| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Fix potential UAF in MLD delayed work
A race condition exists between device teardown and incoming MLD query
processing, leading to a Use-After-Free in the MLD delayed work.
During device destruction, the primary reference to inet6_dev is dropped,
which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of inet6_dev memory
is deferred via RCU.
Concurrently, the packet receive path runs under RCU read lock and obtains
the inet6_dev pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can
safely dereference inet6_dev even if its refcount has hit 0.
However, if CPU-0 calls igmp6_event_query() and schedules delayed work, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in6_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the inet6_dev memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period, the device is freed while the work is still scheduled.
When the work runs, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.
Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in6_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not schedule the work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer()
A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and
incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free
in the IGMP timer callback.
During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference
to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of
in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()).
Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the
in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely
dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0.
However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again),
the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer
expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.
Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer.
A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block
The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked
independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are
backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and
command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL
register and moves data through the shared cache registers.
Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The
per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a
different lock.
The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of
the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs
decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache
read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule
write to another Super VCAP instance.
Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache
between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer
commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.
Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule
lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the
per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that
serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new
admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the
control lock instead of a per-instance one.
No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a
single mutex cannot self-deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats agent registration race
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() registers the stats agent through
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper publishes the agent in
hv_vhca->agents[type] under agents_lock and immediately schedules an
asynchronous control invalidation on the HV VHCA workqueue before
returning to mlx5e.
The asynchronous invalidation invokes the control agent's invalidate
callback, which reads the hypervisor control block and forwards the
command to mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_control(). That callback may either:
- call cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->stats_agent.work), or
- call queue_delayed_work(priv->wq, &sagent->work, sagent->delay).
However, the delayed_work and priv->stats_agent.agent are only
initialized after mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create() returns to mlx5e:
agent = mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(...); /* publish + invalidate */
...
priv->stats_agent.agent = agent; /* too late */
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->stats_agent.work, ...); /* too late */
If the asynchronous control path runs before the two assignments
above, it can:
- Operate on an uninitialized delayed_work whose timer.function is
NULL. queue_delayed_work() calls add_timer() unconditionally, so
when the timer expires the timer softirq invokes a NULL function
pointer.
- Re-initialize the timer later through INIT_DELAYED_WORK() while
the timer is already enqueued in the timer wheel, corrupting the
hlist (entry.pprev cleared while the previous bucket node still
points at this entry).
- When the worker eventually runs, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() reads
sagent->agent (NULL) and dereferences it inside
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_write().
Fix this by:
- Initializing priv->stats_agent.work before invoking
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(), so the work is always in a valid
state when the control callback observes it.
- Adding a struct mlx5_hv_vhca_agent **ctx_update out-parameter
to mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper writes the agent
pointer to *ctx_update before publishing into hv_vhca->agents[]
and triggering the agents_update flow, so any callback
subsequently invoked from that flow already sees a valid
priv->stats_agent.agent. This avoids having the control
callback participate in agent initialization.
While at it, access priv->stats_agent.agent with
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for the cross-CPU access with the worker, and
clear priv->stats_agent.buf on the agent_create() failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: stp: Fix a potential use-after-free when deleting a bridge
The three STP timers are not supposed to be armed while the bridge is
administratively down. They are synchronously deactivated when the
bridge is put administratively down and the various call sites check for
'IFF_UP' before arming them.
This check is missing from br_topology_change_detection() and it is
possible to engineer a situation in which the topology change timer is
armed while the bridge is administratively down, resulting in a
use-after-free [1] when the bridge is deleted.
Fix by adding the missing check and for good measures synchronously
shutdown the three timers when the bridge is deleted.
[1]
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88811662b9b0 object type: timer_list hint: br_topology_change_timer_expired (net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:120)
WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1bc/0x450, CPU#9: ip/359 |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler setVaryHeader replaces application Vary headers such as Authorization or Cookie with Origin, allowing a caching proxy or CDN to reuse authenticated responses across users and disclose sensitive information. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: close durable scavenger races against m_fp_list lookups
ksmbd_durable_scavenger() has two related races against any walker
that iterates f_ci->m_fp_list, including ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode()
(used by ksmbd_vfs_rename) and the share-mode checks in
fs/smb/server/smb_common.c.
(1) fp->node list-head reuse. Durable-preserved handles can remain
linked on f_ci->m_fp_list after session teardown so share-mode checks
still see them while the handle is reconnectable. The scavenger
collected expired handles by adding fp->node to a local
scavenger_list after removing them from the global durable idr.
