private data after unregistering it in
LAG teardown. Otherwise a slightly lagging second pass through
mlx5_unload_one() might try to unregister it again and trip over
use-after-free.
On s390 almost all PCI level recovery events trigger two passes through
mxl5_unload_one() - one through the poll_health() method and one through
mlx5_pci_err_detected() as callback from generic PCI error recovery.
While testing PCI error recovery paths with more kernel debug features
enabled, this issue reproducibly led to kernel panics with the following
call chain:
Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
Failing address: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6000 TEID: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6803 ESOP-2 FSI
Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
AS:00000000705c4007 R3:0000000000000024
Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1]SMP
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 156 Comm: kmcheck Kdump: loaded Not tainted
6.18.0-20251130.rc7.git0.16131a59cab1.300.fc43.s390x+debug #1 PREEMPT
Krnl PSW : 0404e00180000000 0000020fc86aa1dc (__lock_acquire+0x5c/0x15f0)
R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000000 0000020f00000001 6b6b6b6b6b6b6c33 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000020fca28b820 0000000000000000 0000010a1ced8100
0000010a1ced8100 0000020fc9775068 0000018fce14f8b8 0000018fce14f7f8
Krnl Code: 0000020fc86aa1cc: e3b003400004 lg %r11,832
0000020fc86aa1d2: a7840211 brc 8,0000020fc86aa5f4
*0000020fc86aa1d6: c09000df0b25 larl %r9,0000020fca28b820
>0000020fc86aa1dc: d50790002000 clc 0(8,%r9),0(%r2)
0000020fc86aa1e2: a7840209 brc 8,0000020fc86aa5f4
0000020fc86aa1e6: c0e001100401 larl %r14,0000020fca8aa9e8
0000020fc86aa1ec: c01000e25a00 larl %r1,0000020fca2f55ec
0000020fc86aa1f2: a7eb00e8 aghi %r14,232
Call Trace:
__lock_acquire+0x5c/0x15f0
lock_acquire.part.0+0xf8/0x270
lock_acquire+0xb0/0x1b0
down_write+0x5a/0x250
mlx5_detach_device+0x42/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x50/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload_one+0x42/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x150 [mlx5_core]
zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xcc/0x388 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (ibmpex) fix use-after-free in high/low store
The ibmpex_high_low_store() function retrieves driver data using
dev_get_drvdata() and uses it without validation. This creates a race
condition where the sysfs callback can be invoked after the data
structure is freed, leading to use-after-free.
Fix by adding a NULL check after dev_get_drvdata(), and reordering
operations in the deletion path to prevent TOCTOU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: Fix memory leak in nr_sendmsg()
syzbot reported a memory leak [1].
When function sock_alloc_send_skb() return NULL in nr_output(), the
original skb is not freed, which was allocated in nr_sendmsg(). Fix this
by freeing it before return.
[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888129f35500 (size 240):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6119, jiffies 4294944652
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 52 28 81 88 ff ff ..........R(....
backtrace (crc 1456a3e4):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4983 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5288 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x36f/0x5e0 mm/slub.c:5340
__alloc_skb+0x203/0x240 net/core/skbuff.c:660
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x69/0x3f0 net/core/skbuff.c:6671
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x379/0x3e0 net/core/sock.c:2965
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1859 [inline]
nr_sendmsg+0x287/0x450 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:1105
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x293/0x2a0 net/socket.c:1195
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x45d/0x710 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x143/0x170 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix middle attribute validation in push_nsh() action
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))
The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions(). The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr(). But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK. We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH. We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect. The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ #115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
__asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
__sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action. Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today. So, keeping as it is. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix a UAF problem in xattr repair
The xchk_setup_xattr_buf function can allocate a new value buffer, which
means that any reference to ab->value before the call could become a
dangling pointer. Fix this by moving an assignment to after the buffer
setup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-mixer: us16x08: validate meter packet indices
get_meter_levels_from_urb() parses the 64-byte meter packets sent by
the device and fills the per-channel arrays meter_level[],
comp_level[] and master_level[] in struct snd_us16x08_meter_store.
