| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size
'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes
with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst.
Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for
unrecognized values.
Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so
that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic.
End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as
the session state would be then by definition corrupted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix double unregister of HCA_PORTS component
Clear hca_devcom_comp in device's private data after unregistering it in
LAG teardown. Otherwise a slightly lagging second pass through
mlx5_unload_one() might try to unregister it again and trip over
use-after-free.
On s390 almost all PCI level recovery events trigger two passes through
mxl5_unload_one() - one through the poll_health() method and one through
mlx5_pci_err_detected() as callback from generic PCI error recovery.
While testing PCI error recovery paths with more kernel debug features
enabled, this issue reproducibly led to kernel panics with the following
call chain:
Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
Failing address: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6000 TEID: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6803 ESOP-2 FSI
Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
AS:00000000705c4007 R3:0000000000000024
Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1]SMP
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 156 Comm: kmcheck Kdump: loaded Not tainted
6.18.0-20251130.rc7.git0.16131a59cab1.300.fc43.s390x+debug #1 PREEMPT
Krnl PSW : 0404e00180000000 0000020fc86aa1dc (__lock_acquire+0x5c/0x15f0)
R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000000 0000020f00000001 6b6b6b6b6b6b6c33 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000020fca28b820 0000000000000000 0000010a1ced8100
0000010a1ced8100 0000020fc9775068 0000018fce14f8b8 0000018fce14f7f8
Krnl Code: 0000020fc86aa1cc: e3b003400004 lg %r11,832
0000020fc86aa1d2: a7840211 brc 8,0000020fc86aa5f4
*0000020fc86aa1d6: c09000df0b25 larl %r9,0000020fca28b820
>0000020fc86aa1dc: d50790002000 clc 0(8,%r9),0(%r2)
0000020fc86aa1e2: a7840209 brc 8,0000020fc86aa5f4
0000020fc86aa1e6: c0e001100401 larl %r14,0000020fca8aa9e8
0000020fc86aa1ec: c01000e25a00 larl %r1,0000020fca2f55ec
0000020fc86aa1f2: a7eb00e8 aghi %r14,232
Call Trace:
__lock_acquire+0x5c/0x15f0
lock_acquire.part.0+0xf8/0x270
lock_acquire+0xb0/0x1b0
down_write+0x5a/0x250
mlx5_detach_device+0x42/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x50/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload_one+0x42/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x150 [mlx5_core]
zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xcc/0x388 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: do not generate ACCESS/MODIFY events on child for special files
inotify/fanotify do not allow users with no read access to a file to
subscribe to events (e.g. IN_ACCESS/IN_MODIFY), but they do allow the
same user to subscribe for watching events on children when the user
has access to the parent directory (e.g. /dev).
Users with no read access to a file but with read access to its parent
directory can still stat the file and see if it was accessed/modified
via atime/mtime change.
The same is not true for special files (e.g. /dev/null). Users will not
generally observe atime/mtime changes when other users read/write to
special files, only when someone sets atime/mtime via utimensat().
Align fsnotify events with this stat behavior and do not generate
ACCESS/MODIFY events to parent watchers on read/write of special files.
The events are still generated to parent watchers on utimensat(). This
closes some side-channels that could be possibly used for information
exfiltration [1].
[1] https://snee.la/pdf/pubs/file-notification-attacks.pdf |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: Fix memory leak in nr_sendmsg()
syzbot reported a memory leak [1].
When function sock_alloc_send_skb() return NULL in nr_output(), the
original skb is not freed, which was allocated in nr_sendmsg(). Fix this
by freeing it before return.
[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888129f35500 (size 240):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6119, jiffies 4294944652
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 52 28 81 88 ff ff ..........R(....
backtrace (crc 1456a3e4):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4983 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5288 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x36f/0x5e0 mm/slub.c:5340
__alloc_skb+0x203/0x240 net/core/skbuff.c:660
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x69/0x3f0 net/core/skbuff.c:6671
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x379/0x3e0 net/core/sock.c:2965
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1859 [inline]
nr_sendmsg+0x287/0x450 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:1105
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x293/0x2a0 net/socket.c:1195
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x45d/0x710 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x143/0x170 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-mixer: us16x08: validate meter packet indices
get_meter_levels_from_urb() parses the 64-byte meter packets sent by
the device and fills the per-channel arrays meter_level[],
comp_level[] and master_level[] in struct snd_us16x08_meter_store.
