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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80765 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both byte ranges. A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject descriptor lengths that exceed the packet. Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report descriptor length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80772 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80875 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: use parsed transport offset in TCP state lookup TCP state handling reparses the skb to find the TCP header. For IPv6 it uses sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code already parsed the packet with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb() and has the real transport-header offset in iph.len. This makes TCP state handling look at the wrong bytes when an IPv6 packet carries extension headers. Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() when reading the TCP header. For IPv4 and for IPv6 packets without extension headers, the passed offset matches the previous value. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80910 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: lpass-wsa-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses EAR SPKR PA Gain" and the four "WSA RX* Mux" controls are enumerated, but their get and put callbacks access the value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int). This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type") and commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type"), but wsa-macro was missed. On 64-bit kernels with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG this trips the elem value sanity check and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-78012 | 2026-09-04 | 9.8 Critical | ||
| An issue in the NetStaX EtherNet/IP Stack prior to v5.6.1 could allow a large Class 3 explicit-message request to exceed the application-side receive buffer without generating an error or warning. The result could be memory corruption, a device crash, or a potential remote attack vector without the originating device receiving a CIP error indicating that the request could not be processed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80868 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: Allocate iomap inline_data using alloc_page This fixes a BUG reported in iomap_write_end_inline: iomap_inline_data_valid checks that the inline_data fits within a page. If the inline_data is allocated with kmemdup there's no guarantee that it's page-aligned, so the check sometimes fails. Allocate it with alloc_page to ensure it's page-aligned. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64367 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-goodix-spi: validate report size to prevent stack buffer overflow goodix_hid_set_raw_report() builds a protocol frame in a 128-byte stack buffer (tmp_buf), writing an 11-12 byte header followed by the caller-supplied report data. The HID core caps report size at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, while the driver does not set hid_ll_driver.max_buffer_size and performs no bounds checking before copying the payload: memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, buf, len); A hidraw SET_REPORT ioctl with a report larger than ~116 bytes overflows the stack buffer. Add a size check after constructing the header, rejecting reports that would exceed the buffer capacity. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55402 | 1 Absolute | 1 Secure Access | 2026-09-04 | 5.9 Medium |
| CVE-2026-55402 is an out of bounds read vulnerability in Secure Access servers prior to version 14.57. Attackers with an ‘in the middle’ position can send specially crafted data to a server causing a persistent denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80907 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix UVD dpb min size calculation for H264 This should use actual number of references from the decode message, instead of maximum derived from level. (cherry picked from commit 64b525edb7e7bdfcdc77883c5e413804e2396856) | ||||
| CVE-2026-85504 | 1 Freeipmi | 1 Freeipmi | 2026-09-04 | 9.8 Critical |
| FreeIPMI before 1.6.19 has a stack-based buffer overflow in _ipmi_sel_oem_fujitsu_get_sel_entry_long_text in libfreeipmi/sel/ipmi-sel-string-fujitsu-irmc-common.c via malformed Fujitsu SEL long-text responses. | ||||
| CVE-2023-20577 | 2026-09-04 | 7.4 High | ||
| A heap overflow in SMM module may allow an attacker with access to a second vulnerability that enables writing to SPI flash, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80874 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: dts: renesas: ironhide: Describe inline ECC carveouts The DBSC5 DRAM controller protects DRAM content using inline ECC. The inline ECC utilizes areas of DRAM for its operation, which are in the DRAM address range, but must not be accessed or modified. Describe the inline ECC carveout areas used by the DBSC5 controller on this hardware as reserved-memory, which must not be accessed. Include DRAM areas which are unprotected by ECC as well, those are parts of the DRAM which directly precede the ECC carveout. In case of high DRAM utilization, unless the inline ECC carveouts are properly reserved, Linux may use and corrupt the memory used by the DBSC5 DRAM controller for inline ECC, which would lead to the system becoming unstable. | ||||
