| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability in
the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of
Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an unauthenticated, logically adjacent BGP peer sending a specifically malformed BGP packet to cause rpd to crash and restart, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). Continued receipt and processing of this packet will create a sustained Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
This issue only affects systems configured in
either of two ways:
* systems with BGP traceoptions enabled
* systems with BGP family traffic-engineering (BGP-LS)
configured
and can be exploited from a directly connected and configured BGP peer.
This issue affects iBGP and eBGP
with
any address family
configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 are affected by this vulnerability.
This issue affects:
Junos OS:
*
from 21.4 before 21.4R3-S9,
* from 22.2 before 22.2R3-S5,
* from 22.3 before 22.3R3-S4,
* from 22.4 before 22.4R3-S5,
* from 23.2 before 23.2R2-S3,
* from 23.4 before 23.4R2-S3,
* from 24.2 before 24.2R1-S2, 24.2R2;
Junos OS Evolved:
* from 21.4-EVO before 21.4R3-S9-EVO,
* from 22.2-EVO before 22.2R3-S5-EVO,
* from 22.3-EVO before 22.3R3-S4-EVO,
* from 22.4-EVO before 22.4R3-S5-EVO,
* from 23.2-EVO before 23.2R2-S3-EVO,
* from 23.4-EVO before 23.4R2-S2-EVO,
* from 24.2-EVO before 24.2R1-S2-EVO, 24.2R2-EVO.
This issue does not affect versions of Junos OS prior to 21.3R1.
This issue does not affect versions of Junos OS Evolved prior to 21.3R1-EVO.
This is a similar, but different vulnerability than the issue reported as CVE-2024-39516. |
| in OpenHarmony v5.0.2 and prior versions allow a local attacker cause DOS through out-of-bounds read. |
| in OpenHarmony v5.0.2 and prior versions allow a local attacker cause DOS through out-of-bounds read. |
| Substance3D - Designer versions 14.1 and earlier are affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass mitigations such as ASLR. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| Substance3D - Designer versions 14.1 and earlier are affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass mitigations such as ASLR. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| Substance3D - Viewer versions 0.22 and earlier are affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| An out-of-bounds read in Ivanti EPM before the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcache: avoid oversized read request in cache missing code path
In the cache missing code path of cached device, if a proper location
from the internal B+ tree is matched for a cache miss range, function
cached_dev_cache_miss() will be called in cache_lookup_fn() in the
following code block,
[code block 1]
526 unsigned int sectors = KEY_INODE(k) == s->iop.inode
527 ? min_t(uint64_t, INT_MAX,
528 KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector)
529 : INT_MAX;
530 int ret = s->d->cache_miss(b, s, bio, sectors);
Here s->d->cache_miss() is the call backfunction pointer initialized as
cached_dev_cache_miss(), the last parameter 'sectors' is an important
hint to calculate the size of read request to backing device of the
missing cache data.
Current calculation in above code block may generate oversized value of
'sectors', which consequently may trigger 2 different potential kernel
panics by BUG() or BUG_ON() as listed below,
1) BUG_ON() inside bch_btree_insert_key(),
[code block 2]
886 BUG_ON(b->ops->is_extents && !KEY_SIZE(k));
2) BUG() inside biovec_slab(),
[code block 3]
51 default:
52 BUG();
53 return NULL;
All the above panics are original from cached_dev_cache_miss() by the
oversized parameter 'sectors'.
Inside cached_dev_cache_miss(), parameter 'sectors' is used to calculate
the size of data read from backing device for the cache missing. This
size is stored in s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 4]
909 s->insert_bio_sectors = min(sectors, bio_sectors(bio) + reada);
Then the actual key inserting to the internal B+ tree is generated and
stored in s->iop.replace_key by the following lines of code,
[code block 5]
911 s->iop.replace_key = KEY(s->iop.inode,
912 bio->bi_iter.bi_sector + s->insert_bio_sectors,
913 s->insert_bio_sectors);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 1) by BUG_ON() from
the above code block.
And the bio sending to backing device for the missing data is allocated
with hint from s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 6]
926 cache_bio = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOWAIT,
927 DIV_ROUND_UP(s->insert_bio_sectors, PAGE_SECTORS),
928 &dc->disk.bio_split);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 2) by BUG() from the
agove code block.
Now let me explain how the panics happen with the oversized 'sectors'.
In code block 5, replace_key is generated by macro KEY(). From the
definition of macro KEY(),
[code block 7]
71 #define KEY(inode, offset, size) \
72 ((struct bkey) { \
73 .high = (1ULL << 63) | ((__u64) (size) << 20) | (inode), \
74 .low = (offset) \
75 })
Here 'size' is 16bits width embedded in 64bits member 'high' of struct
bkey. But in code block 1, if "KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector" is
very probably to be larger than (1<<16) - 1, which makes the bkey size
calculation in code block 5 is overflowed. In one bug report the value
of parameter 'sectors' is 131072 (= 1 << 17), the overflowed 'sectors'
results the overflowed s->insert_bio_sectors in code block 4, then makes
size field of s->iop.replace_key to be 0 in code block 5. Then the 0-
sized s->iop.replace_key is inserted into the internal B+ tree as cache
missing check key (a special key to detect and avoid a racing between
normal write request and cache missing read request) as,
[code block 8]
915 ret = bch_btree_insert_check_key(b, &s->op, &s->iop.replace_key);
Then the 0-sized s->iop.replace_key as 3rd parameter triggers the bkey
size check BUG_ON() in code block 2, and causes the kernel panic 1).
Another ke
---truncated--- |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Management Provider allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
