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Search Results (15186 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72018 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dibs: loopback: validate offset and size in move_data() The loopback move_data() performs a memcpy into the registered DMB without checking whether offset + size exceeds the DMB length. Unlike real ISM hardware, which enforces memory region bounds natively, the software loopback has no such protection. A peer-supplied out-of-bounds offset or oversized write would result in an OOB write past the allocated kernel buffer. Add an explicit bounds check before the memcpy to reject such requests with -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43745 | 1 Apple | 5 Ios And Ipados, Ipados, Iphone Os and 2 more | 2026-08-17 | 6.5 Medium |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.5.2, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43676 | 1 Apple | 5 Ios And Ipados, Ipados, Iphone Os and 2 more | 2026-08-17 | 6.5 Medium |
| An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.5.2, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72025 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/monwriter: Reject buffer reuse with different data length When data buffers are reused, e.g. for interval sample records, the first record determines the data length, and the size of the buffer for user copy. Current monwriter code does not check if the data length was changed for subsequent records, which also would never happen for valid user programs. However, a malicious user could change the data length, resulting in out of bounds user copy to the kernel buffer, and memory corruption. By default, the monwriter misc device is created with root-only permissions, so practical impact is typically low. Fix this by checking for changed data length and rejecting such records. | ||||
| CVE-2026-16887 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| IBM i 7.6 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds write. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12553 | 1 Hp | 1 Web Jetadmin | 2026-08-17 | N/A |
| HP has identified a potential vulnerability in HP Web Jetadmin (WJA) that may allow an unauthenticated actor to read from or write to arbitrary files through a DLL hijacking mechanism. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72130 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length. In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the short length and then format the message anyway. Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length. Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge(). This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is configured on the target. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72302 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Use overflow checks in control_update size calc In sof_ipc3_control_update(), the expected_size calculation uses firmware-provided cdata->num_elems in arithmetic that could overflow on 32-bit platforms, wrapping to a small value. This would allow the cdata->rhdr.hdr.size comparison to pass with mismatched sizes, potentially leading to out-of-bounds access in snd_sof_update_control. Use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() to detect and reject overflowed size calculations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64145 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: fix dma_buffer leak on bus acquire failure wilc_wlan_firmware_download() allocates dma_buffer with kmalloc() at the top of the function and uses a 'fail:' label to free it via kfree(dma_buffer) on error. All later error paths correctly use 'goto fail' to route through this cleanup. However, the early failure path after the first acquire_bus() call uses a bare 'return ret;', which leaks dma_buffer whenever the bus acquire fails. Replace the early return with goto fail so the existing cleanup path runs. Found via a custom Coccinelle semantic patch hunting for kmalloc'd locals leaked on early-return error paths in driver firmware-download code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-16929 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-08-17 | 5.3 Medium |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to a buffer overflow. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12519 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-08-17 | 5 Medium |
| The WNC-M14A2A LTE-M modem driver mishandles unsolicited %NOTIFYEV: events in on_cmd_socknotifyev() (drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/wncm14a2a.c). The response line is linearized into a fixed 40-byte stack buffer via net_buf_linearize(), which caps the copy at 39 bytes and returns out_len <= 39. The two quote-delimiter scanning loops, however, were bounded by len — the full CR/LF-delimited frame length returned by net_buf_findcrlf() — rather than by out_len. When a %NOTIFYEV: line longer than 39 bytes contains no " within the linearized region, the loop indices p1/p2 walk past value[39] and read adjacent stack memory until a stray quote byte is found or the index reaches len. The over-read string is then passed to strncmp()/atoi()/LOG_*, and if a quote byte is found out of bounds the subsequent value[p2] = '\0' performs a single-NUL out-of-bounds stack write at an attacker-influenced offset. The %NOTIFYEV: payload carries network-derived content (LTIME network time, SIB1 base-station system information, CSPS/RRCSTATE), so a rogue cellular base station, a malicious or compromised modem module, or RF manipulation that induces an over-long notify line reaches the defect without any application interaction; the handler runs automatically on the unsolicited event in the modem RX thread. The impact is out-of-bounds stack disclosure (into logs and parsing) and stack corruption that can crash the modem RX thread (denial of service). The write offset is only weakly controlled, so memory-safe code execution is not demonstrated. The fix bounds both scanning loops by out_len, keeping all accesses within the linearized buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72196 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()'s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries: t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; } find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dp's allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch ("fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion", <20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com>) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path's memmove(&dp->vcn, ...) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72226 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV OOB check overflow A TT unicast TVLV contains the number of VLANs stored in it. This number is an u16 and gets multiplied by the size of the struct batadv_tvlv_tt_vlan_data (8 bytes). The size can therefore overflow the u16 used to store the tt_vlan_len. All additional safety checks to prevent out-of-bounds access of the TVLV buffer are invalid due to this overflow. Using size_t prevents this overflow and ensures that the safety checks compare against the actual buffer requirements. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71969 | 1 Op-tee | 1 Op-tee Os | 2026-08-17 | 6.7 Medium |
