| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error
snd_pcm_oss_proc_write() links a newly allocated setup entry into the
OSS setup list before duplicating the task name. If the task-name
allocation fails, the error path frees the already linked entry and
leaves setup_list pointing at freed memory.
A later OSS device open can then walk the stale list entry in
snd_pcm_oss_look_for_setup() and dereference freed memory.
Allocate the task name and initialize the setup entry before publishing
the entry on setup_list. Also fetch the initial proc read iterator only
after taking setup_mutex, so all setup_list traversal follows the same
list lifetime rules. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure
rss_prepare_get() allocates the indirection table and hash key buffer
via rss_get_data_alloc(), then calls ops->get_rxfh() to populate them.
If get_rxfh() fails, the function returns an error without freeing
the allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: module: call ethnl_ops_complete() on module flash errors
When validate() fails we are skipping over ethnl_ops_complete()
even tho we already called ethnl_ops_begin(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: module: avoid leaking a netdev ref on module flash errors
module_flash_fw_schedule() is missing undo for setting
the "in_progress" flag and taking the netdev reference.
Delay taking these, the device can't disappear while
we are holding rtnl_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: check skb_clone() return value in send_mcast_pkt()
The skb_clone() function can return NULL if memory allocation fails.
send_mcast_pkt() calls skb_clone() without checking the return value, which
can lead to a NULL pointer dereference in send_pkt() when it dereferences
skb->data.
Add a NULL check after skb_clone() and skip the peer if the clone fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: refuse to enslave CAN devices
syzbot reported a kernel paging request crash in
can_rx_unregister() inside net/can/af_can.c. The crash occurs
because a virtual CAN device (vxcan) is being enslaved to a
bonding master.
During the enslavement process, the bonding driver mutates
and modifies the network device states to fit an Ethernet-like
aggregation model. However, CAN devices operate on a completely
different Layer 2 architecture, relying on the CAN mid-layer
private data structure (can_ml_priv) instead of standard
Ethernet structures. Since bonding does not initialize or
maintain these CAN structures, subsequent operations on the
half-enslaved interface (such as closing associated sockets
via isotp_release) lead to a null-pointer dereference when
accessing the CAN receiver lists.
Bonding CAN interfaces is architecturally invalid as CAN lacks
MAC addresses, ARP capabilities, and standard Ethernet
link-layer mechanisms. While generic loopback devices are
blocked globally in net/core/dev.c, virtual CAN devices
bypass this check because they do not carry the IFF_LOOPBACK
flag, despite acting as local software-loopbacks.
Fix this by explicitly blocking network devices of type
ARPHRD_CAN from being enslaved at the very beginning of
bond_enslave(). This prevents illegal state mutations,
eliminates the resulting KASAN crashes, and avoids potential
memory leaks from incomplete socket cleanups.
As the CAN support has been added a long time after bonding
the Fixes-tag points to the introduction of ARPHRD_CAN that
would have needed a specific handling in bonding_main.c. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: Fix sleep in atomic context in netlink path
Since the introduction of the netlink configuration path for bridge
ports in commit 25c71c75ac87 ("bridge: bridge port parameters over
netlink"), br_setport() was always called with the bridge lock held
around it. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock protects
the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the function
only processed three STP related netlink attributes (cost, priority and
state).
Nowadays, br_setport() processes a lot more attributes and most of them
do not need the bridge lock:
* Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path.
Annotations can be added in net-next.
* FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock.
* Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock.
* Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data
path. Annotations can be added in net-next.
* Backup port and NHID: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data
path.
This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain
bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit
cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1].
Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when
processing the three STP related attributes that require it. This is
consistent with the multicast attributes where each attribute acquires
the multicast lock instead of having one critical section for all
relevant attributes.
[1]
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 356, name: bridge
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
2 locks held by bridge/356:
#0: ffffffff919473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:7002)
#1: ffff888115072d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: br_setlink (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1117)
Preemption disabled at:
0x0
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
__might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163)
netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262)
netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428)
dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289)
br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172)
br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747)
br_setport (net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1000)
br_setlink (net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1118)
rtnl_bridge_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7005)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
__sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:787 (discriminator 4) net/socket.c:802 (discriminator 4))
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2698)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2752)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2784)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: Fix sleep in atomic context in sysfs path
Since the start of the git history, brport_store() always acquired the
bridge lock. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock
protects the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the
function was only used by two STP related attributes (cost and
priority).