Currently the function derives the channel index directly from the
meter packet (MUB2(meter_urb, s) - 1) and uses it to index those
arrays without validating the range. If the packet contains a
negative or out-of-range channel number, the driver may write past
the end of these arrays.
Introduce a local channel variable and validate it before updating the
arrays. We reject negative indices, limit meter_level[] and
comp_level[] to SND_US16X08_MAX_CHANNELS, and guard master_level[]
updates with ARRAY_SIZE(master_level). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Reset t_task_cdb pointer in error case
If allocation of cmd->t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later
dereferenced in the 'err' path.
In case of error, reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default
fixed-size buffer.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: phy: fsl-usb: Fix use-after-free in delayed work during device removal
The delayed work item otg_event is initialized in fsl_otg_conf() and
scheduled under two conditions:
1. When a host controller binds to the OTG controller.
2. When the USB ID pin state changes (cable insertion/removal).
A race condition occurs when the device is removed via fsl_otg_remove():
the fsl_otg instance may be freed while the delayed work is still pending
or executing. This leads to use-after-free when the work function
fsl_otg_event() accesses the already freed memory.
The problematic scenario:
(detach thread) | (delayed work)
fsl_otg_remove() |
kfree(fsl_otg_dev) //FREE| fsl_otg_event()
| og = container_of(...) //USE
| og-> //USE
Fix this by calling disable_delayed_work_sync() in fsl_otg_remove()
before deallocating the fsl_otg structure. This ensures the delayed work
is properly canceled and completes execution prior to memory deallocation.
This bug was identified through static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Avoid unregistering PSP twice
PSP is unregistered twice in:
_mlx5e_remove -> mlx5e_psp_unregister
mlx5e_nic_cleanup -> mlx5e_psp_unregister
This leads to a refcount underflow in some conditions:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1694 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd8/0xe0
[...]
mlx5e_psp_unregister+0x26/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_nic_cleanup+0x26/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_remove+0xe6/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30
device_release_driver_internal+0x194/0x1f0
bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
device_del+0x159/0x3c0
mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0xbc/0x2a0 [mlx5_core]
[...]
Do not directly remove psp from the _mlx5e_remove path, the PSP cleanup
happens as part of profile cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ti_am335x_tsc - fix off-by-one error in wire_order validation
The current validation 'wire_order[i] > ARRAY_SIZE(config_pins)' allows
wire_order[i] to equal ARRAY_SIZE(config_pins), which causes out-of-bounds
access when used as index in 'config_pins[wire_order[i]]'.
Since config_pins has 4 elements (indices 0-3), the valid range for
wire_order should be 0-3. Fix the off-by-one error by using >= instead
of > in the validation check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/hsr: fix NULL pointer dereference in prp_get_untagged_frame()
prp_get_untagged_frame() calls __pskb_copy() to create frame->skb_std
but doesn't check if the allocation failed. If __pskb_copy() returns
NULL, skb_clone() is called with a NULL pointer, causing a crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5625 Comm: syz.1.18 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_clone+0xd7/0x3a0 net/core/skbuff.c:2041
Code: 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 23 29 05 f9 49 83 3e 00 0f 85 a0 01 00 00 e8 94 dd 9d f8 48 8d 6b 7e 49 89 ee 49 c1 ee 03 <43> 0f b6 04 26 84 c0 0f 85 d1 01 00 00 44 0f b6 7d 00 41 83 e7 0c
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d00f200 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: ffffffff892235a1 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88803372a480
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000820 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 000000000000007e R08: ffffffff8f7d0f77 R09: 1ffffffff1efa1ee
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1efa1ef R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: 000000000000000f R15: ffff88805144cc00
FS: 0000555557f6d500(0000) GS:ffff88808d72f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555581d35808 CR3: 000000005040e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
hsr_forward_do net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:-1 [inline]
hsr_forward_skb+0x1013/0x2860 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:741
hsr_handle_frame+0x6ce/0xa70 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c:84
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x10b9/0x4380 net/core/dev.c:5966
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6077 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x72/0x380 net/core/dev.c:6192
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6278 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x1cb/0x790 net/core/dev.c:6337
tun_rx_batched+0x1b9/0x730 drivers/net/tun.c:1485
tun_get_user+0x2b65/0x3e90 drivers/net/tun.c:1953
tun_chr_write_iter+0x113/0x200 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f0449f8e1ff
Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 f9 92 02 00 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 4c 93 02 00 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd7ad94c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f044a1e5fa0 RCX: 00007f0449f8e1ff
RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 0000200000000500 RDI: 00000000000000c8
RBP: 00007ffd7ad94d20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000000000003e R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007f044a1e5fa0 R14: 00007f044a1e5fa0 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Add a NULL check immediately after __pskb_copy() to handle allocation
failures gracefully. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: duplicate handshake cancellations leak socket
When a handshake request is cancelled it is removed from the
handshake_net->hn_requests list, but it is still present in the
handshake_rhashtbl until it is destroyed.
