| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: esd_usb: esd_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In esd_usb_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to
the dev->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback
esd_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In
esd_usb_close() the URBs are freed by calling
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in esd_usb_close().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
esd_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev->rx_submitted anchor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc
Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc.
We need to check for that constraint.
Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this
issue for the curious.
GangMin Kim <km.kim1503@gmail.com> managed to concot a scenario as follows:
ROOT qdisc 1:0 (QFQ)
├── class 1:1 (weight=15, lmax=16384) netem with delay 6.4s
└── class 1:2 (weight=1, lmax=1514) teql
GangMin sends a packet which is enqueued to 1:1 (netem).
Any invocation of dequeue by QFQ from this class will not return a packet
until after 6.4s. In the meantime, a second packet is sent and it lands on
1:2. teql's enqueue will return success and this will activate class 1:2.
Main issue is that teql only updates the parent visible qlen (sch->q.qlen)
at dequeue. Since QFQ will only call dequeue if peek succeeds (and teql's
peek always returns NULL), dequeue will never be called and thus the qlen
will remain as 0. With that in mind, when GangMin updates 1:2's lmax value,
the qfq_change_class calls qfq_deact_rm_from_agg. Since the child qdisc's
qlen was not incremented, qfq fails to deactivate the class, but still
frees its pointers from the aggregate. So when the first packet is
rescheduled after 6.4 seconds (netem's delay), a dangling pointer is
accessed causing GangMin's causing a UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rsi: Fix memory corruption due to not set vif driver data size
The struct ieee80211_vif contains trailing space for vif driver data,
when struct ieee80211_vif is allocated, the total memory size that is
allocated is sizeof(struct ieee80211_vif) + size of vif driver data.
The size of vif driver data is set by each WiFi driver as needed.
The RSI911x driver does not set vif driver data size, no trailing space
for vif driver data is therefore allocated past struct ieee80211_vif .
The RSI911x driver does however use the vif driver data to store its
vif driver data structure "struct vif_priv". An access to vif->drv_priv
leads to access out of struct ieee80211_vif bounds and corruption of
some memory.
In case of the failure observed locally, rsi_mac80211_add_interface()
would write struct vif_priv *vif_info = (struct vif_priv *)vif->drv_priv;
vif_info->vap_id = vap_idx. This write corrupts struct fq_tin member
struct list_head new_flows . The flow = list_first_entry(head, struct
fq_flow, flowchain); in fq_tin_reset() then reports non-NULL bogus
address, which when accessed causes a crash.
The trigger is very simple, boot the machine with init=/bin/sh , mount
devtmpfs, sysfs, procfs, and then do "ip link set wlan0 up", "sleep 1",
"ip link set wlan0 down" and the crash occurs.
Fix this by setting the correct size of vif driver data, which is the
size of "struct vif_priv", so that memory is allocated and the driver
can store its driver data in it, instead of corrupting memory around
it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: Fix memleak in l2tp_udp_encap_recv().
syzbot reported memleak of struct l2tp_session, l2tp_tunnel,
sock, etc. [0]
The cited commit moved down the validation of the protocol
version in l2tp_udp_encap_recv().
The new place requires an extra error handling to avoid the
memleak.
Let's call l2tp_session_put() there.
[0]:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810a290200 (size 512):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6086, jiffies 4294944299
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
7d eb 04 0c 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }...............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc babb6a4f):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4958 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5656 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x3e0/0x660 mm/slub.c:5669
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline]
l2tp_session_create+0x3a/0x3b0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1778
pppol2tp_connect+0x48b/0x920 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:755
__sys_connect_file+0x7a/0xb0 net/socket.c:2089
__sys_connect+0xde/0x110 net/socket.c:2108
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2114 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2111 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:2111
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Octeontx2-af: Add proper checks for fwdata
firmware populates MAC address, link modes (supported, advertised)
and EEPROM data in shared firmware structure which kernel access
via MAC block(CGX/RPM).
Accessing fwdata, on boards booted with out MAC block leading to
kernel panics.