Nowadays, brport_store() processes a lot more attributes and most of
them do not need the bridge lock:
* Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path.
Annotations can be added in net-next.
* FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock.
* Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock.
* Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data
path. Annotations can be added in net-next.
* Backup port: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path.
This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain
bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit
cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1].
Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when
processing the two STP related attributes that require it. Remove the
now stale comment from br_switchdev_set_port_flag(). The
SWITCHDEV_F_DEFER flag can be removed in net-next.
[1]
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 372, name: bash
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
5 locks held by bash/372:
#0: ffff88810c51c3f0 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
#1: ffff888115ce9480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:343)
#2: ffff88810b9fd330 (kn->active#37){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:80 fs/kernfs/file.c:344)
#3: ffffffffa59473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:326)
#4: ffff8881099d2d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: brport_store (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:345)
Preemption disabled at:
0x0
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
__might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163)
netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262)
netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428)
dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289)
br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172)
br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747)
store_learning (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:79 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:235)
brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:346)
kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:352)
new_sync_write (fs/read_write.c:595)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: tsinfo: don't pass ERR_PTR to genlmsg_cancel on prepare failure
The goto err label leads to:
genlmsg_cancel(skb, ehdr);
return ret;
If ethnl_tsinfo_prepare_dump() failed, it has not started a genlmsg.
There's nothing to cancel, and passing an error pointer to
genlmsg_cancel() would cause a crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on
When netem duplicates a packet it re-enqueues the copy at the root qdisc.
If another netem sits in the tree the copy can be duplicated
again, recursing until the stack or memory is exhausted.
The original duplication guard temporarily zeroed q->duplicate around
the re-enqueue, but that does not cover all cases because it is
per-qdisc state shared across all concurrent enqueue paths
and is not safe without additional locking.
Use the skb tc_depth field introduced in an earlier patch:
- increment it on the duplicate before re-enqueue
- skip duplication for any skb whose tc_depth is already non-zero.
This marks the packet itself rather than mutating qdisc state,
therefore it is safe regardless of tree topology or concurrency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix ethx:ingress -> ethy:egress -> ethx:ingress mirred loop
When mirred redirects to ingress (from either ingress or egress) the loop
state from sched_mirred_dev array dev is lost because of 1) the packet
deferral into the backlog and 2) the fact the sched_mirred_dev array is
cleared. In such cases, if there was a loop we won't discover it.
Here's a simple test to reproduce:
ip a add dev port0 10.10.10.11/24
tc qdisc add dev port0 clsact
tc filter add dev port0 egress protocol ip \
prio 10 matchall action mirred ingress redirect dev port1
tc qdisc add dev port1 clsact
tc filter add dev port1 ingress protocol ip \
prio 10 matchall action mirred egress redirect dev port0
ping -c 1 -W0.01 10.10.10.10 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflow
tcf_mirred_act() checks sched_mirred_nest against MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT (4)
to prevent deep recursion. However, when the action uses blockcast
(tcfm_blockid != 0), the function returns at the tcf_blockcast() call
BEFORE reaching the counter increment. As a result, the recursion
counter never advances and the limit check is entirely bypassed.
When two devices share a TC egress block with a mirred blockcast rule,
a packet egressing on device A is mirrored to device B via blockcast;
device B's egress TC re-enters tcf_mirred_act() via blockcast and
mirrors back to A, creating an unbounded recursion loop:
tcf_mirred_act -> tcf_blockcast -> tcf_mirred_to_dev -> dev_queue_xmit
-> sch_handle_egress -> tcf_classify -> tcf_mirred_act -> (repeat)
This recursion continues until the kernel stack overflows.
The bug is reachable from an unprivileged user via
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET): user namespaces grant
CAP_NET_ADMIN in the new network namespace, which is sufficient to
create dummy devices, attach clsact qdiscs with shared blocks, and
install mirred blockcast filters.
