| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| On affected platforms running Arista EOS with Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) relay configured, an unauthenticated attacker with network access could send a crafted DHCP reply packet from an IP address that is not configured as a helper address, and the relay agent would forward it to clients without validating the source. This could allow the attacker to supply clients with malicious network configuration parameters, potentially resulting in traffic interception or denial of service for affected clients. |
| Insufficient verification of data authenticity may allow a local attacker to bypass Secure Debug Unlock (SDU), potentially resulting in unauthorized debug access. |
| AsiaInfo Business Support System (BSS) 9.2.0 through 9.2.40 does not correctly verify cryptographic signatures for JSON Web Tokens (JWT). A remote, unauthenticated attacker could forge a well-formed JWT without a valid signature and use it to execute privileged actions. Fixed in 9.2.41. |
| CAI Content Credentials is affected by an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized write access. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must visit a maliciously crafted URL or interact with a compromised web page. |
| CAI Content Credentials is affected by an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized write access. Exploit depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. |
| CAI Content Credentials is affected by an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized write access. Exploit depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. |
| Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, when a GCS service is configured with the cache_control option, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload signs direct-upload URLs with V4, and the V4 signature covers only the Cache-Control and Host headers. A direct-upload client can therefore send a Content-Type of its choosing, and can omit the declared Content-MD5, without invalidating the URL. GCS stores the supplied content type as object metadata, which takes precedence over the response-content-type that Active Storage sets on download URLs, so an uploaded object could be served as inline HTML under the application's bucket path on storage.googleapis.com. Script in such an object runs on the storage origin rather than the application's, but could register a Service Worker scoped to the bucket path and read or replace a victim's later responses for signed URLs in that bucket. Applications that use the GCS service with cache_control configured and accept direct uploads are affected. GCS services without cache_control sign with V2 and are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2. |
| Action Pack is a framework for handling and responding to web requests. From 8.1 until 8.1.4.1, Since Rails 8.1.0, ActionDispatch::RemoteIp derives request.remote_ip from Rack::Request#forwarded_for, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 Forwarded header in preference to X-Forwarded-For. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to X-Forwarded-For but passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through unchanged, request.remote_ip returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only Client-Ip with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof request.remote_ip, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default by: of rate_limit), and falsifying the client address in logs. An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements: Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, forwarded_for reads only X-Forwarded-For. Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied Forwarded header. Relies on request.remote_ip for access control, rate limiting, or auditing. The fix detects a spoofed Forwarded header only when the proxy also sets X-Forwarded-For. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through and sets no X-Forwarded-For remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite Forwarded, or apply the workaround below. This issue is fixed in version 8.1.4.1. |
| A origin validation error vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientMac 7.4.0 through 7.4.7, FortiClientWindows 7.4.0 through 7.4.7, FortiClientWindows 7.2.0 through 7.2.14, FortiClientWindowsPAM 7.4.7, FortiClientWindowsPAM 7.2.14 may allow an unauthorized remote attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands. Successful exploitation requires interaction with the victim. |
| An unprivileged application can exploit a lack of package/signature validation in SystemUI's `RemoteQCController` when resolving a hardcoded `content://` URI. This allows the attacker to squat on a specific authority if the legitimate package is absent, inject spoofed UI elements into the trusted SystemUI Quick Controls panel, and gain a Background Activity Launch (BAL) grant from SystemUI when the user interacts with the spoofed element. |
| Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Gleam allows an adversary in the middle to substitute forged Hex package contents during dependency resolution.
During dependency resolution Gleam fetches package metadata from the signature-verified Hex repository, which covers each release's dependency requirements and SHA-256 outer_checksum. After resolving versions, gleam_cli::dependencies::lookup_package makes a second request to the unsigned Hex API through gleam_core::hex::get_package_release and records the outer_checksum and dependency names from that JSON response into manifest.toml, instead of the values from the verified repository metadata. The Hex repository signature does not cover the API response.
An adversary in the middle who can intercept TLS with a certificate trusted by the Gleam process (for example a TLS-inspecting proxy using a CA in the operating system trust store or added through GLEAM_CACERTS_PATH), and who can modify both the API release response and the corresponding repository tarball, can supply a package archive with a matching forged checksum without the Hex repository signing key. Gleam verifies the forged tarball against the forged checksum, accepts it, and extracts it as a dependency source, resulting in loss of integrity of the downloaded package contents.
