| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix subvolume deletion lockup caused by inodes xarray race
There is a race condition between inode eviction and inode caching that
can cause a live struct btrfs_inode to be missing from the root->inodes
xarray. Specifically, there is a window during evict() between the inode
being unhashed and deleted from the xarray. If btrfs_iget() is called
for the same inode in that window, it will be recreated and inserted
into the xarray, but then eviction will delete the new entry, leaving
nothing in the xarray:
Thread 1 Thread 2
---------------------------------------------------------------
evict()
remove_inode_hash()
btrfs_iget_path()
btrfs_iget_locked()
btrfs_read_locked_inode()
btrfs_add_inode_to_root()
destroy_inode()
btrfs_destroy_inode()
btrfs_del_inode_from_root()
__xa_erase
In turn, this can cause issues for subvolume deletion. Specifically, if
an inode is in this lost state, and all other inodes are evicted, then
btrfs_del_inode_from_root() will call btrfs_add_dead_root() prematurely.
If the lost inode has a delayed_node attached to it, then when
btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot() calls btrfs_kill_all_delayed_nodes(),
it will loop forever because the delayed_nodes xarray will never become
empty (unless memory pressure forces the inode out). We saw this
manifest as soft lockups in production.
Fix it by only deleting the xarray entry if it matches the given inode
(using __xa_cmpxchg()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in kasan_populate_vmalloc()
kasan_populate_vmalloc() and its helpers ignore the caller's gfp_mask and
always allocate memory using the hardcoded GFP_KERNEL flag. This makes
them inconsistent with vmalloc(), which was recently extended to support
GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO allocations.
Page table allocations performed during shadow population also ignore the
external gfp_mask. To preserve the intended semantics of GFP_NOFS and
GFP_NOIO, wrap the apply_to_page_range() calls into the appropriate
memalloc scope.
xfs calls vmalloc with GFP_NOFS, so this bug could lead to deadlock.
There was a report here
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/686ea951.050a0220.385921.0016.GAE@google.com
This patch:
- Extends kasan_populate_vmalloc() and helpers to take gfp_mask;
- Passes gfp_mask down to alloc_pages_bulk() and __get_free_page();
- Enforces GFP_NOFS/NOIO semantics with memalloc_*_save()/restore()
around apply_to_page_range();
- Updates vmalloc.c and percpu allocator call sites accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: transfer phy_config_inband() locking responsibility to phylink
Problem description
===================
Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between
&pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows.
phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex
-> phylink_major_config()
-> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock
whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and
&pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else,
&pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at
the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy().
The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing
lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other
way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's
callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method,
invoked by the PHY state machine.
phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of
phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired.
Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to
serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config.
So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be
consistent with this order.
Problem impact
==============
I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing
phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call,
is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will
deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically
speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium
auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state
to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the
problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep.
Proposed solution
=================
Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having
phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only
caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before
&pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place.
Solution details, considerations, notes
=======================================
This is the phy_config_inband() call graph:
sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy()
|
v
phylink_sfp_connect_phy()
|
v
phylink_sfp_config_phy()
|
| sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert()
| |
| v
| phylink_sfp_module_insert()
| |
| | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start()
| | |
| | v
| | phylink_sfp_module_start()
| | |
| v v
| phylink_sfp_config_optical()
phylink_start() | |
| phylink_resume() v v
| | phylink_sfp_set_config()
| | |
v v v
phylink_mac_initial_config()
| phylink_resolve()
| | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set()
v v v
phylink_major_config()
|
v
phy_config_inband()
phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not
acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire
&pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config().
phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires
&pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock.
phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is
completely uninteresting, because it only call
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
led: qcom-lpg: Fix sleeping in atomic
lpg_brighness_set() function can sleep, while led's brightness_set()
callback must be non-blocking. Change LPG driver to use
brightness_set_blocking() instead.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 101, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc1-00014-gbe99b089c6fc-dirty #85
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe4/0xf0
show_stack+0x18/0x40
dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xb4
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
__might_resched+0x170/0x254
__might_sleep+0x48/0x9c
__mutex_lock+0x4c/0x400
mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x40
lpg_brightness_single_set+0x40/0x90
led_set_brightness_nosleep+0x34/0x60
led_heartbeat_function+0x80/0x170
call_timer_fn+0xb8/0x340
__run_timers.part.0+0x20c/0x254
run_timer_softirq+0x3c/0x7c
_stext+0x14c/0x578
____do_softirq+0x10/0x20
call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x5c
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
__irq_exit_rcu+0x164/0x170
irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x40
el1_interrupt+0x38/0x50
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x2c
el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
cpuidle_enter_state+0xc8/0x380
cpuidle_enter+0x38/0x50
do_idle+0x244/0x2d0
cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x30
rest_init+0x128/0x1a0
arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x18
start_kernel+0x6f4/0x734
__primary_switched+0xbc/0xc4 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Always leave BHs disabled when running ->parallel()
A deadlock can happen when an overloaded system runs ->parallel() in the
context of the current task:
padata_do_parallel
->parallel()
pcrypt_aead_enc/dec
padata_do_serial
spin_lock(&reorder->lock) // BHs still enabled
<interrupt>
...
__do_softirq
...
padata_do_serial
spin_lock(&reorder->lock)
It's a bug for BHs to be on in _do_serial as Steffen points out, so
ensure they're off in the "current task" case like they are in
padata_parallel_worker to avoid this situation. |
| A post-authentication flaw in the network two-phase commit protocol used for cross-shard transactions in MongoDB Server may lead to logical data inconsistencies under specific conditions which are not predictable and exist for a very short period of time. This error can cause the transaction coordination logic to misinterpret the transaction as committed, resulting in inconsistent state on those shards. This may lead to low integrity and availability impact.
This issue impacts MongoDB Server v8.0 versions prior to 8.0.16, MongoDB Server v7.0 versions prior to 7.0.26 and MongoDB server v8.2 versions prior to 8.2.2. |
| A flaw was found in the X server's request handling. Non-zero 'bytes to ignore' in a client's request can cause the server to skip processing another client's request, potentially leading to a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix deadlock when aborting transaction during relocation with scrub
Before relocating a block group we pause scrub, then do the relocation and
then unpause scrub. The relocation process requires starting and committing
a transaction, and if we have a failure in the critical section of the
transaction commit path (transaction state >= TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START),
we will deadlock if there is a paused scrub.
That results in stack traces like the following:
[42.479] BTRFS info (device sdc): relocating block group 53876686848 flags metadata|raid6
[42.936] BTRFS warning (device sdc): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
[42.936] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[42.936] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
[42.936] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 346822 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1977 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc8/0xeb0 [btrfs]
[42.936] Modules linked in: dm_flakey dm_mod loop btrfs (...)
[42.936] CPU: 11 PID: 346822 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[42.936] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[42.936] RIP: 0010:btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc8/0xeb0 [btrfs]
[42.936] Code: ff ff 45 8b (...)
