| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix out-of-bounds write in irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs
The irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs function loops through all of the umem DMA
blocks to populate the PBLEs and will stop when either the last DMA
block is reached or palloc->total_cnt is reached. The issue is that
the logic for checking palloc->total_cnt would only work for non-zero
values.
When irdma_setup_pbles is called with lvl==0, it
calls irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs with palloc->total_cnt==0, which means
the only way to break out of the loop is to reach the last umem DMA
block, which means it could end up going beyond the fixed size of 4
iwmr->pgaddrmem array that is used in the lvl==0 case.
In the case of QP/CQ/SRQ rings, the value of lvl is determined by a
separate input (for example, req.cq_pages in the case of a CQ). So,
we must perform explicit checking to ensure we don't overflow the
pgaddrmem array if the user provides a umem that consists of more
blocks than their provided req.cq_pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: Correct data type for scan index to avoid infinite loop
A kernel soft lockup was observed during Wi-Fi scanning on the 6GHz band.
The CPU becomes stuck in rtw89_hw_scan_add_chan_ax for over 20 seconds,
leading to a system panic.
RIP points to 0f b6 c3 (movzbl %bl, %eax), which zero-extends
the low 8 bits of RBX into RAX.
RBX (the counter i) has reached a huge value: 0x137466a1.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u16:4:6124]
Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work [cfg80211]
RIP: 0010:rtw89_hw_scan_add_chan_ax+0xb3/0x6e0 [rtw89_core]
Code: a0 48 89 45 a8 44 89 6d 9c 44 89 75 98 eb 29 66 66 2e 0f 1f
84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 c3 01
<0f> b6 c3 41 3b 44 24 74 0f 83 0b 02 00 00 0f b6 c3 48 8d 14 80 49
RSP: 0018:ffffcb48cbaa39f8 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 00000000137466a1 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff89ffc9d851a8 RSI: 0000000000004f0d RDI: 0000000096af0130
RBP: ffffcb48cbaa3a60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a00b7502080
R10: ffff8a00b75ff600 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89ffc7553870
R13: ffff8a00b7ac8f19 R14: ffff8a00b75020d8 R15: ffff89ffc3d54d80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a014f962000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007558d7f9f4c4 CR3: 0000000178040001 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtw89_hw_scan_prep_chan_list_ax+0x8a/0x400 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_hw_scan_start+0x546/0x8a0 [rtw89_core]
? rtw89_fw_h2c_default_cmac_tbl+0x13c/0x1f0 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_ops_hw_scan+0xae/0x120 [rtw89_core]
drv_hw_scan+0xbb/0x180 [mac80211]
__ieee80211_start_scan+0x2fc/0x750 [mac80211]
ieee80211_request_scan+0xe/0x20 [mac80211]
ieee80211_scan+0x123/0x190 [mac80211]
rdev_scan+0x40/0x110 [cfg80211]
cfg80211_scan_6ghz+0x5a1/0xa30 [cfg80211]
By objdump with source:
for (i = 0; i < req->n_6ghz_params; i++) {
5fbc0: 83 c3 01 add $0x1,%ebx --> i++
5fbc3: 0f b6 c3 movzbl %bl,%eax --> get counter
fbc6: 41 3b 44 24 74 cmp 0x74(%r12),%eax
* RBX: 00000000137466a1 -> %bl = a1 -> EAX = 000000a1 (161) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: Block VFs from clobbering special CGX PKIND state
PF and VF NIX LFs that share a CGX LMAC reuse the same hardware PKIND
programming. When HiGig2 or EDSA parsing is enabled, a VF NIX LF alloc must
not reset the LMAC RX PKIND or default TX parse config over the PF setup.
Add cgx_get_pkind() and rvu_cgx_is_pkind_config_permitted() so VFs skip
cgx_set_pkind(), rvu_npc_set_pkind(), and NIX_AF_LFX_TX_PARSE_CFG updates
when the LMAC is using NPC_RX_HIGIG_PKIND or NPC_RX_EDSA_PKIND. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: lock sk in iso_sock_getname
Accessing iso_pi(sk)->conn requires lock_sock, which is not held here.
