| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Flag Forge is a Capture The Flag (CTF) platform. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.3.2, the `/api/admin/badge-templates` (GET) and `/api/admin/badge-templates/create` (POST) endpoints previously allowed access without authentication or authorization. This could have enabled unauthorized users to retrieve all badge templates and sensitive metadata (createdBy, createdAt, updatedAt) and/or create arbitrary badge templates in the database. This could lead to data exposure, database pollution, or abuse of the badge system. The issue has been fixed in FlagForge v2.3.2. GET, POST, UPDATE, and DELETE endpoints now require authentication. Authorization checks ensure only admins can access and modify badge templates. No reliable workarounds are available. |
| ssh in OpenSSH before 10.1 allows the '\0' character in an ssh:// URI, potentially leading to code execution when a ProxyCommand is used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: Fix PCI device refcount leak in radeon_atrm_get_bios()
As comment of pci_get_class() says, it returns a pci_device with its
refcount increased and decreased the refcount for the input parameter
@from if it is not NULL.
If we break the loop in radeon_atrm_get_bios() with 'pdev' not NULL, we
need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the refcount. Add the missing
pci_dev_put() to avoid refcount leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix soft lockup in status_resync
status_resync() will calculate 'curr_resync - recovery_active' to show
user a progress bar like following:
[============>........] resync = 61.4%
'curr_resync' and 'recovery_active' is updated in md_do_sync(), and
status_resync() can read them concurrently, hence it's possible that
'curr_resync - recovery_active' can overflow to a huge number. In this
case status_resync() will be stuck in the loop to print a large amount
of '=', which will end up soft lockup.
Fix the problem by setting 'resync' to MD_RESYNC_ACTIVE in this case,
this way resync in progress will be reported to user. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gvt: fix vgpu debugfs clean in remove
Check carefully on root debugfs available when destroying vgpu,
e.g in remove case drm minor's debugfs root might already be destroyed,
which led to kernel oops like below.
Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25
i915 0000:00:02.0: MDEV: Unregistering
intel_vgpu_mdev b1338b2d-a709-4c23-b766-cc436c36cdf0: Removing from iommu group 14
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000150
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 3 PID: 1046 Comm: driverctl Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2+ #6
Hardware name: HP HP ProDesk 600 G3 MT/829D, BIOS P02 Ver. 02.44 09/13/2022
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x5e2/0x1f90
Code: 87 ad 09 00 00 39 05 e1 1e cc 02 0f 82 f1 09 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 48 83 c4 48 89 d0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 45 31 ff <48> 81 3f 60 9e c2 b6 45 0f 45 f8 83 fe 01 0f 87 55 fa ff ff 89 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff9f770274f948 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000150
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8895d1173300 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fc9b2ba0740(0000) GS:ffff889cdfcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000150 CR3: 000000010fd93005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0
down_write+0x2a/0xd0
? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
? start_creating.part.0+0x110/0x110
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60
intel_gvt_debugfs_remove_vgpu+0x15/0x30 [kvmgt]
intel_gvt_destroy_vgpu+0x60/0x100 [kvmgt]
intel_vgpu_release_dev+0xe/0x20 [kvmgt]
device_release+0x30/0x80
kobject_put+0x79/0x1b0
device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230
bus_remove_device+0xec/0x160
device_del+0x189/0x400
? up_write+0x9c/0x1b0
? mdev_device_remove_common+0x60/0x60 [mdev]
mdev_device_remove_common+0x22/0x60 [mdev]
mdev_device_remove_cb+0x17/0x20 [mdev]
device_for_each_child+0x56/0x80
mdev_unregister_parent+0x5a/0x81 [mdev]
intel_gvt_clean_device+0x2d/0xe0 [kvmgt]
intel_gvt_driver_remove+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
i915_driver_remove+0xac/0x100 [i915]
i915_pci_remove+0x1a/0x30 [i915]
pci_device_remove+0x31/0xa0
device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230
unbind_store+0xd8/0x100
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x156/0x210
vfs_write+0x236/0x4a0
ksys_write+0x61/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x80
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0
? up_read+0x17/0x20
? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fc9b2c9e0c4