| OP-TEE OS through 4.10.0, fixed in commit 7b8b494, contains a buffer underwrite vulnerability in the RSA NOPAD encrypt and decrypt operations within the mbedTLS software backend and SE050 hardware driver that allows a malicious Trusted Application to corrupt secure-world heap memory by supplying an input length exceeding the RSA modulus size. When src_len exceeds rsa_len, the subtraction expression wraps to a large unsigned value, causing a subsequent memcpy to write attacker-controlled data before the destination buffer in S-EL1 secure-world heap memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72277 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: nv: Inject SEA if guest VNCR isn't normal memory When constructing an L1 VNCR mapping, KVM unconditionally uses cacheable memory attributes, even if the underlying PFN isn't memory. This gets particularly hairy if the endpoint doesn't support cacheable memory attributes, potentially throwing an SError on writeback... While KVM does permit cacheable memory attributes on certain PFNMAP VMAs, kvm_translate_vncr() isn't currently grabbing the VMA. So do the simpler thing for now and just reject everything that isn't memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72423 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes The conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer together with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory range described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write opts->error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an error. For an invalid size smaller than the end of opts->error, that write can land outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid arguments, but only report the error through opts->error when the supplied size includes the field. This preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte layouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts->error. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72380 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[] pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation. req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so a range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING test and indexes bedata->rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single bound covers both ends. A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire protocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and stop trusting the backend: set bedata->disabled. The event handler then ignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a response return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the fatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()). The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments). | ||||
| CVE-2026-10673 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-08-17 | 8.3 High |
| The Zephyr ADIN2111/ADIN1110 10BASE-T1S/T1L Ethernet driver (drivers/ethernet/eth_adin2111.c) reassembles received Ethernet frames in OPEN Alliance (OA) SPI mode by copying device-supplied 64-byte data chunks into a fixed static buffer ctx->buf of size CONFIG_ETH_ADIN2111_BUFFER_SIZE (default 1524 bytes). In eth_adin2111_oa_data_read(), each valid chunk was memcpy'd into ctx->buf[ctx->scur] and the write cursor scur advanced, with no check that scur + len stayed within the buffer. The number of chunks (up to 255, from the BUFSTS RCA field) and the per-chunk length are taken entirely from the frame data received off the wire; the cursor is only reset on a start-of-frame chunk. An attacker on the single-pair Ethernet segment can therefore send a frame whose reassembled size exceeds the configured buffer, causing the driver's RX offload thread to write attacker-controlled frame bytes past the end of the static buffer into adjacent driver/kernel memory (up to roughly 14.8 KB in the worst case). This is a remotely/adjacently reachable out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) that can corrupt memory and cause denial of service or potentially code execution. The defect was introduced when OA SPI support was added (commit 0ca8b0756b1) and shipped in releases v3.7.0 through v4.4.0. The fix adds a bounds check that drops the oversized frame and resets the cursor before the copy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72217 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Bound-check xdr_buf_to_bvec() stores before writing xdr_buf_to_bvec() writes a bio_vec into the caller's array before testing whether that slot is in range, and the head branch performs the store with no check at all. When the caller's budget is exactly used up, the next store lands one element past the end of the array. The overflow label returns count - 1, which masks the surplus store but cannot undo it. rq_bvec, the array passed by nfsd_vfs_write(), is allocated to exactly rq_maxpages entries with no slack. The OOB store can land in adjacent slab memory; the bv_len and bv_offset fields written there are derived from client-supplied RPC payload sizes. Move the in-range check ahead of the store in the head, page-loop, and tail branches. With the check at the top of each sequence, count is incremented only after a successful store, so the overflow label can return count directly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72352 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: bpf: Fix hid_bpf_get_data() range check hid_bpf_get_data() returns a pointer into the HID-BPF context data when the caller-provided offset and size fit inside ctx->allocated_size. The current check adds rdwr_buf_size and offset before comparing the result against ctx->allocated_size. Since both values are unsigned, a very large size can wrap the sum below ctx->allocated_size and make the helper return a pointer even though the requested range is not contained in the backing buffer. Use check_add_overflow() to reject wrapped range ends before comparing the requested range end against ctx->allocated_size. | ||||