[42.936] RSP: 0018:ffffb58649633b48 EFLAGS: 00010282
[42.936] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8be6ef4d5bd8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[42.936] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffffb35e7782 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[42.936] RBP: ffff8be6ef4d5c98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb586496339e8
[42.936] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8be6d38c7c00
[42.936] R13: 00000000ffffffe4 R14: ffff8be6c268c000 R15: ffff8be6ef4d5cf0
[42.936] FS: 00007f381a82b340(0000) GS:ffff8beddfcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[42.936] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[42.936] CR2: 00007f1e35fb7638 CR3: 0000000117680006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[42.936] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[42.936] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[42.936] Call Trace:
[42.936] <TASK>
[42.936] ? start_transaction+0xcb/0x610 [btrfs]
[42.936] prepare_to_relocate+0x111/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[42.936] relocate_block_group+0x57/0x5d0 [btrfs]
[42.936] ? btrfs_wait_nocow_writers+0x25/0xb0 [btrfs]
[42.936] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x248/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[42.936] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[42.936] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3b/0x150 [btrfs]
[42.936] btrfs_balance+0x8ff/0x11d0 [btrfs]
[42.936] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x14a/0x410
[42.936] btrfs_ioctl+0x2334/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[42.937] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360
[42.937] ? refill_obj_stock+0xb0/0x160
[42.937] ? seq_release+0x25/0x30
[42.937] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x3b5/0x4b0
[42.937] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x2e/0xa0
[42.937] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[42.937] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[42.937] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[42.937] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[42.937] RIP: 0033:0x7f381a6ffe9b
[42.937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 (...)
[42.937] RSP: 002b:00007ffd45ecf060 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[42.937] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f381a6ffe9b
[42.937] RDX: 00007ffd45ecf150 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003
[42.937] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 0000000000000000
[42.937] R10: 00007f381a60c878 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd45ed0423
[42.937] R13: 00007ffd45ecf150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd45ecf148
[42.937] </TASK>
[42.937] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[42.937] BTRFS: error (device sdc: state A) in cleanup_transaction:1977: errno=-28 No space left
[59.196] INFO: task btrfs:346772 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.196] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.196] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/set_memory: Avoid spinlock recursion in change_page_attr()
Commit 1f9ad21c3b38 ("powerpc/mm: Implement set_memory() routines")
included a spin_lock() to change_page_attr() in order to
safely perform the three step operations. But then
commit 9f7853d7609d ("powerpc/mm: Fix set_memory_*() against
concurrent accesses") modify it to use pte_update() and do
the operation safely against concurrent access.
In the meantime, Maxime reported some spinlock recursion.
[ 15.351649] BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, kworker/0:2/217
[ 15.357540] lock: init_mm+0x3c/0x420, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kworker/0:2/217, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 15.366563] CPU: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.15.0+ #523
[ 15.373350] Workqueue: events do_free_init
[ 15.377615] Call Trace:
[ 15.380232] [e4105ac0] [800946a4] do_raw_spin_lock+0xf8/0x120 (unreliable)
[ 15.387340] [e4105ae0] [8001f4ec] change_page_attr+0x40/0x1d4
[ 15.393413] [e4105b10] [801424e0] __apply_to_page_range+0x164/0x310
[ 15.400009] [e4105b60] [80169620] free_pcp_prepare+0x1e4/0x4a0
[ 15.406045] [e4105ba0] [8016c5a0] free_unref_page+0x40/0x2b8
[ 15.411979] [e4105be0] [8018724c] kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte+0x6c/0x94
[ 15.418989] [e4105c00] [801424e0] __apply_to_page_range+0x164/0x310
[ 15.425451] [e4105c50] [80187834] kasan_release_vmalloc+0xbc/0x134
[ 15.431898] [e4105c70] [8015f7a8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x4e4/0xdd8
[ 15.438560] [e4105d30] [80160d10] _vm_unmap_aliases.part.0+0x17c/0x24c
[ 15.445283] [e4105d60] [801642d0] __vunmap+0x2f0/0x5c8
[ 15.450684] [e4105db0] [800e32d0] do_free_init+0x68/0x94
[ 15.456181] [e4105dd0] [8005d094] process_one_work+0x4bc/0x7b8
[ 15.462283] [e4105e90] [8005d614] worker_thread+0x284/0x6e8
[ 15.468227] [e4105f00] [8006aaec] kthread+0x1f0/0x210
[ 15.473489] [e4105f40] [80017148] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
Remove the read / modify / write sequence to make the operation atomic
and remove the spin_lock() in change_page_attr().