Currently the function derives the channel index directly from the
meter packet (MUB2(meter_urb, s) - 1) and uses it to index those
arrays without validating the range. If the packet contains a
negative or out-of-range channel number, the driver may write past
the end of these arrays.
Introduce a local channel variable and validate it before updating the
arrays. We reject negative indices, limit meter_level[] and
comp_level[] to SND_US16X08_MAX_CHANNELS, and guard master_level[]
updates with ARRAY_SIZE(master_level). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Reset t_task_cdb pointer in error case
If allocation of cmd->t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later
dereferenced in the 'err' path.
In case of error, reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default
fixed-size buffer.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: phy: fsl-usb: Fix use-after-free in delayed work during device removal
The delayed work item otg_event is initialized in fsl_otg_conf() and
scheduled under two conditions:
1. When a host controller binds to the OTG controller.
2. When the USB ID pin state changes (cable insertion/removal).
A race condition occurs when the device is removed via fsl_otg_remove():
the fsl_otg instance may be freed while the delayed work is still pending
or executing. This leads to use-after-free when the work function
fsl_otg_event() accesses the already freed memory.
The problematic scenario:
(detach thread) | (delayed work)
fsl_otg_remove() |
kfree(fsl_otg_dev) //FREE| fsl_otg_event()
| og = container_of(...) //USE
| og-> //USE
Fix this by calling disable_delayed_work_sync() in fsl_otg_remove()
before deallocating the fsl_otg structure. This ensures the delayed work
is properly canceled and completes execution prior to memory deallocation.
This bug was identified through static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/deadline: only set free_cpus for online runqueues
Commit 16b269436b72 ("sched/deadline: Modify cpudl::free_cpus
to reflect rd->online") introduced the cpudl_set/clear_freecpu
functions to allow the cpu_dl::free_cpus mask to be manipulated
by the deadline scheduler class rq_on/offline callbacks so the
mask would also reflect this state.
Commit 9659e1eeee28 ("sched/deadline: Remove cpu_active_mask
from cpudl_find()") removed the check of the cpu_active_mask to
save some processing on the premise that the cpudl::free_cpus
mask already reflected the runqueue online state.
Unfortunately, there are cases where it is possible for the
cpudl_clear function to set the free_cpus bit for a CPU when the
deadline runqueue is offline. When this occurs while a CPU is
connected to the default root domain the flag may retain the bad
state after the CPU has been unplugged. Later, a different CPU
that is transitioning through the default root domain may push a
deadline task to the powered down CPU when cpudl_find sees its
free_cpus bit is set. If this happens the task will not have the
opportunity to run.
One example is outlined here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250110233010.2339521-1-opendmb@gmail.com
Another occurs when the last deadline task is migrated from a
CPU that has an offlined runqueue. The dequeue_task member of
the deadline scheduler class will eventually call cpudl_clear
and set the free_cpus bit for the CPU.
This commit modifies the cpudl_clear function to be aware of the
online state of the deadline runqueue so that the free_cpus mask
can be updated appropriately.
It is no longer necessary to manage the mask outside of the
cpudl_set/clear functions so the cpudl_set/clear_freecpu
functions are removed. In addition, since the free_cpus mask is
now only updated under the cpudl lock the code was changed to
use the non-atomic __cpumask functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Avoid unregistering PSP twice
PSP is unregistered twice in:
_mlx5e_remove -> mlx5e_psp_unregister
mlx5e_nic_cleanup -> mlx5e_psp_unregister
This leads to a refcount underflow in some conditions:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1694 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd8/0xe0
[...]
mlx5e_psp_unregister+0x26/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_nic_cleanup+0x26/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_remove+0xe6/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30
device_release_driver_internal+0x194/0x1f0
bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
device_del+0x159/0x3c0
mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0xbc/0x2a0 [mlx5_core]
[...]
