| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The extension's frontend detail-view document lookup does not apply the current site's siteHash filter or frontend user access filter, unlike the regular search path. A visitor who can obtain or guess a valid Solr document id can retrieve documents through this lookup without the same access restrictions enforced elsewhere. |
| The extension allows a request-provided additionalFilters parameter to register a named siteHash filter before the system's own siteHash filter is applied, and the query builder does not overwrite an already-registered named filter. In a shared Solr core serving multiple TYPO3 sites, a visitor can use this to read public documents belonging to another site. The same root cause also affects the suggest top-results path when suggest is enabled. |
| The extension's indexer passed every field value returned by content object rendering through PHP's unserialize() function when transferring multi-value data for the SOLR_CLASSIFICATION, SOLR_MULTIVALUE and SOLR_RELATION content object types, rather than a safe format. If user-generated content saved in the TYPO3 database can reach an indexed field, this exposes a PHP Object Injection surface. |
| The extension passes the user-supplied search query parameter to Apache Solr without restricting advanced Solr query syntax such as wildcards, field selectors and range queries. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use this syntax to enumerate indexed field names and extract their stored values through boolean- and range-based blind extraction techniques, independent of any site-specific configuration. |
| The extension fails to restrict a backend AJAX endpoint for inline editing to fields the current user is permitted to see or edit. An authenticated, low-privileged backend user can supply arbitrary table, field and record parameters, and trigger an error response that discloses the current database value of the requested field, leading to disclosure of sensitive information such as backend and frontend user password hashes. Exploitation requires a valid, authenticated TYPO3 backend user account with access to the extensions backend module. |
| The extension fails to enforce enable-field restrictions on a repository query parameter. An unauthenticated remote user can pass a demand-override parameter to view hidden or time-restricted events, unless the disableOverrideDemand plugin setting is active. Exploitation of this issue requires only that disableOverrideDemand is not enabled. |
| The extension passes an editor-configurable email subject string directly into a Fluid template source without restriction. A backend user with edit access to the event plugin or Backend Module can supply Fluid ViewHelper syntax in this field to disclose sensitive data or execute TypoScript content objects. Exploitation of this issue requires an authenticated backend account with edit access to the event registration plugin or backend module. |
| The extension fails to properly validate the expiration of a client-supplied JWT token, allowing an attacker in control of a valid API key to authenticate with an expired token. Exploitation requires the attacker to already be in control of the SYSSY project's API key. |
| When OpenSSL is unavailable on the server, the extension transmits TYPO3 system information in cleartext instead of encrypting it. Exploitation requires the attacker to already be in control of the SYSSY project's API key. |
| The extension fails to restrict which frontend usergroups a logged-in user may assign to their own account when the profile edit plugin uses its default field configuration, allowing self-service privilege escalation into arbitrary frontend groups. |
| The extension fails to require the dedicated admin confirmation token when processing an admin-approval request, so a regular user confirmation hash, obtainable by any visitor through the public resend-confirmation action, is sufficient to self-approve a pending account awaiting admin approval. |
| The extension's user detail view fails to verify that a requested user record matches the configured or logged-in target, allowing any visitor with access to the Detail or List plugin to retrieve another frontend user's profile data, including name, email, date of birth and address, by supplying an arbitrary user ID. |
| The extension passes the raw value of a form field configured as "This field contains the name of the sender" directly into a Fluid View as template source, without any sanitization, and renders it. An anonymous, unauthenticated user can submit Fluid template syntax in that field to execute arbitrary Fluid ViewHelpers leading to disclosure of server configuration, environment variables and application source, and potentially remote code execution. Exploitation requires only that a form field is configured as the sender_name field, a common and default-adjacent Powermail configuration. No authentication or user interaction beyond a normal form submission is required. This vulnerability is reported to be actively exploited in the wild. |
| The extension fails to properly sanitize user input before using it in a database query. As a result, a low-privileged backend user can inject arbitrary SQL through a URL parameter within the "Forms Export" backend module. Exploitation requires a low-privileged backend user and read access to the "Forms Export" Backend module. |
| The extension fails to safely process untrusted client input of an attacker-controlled cookie directly to PHP's unserialize(). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can supply a crafted serialized payload to trigger PHP Object Injection, leading to Remote Code Execution on the TYPO3 server. |
| The extension fails to validate a client-supplied template element key before using it to build file paths for saving and deleting Mask template files. An authenticated backend user with access to the Mask module can supply a key containing path traversal sequences to create or delete .html files outside the configured template directory. |
| The extension validates the HMAC of a frontend employee edit link only in the action that renders the edit form, not in the action that persists the change. An unauthenticated visitor who knows the UID of a visible employee record can send a direct POST request to the update action and overwrite that record without a valid edit link or any ownership check. |
| The extension resolves the targeted club record from a user-supplied request argument in its frontend edit, update, and activate actions, but performs no ownership check in any of them. An unauthenticated visitor who knows the UID of a club record can send a direct request to the update or activate action and overwrite that record, or publish one still awaiting approval, without owning it. |
| The frontend company self-service editing feature relies on a template-level visibility flag to hide the edit form for company records a visitor does not own, but the corresponding write operation does not repeat this ownership check on the server side. As a result, a visitor who knows the identifier of a company record from the public directory can submit a modified update request for that record directly and overwrite its data, without the application ever confirming that the visitor owns it. |
| The frontend topic editing flow does not verify on the server side that the requesting visitor owns the topic being modified. As a result, a visitor who knows the identifier of a topic from the public forum can submit a modified update request for that topic directly and overwrite its content, without the application confirming ownership. Topic identifiers are visible in the public forum listing, and exploitation requires no privileged access or non-default configuration. |