To do the operation atomically, we can't use pte modification helpers
anymore. Because all platforms have different combination of bits, it
is not easy to use those bits directly. But all have the
_PAGE_KERNEL_{RO/ROX/RW/RWX} set of flags. All we need it to compare
two sets to know which bits are set or cleared.
For instance, by comparing _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX and _PAGE_KERNEL_RO you
know which bit gets cleared and which bit get set when changing exec
permission. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler
The following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:
- All tags allocated
- The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()
- ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls
ufshcd_err_handler()
- ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:
Workqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x298/0x5d8
__schedule+0x6cc/0xa94
schedule+0x12c/0x298
blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480
__blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284
blk_get_request+0x74/0x134
ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640
ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c
ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8
ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254
ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354
ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58
process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c
worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c
kthread+0x150/0x1b4
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
Fix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved
request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: core: Make do_proc_control() and do_proc_bulk() killable
The USBDEVFS_CONTROL and USBDEVFS_BULK ioctls invoke
usb_start_wait_urb(), which contains an uninterruptible wait with a
user-specified timeout value. If timeout value is very large and the
device being accessed does not respond in a reasonable amount of time,
the kernel will complain about "Task X blocked for more than N
seconds", as found in testing by syzbot:
INFO: task syz-executor.0:8700 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor.0 state:D stack:23192 pid: 8700 ppid: 8455 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4681 [inline]
__schedule+0xc07/0x11f0 kernel/sched/core.c:5938
schedule+0x14b/0x210 kernel/sched/core.c:6017
schedule_timeout+0x98/0x2f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1857
do_wait_for_common+0x2da/0x480 kernel/sched/completion.c:85
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion_timeout+0x46/0x60 kernel/sched/completion.c:157
usb_start_wait_urb+0x167/0x550 drivers/usb/core/message.c:63
do_proc_bulk+0x978/0x1080 drivers/usb/core/devio.c:1236
proc_bulk drivers/usb/core/devio.c:1273 [inline]
usbdev_do_ioctl drivers/usb/core/devio.c:2547 [inline]
usbdev_ioctl+0x3441/0x6b10 drivers/usb/core/devio.c:2713
...
To fix this problem, this patch replaces usbfs's calls to
usb_control_msg() and usb_bulk_msg() with special-purpose code that
does essentially the same thing (as recommended in the comment for
usb_start_wait_urb()), except that it always uses a killable wait and
it uses GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_NOIO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isdn: mISDN: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context
The driver can call card->isac.release() function from an atomic
context.
Fix this by calling this function after releasing the lock.
The following log reveals it:
[ 44.168226 ] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/workqueue.c:3018
[ 44.168941 ] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 5475, name: modprobe
[ 44.169574 ] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 44.169899 ] irq event stamp: 0
[ 44.170160 ] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 44.170627 ] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff814209ed>] copy_process+0x132d/0x3e00
[ 44.171240 ] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81420a1a>] copy_process+0x135a/0x3e00
[ 44.171852 ] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 44.172318 ] Preemption disabled at:
[ 44.172320 ] [<ffffffffa009b0a9>] nj_release+0x69/0x500 [netjet]
[ 44.174441 ] Call Trace:
[ 44.174630 ] dump_stack_lvl+0xa8/0xd1
[ 44.174912 ] dump_stack+0x15/0x17
[ 44.175166 ] ___might_sleep+0x3a2/0x510
[ 44.175459 ] ? nj_release+0x69/0x500 [netjet]
[ 44.175791 ] __might_sleep+0x82/0xe0
[ 44.176063 ] ? start_flush_work+0x20/0x7b0
[ 44.176375 ] start_flush_work+0x33/0x7b0
[ 44.176672 ] ? trace_irq_enable_rcuidle+0x85/0x170
[ 44.177034 ] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xaa/0x1f0