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
[ 10.460721] Modules linked in:
[ 10.463779] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 174 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5-00154-g76ec646abdf7-dirty #3 PREEMPT
[ 10.474045] Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN98XX board (DT)
[ 10.479793] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 10.484159] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 10.491124] pc : rvu_sdp_init+0x18/0x114
[ 10.495051] lr : rvu_probe+0xe58/0x1d18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix potential underflow in virtio_transport_get_credit()
The credit calculation in virtio_transport_get_credit() uses unsigned
arithmetic:
ret = vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt);
If the peer shrinks its advertised buffer (peer_buf_alloc) while bytes
are in flight, the subtraction can underflow and produce a large
positive value, potentially allowing more data to be queued than the
peer can handle.
Reuse virtio_transport_has_space() which already handles this case and
add a comment to make it clear why we are doing that.
[Stefano: use virtio_transport_has_space() instead of duplicating the code]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-sprd-adi: Fix double free in probe error path
The driver currently uses spi_alloc_host() to allocate the controller
but registers it using devm_spi_register_controller().
If devm_register_restart_handler() fails, the code jumps to the
put_ctlr label and calls spi_controller_put(). However, since the
controller was registered via a devm function, the device core will
automatically call spi_controller_put() again when the probe fails.
This results in a double-free of the spi_controller structure.
Fix this by switching to devm_spi_alloc_host() and removing the
manual spi_controller_put() call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/io-pgtable-arm: fix size_t signedness bug in unmap path
__arm_lpae_unmap() returns size_t but was returning -ENOENT (negative
error code) when encountering an unmapped PTE. Since size_t is unsigned,
-ENOENT (typically -2) becomes a huge positive value (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE
on 64-bit systems).
This corrupted value propagates through the call chain:
__arm_lpae_unmap() returns -ENOENT as size_t
-> arm_lpae_unmap_pages() returns it
-> __iommu_unmap() adds it to iova address
-> iommu_pgsize() triggers BUG_ON due to corrupted iova
This can cause IOVA address overflow in __iommu_unmap() loop and
trigger BUG_ON in iommu_pgsize() from invalid address alignment.
Fix by returning 0 instead of -ENOENT. The WARN_ON already signals
the error condition, and returning 0 (meaning "nothing unmapped")
is the correct semantic for size_t return type. This matches the
behavior of other io-pgtable implementations (io-pgtable-arm-v7s,
io-pgtable-dart) which return 0 on error conditions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue
If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at
the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues
the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on
the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued
or because the I/O thread requeued it.
The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to
things like UAFs or refcount underruns.
Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and
moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we
have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it.
Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call
rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the
queue, so fix that also. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ife: avoid possible NULL deref
tcf_ife_encode() must make sure ife_encode() does not return NULL.
syzbot reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:ife_tlv_meta_encode+0x41/0xa0 net/ife/ife.c:166
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 8990 Comm: syz.0.696 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ife_encode_meta_u32+0x153/0x180 net/sched/act_ife.c:101
tcf_ife_encode net/sched/act_ife.c:841 [inline]
tcf_ife_act+0x1022/0x1de0 net/sched/act_ife.c:877
tc_act include/net/tc_wrapper.h:130 [inline]
tcf_action_exec+0x1c0/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1152
tcf_exts_exec include/net/pkt_cls.h:349 [inline]
mall_classify+0x1a0/0x2a0 net/sched/cls_matchall.c:42
tc_classify include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 [inline]
__tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 [inline]
tcf_classify+0x7f2/0x1380 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860
multiq_classify net/sched/sch_multiq.c:39 [inline]
multiq_enqueue+0xe0/0x510 net/sched/sch_multiq.c:66
dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x45/0x250 net/core/dev.c:4147
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4262 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2998/0x46c0 net/core/dev.c:4798 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: ensure safe queue release with state management
Directly calling `put_queue` carries risks since it cannot
guarantee that resources of `uacce_queue` have been fully released
beforehand. So adding a `stop_queue` operation for the
UACCE_CMD_PUT_Q command and leaving the `put_queue` operation to
the final resource release ensures safety.
Queue states are defined as follows:
- UACCE_Q_ZOMBIE: Initial state
- UACCE_Q_INIT: After opening `uacce`
- UACCE_Q_STARTED: After `start` is issued via `ioctl`
When executing `poweroff -f` in virt while accelerator are still
working, `uacce_fops_release` and `uacce_remove` may execute
concurrently. This can cause `uacce_put_queue` within
`uacce_fops_release` to access a NULL `ops` pointer. Therefore, add
state checks to prevent accessing freed pointers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: Fix kernel panic in GET_INSTANCE_ID macro
The GET_INSTANCE_ID macro that caused a kernel panic when accessing sysfs
attributes:
1. Off-by-one error: The loop condition used '<=' instead of '<',
causing access beyond array bounds. Since array indices are 0-based
and go from 0 to instances_count-1, the loop should use '<'.