Because fp->node is the same list_head used by m_fp_list,
list_add(&fp->node, &scavenger_list) overwrites the m_fp_list links
and corrupts both lists. CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST can report this on the
share-mode walk path.
(2) Refcount race against m_fp_list walkers. The scavenger qualifies
an expired durable handle with atomic_read(&fp->refcount) > 1 and
fp->conn under global_ft.lock, removes fp from global_ft, then drops
global_ft.lock before unlinking fp from m_fp_list and freeing it.
During that gap fp is still linked on m_fp_list with f_state ==
FP_INITED. ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode() under m_lock read calls
ksmbd_fp_get() (atomic_inc_not_zero on refcount that is still 1) and
takes a live reference; the scavenger then unlinks and frees fp
while the holder owns a reference, leading to UAF on the holder's
subsequent ksmbd_fd_put() and on any field reads performed by a
concurrent share-mode walker that iterates m_fp_list without taking
ksmbd_fp_get() (smb_check_perm_dleases-like paths).
Fix both:
* Stop reusing fp->node as a scavenger-private list node. Remove
one expired handle from global_ft under global_ft.lock, take an
explicit transient reference, drop the lock, unlink fp->node
from m_fp_list under f_ci->m_lock, then drop both the durable
lifetime and transient references with atomic_sub_and_test(2,
&fp->refcount). If the scavenger is the last putter the close
runs there; otherwise an in-flight holder that already raced
through the m_fp_list lookup owns the final close via its
ksmbd_fd_put() path. The one-at-a-time disposal can rescan the
durable idr when multiple handles expire in the same pass, but
durable scavenging is a background expiration path and the final
full scan recomputes min_timeout before the next wait.
* Clear fp->persistent_id inside __ksmbd_remove_durable_fd() right
after idr_remove(), so a delayed final close from a holder that
snatched fp does not re-issue idr_remove() on a persistent id
that idr_alloc_cyclic() in ksmbd_open_durable_fd() may have
already handed out to a brand-new durable handle.
* Bypass the per-conn open_files_count decrement in
__put_fd_final() when fp is detached from any session table
(fp->conn cleared by session_fd_check() at durable preserve --
paired with the volatile_id clear at unpublish, so checking
fp->conn alone is sufficient). The walker that owns the final
close runs from an unrelated work->conn whose
stats.open_files_count never tracked this durable fp; without
this guard the holder would underflow that unrelated counter.
The two races are folded into one patch because patch (1) alone
cleans up the corrupted list but leaves a deterministic UAF window
for m_fp_list walkers that the transient-reference and
persistent_id discipline in (2) close; bisecting onto an
intermediate state would land on a UAF that pre-patch chaos merely
made less reproducible.
Validation:
* CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST coverage for the list_head reuse path.
* KASAN-enabled direct SMB2 durable-handle coverage that exercised
ksmbd_durable_scavenger() and non-NULL ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode()
returns while durable handles expired under concurrent rename
lookups, with no KASAN, UAF, list-corruption, ODEBUG, or WARNING
reports.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: uniwill-laptop: Do not enable the charging limit even when forced
It seems that on some older models (~2020) the battery charging limit
can permanently damage the battery. Prevent users from enabling this
feature thru the "force" module parameter to avoid causing permanent
hardware damage on such devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: fix urb->setup_packet leak in error paths
The setup_packet of control urb is not freed if usb_submit_urb fails or
the submitted urb is killed. Add free in these two paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix dma_buffer leak on bus acquire failure
wilc_wlan_firmware_download() allocates dma_buffer with kmalloc() at
the top of the function and uses a 'fail:' label to free it via
kfree(dma_buffer) on error.
All later error paths correctly use 'goto fail' to route through this
cleanup. However, the early failure path after the first acquire_bus()
call uses a bare 'return ret;', which leaks dma_buffer whenever the bus
acquire fails.
Replace the early return with goto fail so the existing cleanup path
runs.
Found via a custom Coccinelle semantic patch hunting for kmalloc'd
locals leaked on early-return error paths in driver firmware-download
code. |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix metabuf leak in inode xattr initialization
commit bb88e8da0025 ("erofs: use meta buffers for xattr operations")
converted xattr operations to use on-stack erofs_buf instances.
erofs_init_inode_xattrs() uses such a metabuf while reading the inline
xattr header and shared xattr id array.
Some error paths after erofs_read_metabuf() leave through out_unlock
without dropping the metabuf, so the folio reference can leak.