Code: 15 71 7d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 3d 05 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffec29c81c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007fc9b2c9e0c4
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 0000559f8b5f48a0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000559f8b5f48a0 R08: 0000559f8b5f3540 R09: 00007fc9b2d76d30
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000000000000d
R13: 00007fc9b2d77780 R14: 000000000000000d R15: 00007fc9b2d72a00
</TASK>
Modules linked in: sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_pmc_core_pltdrv intel_pmc_core intel_tcc_cooling x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ee1004 igbvf rapl vfat fat intel_cstate intel_uncore pktcdvd i2c_i801 pcspkr wmi_bmof i2c_smbus acpi_pad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd zram fuse dm
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Fix a leak in map_user_pages()
If get_user_pages_fast() allocates some pages but not as many as we
wanted, then the current code leaks those pages. Call put_page() on
the pages before returning. |
| A potential security vulnerability has been identified in HP Sure Start’s protection of the Intel Flash Descriptor in certain HP PC products, which might allow security bypass, arbitrary code execution, loss of integrity or confidentiality, or denial of service. HP is releasing BIOS updates to mitigate the potential vulnerability. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in ABB EIBPORT V3 KNX, ABB EIBPORT V3 KNX GSM.This issue affects EIBPORT V3 KNX: before 3.9.2; EIBPORT V3 KNX GSM: before 3.9.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
test_firmware: fix memory leak in test_firmware_init()
When misc_register() failed in test_firmware_init(), the memory pointed
by test_fw_config->name is not released. The memory leak information is
as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810a34cb00 (size 32):
comm "insmod", pid 7952, jiffies 4294948236 (age 49.060s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
74 65 73 74 2d 66 69 72 6d 77 61 72 65 2e 62 69 test-firmware.bi
6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 n...............
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b21fcb>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x4b/0xc0
[<ffffffff81affb96>] kstrndup+0x46/0xc0
[<ffffffffa0403a49>] __test_firmware_config_init+0x29/0x380 [test_firmware]
[<ffffffffa040f068>] 0xffffffffa040f068
[<ffffffff81002c41>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x780
[<ffffffff816a72c3>] do_init_module+0x1c3/0x630
[<ffffffff816adb9e>] load_module+0x623e/0x76a0
[<ffffffff816af471>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x181/0x240
[<ffffffff89978f99>] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[<ffffffff89a0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: fix null pointer dereference in blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping()
Our syzkaller report a null pointer dereference, root cause is
following:
__blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs
set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs
blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs
blk_mq_alloc_rqs
// failed due to oom
alloc_pages_node
// set->tags[hctx_idx] is still NULL
blk_mq_free_rqs
drv_tags = set->tags[hctx_idx];
// null pointer dereference is triggered
blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping(drv_tags, ...)
This is because commit 63064be150e4 ("blk-mq:
Add blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs()") merged the two steps:
1) set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_rq_map()
2) blk_mq_alloc_rqs(..., set->tags[hctx_idx])
into one step:
set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs()
Since tags is not initialized yet in this case, fix the problem by
checking if tags is NULL pointer in blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: raspberrypi: fix possible memory leak in rpi_firmware_probe()
In rpi_firmware_probe(), if mbox_request_channel() fails, the 'fw' will
not be freed through rpi_firmware_delete(), fix this leak by calling
kfree() in the error path. |
| IBM Standards Processing Engine 10.0.1.10 could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an unsafe java deserialization. By sending specially crafted input, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. |
| Insufficiently Protected Credentials in the Crowdstrike connector can lead to Crowdstrike credentials being leaked. A malicious user can access cached credentials from a Crowdstrike connector in another space by creating and running a Crowdstrike connector in a space to which they have access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeon_ep: cancel queued works in probe error path
If it fails to get the devices's MAC address, octep_probe exits while
leaving the delayed work intr_poll_task queued. When the work later
runs, it's a use after free.
