In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card The loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname where `len < sizeof(card->id)` is used for the bounds check. Since sizeof(card->id) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes, writing 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer, overwriting the terminating nullbyte. When this non-null-terminated string is later passed to snd_card_set_id() -> copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans forward with `while (*nid && ...)` and reads past the end of the stack buffer, reading the contents of the stack. A USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space characters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string sound/core/init.c:696 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c sound/core/init.c:718 The off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d ("ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1), which first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original code never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy. Fix this by changing the loop bound to `sizeof(card->id) - 1`, ensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator.
History

Fri, 01 May 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card The loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname where `len < sizeof(card->id)` is used for the bounds check. Since sizeof(card->id) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes, writing 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer, overwriting the terminating nullbyte. When this non-null-terminated string is later passed to snd_card_set_id() -> copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans forward with `while (*nid && ...)` and reads past the end of the stack buffer, reading the contents of the stack. A USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space characters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string sound/core/init.c:696 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c sound/core/init.c:718 The off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d ("ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1), which first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original code never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy. Fix this by changing the loop bound to `sizeof(card->id) - 1`, ensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator.
Title ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-05-01T14:15:05.804Z

Reserved: 2026-03-09T15:48:24.140Z

Link: CVE-2026-31778

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-05-01T15:16:41.190

Modified: 2026-05-01T15:24:14.893

Link: CVE-2026-31778

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.