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12866 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-49525 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx25821: Fix the warning when removing the module When removing the module, we will get the following warning: [ 14.746697] remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/21', leaking at least 'cx25821[1]' [ 14.747449] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 368 at fs/proc/generic.c:717 remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x3f0 [ 14.751611] RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x3f0 [ 14.759589] Call Trace: [ 14.759792] <TASK> [ 14.759975] unregister_irq_proc+0x14c/0x170 [ 14.760340] irq_free_descs+0x94/0xe0 [ 14.760640] mp_unmap_irq+0xb6/0x100 [ 14.760937] acpi_unregister_gsi_ioapic+0x27/0x40 [ 14.761334] acpi_pci_irq_disable+0x1d3/0x320 [ 14.761688] pci_disable_device+0x1ad/0x380 [ 14.762027] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x60 [ 14.762442] ? cx25821_shutdown+0x20/0x9f0 [cx25821] [ 14.762848] cx25821_finidev+0x48/0xc0 [cx25821] [ 14.763242] pci_device_remove+0x92/0x240 Fix this by freeing the irq before call pci_disable_device(). | ||||
| CVE-2022-48631 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bug in extents parsing when eh_entries == 0 and eh_depth > 0 When walking through an inode extents, the ext4_ext_binsearch_idx() function assumes that the extent header has been previously validated. However, there are no checks that verify that the number of entries (eh->eh_entries) is non-zero when depth is > 0. And this will lead to problems because the EXT_FIRST_INDEX() and EXT_LAST_INDEX() will return garbage and result in this: [ 135.245946] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 135.247579] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents.c:2258! [ 135.249045] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 135.250320] CPU: 2 PID: 238 Comm: tmp118 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #4 [ 135.252067] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 135.255065] RIP: 0010:ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xc20/0xcb0 [ 135.256475] Code: [ 135.261433] RSP: 0018:ffffc900005939f8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 135.262847] RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffffc90000593b70 RCX: 0000000000000023 [ 135.264765] RDX: ffff8880038e5f10 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff8880046e922c [ 135.266670] RBP: ffff8880046e9348 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888002ca580c [ 135.268576] R10: 0000000000002602 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000024 [ 135.270477] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 135.272394] FS: 00007fdabdc56740(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 135.274510] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 135.276075] CR2: 00007ffc26bd4f00 CR3: 0000000006261004 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 [ 135.277952] Call Trace: [ 135.278635] <TASK> [ 135.279247] ? preempt_count_add+0x6d/0xa0 [ 135.280358] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x55/0xb0 [ 135.281612] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x18/0x30 [ 135.282704] ext4_map_blocks+0x294/0x5a0 [ 135.283745] ? xa_load+0x6f/0xa0 [ 135.284562] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x3d6/0x770 [ 135.285646] read_pages+0x67/0x1d0 [ 135.286492] ? folio_add_lru+0x51/0x80 [ 135.287441] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x124/0x170 [ 135.288510] filemap_get_pages+0x23d/0x5a0 [ 135.289457] ? path_openat+0xa72/0xdd0 [ 135.290332] filemap_read+0xbf/0x300 [ 135.291158] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x17/0x40 [ 135.292192] new_sync_read+0x103/0x170 [ 135.293014] vfs_read+0x15d/0x180 [ 135.293745] ksys_read+0xa1/0xe0 [ 135.294461] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 [ 135.295284] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 This patch simply adds an extra check in __ext4_ext_check(), verifying that eh_entries is not 0 when eh_depth is > 0. | ||||
| CVE-2024-36024 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Disable idle reallow as part of command/gpint execution [Why] Workaroud for a race condition where DMCUB is in the process of committing to IPS1 during the handshake causing us to miss the transition into IPS2 and touch the INBOX1 RPTR causing a HW hang. [How] Disable the reallow to ensure that we have enough of a gap between entry and exit and we're not seeing back-to-back wake_and_executes. | ||||
| CVE-2023-52828 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 6.6 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit bar(cond): if r1 != 0 goto pc+2 call do_something exit call foo r0 = 0 // Never seen by verifier exit // main(ctx): r1 = ... call bar r0 = 0 exit Here, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following: bpf_throw foo bar main In bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such, the return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT emits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of the program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return address as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the unreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect. To remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as part of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when such a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final instruction ends up being a call instruction. | ||||
| CVE-2022-48721 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 </IRQ> <TASK> The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49790 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - invert valid length check when fetching device IDs syzbot is reporting uninitialized value at iforce_init_device() [1], for commit 6ac0aec6b0a6 ("Input: iforce - allow callers supply data buffer when fetching device IDs") is checking that valid length is shorter than bytes to read. Since iforce_get_id_packet() stores valid length when returning 0, the caller needs to check that valid length is longer than or equals to bytes to read. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53135 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK in imprecise unwinding stack mode When CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is unset, the stack unwinding function walk_stackframe randomly reads the stack and then, when KASAN is enabled, it can lead to the following backtrace: [ 0.000000] ================================================================== [ 0.000000] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0xa6/0x11a [ 0.000000] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff81807c40 by task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.2.0-12919-g24203e6db61f #43 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007ba8>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c49c80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x22/0x36 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80c3783e>] print_report+0x198/0x4a8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099ecc>] init_param_lock+0x26/0x2a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f68a>] kasan_report+0x9a/0xc8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007c4a>] walk_stackframe+0xa2/0x11a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e99c>] desc_make_final+0x80/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04e>] stack_trace_save+0x88/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80099fc2>] filter_irq_stacks+0x72/0x76 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006b95e>] devkmsg_read+0x32a/0x32e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec16>] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x52 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8006e998>] desc_make_final+0x7c/0x84 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8009a04a>] stack_trace_save+0x84/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015ec52>] kasan_set_track+0x12/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015f22e>] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x5e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8015e7ea>] __kmem_cache_create+0x21e/0x39a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e133ac>] create_boot_cache+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e17ab2>] kmem_cache_init+0x6c/0x11e [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e00fd6>] mm_init+0xd8/0xfe [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80e011d8>] start_kernel+0x190/0x3ca [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0 [ 0.000000] and is located at offset 0 in frame: [ 0.000000] stack_trace_save+0x0/0xa6 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] This frame has 1 object: [ 0.000000] [32, 56) 'c' [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 0.000000] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x81a07 [ 0.000000] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000001000 ff600003f1e3d150 ff600003f1e3d150 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff [ 0.000000] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] >ffffffff81807c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 [ 0.000000] ^ [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ffffffff81807d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 0.000000] ================================================================== Fix that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when reading the stack in imprecise mode. | ||||
| CVE-2024-41072 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: wext: add extra SIOCSIWSCAN data check In 'cfg80211_wext_siwscan()', add extra check whether number of channels passed via 'ioctl(sock, SIOCSIWSCAN, ...)' doesn't exceed IW_MAX_FREQUENCIES and reject invalid request with -EINVAL otherwise. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53079 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix steering rules cleanup vport's mc, uc and multicast rules are not deleted in teardown path when EEH happens. Since the vport's promisc settings(uc, mc and all) in firmware are reset after EEH, mlx5 driver will try to delete the above rules in the initialization path. This cause kernel crash because these software rules are no longer valid. Fix by nullifying these rules right after delete to avoid accessing any dangling pointers. Call Trace: __list_del_entry_valid+0xcc/0x100 (unreliable) tree_put_node+0xf4/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] tree_remove_node+0x30/0x70 [mlx5_core] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x14c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core] esw_apply_vport_rx_mode+0x10c/0x200 [mlx5_core] esw_update_vport_rx_mode+0xb4/0x180 [mlx5_core] esw_vport_change_handle_locked+0x1ec/0x230 [mlx5_core] esw_enable_vport+0x130/0x260 [mlx5_core] mlx5_eswitch_enable_sriov+0x2a0/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_device_enable_sriov+0x74/0x440 [mlx5_core] mlx5_load_one+0x114c/0x1550 [mlx5_core] mlx5_pci_resume+0x68/0xf0 [mlx5_core] eeh_report_resume+0x1a4/0x230 eeh_pe_dev_traverse+0x98/0x170 eeh_handle_normal_event+0x3e4/0x640 eeh_handle_event+0x4c/0x370 eeh_event_handler+0x14c/0x210 kthread+0x168/0x1b0 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x84 | ||||
| CVE-2022-49798 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race where eprobes can be called before the event The flag that tells the event to call its triggers after reading the event is set for eprobes after the eprobe is enabled. This leads to a race where the eprobe may be triggered at the beginning of the event where the record information is NULL. The eprobe then dereferences the NULL record causing a NULL kernel pointer bug. Test for a NULL record to keep this from happening. | ||||
| CVE-2023-52701 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: use a bounce buffer for copying skb->mark syzbot found arm64 builds would crash in sock_recv_mark() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y x86 and powerpc are not detecting the issue because they define user_access_begin. This will be handled in a different patch, because a check_object_size() is missing. Only data from skb->cb[] can be copied directly to/from user space, as explained in commit 79a8a642bf05 ("net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field") syzbot report was: usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 168, size 4)! ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4410 Comm: syz-executor533 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7-syzkaller-17907-g2d3827b3f393 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 sp : ffff80000fb9b9a0 x29: ffff80000fb9b9b0 x28: ffff0000c6073400 x27: 0000000020001a00 x26: 0000000000000014 x25: ffff80000cf52000 x24: fffffc0000000000 x23: 05ffc00000000200 x22: fffffc000324bf80 x21: ffff0000c92fe1a8 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000004 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 656a626f2042554c x16: ffff0000c6073dd0 x15: ffff80000dbd2118 x14: ffff0000c6073400 x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff0000c6073400 x11: ff808000081bbb4c x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x8 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x7 : ffff80000bf650d4 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0001fefbff08 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000006c Call trace: usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 __check_heap_object+0xa8/0x100 mm/slub.c:4761 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline] __check_object_size+0x208/0x6b8 mm/usercopy.c:251 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline] __copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:115 [inline] put_cmsg+0x408/0x464 net/core/scm.c:238 sock_recv_mark net/socket.c:975 [inline] __sock_recv_cmsgs+0x1fc/0x248 net/socket.c:984 sock_recv_cmsgs include/net/sock.h:2728 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0x2d8/0x678 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482 ____sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x3a0 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2737 [inline] __sys_recvmsg+0x194/0x210 net/socket.c:2767 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2777 [inline] __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2774 [inline] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x2c/0x3c net/socket.c:2774 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x64/0x178 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:193 el0_svc+0x58/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:637 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:655 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: 91388800 aa0903e1 f90003e8 94e6d752 (d4210000) | ||||
| CVE-2024-35834 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: recycle buffer in case Rx queue was full Add missing xsk_buff_free() call when __xsk_rcv_zc() failed to produce descriptor to XSK Rx queue. | ||||
| CVE-2024-57993 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-thrustmaster: Fix warning in thrustmaster_probe by adding endpoint check syzbot has found a type mismatch between a USB pipe and the transfer endpoint, which is triggered by the hid-thrustmaster driver[1]. There is a number of similar, already fixed issues [2]. In this case as in others, implementing check for endpoint type fixes the issue. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=040e8b3db6a96908d470 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=348331f63b034f89b622 | ||||
| CVE-2022-49503 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 6.0 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath9k_htc: fix potential out of bounds access with invalid rxstatus->rs_keyix The "rxstatus->rs_keyix" eventually gets passed to test_bit() so we need to ensure that it is within the bitmap. drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/common.c:46 ath9k_cmn_rx_accept() error: passing untrusted data 'rx_stats->rs_keyix' to 'test_bit()' | ||||
| CVE-2021-47376 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Add oversize check before call kvcalloc() Commit 7661809d493b ("mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls") add the oversize check. When the allocation is larger than what kmalloc() supports, the following warning triggered: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8408 at mm/util.c:597 kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 8408 Comm: syz-executor221 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597 Call Trace: kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:806 [inline] kvmalloc_array include/linux/mm.h:824 [inline] kvcalloc include/linux/mm.h:829 [inline] check_btf_line kernel/bpf/verifier.c:9925 [inline] check_btf_info kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10049 [inline] bpf_check+0xd634/0x150d0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13759 bpf_prog_load kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2301 [inline] __sys_bpf+0x11181/0x126e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4587 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae | ||||
| CVE-2022-49506 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/mediatek: Add vblank register/unregister callback functions We encountered a kernel panic issue that callback data will be NULL when it's using in ovl irq handler. There is a timing issue between mtk_disp_ovl_irq_handler() and mtk_ovl_disable_vblank(). To resolve this issue, we use the flow to register/unregister vblank cb: - Register callback function and callback data when crtc creates. - Unregister callback function and callback data when crtc destroies. With this solution, we can assure callback data will not be NULL when vblank is disable. | ||||
| CVE-2023-52868 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thermal: core: prevent potential string overflow The dev->id value comes from ida_alloc() so it's a number between zero and INT_MAX. If it's too high then these sprintf()s will overflow. | ||||
| CVE-2024-27067 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/evtchn: avoid WARN() when unbinding an event channel When unbinding a user event channel, the related handler might be called a last time in case the kernel was built with CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ. This might cause a WARN() in the handler. Avoid that by adding an "unbinding" flag to struct user_event which will short circuit the handler. | ||||
| CVE-2024-53167 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfs/blocklayout: Don't attempt unregister for invalid block device Since commit d869da91cccb ("nfs/blocklayout: Fix premature PR key unregistration") an unmount of a pNFS SCSI layout-enabled NFS may dereference a NULL block_device in: bl_unregister_scsi+0x16/0xe0 [blocklayoutdriver] bl_free_device+0x70/0x80 [blocklayoutdriver] bl_free_deviceid_node+0x12/0x30 [blocklayoutdriver] nfs4_put_deviceid_node+0x60/0xc0 [nfsv4] nfs4_deviceid_purge_client+0x132/0x190 [nfsv4] unset_pnfs_layoutdriver+0x59/0x60 [nfsv4] nfs4_destroy_server+0x36/0x70 [nfsv4] nfs_free_server+0x23/0xe0 [nfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x30/0xb0 cleanup_mnt+0xba/0x150 task_work_run+0x59/0x90 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x217/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 This happens because even though we were able to create the nfs4_deviceid_node, the lookup for the device was unable to attach the block device to the pnfs_block_dev. If we never found a block device to register, we can avoid this case with the PNFS_BDEV_REGISTERED flag. Move the deref behind the test for the flag. | ||||
| CVE-2024-57893 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-07-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: oss: Fix races at processing SysEx messages OSS sequencer handles the SysEx messages split in 6 bytes packets, and ALSA sequencer OSS layer tries to combine those. It stores the data in the internal buffer and this access is racy as of now, which may lead to the out-of-bounds access. As a temporary band-aid fix, introduce a mutex for serializing the process of the SysEx message packets. | ||||