A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.
History

Sun, 05 Jul 2026 07:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.
Title Keycloak-services: keycloak-services: oidc email_verified claim incorrectly applied to userinfo email
First Time appeared Redhat
Redhat build Keycloak
Redhat jboss Data Grid
Redhat jbosseapxp
Redhat red Hat Single Sign On
Weaknesses CWE-1288
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_data_grid:8
cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp
cpe:/a:redhat:red_hat_single_sign_on:7
Vendors & Products Redhat
Redhat build Keycloak
Redhat jboss Data Grid
Redhat jbosseapxp
Redhat red Hat Single Sign On
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: redhat

Published:

Updated: 2026-07-05T06:55:30.225Z

Reserved: 2026-07-05T06:32:45.726Z

Link: CVE-2026-14781

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

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cve-icon Redhat

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cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

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