Move the cancelation of intr_poll_task from octep_remove into
octep_device_cleanup. This does not change anything in the octep_remove
flow, but octep_device_cleanup is called also in the octep_probe error
path, where the cancelation is needed.
Note that the cancelation of ctrl_mbox_task has to follow
intr_poll_task's, because the ctrl_mbox_task may be queued by
intr_poll_task. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: ov772x: Fix memleak in ov772x_probe()
A memory leak was reported when testing ov772x with bpf mock device:
AssertionError: unreferenced object 0xffff888109afa7a8 (size 8):
comm "python3", pid 279, jiffies 4294805921 (age 20.681s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
80 22 88 15 81 88 ff ff ."......
backtrace:
[<000000009990b438>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000009e32f7d7>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<00000000faf48134>] v4l2_ctrl_handler_init_class+0x11d/0x180 [videodev]
[<00000000da376937>] ov772x_probe+0x1c3/0x68c [ov772x]
[<000000003f0d225e>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<00000000e0b6db89>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<000000001b19fcee>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<0000000048370519>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<000000005ead07a0>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<0000000043f452b8>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000358e5596>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000043f83c5d>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000ee0f3046>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000e0278184>] i2c_new_client_device+0x359/0x4f0
[<0000000070baf34f>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
[<00000000a9f2159d>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160
unreferenced object 0xffff888119825c00 (size 256):
comm "python3", pid 279, jiffies 4294805921 (age 20.681s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 b4 a5 17 81 88 ff ff 00 5e 82 19 81 88 ff ff .........^......
10 5c 82 19 81 88 ff ff 10 5c 82 19 81 88 ff ff .\.......\......
backtrace:
[<000000009990b438>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000009e32f7d7>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<0000000073d88e0b>] v4l2_ctrl_new.cold+0x19b/0x86f [videodev]
[<00000000b1f576fb>] v4l2_ctrl_new_std+0x16f/0x210 [videodev]
[<00000000caf7ac99>] ov772x_probe+0x1fa/0x68c [ov772x]
[<000000003f0d225e>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<00000000e0b6db89>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<000000001b19fcee>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<0000000048370519>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<000000005ead07a0>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<0000000043f452b8>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000358e5596>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000043f83c5d>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000ee0f3046>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000e0278184>] i2c_new_client_device+0x359/0x4f0
[<0000000070baf34f>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
The reason is that if priv->hdl.error is set, ov772x_probe() jumps to the
error_mutex_destroy without doing v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(), and all
resources allocated in v4l2_ctrl_handler_init() and v4l2_ctrl_new_std()
are leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: drop gfx_v11_0_cp_ecc_error_irq_funcs
The gfx.cp_ecc_error_irq is retired in gfx11. In gfx_v11_0_hw_fini still
use amdgpu_irq_put to disable this interrupt, which caused the call trace
in this function.
[ 102.873958] Call Trace:
[ 102.873959] <TASK>
[ 102.873961] gfx_v11_0_hw_fini+0x23/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874019] gfx_v11_0_suspend+0xe/0x20 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874072] amdgpu_device_ip_suspend_phase2+0x240/0x460 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874122] amdgpu_device_ip_suspend+0x3d/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874172] amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset+0xd9/0x490 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874223] amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0x548/0xce6 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874321] amdgpu_debugfs_reset_work+0x4c/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 102.874375] process_one_work+0x21f/0x3f0
[ 102.874377] worker_thread+0x200/0x3e0
[ 102.874378] ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 102.874379] kthread+0xfd/0x130
[ 102.874380] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 102.874381] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
v2:
- Handle umc and gfx ras cases in separated patch
- Retired the gfx_v11_0_cp_ecc_error_irq_funcs in gfx11
v3:
- Improve the subject and code comments
- Add judgment on gfx11 in the function of amdgpu_gfx_ras_late_init
v4:
- Drop the define of CP_ME1_PIPE_INST_ADDR_INTERVAL and
SET_ECC_ME_PIPE_STATE which using in gfx_v11_0_set_cp_ecc_error_state
- Check cp_ecc_error_irq.funcs rather than ip version for a more
sustainable life
v5:
- Simplify judgment conditions |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_fq: fix integer overflow of "credit"
if sch_fq is configured with "initial quantum" having values greater than
INT_MAX, the first assignment of "credit" does signed integer overflow to
a very negative value.
