| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Visual Studio allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in SQL Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Visual Studio allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft JScript allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft UxTheme Library (uxtheme.dll) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Standard XPS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Standard XPS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to corrupt memory due to an integer underflow. |
| AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3. |
| AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2. |
| The rpcap client code that processes a RPCAP_MSG_PACKET message received from the server incorrectly validates its headers. A malicious server can send a crafted message and cause the client to treat up to 20 bytes of the client process memory beyond the end of the buffer as if it was a part of the captured packet. |
| In BPF instructions that load/store a value from/to a scratch memory register the register index is an unsigned 32-bit integer and must not exceed 15, but libpcap BPF interpreter does not validate the value. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading and writing the OS process memory in the 16GiB starting at the current stack frame on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures. |
| libpcap BPF interpreter detects neither reaching the end of the filter program buffer due to lack of a return instruction nor executing a jump instruction with an offset that translates to a pointer outside of the buffer. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading the OS process memory in the 32GiB around the buffer on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures. |
| Net::IP::LPM versions before 1.12 for Perl accept malformed prefix lengths.
Non-numeric and non-ASCII prefix lengths are accepted and treated as 0. Integers over 31 bits are silently truncated. A single malformed mask will poison the lookup table.
The result is that the lookup will silently succeed for every address. An allow-list will allow every address, and a deny-list will block every address. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to store a value of arbitrary size in an attribute whose length constraint should bound it.
Ash measures string length with Elixir's String.length/1, which counts Unicode graphemes, in the max_length and min_length constraints of Ash.Type.String (apply_constraints/2 in lib/ash/type/string.ex), in Ash.Resource.Validation.StringLength, and in the string_length expression function. A grapheme carries an unbounded number of combining marks, so a base character followed by a million combining acute accents is one grapheme and megabytes of data, and satisfies max_length: 2. Where the data layer imposes no independent limit (ETS, Mnesia, or a Postgres text column) the whole value is persisted, so an attacker can write an entire request body into an attribute declared with a small maximum and grow storage without bound.
The counting unit also disagrees with the storage layer, which counts codepoints rather than graphemes, so a value accepted by the constraint can still be rejected or truncated by the column. A Postgres varchar(n) column bounds the value itself and is not exposed.
This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.33.0. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client's own account.
When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional key_authorization field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for EIP-7702 account delegations of the client's choosing.
When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but never reads its aa_authorization_list field. Every signed delegation in that list is charged as intrinsic gas before the payment call runs, so a client attaching delegations from throwaway authority keys makes the sponsor pay for them within the default gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of seven entries the sponsored cost rises from about 46,575 gas to about 1,884,087 gas. Because each entry is applied as a persistent set-code delegation, a client can also upgrade its own accounts to delegated code at the sponsor's expense.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1. |
| Substance3D - Sampler is affected by a Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