2. Missing NULL check: The code dereferenced attr_name_kobj->name
without checking if attr_name_kobj was NULL, causing a null pointer
dereference in min_length_show() and other attribute show functions.
The panic occurred when fwupd tried to read BIOS configuration attributes:
Oops: general protection fault [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:min_length_show+0xcf/0x1d0 [hp_bioscfg]
Add a NULL check for attr_name_kobj before dereferencing and corrects
the loop boundary to match the pattern used elsewhere in the driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In kvaser_usb_set_{,data_}bittiming() -> kvaser_usb_setup_rx_urbs(), the
URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the dev->rx_submitted
anchor and submitted. In the complete callback
kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In
kvaser_usb_remove_interfaces() the URBs are freed by calling
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev->rx_submitted anchor. |
| IBM Jazz Reporting Service could allow an authenticated user on the host network to obtain sensitive information about other projects that reside on the server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Sanitize payload size to prevent member overflow
In qla27xx_copy_fpin_pkt() and qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt(), the frame_size
reported by firmware is used to calculate the copy length into
item->iocb. However, the iocb member is defined as a fixed-size 64-byte
array within struct purex_item.
If the reported frame_size exceeds 64 bytes, subsequent memcpy calls will
overflow the iocb member boundary. While extra memory might be allocated,
this cross-member write is unsafe and triggers warnings under
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
Fix this by capping total_bytes to the size of the iocb member (64 bytes)
before allocation and copying. This ensures all copies remain within the
bounds of the destination structure member. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In ems_usb_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to
the dev->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback
ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In
ems_usb_close() the URBs are freed by calling
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in ems_usb_close().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev->rx_submitted anchor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: Coalesce only linear skb
vsock/virtio common tries to coalesce buffers in rx queue: if a linear skb
(with a spare tail room) is followed by a small skb (length limited by
GOOD_COPY_LEN = 128), an attempt is made to join them.
Since the introduction of MSG_ZEROCOPY support, assumption that a small skb
will always be linear is incorrect. In the zerocopy case, data is lost and
the linear skb is appended with uninitialized kernel memory.
Of all 3 supported virtio-based transports, only loopback-transport is
affected. G2H virtio-transport rx queue operates on explicitly linear skbs;
see virtio_vsock_alloc_linear_skb() in virtio_vsock_rx_fill(). H2G
vhost-transport may allocate non-linear skbs, but only for sizes that are
not considered for coalescence; see PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER in
virtio_vsock_alloc_skb().
Ensure only linear skbs are coalesced. Note that skb_tailroom(last_skb) > 0
guarantees last_skb is linear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: implement mremap in uacce_vm_ops to return -EPERM
The current uacce_vm_ops does not support the mremap operation of
vm_operations_struct. Implement .mremap to return -EPERM to remind
users.
The reason we need to explicitly disable mremap is that when the
driver does not implement .mremap, it uses the default mremap
method. This could lead to a risk scenario:
An application might first mmap address p1, then mremap to p2,
followed by munmap(p1), and finally munmap(p2). Since the default
mremap copies the original vma's vm_private_data (i.e., q) to the
new vma, both munmap operations would trigger vma_close, causing
q->qfr to be freed twice(qfr will be set to null here, so repeated
release is ok). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hv_netvsc: reject RSS hash key programming without RX indirection table
RSS configuration requires a valid RX indirection table. When the device
reports a single receive queue, rndis_filter_device_add() does not
allocate an indirection table, accepting RSS hash key updates in this
state leads to a hang.
Fix this by gating netvsc_set_rxfh() on ndc->rx_table_sz and return
-EOPNOTSUPP when the table is absent. This aligns set_rxfh with the device
capabilities and prevents incorrect behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio()
Wang Zhaolong reports a deadlock involving NFSv4.1 state recovery
waiting on kthreadd, which is attempting to reclaim memory by calling
nfs_release_folio(). The latter cannot make progress due to state
recovery being needed.
It seems that the only safe thing to do here is to kick off a writeback
of the folio, without waiting for completion, or else kicking off an
asynchronous commit. |
