| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix kernel panic during driver load failure
Avoid kernel panic if MES init fails during driver load. The KIQ ring is
falsely marked as ready as ASICs that use MES, KIQ is owned by MES.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:gfx_v12_1_wait_reg_mem+0x5a/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
Call Trace:
gfx_v12_1_ring_emit_reg_write_reg_wait+0x1f/0x30 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gmc_fw_reg_write_reg_wait+0xb2/0x190 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb+0x1cc/0x230 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gart_invalidate_tlb+0x81/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gart_unbind+0x72/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind+0xa4/0xb0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ttm_tt_unpopulate+0x13/0xd0 [amdgpu]
amdttm_tt_unpopulate+0x29/0x70 [amdttm]
ttm_bo_put+0x1eb/0x360 [amdttm]
amdgpu_bo_free_kernel+0xf9/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ih_ring_fini+0x5a/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_irq_fini_hw+0x58/0x80 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x4e0/0x5b0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x60/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_pci_probe+0x28e/0x6d0 [amdgpu]
pci_device_probe+0x19f/0x220
really_probe+0x1ed/0x340
driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x80
__driver_attach+0xd3/0x1a0
bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xa0
bus_add_driver+0x19f/0x270
driver_register+0x5d/0xf0
do_one_initcall+0xac/0x200
do_init_module+0x1ec/0x280
__se_sys_finit_module+0x2de/0x310
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x250
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
(cherry picked from commit 4623b958dd6da0f4c3026afdf330626a09ecb0f0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: invoke pm_genpd_remove() before freeing genpd
Call pm_genpd_remove() to unregister from global list prior to releasing
acp_genpd memory, and clear the pointer after free.
(cherry picked from commit cd8650d7a91ee8b768e202354672553faa5cc1f2) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: reject mapping a reserved doorbell to a new queue
When creating an user-queue, the user space
provides a doorbell BO handle and an offset within
the bo to obtain a doorbell.
However current implementation using xa_store_irq()
to store a doorbell, which allows a later queue created
with the same BO and offset parameters to overwrite an
existing queue and doorbell mapping.
This can cause problems like misrouting fence IRQ
processing to a wrong queue, and mislead the cleanup
process of one queue erasing the mapping of another queue.
This commit fixes this issue by replacing xa_store_irq with
xa_insert_irq, which rejects mapping a reserved
doorbell to a newly created queue
(cherry picked from commit 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix aperture mapping leak
amdgpu_pci_remove() calls drm_dev_unplug() before invoking the driver
fini routines. This causes drm_dev_enter() in amdgpu_ttm_fini() to
always return false, so iounmap(aper_base_kaddr) never runs on normal
driver unload, leaving an orphaned entry in the x86 PAT interval tree.
On connected_to_cpu hardware, the aperture is mapped write-back (WB) via
ioremap_cache(). On reload, IP discovery calls memremap(..., MEMREMAP_WC)
over the same range. The WC vs WB conflict causes:
ioremap error for 0x..., requested 0x1, got 0x0
amdgpu: discovery failed: -2
Fix by switching to devres-managed mappings so cleanup is guaranteed
regardless of drm_dev_enter() state:
- connected_to_cpu path: devm_memremap(MEMREMAP_WB). For
IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM ranges this takes the try_ram_remap() shortcut,
returning __va(offset) from the existing kernel direct map. No new
ioremap VA or PAT entry is created, so there is nothing to orphan.
- dGPU path: devm_ioremap_wc() registers iounmap() as a devres action,
guaranteeing cleanup at device_del() time.
Also remove iounmap(aper_base_kaddr) from amdgpu_device_unmap_mmio()
since the mapping is now devres-owned.
v2: Remove redundant x86_64 guard (Lijo)
(cherry picked from commit d871e99879cb5fd1fa798b006b4888887e63a17a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL
check_add_overflow() unconditionally writes the truncated sum into *d
even on overflow, per its contract in include/linux/overflow.h.