[ 44.177372 ] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xaa/0x1f0
[ 44.177711 ] __flush_work+0x11a/0x1a0
[ 44.177991 ] ? flush_work+0x20/0x20
[ 44.178257 ] ? lock_release+0x13c/0x8f0
[ 44.178550 ] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 44.178872 ] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x148/0x360
[ 44.179187 ] ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x20/0x20
[ 44.179530 ] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 44.179846 ] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x55/0x900
[ 44.180168 ] ? ____kasan_slab_free+0x116/0x140
[ 44.180505 ] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x60
[ 44.180878 ] ? skb_queue_purge+0x1a3/0x1c0
[ 44.181189 ] ? kfree+0x13e/0x290
[ 44.181438 ] flush_work+0x17/0x20
[ 44.181695 ] mISDN_freedchannel+0xe8/0x100
[ 44.182006 ] isac_release+0x210/0x260 [mISDNipac]
[ 44.182366 ] nj_release+0xf6/0x500 [netjet]
[ 44.182685 ] nj_remove+0x48/0x70 [netjet]
[ 44.182989 ] pci_device_remove+0xa9/0x250 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: serialize hash resizes and cleanups
Syzbot was able to trigger the following warning [1]
No repro found by syzbot yet but I was able to trigger similar issue
by having 2 scripts running in parallel, changing conntrack hash sizes,
and:
for j in `seq 1 1000` ; do unshare -n /bin/true >/dev/null ; done
It would take more than 5 minutes for net_namespace structures
to be cleaned up.
This is because nf_ct_iterate_cleanup() has to restart everytime
a resize happened.
By adding a mutex, we can serialize hash resizes and cleanups
and also make get_next_corpse() faster by skipping over empty
buckets.
Even without resizes in the picture, this patch considerably
speeds up network namespace dismantles.
[1]
INFO: task syz-executor.0:8312 can't die for more than 144 seconds.
task:syz-executor.0 state:R running task stack:25672 pid: 8312 ppid: 6573 flags:0x00004006
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4955 [inline]
__schedule+0x940/0x26f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6236
preempt_schedule_common+0x45/0xc0 kernel/sched/core.c:6408
preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x18 arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S:35
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x109/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:390
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:32 [inline]
get_next_corpse net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2252 [inline]
nf_ct_iterate_cleanup+0x15a/0x450 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2275
nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list+0x14c/0x4f0 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2469
ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:171
setup_net+0x639/0xa30 net/core/net_namespace.c:349
copy_net_ns+0x319/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:470
create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226
ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3128
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3202 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3200 [inline]
__x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3200
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f63da68e739
RSP: 002b:00007f63d7c05188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f63da792f80 RCX: 00007f63da68e739
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000000
RBP: 00007f63da6e8cc4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f63da792f80
R13: 00007fff50b75d3f R14: 00007f63d7c05300 R15: 0000000000022000
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/27:
#0: ffffffff8b980020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6446
2 locks held by kworker/u4:2/153:
#0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline]
#0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline]
#0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1198 [inline]
#0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:634 [inline]
#0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:661 [inline]
#0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x896/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2268
#1: ffffc9000140fdb0 ((kfence_timer).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8ca/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2272
1 lock held by systemd-udevd/2970:
1 lock held by in:imklog/6258:
#0: ffff88807f970ff0 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0xe9/0x100 fs/file.c:990
3 locks held by kworker/1:6/8158:
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/8312:
2 locks held by kworker/u4:13/9320:
1 lock held by
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix soft lockup during fsstress
Below traces are observed during fsstress and system got hung.