Consolidate the cleanup at out_unlock. erofs_put_metabuf() is a
no-op if no folio has been acquired, and this keeps all paths after
taking EROFS_I_BL_XATTR_BIT covered by a single cleanup site. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pds_core: fix debugfs_lookup dentry leak and error handling
debugfs_lookup() returns a dentry with an elevated reference count that
must be released with dput(). The current code discards the returned
dentry without calling dput(), causing a reference leak on every
firmware reset recovery.
Additionally, when CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is disabled, debugfs_lookup()
returns ERR_PTR(-ENODEV), not NULL. The current check passes for error
pointers and would call dput() on an invalid pointer, causing a crash. |
| Incorrect permission assignment for critical resource in Azure SQL Database allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). In gst_avi_demux_riff_parse_vprp(), the number of available gst_riff_vprp_video_field_desc entries is calculated by dividing the remaining buffer size by the attacker-controlled vprp->fields value, rather than by sizeof(gst_riff_vprp_video_field_desc). This can cause the parser to treat more field descriptors as available than fit in the input buffer, resulting in out-of-bounds reads. Processing a crafted AVI via playbin/decodebin can crash the application (denial of service). Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072). |
| A flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). When parsing FUJIFILM metadata in an AVI strd chunk, gst_avi_demux_parse_strd() decrements a remaining-length counter by fixed offsets (98 and 10 bytes) without verifying sufficient data remains. For crafted strd payloads of exactly 106 or 107 bytes, the counter underflows to a very large unsigned value, causing subsequent null-terminated string scanning to read far beyond the allocated heap buffer. Date-format normalization may also write beyond the buffer end. Confirmed impacts include heap out-of-bounds read, out-of-bounds write, heap information disclosure (adjacent data appearing in parsed metadata), and application crash/denial of service. The avidemux element is auto-plugged by playbin, decodebin, and gst-discoverer, so opening or previewing a crafted AVI is sufficient to trigger the issue. Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072). |
| Hasura is an open-source product that provides users GraphQL or REST APIs. Prior to 2.49.2 and 2.45.5, a user can use a where clause on a table computed field (returning SETOF some_table) to infer row values that ought to be filtered for their role based on some_table's row-level permissions. While such rows cannot be returned directly, like predicates on strings for instance allow values to be brute forced efficiently with the where clause as an oracle. This issue is fixed in versions 2.49.2 and 2.45.5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: iosm: bound device offsets in the MUX downlink decoder
mux_dl_adb_decode() walks a chain of aggregated datagram tables using
offsets and lengths taken from the modem. first_table_index,
next_table_index, table_length, datagram_index and datagram_length are
all device supplied le values. Only first_table_index was checked, and
only for being non zero. The decoder then formed adth = block +
adth_index and read the table header and the datagram entries with no
bound against the received skb. A modem that reports an index or a
length past the downlink buffer makes the decoder read out of bounds.
The buffer is IPC_MEM_MAX_DL_MUX_LITE_BUF_SIZE and skb->len is at most
that, so skb->len is the real limit, but none of these in band offsets
were checked against it.
The table chain is also followed with no forward progress check. The loop
takes the next table from adth->next_table_index and stops only when that
reaches zero. A modem can stage two tables that point at each other, so
the loop never ends. It runs in softirq and clones the skb on every pass.
Validate every device offset and length against skb->len before use.
The block header must fit. Each table header, on entry and after every
next_table_index, must lie inside the skb. The datagram table must fit.
Each datagram index and length must stay inside the skb. The header
padding must not exceed the datagram length so the receive length does
not wrap. Require each next_table_index to move forward so the chain
cannot cycle.
This was reproduced under KASAN as a slab out of bounds read on a normal
downlink receive once the iosm net device is up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_multiq: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked
multiq_dequeue() takes a packet from a band's child with a direct
->dequeue() call after multiq_peek() peeked it. When the child is
non-work-conserving the peek stashes the skb in the child's gso_skb, so
the direct dequeue returns a different skb and orphans the stash,
desyncing the child's qlen/backlog. With a qfq child reached through a
peeking parent (e.g. tbf) this re-enters the child on an emptied list and
dereferences NULL, panicking the kernel from softirq on ordinary egress.
Take the packet through qdisc_dequeue_peeked(), as sch_prio already does
and as sch_red and sch_sfb were just fixed to do. The helper is a no-op
when the child has no stash, so a work-conserving child is unaffected. |