The four check_add_overflow() guards in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl()
and set_ntacl_dacl() break out of the ACE-building loops on overflow,
but the truncated *size is then consumed downstream at the end of
set_ntacl_dacl():
pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(pndacl->size) + size);
This produces an on-wire NT ACL whose pndacl->size under-reports the
bytes actually written by the preceding fill_ace_for_sid()/memcpy()
calls, yielding a malformed ACL that can trigger out-of-bounds reads
when re-parsed by clients or ksmbd itself.
Restore *size to its pre-addition value on each overflow branch (via
`*size -= ace_sz` / `size -= nt_ace_size`) so that after the break,
*size once again holds the cumulative size of the successfully-written
ACEs. The committed ACL is then truncated-but-self-consistent rather
than malformed.
The ksmbd DACL builders are the only check_add_overflow() sites found
where an overflow path breaks out of a loop and the destination value
is consumed afterward. The other nearby break-style cases either
return -EINVAL on overflow (transport_ipc.c) or break without
consuming the overflowed destination value afterward (buildid.c). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion
This fixes this race:
- thread a: io_uring_enter -> register sqe ->
fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -> allocate ent but doesn't grab queue_ref
yet
- thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -> fuse_chan_abort() ->
fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0
- thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of
fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes
- thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs
and calls
"wait_event(ring->stop_waitq, atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) == 0);"
The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as
nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring,
queue, and ent are leaked.
Fix this by checking fch->connected under fch->lock after the created
ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the
scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref
and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already
waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch->connected, or
if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the
async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents
and decrementing the ent's ref on the queue, which will unblock the
eventual queue and ring teardown. |
| OPeNDAP Hyrax allows SSRF and credential disclosure via unvalidated HTTP redirects that bypass the AllowedHosts allowlist and leak Earthdata headers (User-Id, Echo-Token) to attacker-controlled endpoints. |
| Nefteprodukttekhnika BUK TS-G Gas Station Automation System 2.9.1 on Linux contains a SQL Injection vulnerability (CWE-89) in the system configuration module. A remote attacker can send specially crafted HTTP POST requests to the /php/request.php endpoint via the sql parameter in application/x-www-form-urlencoded data (e.g., action=do&sql=<query_here>&reload_driver=0) to execute arbitrary SQL commands and potentially achieve remote code execution. |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox 's sending email, fax, SMS, etc. functionality accepts a
@@INCLUDE command, which can be set to network locations using UNC paths
(e.g., “\\Server\Share”). The server processes these paths without
validation, resulting in outbound connection attempts to
attacker-controlled SMB servers. This enables authenticated attackers to
trigger the server to authenticate to arbitrary SMB endpoints,
potentially exposing NTLM authentication information (such as NTLM
hashes). If outbound connections to port 445 (SMB) are permitted,
attackers can use this to conduct SMB relay or credential theft attacks.
Exploitation of the “pathname” parameter is possible without
authentication. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage
Teddy reported that a XEN HVM has a long boot delay, which was bisected to
the recent enhancements to the negative motion detection. It turned out
that the jiffies clocksource is used in early boot before it is registered,
which leaves the max_delta_raw field at zero. That causes the read out to
be clamped to the max delta of 0, which means time is not making progress.
Cure it by ensuring that it is initialized before its first usage in
timekeeping_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: stop hardware after post-start probe failures
wacom_parse_and_register() starts HID hardware before registering inputs
and initializing pad LEDs/remotes. Those later steps can fail, but their
error paths currently release Wacom resources without stopping the HID
hardware.
Route post-hid_hw_start() failures through hid_hw_stop() before
releasing driver resources.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while
reviewing kernel code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable
syzbot reported a puzzling splat:
WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20
stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in
hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when
debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug
objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup.
Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the
following a few seconds before the splat:
ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled
So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup
failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug
objects and freed the shadow objects:
debug_object_assert_init()
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return; obj = alloc();
if (!obj) {
// Out of memory
debug_objects_enabled = false;
free_objects();
obj = lookup_or_alloc();
// The lookup failed because the other side
// removed the objects, so this returns
// an error code as the object in question
// is not statically initialized
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj))
return;
if (!obj) {
debug_oom();
return;
}
print(...)
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return;
fixup(...)
The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false,
but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer
disfunctional.
This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and
debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized
objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case
gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the
NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow
object.
Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before
invoking the print and fixup function in those two places. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: core: fix uninitialized data in debugfs
If *ppos is non-zero then simple_write_to_buffer() will not initialize
the start of buf[]. Non zero values for *ppos aren't going to work
anyway. Test for them at the start of the function and return -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check to response query
Add variable representations for BufLength and BufOffset in
rndis_query_response(), and perform a length check on them.
This is identical to how rndis_set_response() handles these parameters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: use GFP_ATOMIC in wacom_wac_queue_flush()
wacom_wac_queue_flush() is called via the .raw_event callback
(wacom_raw_event → wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce → wacom_wac_queue_flush).
For USB HID devices, this callback is invoked from hid_irq_in(), which
is a URB completion handler running in atomic context. Using GFP_KERNEL
in this path can sleep, leading to a "scheduling while atomic" bug.
Use GFP_ATOMIC instead. The existing code already handles allocation
failure by skipping the fifo entry and continuing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing
[There is no upstream commit, as this code was removed by upstream
commit 044925f9b565 ("mm: fs: remove filemap_nr_thps*() functions and their users")]
As-is, khugepaged and writable-file opening exclude each other. A file
cannot be open writeable and have THPs (because the filesystem is not aware
of them). khugepaged will never collapse file pages for files that are
opened writeable. On an open(O_RDWR/O_WRONLY), the page cache for that
particular file is dropped. This is fine because nothing could've been
dirtied.
However, there is an edge-case: collapse_file() might not be able to
coexist with concurrent writers, but it can coexist with dirty folios
(from previous writers). Therefore, the following can happen:
open(file, O_RDWR)
write(file)
close(file)
madvise(file_mapping, MADV_COLLAPSE, some non-dirty range)
open(file, O_RDWR)
nr_thps > 0
truncate_inode_pages()
/* THPs are cleared out, but so are the dirty folios */
When this edge-case happens, there is data loss, as the dirty folios are
fully discarded.
Fix it by fully writing back the page cache (and waiting) when collapsing
file THPs. Doing so provides the guarantee that no dirty folio will be
observed while there are active THPs. To fully ensure this is safe, the
invalidate_lock needs to be held while doing the writeout, so that
do_dentry_open()'s page cache truncation excludes this write-and-wait.
As a side effect, move the nr_thps counter bumping outside the i_pages
lock. This is correct since the counter itself is an atomic_t and the
producer <-> consumer correctness is provided by a full memory barrier:
smp_mb() in collapse_file()/memory barrier implied by full ordering in
get_write_access() -> atomic_inc_unless_negative(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_uart: clear HCI_UART_SENDING when write_work is canceled
HCI_UART_SENDING bit in tx_state means write_work is pending and blocks
queueing it again. Currently this bit is not cleared when canceling the
work in hci_uart_close(), which blocks future writes when device is
reopened later if write_work was pending.
Fix by clearing HCI_UART_SENDING when canceling the work.
Also make clearing of tx_skb safe by using disable_work_sync +
enable_work instead of just cancel_work_sync. hci_uart_flush() purges
the proto tx queue so we can cancel the pending write_work there,
instead of doing it just in hci_uart_close(). Re-enable and possibly
requeue the work after queue flush. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in tsi148 bridge
tsi148_probe() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into
tsi148_bridge->lm_resources. The probe error path frees this list, but
tsi148_remove() only frees the dma, slave and master resource lists, so
the location monitor resource is leaked on device unbind or module
unload.
Free the lm_resources list in tsi148_remove() as well, before
tsi148_bridge is freed. |
| A host header injection vulnerability in picocms/Pico through 2.1.4 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to control the origin of JavaScript and CSS assets loaded by the default theme. When base_url is unset (the default), Pico::getBaseUrl in lib/Pico.php builds the base URL from unvalidated Host, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, and X-Forwarded-Port request headers. |
| A path traversal vulnerability in o1lab/xmysql (all versions) allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read and download arbitrary files from the server. The lib/xapi.js file at lines 338 and 424 uses the user-controlled req.query.name parameter in path.join(cwd, name) without sanitization before passing it to res.download, enabling directory traversal via ../ sequences to access sensitive system files. |