Fix by adding the lock/release. |
| A vulnerability was found in Golang FIPS OpenSSL. This flaw allows a malicious user to randomly cause an uninitialized buffer length variable with a zeroed buffer to be returned in FIPS mode. It may also be possible to force a false positive match between non-equal hashes when comparing a trusted computed hmac sum to an untrusted input sum if an attacker can send a zeroed buffer in place of a pre-computed sum. It is also possible to force a derived key to be all zeros instead of an unpredictable value. This may have follow-on implications for the Go TLS stack. |
| go-gh is a collection of Go modules to make authoring GitHub CLI extensions easier. A security vulnerability has been identified in versions prior to 2.12.1 where an attacker-controlled GitHub Enterprise Server could result in executing arbitrary commands on a user's machine by replacing HTTP URLs provided by GitHub with local file paths for browsing. In `2.12.1`, `Browser.Browse()` has been enhanced to allow and disallow a variety of scenarios to avoid opening or executing files on the filesystem without unduly impacting HTTP URLs. No known workarounds are available other than upgrading. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() for transmit path header pulls
In vxlan_xmit(), arp_reduce(), and vxlan_mdb_entry_skb_get(), pskb_may_pull() was
being called to verify the availability of network layer headers (ARP, IPv6/ND,
IP/IPv6 MDB keys).
However, during transmit skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb)
is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, len) only checks len bytes from skb->data
rather than skb_network_offset(skb) + len, which can leave part of the network header
in non-linear frags.
Replace these remaining pskb_may_pull() calls with pskb_network_may_pull() to properly
account for the MAC header offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
um: vector: fix use-after-free in vector_mmsg_rx()
When vector_mmsg_rx() discards a packet whose overlay header fails
verify_header(), it frees the skb and continues the loop:
if (header_check < 0) {
dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
vp->estats.rx_encaps_errors++;
continue;
}
The normal and short-packet paths fall through to the bottom of the
loop body, which clears the consumed slot and advances the cursors:
(*skbuff_vector) = NULL;
mmsg_vector++;
skbuff_vector++;
The verify_header() < 0 path skips that via continue, so the freed skb
is left in skbuff_vector[] and the cursors do not advance. The next
iteration reads the same slot, gets the freed skb, and frees it again,
producing a refcount underflow / use-after-free in the RX path.
Discard the slot the same way the other paths do before continuing.
Only transports whose verify_header() can return negative are affected:
GRE and L2TPv3 do so on a cookie/session-id mismatch (raw/tap do not),
so any peer on such a transport can trigger it without authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix socket use-after-free during link group termination
__smc_lgr_terminate() drops conns_lock after finding a connection in
lgr->conns_all, but before taking a reference on its socket. The connection
is embedded in the socket, and its registration reference protects it only
while the connection remains in the tree.
A concurrent close can unregister the connection and drop that reference,
freeing the socket before the termination worker reaches sock_hold().
The race is reachable when close overlaps link group termination.
Local stress testing reproduced the use-after-free and KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc]
Write of size 4 by task kworker/3:3
Workqueue: events smc_lgr_terminate_work [smc]
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc]
The socket was allocated by smc_create(), freed through
slab_free_after_rcu_debug(), and was followed by:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc]
Take the socket reference while conns_lock still protects the tree entry.
The unregister path then cannot drop the last reference until termination
has finished using the socket. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igbvf: Fix leak in TX DMA error cleanup
If an error is encountered while mapping TX buffers, the driver should
unmap any buffers already mapped for that skb.
Because count is incremented before each frag mapping, it will always
match the correct number of unmappings needed when dma_error is reached.
Decrementing count before the while loop in dma_error causes an
off-by-one error. If any mapping was successful before an unsuccessful
mapping, exactly one DMA mapping (the head) would leak.
This bug was introduced by a 2010 fix for an endless loop in dma_error.
All other affected drivers have already been fixed. |
| Permission control vulnerability in the notification module. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect availability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Reject adapter interrupt forwarding if already enabled
The MPCIFC instruction doesn't allow registering adapter interrupts without
first unregistering. So reject any request to enable interrupt forwarding
if its already enabled for the zPCI device. This also fixes overwriting and
thus leaking resources when the ioctl is called multiple times for the same
device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_big_sync() callback
There is theoretical UAF if the conn is freed while the hci_sync task is
running.