Do not directly remove psp from the _mlx5e_remove path, the PSP cleanup
happens as part of profile cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: duplicate handshake cancellations leak socket
When a handshake request is cancelled it is removed from the
handshake_net->hn_requests list, but it is still present in the
handshake_rhashtbl until it is destroyed.
If a second cancellation request arrives for the same handshake request,
then remove_pending() will return false... and assuming
HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED isn't set in req->hr_flags, we'll continue
processing through the out_true label, where we put another reference on
the sock and a refcount underflow occurs.
This can happen for example if a handshake times out - particularly if
the SUNRPC client sends the AUTH_TLS probe to the server but doesn't
follow it up with the ClientHello due to a problem with tlshd. When the
timeout is hit on the server, the server will send a FIN, which triggers
a cancellation request via xs_reset_transport(). When the timeout is
hit on the client, another cancellation request happens via
xs_tls_handshake_sync().
Add a test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED) in the pending cancel
path so duplicate cancels can be detected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create
When sync() and link() are called concurrently, both threads may
enter hfs_bnode_find() without finding the node in the hash table
and proceed to create it.
Thread A:
hfsplus_write_inode()
-> hfsplus_write_system_inode()
-> hfs_btree_write()
-> hfs_bnode_find(tree, 0)
-> __hfs_bnode_create(tree, 0)
Thread B:
hfsplus_create_cat()
-> hfs_brec_insert()
-> hfs_bnode_split()
-> hfs_bmap_alloc()
-> hfs_bnode_find(tree, 0)
-> __hfs_bnode_create(tree, 0)
In this case, thread A creates the bnode, sets refcnt=1, and hashes it.
Thread B also tries to create the same bnode, notices it has already
been inserted, drops its own instance, and uses the hashed one without
getting the node.
```
node2 = hfs_bnode_findhash(tree, cnid);
if (!node2) { <- Thread A
hash = hfs_bnode_hash(cnid);
node->next_hash = tree->node_hash[hash];
tree->node_hash[hash] = node;
tree->node_hash_cnt++;
} else { <- Thread B
spin_unlock(&tree->hash_lock);
kfree(node);
wait_event(node2->lock_wq,
!test_bit(HFS_BNODE_NEW, &node2->flags));
return node2;
}
```
However, hfs_bnode_find() requires each call to take a reference.
Here both threads end up setting refcnt=1. When they later put the node,
this triggers:
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&node->refcnt))
In this scenario, Thread B in fact finds the node in the hash table
rather than creating a new one, and thus must take a reference.
Fix this by calling hfs_bnode_get() when reusing a bnode newly created by
another thread to ensure the refcount is updated correctly.
A similar bug was fixed in HFS long ago in commit
a9dc087fd3c4 ("fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create")
but the same issue remained in HFS+ until now. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fsl-cpm: Check length parity before switching to 16 bit mode
Commit fc96ec826bce ("spi: fsl-cpm: Use 16 bit mode for large transfers
with even size") failed to make sure that the size is really even
before switching to 16 bit mode. Until recently the problem went
unnoticed because kernfs uses a pre-allocated bounce buffer of size
PAGE_SIZE for reading EEPROM.
But commit 8ad6249c51d0 ("eeprom: at25: convert to spi-mem API")
introduced an additional dynamically allocated bounce buffer whose size
is exactly the size of the transfer, leading to a buffer overrun in
the fsl-cpm driver when that size is odd.
