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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: microchip-spi: fix zero header_size OOB read in mpf_ops_parse_header() mpf_ops_parse_header() reads header_size from the bitstream at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). When header_size is zero, the expression *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer start. Since initial_header_size is set to 71 in mpf_ops, the fpga-mgr core guarantees the buffer is large enough to reach MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET. The only real gap is the zero header_size case, which cannot be resolved by providing a larger buffer, so return -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307), lrh->attr_off and lrh->redo_len come from the on-disk LRH. When they satisfy aoff + dlen < attr->res.data_off, the assignment attr->res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off); underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1, data_off=0x18). Subsequent code that reads attr->res.data_size to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to 4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation. The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287 catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all attributes. A read site that picks an attribute by name and reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered. Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails at -22 from mi_enum_attr). [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72209 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: validate attribute values on lookup ntfs_attr_find() and ntfs_external_attr_find() check that generic resident attribute values fit in their attribute records and that fixed-size resident values are large enough. For variable-length resident formats, however, the fixed part is not enough: embedded length fields can still point callers past the resident value. A crafted image can set a small resident $FILE_NAME value_length while leaving file_name_length large. Callers then trust file_name_length and read past the resident value when converting or comparing the name. This was reproduced with a crafted image under KASAN as a slab-out-of-bounds read from the kmalloc-1k MFT record copy. The stack included ntfs_lookup(), ntfs_iget(), ntfs_read_locked_inode(), ntfs_attr_name_get(), ntfs_ucstonls(), and utf16s_to_utf8s(). Add a shared attribute value validator and use it before a lookup path can return an attribute, including the AT_UNUSED enumeration case where callers inspect returned attributes directly. The helper validates resident value bounds, minimum resident value sizes, variable-length $FILE_NAME fields, and non-resident mapping-pairs metadata that was previously checked separately in both lookup paths. This also preserves the intended resident @val matching semantics in the external attribute lookup path. The old duplicated validation block overwrote the actual resident value length with the type-specific minimum length before comparing @val, so variable-length resident values could fail to match even when the bytes were identical. Keep the comparison on the actual value length, and make ntfs_attrlist_entry_add() compare resident attributes with lowest_vcn zero instead of reading the non-resident union member after a successful resident match. Reject non-resident $FILE_NAME records too: the format requires $FILE_NAME to be resident and callers treat returned records as resident. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72210 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record: attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length); The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end: b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; } When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check. Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72227 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: mcast: avoid OOB read of num_dests header Before the access to struct batadv_tvlv_mcast_tracker's num_dests, it is attempted to check whether enough space is actually in the network header. But instead of using offsetofend() to check for the whole size (2) which must be accessible, offsetof() of is called. The latter is always returning 0. The comparison with the network header length will always return that enough data is available - even when only 1 or 0 bytes are accessible. Instead of using offsetofend(), use the more common check for the whole header. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72241 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: leds: uleds: Fix potential buffer overread The name string supplied by userspace is not guaranteed to be null-terminated, so using strchr() on it might result in a buffer overread. The same thing will happen when said string is used by the LED class device. Fix this by using strnchr() instead and explicitly check that the name string is properly null-terminated. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72400 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields. The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer. Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72417 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: flowtable: Validate iph->ihl in nf_flow_ip4_tunnel_proto() Add sanity check for iph->ihl field in nf_flow_ip4_tunnel_proto() before using it to compute the header size, avoiding out-of-bounds access with malformed IP headers. While at it, use iph->protocol instead of the hardcoded IPPROTO_IPIP constant when setting ctx->tun.proto and reference ctx->tun.hdr_size when updating ctx->offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72466 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xprtrdma: Fix bcall rep leak and unbounded peek rpcrdma_is_bcall() decodes a reply's first words to decide whether the frame is a backchannel call. Two issues in that decode path let a short or malformed reply leak the receive buffer and drain the Receive queue. First, the speculative peek p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 0); /* five p++ reads follow */ asks xdr_inline_decode() for zero bytes, which returns xdr->p without consulting xdr->end. The five subsequent __be32 reads can then walk up to 20 bytes past the wire payload into stale regbuf contents and misclassify the reply as a backchannel call. Second, after the post-peek p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 3 * sizeof(*p)); if (unlikely(!p)) return true; the short-header arm returns true without calling rpcrdma_bc_receive_call(). The contract with the caller is that a true return transfers ownership of rep to the backchannel path: rpcrdma_reply_handler() if (rpcrdma_is_bcall(r_xprt, rep)) return; /* bare return, skips out_post */ ... out_post: rpcrdma_post_recvs(r_xprt, credits + ...); Because rpcrdma_bc_receive_call() never ran, no one took rep, but rpcrdma_reply_handler still bare-returns past rpcrdma_rep_put() and rpcrdma_post_recvs(). The rep, with its persistently DMA-mapped receive buffer, is orphaned on rb_all_reps and freed only at transport teardown. This completion reposts nothing, so its slot is reclaimed only when a later forward-channel reply reaches out_post and rpcrdma_post_recvs() allocates a fresh rep to backfill; absent that traffic the Receive queue drains and the peer's Sends draw RNR NAKs. Fix by consulting xdr->end after the zero-length peek so the five __be32 reads cannot run unless 20 bytes of wire payload remain. A byte-precise comparison against xdr->end is required because a non-4-aligned receive rounds the stream's word count up past the true payload. Also return false from the short-header arm so the reply falls through the normal out_norqst cleanup chain (rpcrdma_rep_put() plus rpcrdma_post_recvs()). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72480 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: xilinx-ams: fix out-of-bounds channel lookup in event handling ams_event_to_channel() may return a pointer past the end of dev->channels when no matching scan_index is found. This can lead to invalid memory access in ams_handle_event(). Add a bounds check in ams_event_to_channel() and return NULL when no channel is found. Also guard the caller to safely handle this case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: add bounds check to run_get_highest_vcn() run_get_highest_vcn() parses a packed NTFS mapping-pairs buffer without any length bound, relying solely on a 0x00 terminator to stop. A crafted $LogFile UpdateMappingPairs record whose embedded attribute contains mapping-pairs runs without a terminator causes the function to read past the slab allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read on mount. The sibling function run_unpack() received an analogous bounds-check in commit b62567bca474 ("ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()"), but run_get_highest_vcn() was missed. Take a run_buf_size parameter and reject any run header whose payload would extend past the buffer end, mirroring the pattern used by run_unpack(). The caller in fslog.c passes the remaining attribute bytes after the mapping-pairs offset. KASAN report (on mainline v7.1 merge window HEAD): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e2d5400 by task mount/72 Call Trace: run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410 do_action.isra.0+0x3ba8/0x7b50 log_replay+0x9ddd/0x10200 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x4ad/0x610 ntfs_fill_super+0x214a/0x4540 | ||||
| CVE-2026-74457 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: peak_usb: add bounds check for USB channel index The channel control index ctrl_idx is derived from rx->len which comes directly from a device USB payload. The mask 0x0f allows values 0-15, but the array size of usb_if->dev[] is only 2. Values 2-15 cause heap out-of-bounds read, eventually causing kernel panic in the IRQ context. Add bounds checking for ctrl_idx before the array access in both pcan_usb_pro_handle_canmsg() and pcan_usb_pro_handle_error(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74466 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Close speculative mem read possibility The domain value is extracted from a given CCA or EP11 ioctl struct when a CPRB is about to be sent. Thus this is a user controlled value. Under some special conditions (custom device node used, administrative load) this value is used as an array index after bounds checking, but without speculation barrier. Add the missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative execution where this domain value is used. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74258 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data As reported by sashiko [1] we need to use access_ok to check the user space data bounds before we use __get-user to get it. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260610145235.CB1441F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-74287 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate embedded address parameter length sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP, and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header, but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length fits within the bounds of the outer parameter. Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload. A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter. Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds. This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried in INIT or ASCONF processing paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74291 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: topology: Check PCM and DAI name strings before use Topology objects store several PCM and DAI names in fixed-size UAPI arrays. Other topology parser paths validate these fields with bounded strnlen() checks before using them as C strings, but the PCM and DAI paths still pass some fixed-size arrays directly to strlen(), devm_kstrdup(), DAI lookup, and diagnostic prints. A malformed topology blob with a non-NUL-terminated PCM, DAI, or stream capability name can therefore make the parser read past the end of the fixed-size field. Reject unterminated PCM and DAI name fields before consuming them as C strings. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74295 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: hdac_hdmi: Validate written enum value hdac_hdmi_set_pin_port_mux() uses the written enum value to index the texts array before calling snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double(), which validates that the value is within the enum item range. An out-of-range value can therefore make the driver read past the texts array before the helper rejects the write. Move the lookup after the helper has accepted the value. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74336 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: bound S1G TIM PVB walk to the TIM element ieee80211_s1g_check_tim() parses the S1G Partial Virtual Bitmap (PVB) of a received TIM element. The TIM is handed in as the element payload: ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() stores elems->tim = elem->data and elems->tim_len = elem->datalen (net/mac80211/parse.c), so the valid bytes are [tim, tim + tim_len). When walking the encoded blocks the function passes the walker an end sentinel of (const u8 *)tim + tim_len + 2, i.e. two bytes past the end of the element. ieee80211_s1g_find_target_block() loops while (ptr + 1 <= end) and dereferences ptr (and the per-mode ieee80211_s1g_len_*() helpers read *ptr), so it can read up to two bytes beyond the TIM element -- an out-of-bounds read of adjacent skb/heap data when the TIM is the last element in the frame. The +2 appears to account for the element id/len header, but tim already points past that header at the element payload, so the addend is wrong. Pass the correct element end, (const u8 *)tim + tim_len. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74346 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Fix OOB read during CQ MR registration Sashiko pointed out an unrelated bug during a previous patch: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260512183852.614045-1-jmoroni%40google.com This change fixes the bug by eliminating the cqmr->split field which was not being set properly and instead just checks the CQ resize feature flag directly. The cqmr->split field essentially tracks whether IRDMA_FEATURE_CQ_RESIZE is set, but it was not being set until CQ creation time, which is _after_ CQ memory registration (the only other place where it is referenced). As a result, it would always be false during MR registration and would therefore cause irdma_handle_q_mem to populate cqmr->shadow even for GEN_2 HW and beyond: cqmr->shadow = (dma_addr_t)arr[req->cq_pages]; The issue is that for GEN_2 and beyond, req->cq_pages may be exactly equal to iwmr->page_cnt and therefore equal to the size of arr, which would cause an OOB read by one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74350 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate fast symlink target during inode read ocfs2_validate_inode_block() already rejects several inconsistent self-contained dinodes before they are exposed to the rest of the filesystem. Fast symlinks need the same treatment. A zero-cluster symlink is treated as a fast symlink and later read through page_get_link() and ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio(). That path uses strnlen() on the inline payload and then copies len + 1 bytes into the folio. If a corrupt dinode stores an i_size that does not fit the inline area or omits the terminating NUL at i_size, that copy reads past the end of the inode block buffer. Reject zero-cluster symlink dinodes whose i_size exceeds the inline fast-symlink capacity or whose inline payload is not NUL-terminated exactly at i_size when the inode block is validated. This keeps malformed fast symlinks from reaching the read path. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN use-after-free in ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 RIP: 0033:0x7f5c6d859aa7 Read of size 3905 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 (fs/ocfs2/inode.c:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?) __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 (?:?) filemap_read_folio+0x27/0xe0 (?:?) filemap_read_folio+0x35/0xe0 (?:?) do_read_cache_folio+0x138/0x230 (?:?) __page_get_link+0x26/0x110 (?:?) page_get_link+0x2e/0x70 (?:?) vfs_readlink+0x15e/0x250 (?:?) touch_atime+0x4d/0x370 (?:?) do_readlinkat+0x186/0x200 (?:?) do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 (?:?) __x64_sys_readlink+0x46/0x60 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) | ||||