| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue
If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at
the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues
the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on
the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued
or because the I/O thread requeued it.
The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to
things like UAFs or refcount underruns.
Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and
moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we
have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it.
Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call
rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the
queue, so fix that also. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: handle attr_set_size() errors when truncating files
If attr_set_size() fails while truncating down, the error is silently
ignored and the inode may be left in an inconsistent state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: mmp_pdma: Fix race condition in mmp_pdma_residue()
Add proper locking in mmp_pdma_residue() to prevent use-after-free when
accessing descriptor list and descriptor contents.
The race occurs when multiple threads call tx_status() while the tasklet
on another CPU is freeing completed descriptors:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
mmp_pdma_tx_status()
mmp_pdma_residue()
-> NO LOCK held
list_for_each_entry(sw, ..)
DMA interrupt
dma_do_tasklet()
-> spin_lock(&desc_lock)
list_move(sw->node, ...)
spin_unlock(&desc_lock)
| dma_pool_free(sw) <- FREED!
-> access sw->desc <- UAF!
This issue can be reproduced when running dmatest on the same channel with
multiple threads (threads_per_chan > 1).
Fix by protecting the chain_running list iteration and descriptor access
with the chan->desc_lock spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity: disable recursive forward error correction
There are two problems with the recursive correction:
1. It may cause denial-of-service. In fec_read_bufs, there is a loop that
has 253 iterations. For each iteration, we may call verity_hash_for_block
recursively. There is a limit of 4 nested recursions - that means that
there may be at most 253^4 (4 billion) iterations. Red Hat QE team
actually created an image that pushes dm-verity to this limit - and this
image just makes the udev-worker process get stuck in the 'D' state.
2. It doesn't work. In fec_read_bufs we store data into the variable
"fio->bufs", but fio bufs is shared between recursive invocations, if
"verity_hash_for_block" invoked correction recursively, it would
overwrite partially filled fio->bufs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: fix deadlock when reading partition table
When one process(such as udev) opens ublk block device (e.g., to read
the partition table via bdev_open()), a deadlock[1] can occur:
1. bdev_open() grabs disk->open_mutex
2. The process issues read I/O to ublk backend to read partition table
3. In __ublk_complete_rq(), blk_update_request() or blk_mq_end_request()
runs bio->bi_end_io() callbacks
4. If this triggers fput() on file descriptor of ublk block device, the
work may be deferred to current task's task work (see fput() implementation)
5. This eventually calls blkdev_release() from the same context
6. blkdev_release() tries to grab disk->open_mutex again
7. Deadlock: same task waiting for a mutex it already holds
The fix is to run blk_update_request() and blk_mq_end_request() with bottom
halves disabled. This forces blkdev_release() to run in kernel work-queue
context instead of current task work context, and allows ublk server to make
forward progress, and avoids the deadlock.
[axboe: rewrite comment in ublk] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to detect potential corrupted nid in free_nid_list
As reported, on-disk footer.ino and footer.nid is the same and
out-of-range, let's add sanity check on f2fs_alloc_nid() to detect
any potential corruption in free_nid_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_xmit_callback(): fix handling of failed transmitted URBs
The driver lacks the cleanup of failed transfers of URBs. This reduces the
number of available URBs per error by 1. This leads to reduced performance
and ultimately to a complete stop of the transmission.
If the sending of a bulk URB fails do proper cleanup:
- increase netdev stats
- mark the echo_sbk as free
- free the driver's context and do accounting
- wake the send queue |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()
bm_register_write() opens an executable file using open_exec(), which
internally calls do_open_execat() and denies write access on the file to
avoid modification while it is being executed.
However, when an error occurs, bm_register_write() closes the file using
filp_close() directly. This does not restore the write permission, which
may cause subsequent write operations on the same file to fail.
Fix this by calling exe_file_allow_write_access() before filp_close() to
restore the write permission properly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: remove two invalid BUG_ON()s
Those can be triggered trivially by userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: fix the deadlock of enetc_mdio_lock
After applying the workaround for err050089, the LS1028A platform
experiences RCU stalls on RT kernel. This issue is caused by the
recursive acquisition of the read lock enetc_mdio_lock. Here list some
of the call stacks identified under the enetc_poll path that may lead to
a deadlock:
enetc_poll
-> enetc_lock_mdio
-> enetc_clean_rx_ring OR napi_complete_done
-> napi_gro_receive
-> enetc_start_xmit
-> enetc_lock_mdio
-> enetc_map_tx_buffs
-> enetc_unlock_mdio
-> enetc_unlock_mdio
After enetc_poll acquires the read lock, a higher-priority writer attempts
to acquire the lock, causing preemption. The writer detects that a
read lock is already held and is scheduled out. However, readers under
enetc_poll cannot acquire the read lock again because a writer is already
waiting, leading to a thread hang.
