| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vce: fix integer overflow in image size
Fix a security vulnerability where malicious VCE command streams
with oversized dimensions (e.g. 65536×65536) cause 32-bit integer
overflow, wrapping the calculated buffer size to 0. This bypasses
validation and allows GPU firmware to perform out-of-bound memory
access.
The fix uses 64-bit arithmetic to detect overflow and rejects
invalid dimensions before they reach the hardware.
V2: remove redundant check
V3: modify max height value
V4: remove size64
(cherry picked from commit cbe408dba581755ad1279a487ec786d8927d778d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/sdma7.1: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit c4f230b51cf2d3e7e8b1c800331f3dbed2a9e3f5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/gfx9: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit b71604f8685b0eba07866f4e8dc30f93e1931054) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:
snaptrace = h + 1;
snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
...
case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
if (snaptrace_len) {
...
if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
false, &realm)) { ... }
ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /
ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.
The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised
MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with
no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The
shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.
Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before
consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()
helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,
guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe
for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where
p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the
rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines
below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit
path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: disallow overlapping input ranges for damon_set_regions()
damon_set_regions() assumes the input ranges are sorted by the address and
don't overlap each other. Hence the assumption was initially to be
explicitly validated. But commit 97d482f4592f ("mm/damon/sysfs: reuse
damon_set_regions() for regions setting") has mistakenly removed the
validation.
This can make DAMON behave in unexpected ways. At the best, the
monitoring results snapshot will just look weird since there will be
overlapping regions. DAMOS will also work weirdly, applying the same
action multiple times for overlapping regions, and make DAMOS quota weird.
More seriously, depending on the setup and regions updates sequence,
negative size regions can be made. It will trigger WARN_ONCE() if the
kernel is built with CONFIG_DAMON_DEBUG_SANITY=y. Depending on the
monitoring results, the negative size region can further trigger division
by zero in damon_merge_two_regions().
Note that some of the consequences including the WARN_ONCE() and the
divide by zero depend on commits that were introduced after the root cause
commit 97d482f4592f ("mm/damon/sysfs: reuse damon_set_regions() for
regions setting").
Fix the problems by checking the assumption and returning an error if
the input ranges don't meet the assumption.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to get, not find, block 0
Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to use afs_dir_get_block() to get block 0 rather
than afs_dir_find_block() as the latter caches the found block in the
afs_dir_iter and may[*] switch out the page it's on if another
afs_dir_find_block() is done. This parallels what afs_edit_dir_add() does.
[*] There's more than one block per page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: userspace: fix use-after-free in get_local_id
In mptcp_pm_userspace_get_local_id(), the address entry is looked up under
spinlock, but its id is read after dropping the lock. A concurrent deletion
can free the entry between the unlock and the read, leading to UAF.
The race window is narrow. It was reproduced only with a locally
constructed stress test that repeatedly overlaps an MP_JOIN SYN with a
MPTCP_PM_CMD_SUBFLOW_DESTROY request.
However, the KASAN report below confirms that the race is reachable:
[ 666.319376] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319386] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888124845610 by task swapper/0/0
...
[ 666.319401] Call Trace:
[ 666.319405] <IRQ>
[ 666.319408] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
[ 666.319412] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3b0
[ 666.319418] print_report+0xbe/0x2b0
[ 666.319421] ? mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319423] kasan_report+0xce/0x100
[ 666.319426] ? mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319429] mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319433] mptcp_pm_get_local_id+0x371/0x440
...
[ 666.319821] Allocated by task 45539:
[ 666.319844] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
[ 666.319855] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 666.319858] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
[ 666.319863] __kmalloc_noprof+0x1e7/0x520
[ 666.319867] sock_kmalloc+0xdf/0x130
[ 666.319885] sock_kmemdup+0x1b/0x40
[ 666.319888] mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr+0x261/0x500
[ 666.319910] mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit+0x16a/0x610
...
[ 666.319967] Freed by task 45560:
[ 666.319988] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
[ 666.319991] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 666.319994] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
[ 666.319998] __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
[ 666.320000] kfree+0x166/0x440
[ 666.320003] sock_kfree_s+0x1d/0x50
[ 666.320007] mptcp_userspace_pm_delete_local_addr.isra.0+0x157/0x200
[ 666.320011] mptcp_pm_nl_subflow_destroy_doit+0x51d/0xea0
Fix by copying the id into a local variable while still holding the lock,
and use -1 as a "not found" sentinel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates
When seccomp support was originally added to arm64 in a1ae65b21941
("arm64: add seccomp support"), seccomp was erroneously called _before_
the ptrace syscall-enter-stop and therefore the tracer could trivially
manipulate the syscall register state after the seccomp check had
passed. This was subsequently fixed in a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run
seccomp after ptrace") by moving the seccomp check after the tracer has
run. Unfortunately, a decade later, that fix has been reported to be
incomplete.