Hold refcount to avoid that. Handle NULL hcon, return 0 + do nothing to
match the previous behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: hold conn reference in abort_conn_sync()
There is theoretical UAF if the conn is freed while the hci_sync task is
running.
Hold refcount to avoid that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: hold sk properly in iso_conn_ready
sk deref in iso_conn_ready must be done either under conn->lock, or
holding a refcount, to avoid concurrent close. conn->sk is currently
accessed without either:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
iso_sock_release
iso_conn_ready
sk = conn->sk
lock_sock(sk)
conn->sk = NULL
lock_sock(sk)
release_sock(sk)
iso_sock_kill(sk)
UAF on sk deref
Fix possible UAF by holding sk refcount in iso_conn_ready(). Also
recheck after lock_sock that the socket is still valid. Adjust locking
so conn->sk is cleared only under lock_sock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Prevent access to unsupported weight registers
Sashiko reports:
During initialization of the nct6116 chip, the driver sets data->pwm_num
to 5. However, it assigns several NCT6106 register arrays (such as
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_SEL, and
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_*) to data->REG_PWM and data->REG_WEIGHT_TEMP.
These arrays only contain 3 elements.
In nct6775_update_pwm(), the driver iterates up to data->pwm_num. If
data->has_pwm has bits 3 or 4 set (which is structurally possible for
nct6116), the loop attempts to read elements at index 3 and 4 from these
3-element arrays. This results in a global out-of-bounds read, which can
be caught by KASAN.
Furthermore, the driver uses these garbage out-of-bounds values as
hardware register addresses for subsequent read and write operations. This
leads to invalid hardware register access, potentially causing hardware
misconfiguration or system crashes.
The underlying problem is that the chip does support up to five fan
control channels, but only the first three support weight control.
Fix the problem by extending the affected weight register arrays with
zeroed fields. The driver uses zeroed register addresses to determine
if a register is supported or not, and skips accesses for unsupported
registers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix out-of-bounds clear_bit in ath12k_mac_dp_peer_cleanup()
ath12k_mac_dp_peer_cleanup() clears the ML peer ID slot on the
free_ml_peer_id_map bitmap by indexing it with dp_peer->peer_id. That is
wrong: dp_peer->peer_id for an MLO peer always carries the
ATH12K_PEER_ML_ID_VALID bit (BIT(13)), so clear_bit() is invoked with
index >= 0x2000, which is far outside the bitmap of ATH12K_MAX_MLO_PEERS
(256) bits and corrupts memory adjacent to ah->free_ml_peer_id_map. The
intended bitmap entry also never gets cleared, so subsequent
ath12k_peer_ml_alloc() calls eventually run out of IDs.
The ID without the VALID bit is what ath12k_peer_ml_alloc() returned and
is stored in ahsta->ml_peer_id. Use that instead.
While there, also reset ahsta->ml_peer_id to ATH12K_MLO_PEER_ID_INVALID so
the bitmap and ahsta->ml_peer_id stay in sync.
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00302-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-1.115823.3 |
| Incorrect default permissions in Microsoft PowerShell allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: fix pptable use-after-free
amdgpu_dpm_get_pp_table() returns a pointer to a driver-owned power table
after dropping adev->pm.mutex. The sysfs path then copies from that pointer.
A concurrent pp_table write can replace and free the allocation during the
copy, causing a use-after-free.
Change the DPM interface to copy into caller-provided storage while the mutex
is held. Keep the size-only query for attribute discovery without exposing
the driver-owned pointer.
(cherry picked from commit f6eed7acfd30099ef7baeb6ba45bb59daad80631) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: validate firmware interface structure sizes
iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() only checks that the firmware-provided MCU virtual
address points inside the shared section. The returned pointer is later
used as a full firmware interface structure, so accepting an address near
the end of the shared section can still lead to out-of-bounds accesses.
Pass the expected object size to iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() and reject ranges
that do not fit entirely in the shared section. |
