| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| When using Google Secrets Manager as a backend for the Spring Cloud Config server a client can craft a request to the config server potentially exposing secrets from unintended GCP projects.
Spring Cloud Config 3.1.x: affected from 3.1.0 through 3.1.13 (inclusive); upgrade to 3.1.14 or greater (Enterprise Support Only). Spring Cloud Config 4.1.x: affected from 4.1.0 through 4.1.9 (inclusive); upgrade to 4.1.10 or greater (Enterprise Support Only). Spring Cloud Config 4.2.x: affected from 4.2.0 through 4.2.6 (inclusive); upgrade to 4.2.7 or greater (Enterprise Support Only). Spring Cloud Config 4.3.x: affected from 4.3.0 through 4.3.2 (inclusive); upgrade to 4.3.3 or greater. Spring Cloud Config 5.0.x: affected from 5.0.0 through 5.0.2 (inclusive); upgrade to 5.0.3 or greater. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: libwx: fix VF illegal register access
Register WX_CFG_PORT_ST is a PF restricted register. When a VF is
initialized, attempting to read this register triggers an illegal
register access, which lead to a system hang.
When the device is VF, the bus function ID can be obtained directly from
the PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: reject optional IPTFS templates in outbound policies
syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find()
which flows from xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one().
Commit 3d776e31c841 ("xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode
templates in outbound policies") disallowed optional tunnel and
BEET in outbound policies to prevent this. Later when IPTFS
added, it was not covered by that fix and can still trigger
the out-of-bounds read;
Extend the check to disallow optional IPTFS in outbound policies
as well. IPTFS should be identical to tunnel mode.
IN and FWD policies are not affected: xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one()
is only reachable via the outbound path.
Reproducer, before:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link set dummy0 up
ip addr add 10.1.1.1/24 dev dummy0
ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl
src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs
level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid
2 mode transport
ping -W 1 -c 1 10.1.1.2
PING 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
[ 64.168420] ==================================================================
[ 64.169977] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1ffd20 by task ping/2844
[ 64.169977] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2844 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7-00180-geb23b588430a #98 PREEMPT(full)
[ 64.169977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 64.169977] Call Trace:
[ 64.169977] <TASK>
[ 64.169977] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] print_report+0x152/0x4b0
[ 64.169977] ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0
[ 64.169977] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 64.169977] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20
[ 64.169977] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21b/0x230
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] kasan_report+0xa8/0xd0
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] __xfrm_dst_hash+0x24/0xc0
[ 64.169977] xfrm_state_find+0xa2d/0x2f90
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_state_find+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x210/0x570
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? kernel_text_address+0x5b/0x80
[ 64.169977] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[ 64.169977] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0x90
[ 64.169977] ? arch_stack_walk+0x8c/0xe0
[ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x130/0x200
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0xb2/0x110
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx___refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0xd5/0x310
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x3d8/0xb80
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? ip_route_output_key_hash+0xc6/0x110
[ 64.169977] ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x18/0xe0
[ 64.169977] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x4c9/0x530
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x71/0xc0
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] release_sock+0xb0/0x170
[ 64.169977] udp_connect+0x43/0x50
[ 64.169977] __sys_connect+0xa6/0x100
[ 64.169977] ? alloc_fd+0x2e9/0x300
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? preempt_latency
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel: ethosu: Fix element size accounting for cmd stream validation
There are 2 issues with the element size handling in the command stream
validation which result in too small of a size calculated when the
element size is 16/32/64 bits.
For NHWC format, the element size is simply missing from the
calculation.
The bitfield for the element size is different between IFM/IFM2 and
OFM. IFM and IFM2 encode the precision in parameter bits 2:3, while OFM
uses bits 1:2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix potential out-of-bounds issues
The maximum downscaling factor supported by ISI can be up to 16. Add
minimum value constraint before applying the setting to hardware.
Otherwise, the process will not respond even when Ctrl+C is executed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: make huge_ptep_get handled unaligned addresses
huge_ptep_get() can be handed a virtual address pointing to the middle
of a contpmd/contpte mapped hugetlb folio (examples of callers are
pagemap_hugetlb_range, page_mapped_in_vma).
The arm64 helper rewalks the pgtables in find_num_contig to answer
whether the huge pte we have maps a contpmd or a contpte hugetlb folio,
and returns CONT_PMDS or CONT_PTES, so that it can collect a/d bits over
the contiguous ptes. We can falsely return CONT_PTES instead of
CONT_PMDS if the addr is not aligned. On systems where CONT_PTES !=
CONT_PMDS (meaning page size is 16K), we could collect excess A/D bit
state, meaning extra work for the kernel. Even worse, we may iterate
beyond the PTE table and dereference a garbage ptep pointer to access
physical memory we don't own. Since the ptep pointer is a linear map
address, we may run off the end of the linear map or into a hole,
dereference a VA not mapped into the kernel pgtables and cause kernel
panic.
Fix this by aligning the pmdp pointer down to a contpmd base before
checking equality with the passed huge pte pointer, to correctly answer
whether the huge pte is the base of a contpmd block. |
| Improper input validation in Samsung Android USB Driver for Windows prior to version 1.9.5.0 allows local attacker to access out-of-bounds memory. |
| Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a parameter value overflows the message buffer. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service and modify authentication metadata due to a buffer overflow. |
| CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for Bitlocker before v7.7.4 contains a default TPM PCR policy that fails to consider the system boot state. This allows the TPM to be unsealed via an unintended execution path or from another hardware platform. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-ep-msi: Fix error unwind and prevent double alloc
pci_epf_alloc_doorbell() stores the allocated doorbell message array in
epf->db_msg/epf->num_db before requesting MSI vectors. If MSI allocation
fails, the array is freed but the EPF state may still point to freed
memory.
Clear epf->db_msg and epf->num_db on the MSI allocation failure path so
that later cleanup cannot double-free the array and callers can retry
allocation.
Also return -EBUSY when doorbells have already been allocated to prevent
leaking or overwriting an existing allocation. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Numeric truncation error in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()
smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). The function
marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but
never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs
that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled.
As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop()
this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. Since commit
91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
however, irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without
an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns
false. That is the asm-generic default used by MIPS. Any irq_work_sync()
issued in the reboot/shutdown path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on
a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
...
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.
This issue was noticed on several Realtek MIPS switch SoCs (MIPS
interAptiv) and came up during kernel bump downstream in OpenWrt from
6.18.33 to 6.18.34, after the backport of the patch to the 6.18 stable
branch. The patch also has been backported all the way back to 6.1.
Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the
generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs
and grace periods can still complete. MIPS shuts down all CPUs here
without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not
otherwise issued. Reporting a dying CPU to RCU outside the regular hotplug
offline path is not unprecedented: arm64 does the same in cpu_die_early().
There it is an exception for a CPU that was coming online and is aborting
bringup, rather than the default shutdown action as on MIPS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched. |