[ 130.698396] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 26s! |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: tty_buffer: Fix the softlockup issue in flush_to_ldisc
When running ltp testcase(ltp/testcases/kernel/pty/pty04.c) with arm64, there is a soft lockup,
which look like this one:
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ec
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack+0xd0/0x128
panic+0x15c/0x374
watchdog_timer_fn+0x2b8/0x304
__run_hrtimer+0x88/0x2c0
__hrtimer_run_queues+0xa4/0x120
hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x270
arch_timer_handler_phys+0x40/0x50
handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x94/0x220
__handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xf0
gic_handle_irq+0x84/0xfc
el1_irq+0xc8/0x180
slip_unesc+0x80/0x214 [slip]
tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x64/0x80
tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x50/0x90
flush_to_ldisc+0xbc/0x110
process_one_work+0x1d4/0x4b0
worker_thread+0x180/0x430
kthread+0x11c/0x120
In the testcase pty04, The first process call the write syscall to send
data to the pty master. At the same time, the workqueue will do the
flush_to_ldisc to pop data in a loop until there is no more data left.
When the sender and workqueue running in different core, the sender sends
data fastly in full time which will result in workqueue doing work in loop
for a long time and occuring softlockup in flush_to_ldisc with kernel
configured without preempt. So I add need_resched check and cond_resched
in the flush_to_ldisc loop to avoid it. |
| In processLaunchBrowser of CommandParamsFactory.java, there is a possible browser interaction from the lockscreen due to improper locking. This could lead to physical escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix deadlock triggered by cancel_delayed_work_syn()
The following LOCKDEP was detected:
Workqueue: events smc_lgr_free_work [smc]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.1.0-20221027.rc2.git8.56bc5b569087.300.fc36.s390x+debug #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/3:0/176251 is trying to acquire lock:
00000000f1467148 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: __flush_workqueue+0x7a/0x4f0
but task is already holding lock:
0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #4 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
__flush_work+0x76/0xf0
__cancel_work_timer+0x170/0x220
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x34/0x1c0 [smc]
smc_connect_rdma+0x15e/0x418 [smc]
__smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
__sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
__do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
__do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
system_call+0x82/0xb0
-> #3 (smc_client_lgr_pending){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
__mutex_lock+0x96/0x8e8
mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
smc_connect_rdma+0xa4/0x418 [smc]
__smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
__sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
__do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
__do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
system_call+0x82/0xb0
-> #2 (sk_lock-AF_SMC){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
lock_sock_nested+0x46/0xa8
smc_tx_work+0x34/0x50 [smc]
process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
worker_thread+0x62/0x420
kthread+0x138/0x150
__ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
-> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&smc->conn.tx_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
process_one_work+0x2bc/0x730
worker_thread+0x62/0x420
kthread+0x138/0x150
__ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
-> #0 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
__lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
__flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
worker_thread+0x62/0x420
kthread+0x138/0x150
__ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
(wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2
--> smc_client_lgr_pending
--> (work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
lock(smc_client_lgr_pending);
lock((work_completion)
(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
lock((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2);
*** DEADLOCK ***
2 locks held by kworker/3:0/176251:
#0: 0000000080183548
((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
#1: 0000037fffe97dc8
((work_completion)
(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
stack backtr
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix lockdep assertion on sync reset unload event
Fix lockdep assertion triggered during sync reset unload event. When the
sync reset flow is initiated using the devlink reload fw_activate
option, the PF already holds the devlink lock while handling unload
event. In this case, delegate sync reset unload event handling back to
the devlink callback process to avoid double-locking and resolve the
lockdep warning.
Kernel log:
WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 1578 at devl_assert_locked+0x31/0x40
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x2c/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_sync_reset_unload_event+0xaf/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x222/0x640
worker_thread+0x199/0x350
kthread+0x10b/0x230
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x8e/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix locking in _rtw_join_timeout_handler()
Commit 041879b12ddb ("drivers: staging: rtl8192bs: Fix deadlock in
rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle()") besides fixing the deadlock also
modified _rtw_join_timeout_handler() to use spin_[un]lock_irq()
instead of spin_[un]lock_bh().
_rtw_join_timeout_handler() calls rtw_do_join() which takes
pmlmepriv->scanned_queue.lock using spin_[un]lock_bh(). This
spin_unlock_bh() call re-enables softirqs which triggers an oops in
kernel/softirq.c: __local_bh_enable_ip() when it calls
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled():
[ 244.506087] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at kernel/softirq.c:376 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa6/0x100
...