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90000b7fff8
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 169 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-next-20260410
RIP: 0010:xas_find+0x17/0x480
Call Trace:
xa_find+0x17b/0x1d0
tcf_mirred_act+0x640/0x1060
tcf_action_exec+0x400/0x530
basic_classify+0x128/0x1d0
tcf_classify+0xd83/0x1150
tc_run+0x328/0x620
__dev_queue_xmit+0x797/0x3100
tcf_mirred_to_dev+0x7b1/0xf70
tcf_mirred_act+0x68a/0x1060
[repeating ~30+ times until stack overflow]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Fix this by incrementing sched_mirred_nest before calling
tcf_blockcast() and decrementing it on return, mirroring the
non-blockcast path. This ensures subsequent recursive entries see the
updated counter and are correctly limited by MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Add NULL guards in teardown path to prevent panic on attach failure
When queue allocation fails partway through, the error cleanup frees
and NULLs apc->tx_qp and apc->rxqs. Multiple teardown paths such as
mana_remove(), mana_change_mtu() recovery, and internal error handling
in mana_alloc_queues() can subsequently call into functions that
dereference these pointers without NULL checks:
- mana_chn_setxdp() dereferences apc->rxqs[0], causing a NULL pointer
dereference panic (CR2: 0000000000000000 at mana_chn_setxdp+0x26).
- mana_destroy_vport() iterates apc->rxqs without a NULL check.
- mana_fence_rqs() iterates apc->rxqs without a NULL check.
- mana_dealloc_queues() iterates apc->tx_qp without a NULL check.
Add NULL guards for apc->rxqs in mana_fence_rqs(),
mana_destroy_vport(), and before the mana_chn_setxdp() call. Add a
NULL guard for apc->tx_qp in mana_dealloc_queues() to skip TX queue
draining when TX queues were never allocated or already freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in rt6_fill_node()
Sashiko reported this issue [1]. Apply the same fix as
commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()").
Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings)
without waiting for RCU readers; rt->fib6_siblings.next then still
points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches
&rt->fib6_siblings, causing a CPU stall. fib6_del_route() always
WRITE_ONCE()s rt->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an
inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix stack leak in tagged FIFO buffer
The tagged FIFO path declares iio_buff on the stack with __aligned(8)
but no initializer, but there is a hole in the structure, which will
then leak to userspace as ST_LSM6DSX_SAMPLE_SIZE bytes (6) will be
copied, but the space between that and the timestamp are not
initialized.
Commit c14edb4d0bdc ("iio:imu:st_lsm6dsx Fix alignment and data leak
issues") moved the untagged FIFO path to a kzalloc'd buffer in hw->scan,
but for the tagged path it only added the alignment qualifier and not
the initializer :(
Fix this by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: adis16550: fix stack leak in trigger handler
adis16550_trigger_handler() declares the scan data array on the stack
without initializing it. The memcpy() at the bottom fills only the
first 28 bytes (TEMP + 6 channels of GYRO/ACCEL data), and
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() writes the s64 timestamp at the
8-byte-aligned offset 32. Bytes 28-31 remain uninitialized stack data
which leaks to userspace on ever trigger.
Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler
bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without
an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into
each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is
left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of
stack are pushed to userspace per scan.
This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the
move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing.
bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this
driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a
short-fill issue.
Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header
do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with
p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':');
while (p < eof) {
s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':');
...
}
If the firmware image contains no ':' byte, strnchr() returns NULL.
NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body
runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of
roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash.
The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state
branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this
loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware
and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops.
Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: validate VDO count in Discover Identity ACK handlers
Properly validate the count passed from a device when calling
svdm_consume_identity() or svdm_consume_identity_sop_prime() as the
device-controlled value could index off of the static arrays, which
could leak data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()
svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once
before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every
point in the loop.
In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of
at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX
modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the
CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming
ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set,
an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken
or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to
ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra
Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes,
the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For
mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the
partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen
SVID/VDO bytes.
Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed
past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner
supplies or how the function was reached. |