On arm64, both the first argument to a syscall and its eventual return
value are allocated to register x0. In order to facilitate syscall
restarting and querying of syscall arguments on the syscall exit path,
the original value of x0 is stashed in 'struct pt_regs::orig_x0' early
during the syscall entry path and is returned for the first argument by
syscall_get_arguments(). Unlike 32-bit Arm, this stashed value is not
directly exposed via ptrace() and so changes to register x0 made by the
tracer on a syscall-enter-stop are not reflected in 'orig_x0'. This
means that seccomp, syscall tracepoints and audit can observe a stale
value for the register compared to the argument that will be observed by
the actual syscall.
Re-sync 'orig_x0' from x0 on the syscall entry path following a
potential ptrace stop (i.e. PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY or
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE). This behaviour is limited to native tasks (because
compat tasks expose 'orig_r0' to ptrace) where the syscall is not being
skipped (because x0 is updated to hold the return value of -ENOSYS in
that case). |
| Bitwarden Server before 2026.7.2 does not verify that the caller is a member of the organization identified in a POST /collect request body, allowing any authenticated user to write forged, arbitrarily backdated entries into any organization's audit log. |
| Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.5.0, the iOS Companion app treats tag links (NFC or QR) delivered through an OS-level routing mechanism such as iOS universal links as if they were physically scanned, without validating the calling app or prompting the user. As a result, any untrusted app on the device can forward an arbitrary tag to Home Assistant, causing it to execute the associated automation as though a legitimate user had scanned an authorized tag. This allows silent, unattended automation execution by untrusted local callers. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.5.0. |
| A vulnerability was determined in MingSoft MCMS up to 3.0.6. This affects the function ModelDataImpl.queryDiyFormData of the file /mdiy/form/data/list.do of the component ms-mdiy. Executing a manipulation of the argument formFields can lead to sql injection. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A vulnerability has been found in Dolibarr ERP up to 23.0.3. Affected is the function fail of the file htdocs/takepos/invoice.php of the component TakePOS Module. Such manipulation leads to missing authorization. The attack may be performed from remote. The name of the patch is 8992ce8704da947b6abe7b65a6fe59aed736bb81. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue. |
| A vulnerability has been found in code-projects Task Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /user/comment_count_user.php. The manipulation of the argument task_id leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/gfx9.4.3: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit 5676593d08998d7a6d9e2d51d6b54b3820e3755c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create()
When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert()
returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves
sock->sk pointing at the freed object:
if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
sk_free(sk);
pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops
before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless
on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child
socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves
new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then
fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs
lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the
sk_lock spinlock.
tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a
pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the
guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL
(dangling) rather than NULL.
Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release()
NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided.
The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket
rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M
elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert
returns -E2BIG.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1
lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:710)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1501)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:512)
Allocated by task 1:
sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308)
tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487)
tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
Freed by task 1:
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391)
tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504)
tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding
tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP
responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC
length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a
four-byte boundary.
tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not
four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left
uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing
mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.
Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before
hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path.
This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid
authenticated header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb
length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a
GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment.
A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater
than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().
Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer
against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation
sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a
consumer handles it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: hold an interface reference across the scan worker
mac802154_scan_worker() captures the scanning sub-interface under RCU
and then keeps dereferencing sdata->dev after rcu_read_unlock() and
outside the rtnl -- in the failure traces, in
mac802154_transmit_beacon_req() (skb->dev = sdata->dev), and in the
end_scan cleanup. Nothing keeps that netdev alive across the worker
iteration.
A concurrent DEL_INTERFACE or PHY removal can unregister the interface
once the worker drops the rtnl between its two drv_set_channel()
sections. unregister_netdevice() frees the netdev asynchronously from
netdev_run_todo() with the rtnl already dropped, so neither holding the
rtnl nor the per-PHY IEEE802154_IS_SCANNING flag prevents a stale worker
iteration from dereferencing the freed netdev -- a KASAN
slab-use-after-free, reachable by racing TRIGGER_SCAN against
DEL_INTERFACE (both CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Pin the netdev with netdev_hold() while the RCU read lock is still held,
and release it at every worker exit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ila: reload IPv6 header after pskb_may_pull in checksum adjust
ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling
pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page
fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head()
and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following
get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator()
uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust
call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.
Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA
csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a
slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or
mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are
unauthenticated once it exists.
Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport()
before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the
ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in
that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map
modes never pull and keep their cached pointers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: ptp_s390: Add missing facility check
Only register the physical clock when facility 28 is installed
and PTFF QAF returns that PTFF QPT is available. |