If a second cancellation request arrives for the same handshake request,
then remove_pending() will return false... and assuming
HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED isn't set in req->hr_flags, we'll continue
processing through the out_true label, where we put another reference on
the sock and a refcount underflow occurs.
This can happen for example if a handshake times out - particularly if
the SUNRPC client sends the AUTH_TLS probe to the server but doesn't
follow it up with the ClientHello due to a problem with tlshd. When the
timeout is hit on the server, the server will send a FIN, which triggers
a cancellation request via xs_reset_transport(). When the timeout is
hit on the client, another cancellation request happens via
xs_tls_handshake_sync().
Add a test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED) in the pending cancel
path so duplicate cancels can be detected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fsl-cpm: Check length parity before switching to 16 bit mode
Commit fc96ec826bce ("spi: fsl-cpm: Use 16 bit mode for large transfers
with even size") failed to make sure that the size is really even
before switching to 16 bit mode. Until recently the problem went
unnoticed because kernfs uses a pre-allocated bounce buffer of size
PAGE_SIZE for reading EEPROM.
But commit 8ad6249c51d0 ("eeprom: at25: convert to spi-mem API")
introduced an additional dynamically allocated bounce buffer whose size
is exactly the size of the transfer, leading to a buffer overrun in
the fsl-cpm driver when that size is odd.
Add the missing length parity verification and remain in 8 bit mode
when the length is not even. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid updating compression context during writeback
Bai, Shuangpeng <sjb7183@psu.edu> reported a bug as below:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11441 Comm: syz.0.46 Not tainted 6.17.0 #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_all_cluster_page_ready+0x106/0x550 fs/f2fs/compress.c:857
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_write_cache_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3078 [inline]
__f2fs_write_data_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3290 [inline]
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1c19/0x3600 fs/f2fs/data.c:3317
do_writepages+0x38e/0x640 mm/page-writeback.c:2634
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc mm/filemap.c:386 [inline]
__filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:419 [inline]
file_write_and_wait_range+0x2ba/0x3e0 mm/filemap.c:794
f2fs_do_sync_file+0x6e6/0x1b00 fs/f2fs/file.c:294
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:3043 [inline]
f2fs_file_write_iter+0x76e/0x2700 fs/f2fs/file.c:5259
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x7e9/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x19d/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x470 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The bug was triggered w/ below race condition:
fsync setattr ioctl
- f2fs_do_sync_file
- file_write_and_wait_range
- f2fs_write_cache_pages
: inode is non-compressed
: cc.cluster_size =
F2FS_I(inode)->i_cluster_size = 0
- tag_pages_for_writeback
- f2fs_setattr
- truncate_setsize
- f2fs_truncate
- f2fs_fileattr_set
- f2fs_setflags_common
- set_compress_context
: F2FS_I(inode)->i_cluster_size = 4
: set_inode_flag(inode, FI_COMPRESSED_FILE)
- f2fs_compressed_file
: return true
- f2fs_all_cluster_page_ready
: "pgidx % cc->cluster_size" trigger dividing 0 issue
Let's change as below to fix this issue:
- introduce a new atomic type variable .writeback in structure f2fs_inode_info
to track the number of threads which calling f2fs_write_cache_pages().
- use .i_sem lock to protect .writeback update.
- check .writeback before update compression context in f2fs_setflags_common()
to avoid race w/ ->writepages. |