Add the missing length parity verification and remain in 8 bit mode
when the length is not even. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid updating compression context during writeback
Bai, Shuangpeng <sjb7183@psu.edu> reported a bug as below:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11441 Comm: syz.0.46 Not tainted 6.17.0 #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_all_cluster_page_ready+0x106/0x550 fs/f2fs/compress.c:857
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_write_cache_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3078 [inline]
__f2fs_write_data_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3290 [inline]
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1c19/0x3600 fs/f2fs/data.c:3317
do_writepages+0x38e/0x640 mm/page-writeback.c:2634
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc mm/filemap.c:386 [inline]
__filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:419 [inline]
file_write_and_wait_range+0x2ba/0x3e0 mm/filemap.c:794
f2fs_do_sync_file+0x6e6/0x1b00 fs/f2fs/file.c:294
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:3043 [inline]
f2fs_file_write_iter+0x76e/0x2700 fs/f2fs/file.c:5259
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x7e9/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x19d/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x470 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The bug was triggered w/ below race condition:
fsync setattr ioctl
- f2fs_do_sync_file
- file_write_and_wait_range
- f2fs_write_cache_pages
: inode is non-compressed
: cc.cluster_size =
F2FS_I(inode)->i_cluster_size = 0
- tag_pages_for_writeback
- f2fs_setattr
- truncate_setsize
- f2fs_truncate
- f2fs_fileattr_set
- f2fs_setflags_common
- set_compress_context
: F2FS_I(inode)->i_cluster_size = 4
: set_inode_flag(inode, FI_COMPRESSED_FILE)
- f2fs_compressed_file
: return true
- f2fs_all_cluster_page_ready
: "pgidx % cc->cluster_size" trigger dividing 0 issue
Let's change as below to fix this issue:
- introduce a new atomic type variable .writeback in structure f2fs_inode_info
to track the number of threads which calling f2fs_write_cache_pages().
- use .i_sem lock to protect .writeback update.
- check .writeback before update compression context in f2fs_setflags_common()
to avoid race w/ ->writepages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix XDP_TX path
For XDP_TX action in bnxt_rx_xdp(), clearing of the event flags is not
correct. __bnxt_poll_work() -> bnxt_rx_pkt() -> bnxt_rx_xdp() may be
looping within NAPI and some event flags may be set in earlier
iterations. In particular, if BNXT_TX_EVENT is set earlier indicating
some XDP_TX packets are ready and pending, it will be cleared if it is
XDP_TX action again. Normally, we will set BNXT_TX_EVENT again when we
successfully call __bnxt_xmit_xdp(). But if the TX ring has no more
room, the flag will not be set. This will cause the TX producer to be
ahead but the driver will not hit the TX doorbell.
For multi-buf XDP_TX, there is no need to clear the event flags and set
BNXT_AGG_EVENT. The BNXT_AGG_EVENT flag should have been set earlier in
bnxt_rx_pkt().
The visible symptom of this is that the RX ring associated with the
TX XDP ring will eventually become empty and all packets will be dropped.
Because this condition will cause the driver to not refill the RX ring
seeing that the TX ring has forever pending XDP_TX packets.
The fix is to only clear BNXT_RX_EVENT when we have successfully
called __bnxt_xmit_xdp(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: Verify inode mode when loading from disk
syzbot is reporting that S_IFMT bits of inode->i_mode can become bogus when
the S_IFMT bits of the 16bits "mode" field loaded from disk are corrupted.
According to [1], the permissions field was treated as reserved in Mac OS
8 and 9. According to [2], the reserved field was explicitly initialized
with 0, and that field must remain 0 as long as reserved. Therefore, when
the "mode" field is not 0 (i.e. no longer reserved), the file must be
S_IFDIR if dir == 1, and the file must be one of S_IFREG/S_IFLNK/S_IFCHR/
S_IFBLK/S_IFIFO/S_IFSOCK if dir == 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
e1000: fix OOB in e1000_tbi_should_accept()
In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363
CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x200
kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110
e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10
__napi_poll+0x98/0x380
net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20
__do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d
do_softirq+0xd1/0x120
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130
ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00
__ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340
tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0
tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40
sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430
vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60
ksys_write+0xd1/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10
RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00
R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1:
__kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0
krealloc+0x90/0xc0
add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0
kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4
param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6
param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b
do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250
do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132
do_initcalls+0x46/0x74
kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393
kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of
2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800]
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110
head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
==================================================================
This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last
byte without validating the reported length first:
u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds
adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for
valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: invalidate dentry cache on failed whiteout creation
F2FS can mount filesystems with corrupted directory depth values that
get runtime-clamped to MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH. When RENAME_WHITEOUT
operations are performed on such directories, f2fs_rename performs
directory modifications (updating target entry and deleting source
entry) before attempting to add the whiteout entry via f2fs_add_link.