Only projects that resolve or update Hex dependencies are affected, which happens when the manifest is missing, a dependency is added or updated, or dependency requirements change. Builds that reuse an unchanged, known-good manifest.toml continue to verify tarballs against its pinned checksum.
This issue affects gleam: from 0.18.0-rc1 before 1.18.0. |
| Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, ed25519.verify() decodes a public key in crypto_sign_open() without rejecting small-order points or their non-canonical encodings. With S = 0 and a small-order R value, an attacker who can choose the public key can produce signatures that verify for many messages, or all messages with the identity key, without a private key. This can defeat proof-of-possession, attribution, non-repudiation, or deduplication checks that rely on a signature being bound to the message. Keys produced by normal Ed25519 key generation are not small-order, so applications that verify only trusted or internally generated public keys are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3. |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, FreeSWITCH's inbound ICE handling accepted every connectivity check without cryptographically validating its STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute. A network peer able to reach an ICE-enabled leg's media port could forge an ICE connectivity check without SDP credentials, nominate its own address, redirect RTP and DTLS traffic, and terminate the legitimate media path. On unencrypted legs this enables eavesdropping and media injection, while all WebRTC and SIP legs that negotiate ICE are in scope. Version 1.11.2 introduces the remediation, which requires ice_verify_message_integrity=true. |
| Origin validation error in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Windows Installer allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Windows Remote Procedure Call Runtime allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in JDBC Driver for SQL Server allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Origin validation error in Microsoft Teams for Android allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/vmci: validate packet source for connected sockets
vmci_transport_recv_stream_cb() looks up sockets first by the full source
and destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The
fallback can select a non-listening socket without checking whether the
packet came from its stored peer.
This was reproduced with two VMCI contexts. A RST from the context not
stored in a TCP_SYN_SENT socket reset that socket after it was selected by
the destination-only lookup.
VMCI can process notification packets in bottom-half context when the
socket is not owned by user context, or defer packets to a workqueue. Use
vsock_check_source() after taking the socket lock in the bottom-half path,
and recheck after lock_sock() in the workqueue path. Listening sockets
continue to accept packets from any source.
Reply with a RST addressed from the received packet before dropping a
source that fails validation. This preserves the existing reset behavior
for bound non-listening and concurrently closed sockets without directing
the reset to a connected socket's stored peer. |
| Origin Validation Error vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows untrusted notebook output JavaScript to trigger session-wide keyboard shortcuts, including forced evaluation of all cells and runtime restart.
Livebook's JS-view feature renders notebook-defined JavaScript inside a sandboxed, cross-origin iframe specifically because that JavaScript is untrusted. The trusted iframe shell in iframe/priv/static/iframe/v5.html forwards every keydown event fired in its own window to the parent page without consulting Event.isTrusted, so an event synthesized by the untrusted script through window.dispatchEvent is forwarded exactly as a genuine keystroke would be. The parent-side relay in assets/js/hooks/js_view.js reconstructs and re-dispatches it on the live page with no further validation, and because assets/js/hooks/session.js registers the global shortcut handler on the document in the capture phase, that handler acts on the replicated event regardless of how it was produced.
Sandboxed output JavaScript can therefore drive Livebook's session-wide keyboard shortcuts. Two of them reach LivebookWeb.SessionLive and execute immediately with no confirmation: the shortcut for queueing full evaluation runs every cell in the notebook, and the shortcut for reconnecting the runtime disconnects and reconnects it, discarding in-memory state. A third shortcut deletes the focused cell behind a confirmation dialog that the user can permanently dismiss, after which it too executes silently.
Forced full evaluation is the significant consequence, because it causes the notebook's own Elixir code to run without the user choosing to evaluate anything. A user who merely opens a notebook obtained from a third party, or reached from published documentation, can have its code executed on their runtime. Livebook also mirrors cell outputs to every connected client, so a malicious output triggers in a collaborator's browser as soon as it renders.
This issue affects livebook: from 0.5.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9. |