In this situation, the syzkaller script provided by Cristoph triggers the
CPU soft-lockup warning even with few sockets. It's not an infinite loop,
but "credit" wasn't probably meant to be minus 2Gb for each new flow.
Capping "initial quantum" to INT_MAX proved to fix the issue.
v2: validation of "initial quantum" is done in fq_policy, instead of open
coding in fq_change() _ suggested by Jakub Kicinski |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject invalid reloc tree root keys with stack dump
[BUG]
Syzbot reported a crash that an ASSERT() got triggered inside
prepare_to_merge().
That ASSERT() makes sure the reloc tree is properly pointed back by its
subvolume tree.
[CAUSE]
After more debugging output, it turns out we had an invalid reloc tree:
BTRFS error (device loop1): reloc tree mismatch, root 8 has no reloc root, expect reloc root key (-8, 132, 8) gen 17
Note the above root key is (TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID, ROOT_ITEM,
QUOTA_TREE_OBJECTID), meaning it's a reloc tree for quota tree.
But reloc trees can only exist for subvolumes, as for non-subvolume
trees, we just COW the involved tree block, no need to create a reloc
tree since those tree blocks won't be shared with other trees.
Only subvolumes tree can share tree blocks with other trees (thus they
have BTRFS_ROOT_SHAREABLE flag).
Thus this new debug output proves my previous assumption that corrupted
on-disk data can trigger that ASSERT().
[FIX]
Besides the dedicated fix and the graceful exit, also let tree-checker to
check such root keys, to make sure reloc trees can only exist for subvolumes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: microchip: fix potential UAF in auxdev release callback
Similar to commit 1c11289b34ab ("peci: cpu: Fix use-after-free in
adev_release()"), the auxiliary device is not torn down in the correct
order. If auxiliary_device_add() fails, the release callback will be
called twice, resulting in a UAF. Due to timing, the auxdev code in this
driver "took inspiration" from the aforementioned commit, and thus its
bugs too!
Moving auxiliary_device_uninit() to the unregister callback instead
avoids the issue. |
| The NASA’s Interplanetary Overlay Network (ION) is an implementation of Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN). A BPv7 bundle with a malformed extension block causes uncontrolled memory allocation inside ION-DTN 4.1.3s, leading to receiver thread termination and a Denial-of-Service (DoS). The triggering bundle contains an extension block starting at `0x85070201005bbb0e20b4ea001a000927c0...`. The first byte in the extension block (0x85) indicates a CBOR array of five elements of which the first four are numbers (0x07, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00) but the fifth element is a byte string of length 27 (`0x5bbb0e20b4ea001a000927c0...`). The vulnerability seems to be due to processing the fifth element of the array (i.e., the byte string) as replacing it with a number makes the vulnerability no longer be triggered. While parsing this extension block, ION obtains a very large block length, which in the code in `bei.c`:764) seems to be passed from `blockLength` which is an unsigned int, to a 32 bit signed integer `blkSize`. The unsigned to signed conversion causes `blkSize` to hold the value of -369092043, which is then converted into a 64-bit unsigned value inside `MTAKE(blkSize)`, resulting in an attempt to allocate an unrealistic amount of memory, causing the error. As of time of publication, no known patched versions of BPv7 exist. |
