A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token.
The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email.
Exploitation Conditions:
The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default).
The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default).
The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider.
Concrete Impact:
Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database.
Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows.
Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Sun, 05 Jul 2026 07:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts. | |
| Title | Keycloak-services: keycloak-services: oidc email_verified claim incorrectly applied to userinfo email | |
| First Time appeared |
Redhat
Redhat build Keycloak Redhat jboss Data Grid Redhat jbosseapxp Redhat red Hat Single Sign On |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-1288 | |
| CPEs | cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak: cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_data_grid:8 cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp cpe:/a:redhat:red_hat_single_sign_on:7 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Redhat
Redhat build Keycloak Redhat jboss Data Grid Redhat jbosseapxp Redhat red Hat Single Sign On |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: redhat
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-05T06:55:30.225Z
Reserved: 2026-07-05T06:32:45.726Z
Link: CVE-2026-14781
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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