Currently, the deadlock is avoided by adjusting enetc_lock_mdio to prevent
recursive lock acquisition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/deadline: Stop dl_server before CPU goes offline
IBM CI tool reported kernel warning[1] when running a CPU removal
operation through drmgr[2]. i.e "drmgr -c cpu -r -q 1"
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/cpudeadline.c:219 cpudl_set+0x58/0x170
NIP [c0000000002b6ed8] cpudl_set+0x58/0x170
LR [c0000000002b7cb8] dl_server_timer+0x168/0x2a0
Call Trace:
[c000000002c2f8c0] init_stack+0x78c0/0x8000 (unreliable)
[c0000000002b7cb8] dl_server_timer+0x168/0x2a0
[c00000000034df84] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1a4/0x390
[c00000000034f624] hrtimer_interrupt+0x124/0x300
[c00000000002a230] timer_interrupt+0x140/0x320
Git bisects to: commit 4ae8d9aa9f9d ("sched/deadline: Fix dl_server getting stuck")
This happens since:
- dl_server hrtimer gets enqueued close to cpu offline, when
kthread_park enqueues a fair task.
- CPU goes offline and drmgr removes it from cpu_present_mask.
- hrtimer fires and warning is hit.
Fix it by stopping the dl_server before CPU is marked dead.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8218e149-7718-4432-9312-f97297c352b9@linux.ibm.com/
[2]: https://github.com/ibm-power-utilities/powerpc-utils/tree/next/src/drmgr
[sshegde: wrote the changelog and tested it] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: cadence-quadspi: Implement refcount to handle unbind during busy
driver support indirect read and indirect write operation with
assumption no force device removal(unbind) operation. However
force device removal(removal) is still available to root superuser.
Unbinding driver during operation causes kernel crash. This changes
ensure driver able to handle such operation for indirect read and
indirect write by implementing refcount to track attached devices
to the controller and gracefully wait and until attached devices
remove operation completed before proceed with removal operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix race condition to UAF in snd_usbmidi_free
The previous commit 0718a78f6a9f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Kill timer properly at
removal") patched a UAF issue caused by the error timer.
However, because the error timer kill added in this patch occurs after the
endpoint delete, a race condition to UAF still occurs, albeit rarely.
Additionally, since kill-cleanup for urb is also missing, freed memory can
be accessed in interrupt context related to urb, which can cause UAF.
Therefore, to prevent this, error timer and urb must be killed before
freeing the heap memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Validate i_depth for exhash directories
A fuzzer test introduced corruption that ends up with a depth of 0 in
dir_e_read(), causing an undefined shift by 32 at:
index = hash >> (32 - dip->i_depth);
As calculated in an open-coded way in dir_make_exhash(), the minimum
depth for an exhash directory is ilog2(sdp->sd_hash_ptrs) and 0 is
invalid as sdp->sd_hash_ptrs is fixed as sdp->bsize / 16 at mount time.
So we can avoid the undefined behaviour by checking for depth values
lower than the minimum in gfs2_dinode_in(). Values greater than the
maximum are already being checked for there.
Also switch the calculation in dir_make_exhash() to use ilog2() to
clarify how the depth is calculated.
Tested with the syzkaller repro.c and xfstests '-g quick'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: No more self recovery
When a node withdraws and it turns out that it is the only node that has
the filesystem mounted, gfs2 currently tries to replay the local journal
to bring the filesystem back into a consistent state. Not only is that
a very bad idea, it has also never worked because gfs2_recover_func()
will refuse to do anything during a withdraw.
However, before even getting to this point, gfs2_recover_func()
dereferences sdp->sd_jdesc->jd_inode. This was a use-after-free before
commit 04133b607a78 ("gfs2: Prevent double iput for journal on error")
and is a NULL pointer dereference since then.
Simply get rid of self recovery to fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix UAF of f2fs_inode_info in f2fs_free_dic
The decompress_io_ctx may be released asynchronously after
I/O completion. If this file is deleted immediately after read,
and the kworker of processing post_read_wq has not been executed yet
due to high workloads, It is possible that the inode(f2fs_inode_info)
is evicted and freed before it is used f2fs_free_dic.
The UAF case as below:
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_decompress_end_io
- f2fs_put_dic
- queue_work
add free_dic work to post_read_wq
- do_unlink
- iput
- evict
- call_rcu
This file is deleted after read.
Thread C kworker to process post_read_wq
- rcu_do_batch
- f2fs_free_inode
- kmem_cache_free
inode is freed by rcu
- process_scheduled_works
- f2fs_late_free_dic
- f2fs_free_dic
- f2fs_release_decomp_mem
read (dic->inode)->i_compress_algorithm
This patch store compress_algorithm and sbi in dic to avoid inode UAF.
In addition, the previous solution is deprecated in [1] may cause system hang.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c36ab955-c8db-4a8b-a9d0-f07b5f426c3f@kernel.org |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to trigger foreground gc during f2fs_map_blocks() in lfs mode
w/ "mode=lfs" mount option, generic/299 will cause system panic as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2835!