[ 244.509022] Call Trace:
[ 244.509048] <IRQ>
[ 244.509100] _rtw_join_timeout_handler+0x134/0x170 [r8723bs]
[ 244.509468] ? __pfx__rtw_join_timeout_handler+0x10/0x10 [r8723bs]
[ 244.509772] ? __pfx__rtw_join_timeout_handler+0x10/0x10 [r8723bs]
[ 244.510076] call_timer_fn+0x95/0x2a0
[ 244.510200] __run_timers.part.0+0x1da/0x2d0
This oops is causd by the switch to spin_[un]lock_irq() which disables
the IRQs for the entire duration of _rtw_join_timeout_handler().
Disabling the IRQs is not necessary since all code taking this lock
runs from either user contexts or from softirqs, switch back to
spin_[un]lock_bh() to fix this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: Add missing lock in cfg80211_check_and_end_cac()
Callers of wdev_chandef() must hold the wiphy mutex.
But the worker cfg80211_propagate_cac_done_wk() never takes the lock.
Which triggers the warning below with the mesh_peer_connected_dfs
test from hostapd and not (yet) released mac80211 code changes:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 495 at net/wireless/chan.c:1552 wdev_chandef+0x60/0x165
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 495 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-wt-g03960e6f9d47 #33 13c287eeabfe1efea01c0bcc863723ab082e17cf
Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_propagate_cac_done_wk
Stack:
00000000 00000001 ffffff00 6093267c
00000000 6002ec30 6d577c50 60037608
00000000 67e8d108 6063717b 00000000
Call Trace:
[<6002ec30>] ? _printk+0x0/0x98
[<6003c2b3>] show_stack+0x10e/0x11a
[<6002ec30>] ? _printk+0x0/0x98
[<60037608>] dump_stack_lvl+0x71/0xb8
[<6063717b>] ? wdev_chandef+0x60/0x165
[<6003766d>] dump_stack+0x1e/0x20
[<6005d1b7>] __warn+0x101/0x20f
[<6005d3a8>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xe3/0x15d
[<600b0c5c>] ? mark_lock.part.0+0x0/0x4ec
[<60751191>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x0/0x16
[<600b11a2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5a/0x6e
[<6005d2c5>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x0/0x15d
[<60052e53>] ? unblock_signals+0x3a/0xe7
[<60052f2d>] ? um_set_signals+0x2d/0x43
[<60751191>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x0/0x16
[<607508b2>] ? lock_is_held_type+0x207/0x21f
[<6063717b>] wdev_chandef+0x60/0x165
[<605f89b4>] regulatory_propagate_dfs_state+0x247/0x43f
[<60052f00>] ? um_set_signals+0x0/0x43
[<605e6bfd>] cfg80211_propagate_cac_done_wk+0x3a/0x4a
[<6007e460>] process_scheduled_works+0x3bc/0x60e
[<6007d0ec>] ? move_linked_works+0x4d/0x81
[<6007d120>] ? assign_work+0x0/0xaa
[<6007f81f>] worker_thread+0x220/0x2dc
[<600786ef>] ? set_pf_worker+0x0/0x57
[<60087c96>] ? to_kthread+0x0/0x43
[<6008ab3c>] kthread+0x2d3/0x2e2
[<6007f5ff>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x2dc
[<6006c05b>] ? calculate_sigpending+0x0/0x56
[<6003b37d>] new_thread_handler+0x4a/0x64
irq event stamp: 614611
hardirqs last enabled at (614621): [<00000000600bc96b>] __up_console_sem+0x82/0xaf
hardirqs last disabled at (614630): [<00000000600bc92c>] __up_console_sem+0x43/0xaf
softirqs last enabled at (614268): [<00000000606c55c6>] __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x933/0x985
softirqs last disabled at (614266): [<00000000606c52d6>] __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x643/0x985 |