If f2fs_add_link fails due to the corrupted directory structure, the
function returns an error to VFS, but the partial directory
modifications have already been committed to disk. VFS assumes the
entire rename operation failed and does not update the dentry cache,
leaving stale mappings.
In the error path, VFS does not call d_move() to update the dentry
cache. This results in new_dentry still pointing to the old inode
(new_inode) which has already had its i_nlink decremented to zero.
The stale cache causes subsequent operations to incorrectly reference
the freed inode.
This causes subsequent operations to use cached dentry information that
no longer matches the on-disk state. When a second rename targets the
same entry, VFS attempts to decrement i_nlink on the stale inode, which
may already have i_nlink=0, triggering a WARNING in drop_nlink().
Example sequence:
1. First rename (RENAME_WHITEOUT): file2 → file1
- f2fs updates file1 entry on disk (points to inode 8)
- f2fs deletes file2 entry on disk
- f2fs_add_link(whiteout) fails (corrupted directory)
- Returns error to VFS
- VFS does not call d_move() due to error
- VFS cache still has: file1 → inode 7 (stale!)
- inode 7 has i_nlink=0 (already decremented)
2. Second rename: file3 → file1
- VFS uses stale cache: file1 → inode 7
- Tries to drop_nlink on inode 7 (i_nlink already 0)
- WARNING in drop_nlink()
Fix this by explicitly invalidating old_dentry and new_dentry when
f2fs_add_link fails during whiteout creation. This forces VFS to
refresh from disk on subsequent operations, ensuring cache consistency
even when the rename partially succeeds.
Reproducer:
1. Mount F2FS image with corrupted i_current_depth
2. renameat2(file2, file1, RENAME_WHITEOUT)
3. renameat2(file3, file1, 0)
4. System triggers WARNING in drop_nlink() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix OOB write in bnxt_re_copy_err_stats()
Commit ef56081d1864 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: RoCE related hardware counters
update") added three new counters and placed them after
BNXT_RE_OUT_OF_SEQ_ERR.
BNXT_RE_OUT_OF_SEQ_ERR acts as a boundary marker for allocating hardware
statistics with different num_counters values on chip_gen_p5_p7 devices.
As a result, BNXT_RE_NUM_STD_COUNTERS are used when allocating
hw_stats, which leads to an out-of-bounds write in
bnxt_re_copy_err_stats().
The counters BNXT_RE_REQ_CQE_ERROR, BNXT_RE_RESP_CQE_ERROR, and
BNXT_RE_RESP_REMOTE_ACCESS_ERRS are applicable to generic hardware, not
only p5/p7 devices.
Fix this by moving these counters before BNXT_RE_OUT_OF_SEQ_ERR so they
are included in the generic counter set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: using the num_tqps in the vf driver to apply for resources
Currently, hdev->htqp is allocated using hdev->num_tqps, and kinfo->tqp
is allocated using kinfo->num_tqps. However, kinfo->num_tqps is set to
min(new_tqps, hdev->num_tqps); Therefore, kinfo->num_tqps may be smaller
than hdev->num_tqps, which causes some hdev->htqp[i] to remain
uninitialized in hclgevf_knic_setup().
Thus, this patch allocates hdev->htqp and kinfo->tqp using hdev->num_tqps,
ensuring that the lengths of hdev->htqp and kinfo->tqp are consistent
and that all elements are properly initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_tree_connect_put under concurrency
Under high concurrency, A tree-connection object (tcon) is freed on
a disconnect path while another path still holds a reference and later
executes *_put()/write on it. |