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x6f4/0xc50
f2fs_map_blocks+0x970/0x1550
f2fs_iomap_begin+0xb2/0x1e0
iomap_iter+0x1d6/0x430
__iomap_dio_rw+0x208/0x9a0
f2fs_file_write_iter+0x6b3/0xfa0
aio_write+0x15d/0x2e0
io_submit_one+0x55e/0xab0
__x64_sys_io_submit+0xa5/0x230
do_syscall_64+0x84/0x2f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0010:new_curseg+0x70f/0x720
The root cause of we run out-of-space is: in f2fs_map_blocks(), f2fs may
trigger foreground gc only if it allocates any physical block, it will be
a little bit later when there is multiple threads writing data w/
aio/dio/bufio method in parallel, since we always use OPU in lfs mode, so
f2fs_map_blocks() does block allocations aggressively.
In order to fix this issue, let's give a chance to trigger foreground
gc in prior to block allocation in f2fs_map_blocks(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Fix pd UAF once and for all
There is a race condition/UAF in padata_reorder that goes back
to the initial commit. A reference count is taken at the start
of the process in padata_do_parallel, and released at the end in
padata_serial_worker.
This reference count is (and only is) required for padata_replace
to function correctly. If padata_replace is never called then
there is no issue.
In the function padata_reorder which serves as the core of padata,
as soon as padata is added to queue->serial.list, and the associated
spin lock released, that padata may be processed and the reference
count on pd would go away.
Fix this by getting the next padata before the squeue->serial lock
is released.
In order to make this possible, simplify padata_reorder by only
calling it once the next padata arrives. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush()
syzbot reported use-after-free in vhci_flush() without repro. [0]
From the splat, a thread close()d a vhci file descriptor while
its device was being used by iotcl() on another thread.
Once the last fd refcnt is released, vhci_release() calls
hci_unregister_dev(), hci_free_dev(), and kfree() for struct
vhci_data, which is set to hci_dev->dev->driver_data.
The problem is that there is no synchronisation after unlinking
hdev from hci_dev_list in hci_unregister_dev(). There might be
another thread still accessing the hdev which was fetched before
the unlink operation.
We can use SRCU for such synchronisation.
Let's run hci_dev_reset() under SRCU and wait for its completion
in hci_unregister_dev().
Another option would be to restore hci_dev->destruct(), which was
removed in commit 587ae086f6e4 ("Bluetooth: Remove unused
hci-destruct cb"). However, this would not be a good solution, as
we should not run hci_unregister_dev() while there are in-flight
ioctl() requests, which could lead to another data-race KCSAN splat.
Note that other drivers seem to have the same problem, for exmaple,
virtbt_remove().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807cb8d858 by task syz.1.219/6718
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6718 Comm: syz.1.219 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00196-g08207f42d3ff #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634
skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline]
skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937
skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3368 [inline]
vhci_flush+0x44/0x50 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:69
hci_dev_do_reset net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:552 [inline]
hci_dev_reset+0x420/0x5c0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:592
sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fcf5b98e929
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fcf5c7b9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcf5bbb6160 RCX: 00007fcf5b98e929
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000400448cb RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 00007fcf5ba10b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcf5bbb6160 R15: 00007ffd6353d528
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6535:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
vhci_open+0x57/0x360 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:635
misc_open+0x2bc/0x330 drivers/char/misc.c:161
chrdev_open+0x4c9/0x5e0 fs/char_dev.c:414
do_dentry_open+0xdf0/0x1970 fs/open.c:964
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1094
do_open fs/namei.c:3887 [inline]
path_openat+0x2ee5/0x3830 fs/name
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: clear the dst when changing skb protocol
A not-so-careful NAT46 BPF program can crash the kernel
if it indiscriminately flips ingress packets from v4 to v6:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
ip6_rcv_core (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:190:20)
ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:306:8)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6186:4)
napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6906:9)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7028:13)
do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:462:3)
netif_rx (net/core/dev.c:5326:3)
dev_loopback_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4015:2)
ip_mc_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:363:8)
NF_HOOK (./include/linux/netfilter.h:314:9)
ip_mc_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:400:5)
dst_output (./include/net/dst.h:459:9)
ip_local_out (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130:9)
ip_send_skb (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1496:8)
udp_send_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:1040:8)
udp_sendmsg (net/ipv4/udp.c:1328:10)
The output interface has a 4->6 program attached at ingress.
We try to loop the multicast skb back to the sending socket.
Ingress BPF runs as part of netif_rx(), pushes a valid v6 hdr
and changes skb->protocol to v6. We enter ip6_rcv_core which
tries to use skb_dst(). But the dst is still an IPv4 one left
after IPv4 mcast output.
Clear the dst in all BPF helpers which change the protocol.
Try to preserve metadata dsts, those may carry non-routing
metadata. |