| CVE-2026-14479 | 1 Autodesk | 1 Installer | 2026-09-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| A maliciously crafted input, when processed by the Autodesk Installer IPC frame parser, may trigger improper validation of an input-specified position or offset, resulting in an out-of-range substring operation. A malicious actor may leverage this vulnerability to cause the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM service to terminate unexpectedly, resulting in a denial-of-service condition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47842 | 2 Spring, Vmware | 2 Spring Security, Spring Security | 2026-09-04 | 6.5 Medium |
| Applications using AesBytesEncryptor with the two-argument constructor or when passing a null IV generator and CBC as the encryption mode encrypt data with AES/CBC using a null (all-zero) initialization vector. Spring Security 7.1.0 Spring Security 7.0.0 - 7.0.6 Spring Security 6.5.0 - 6.5.11 Spring Security 6.4.0 - 6.4.18 Spring Security 5.8.0 - 5.8.27 Spring Security 5.7.0 - 5.7.25 | ||||
| CVE-2026-80839 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets The network and transport header fields in struct sk_buff are 16-bit offsets from skb->head, and U16_MAX is reserved as the unset transport header value. batadv_tvlv_call_handler() sets both fields from a received multicast TVLV without checking whether the TVLV end is representable. If the end offset exceeds the field's range, skb_set_transport_header() truncates it so that the transport header precedes the network header. The negative difference is then returned by skb_network_header_len() as a large u32. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() consequently accepts an oversized multicast tracker and accesses memory beyond the skb data. Add skb_set_transport_header_careful(), an offset-aware counterpart to skb_reset_transport_header_careful(), which validates the final head-relative offset before assigning it. Use the new helper in batadv_tvlv_call_handler() and reject unrepresentable TVLVs before setting the network header. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59317 | 2 Spring, Vmware | 2 Spring For Apache Kafka, Spring For Apache Kafka | 2026-09-04 | 6.5 Medium |
| DeadLetterPublishingRecovererFactory reads the retry_topic-original-timestamp header from an inbound ConsumerRecord and passes its raw bytes directly to new BigInteger(header.value()) with no length or format validation. Spring for Apache Kafka 4.1.0 Spring for Apache Kafka 4.0.0 - 4.0.6 Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.0 - 3.3.16 Spring for Apache Kafka 2.9.0 - 2.9.14 Spring for Apache Kafka 2.8.12 and earlier | ||||
| CVE-2026-85509 | 1 Freeipmi | 1 Freeipmi | 2026-09-04 | 9.8 Critical |
| FreeIPMI before 1.6.19 has a stack-based buffer overflow in _read_fru_data in libfreeipmi/fru/ipmi-fru.c when a BMC returns more bytes than requested. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18167 | 1 Tp-link | 1 Archer Ax55 V4 | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the EasyMesh module of TP-Link Archer AX55 v4. When Mesh mode is enabled, a LAN attacker may submit crafted input that causes the easymesh daemon to crash and may potentially achieve remote code execution on the device. Successful exploitation may cause the EasyMesh daemon to crash and may potentially allow remote code execution when Mesh mode is enabled. This may result in high impact to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80825 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: ensure tx headroom in usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb() pushes a TX descriptor and a USB header onto every skb and assumes the headroom for them is already there. That holds for locally generated traffic, where mac80211 reserves hw->extra_tx_headroom, but forwarded frames are sent through ieee80211_8023_xmit(), which does not reserve it. Bridge a wired interface to an mt7925u AP and the first forwarded frame that arrives short panics the kernel: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:415 put:4 tail:0x19b end:0x640 dev:wlan1 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:212! Call trace: skb_panic+0x58/0x60 (P) skb_push+0x58/0x60 mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb+0xf8/0x1b8 [mt7925_common] mt76u_tx_queue_skb+0xa0/0x1f8 [mt76_usb] __mt76_tx_queue_skb+0x54/0xe8 [mt76] mt76_txq_schedule.part.0+0x204/0x478 [mt76] mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x50/0x80 [mt76] mt792x_tx_worker+0x68/0x100 [mt792x_lib] __mt76_worker_fn+0x84/0x150 [mt76] Whether a given setup hits it depends on how much headroom the ingress netdev leaves in its rx skbs. Reproduced on a Raspberry Pi 5 bridging onboard ethernet to a Netgear A9000; originally reported on an MT7986 router running OpenWrt. Nick Morrow's testing on a Pi 4 (bcmgenet), which leaves more headroom, helped narrow the trigger to the ingress path. The same bug was fixed on mt7921 by commit 98c4d0abf5c4 ("mt76: mt7921: don't assume adequate headroom for SDIO headers"), but mt7925 was copied from mt7921 without the fix. Add the same guard here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80827 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-04 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize: buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd); port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL); When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly 8 bytes). If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize), the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read: data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read. Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest, and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency. [ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ] | ||||