| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix eswitch mode block underflow on IPsec acquire SA
mlx5e_xfrm_add_state() handles acquire-flow temporary SAs by allocating
software state and skipping hardware offload setup.
That path jumps to the common success label before taking the eswitch mode
block. After tunnel-mode validation was moved earlier, the common success
label unconditionally calls mlx5_eswitch_unblock_mode(). For acquire SAs,
this decrements esw->offloads.num_block_mode without a matching increment.
Return directly after installing the acquire SA offload handle, so only the
paths that successfully called mlx5_eswitch_block_mode() call the matching
unblock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: move policy_bydst RCU sync from per-netns .exit to .pre_exit
The struct pernet_operations docstring in include/net/net_namespace.h
explicitly warns against blocking RCU primitives in .exit handlers:
Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as
synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch.
[...]
Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible.
Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can
be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between
the calls.
xfrm_policy_fini() violates this: it calls synchronize_rcu() before
freeing the policy_bydst hash tables (so no RCU reader is mid-
traversal at free time), but runs from xfrm_net_ops.exit -- once per
namespace -- so a cleanup_net() of N namespaces pays N full RCU
grace periods serially.
Use the documented pre_exit/exit split. Move the policy flush (and
the workqueue drains it depends on) into a new .pre_exit handler;
xfrm_policy_fini() then runs in .exit and frees the hash tables
after the synchronize_rcu_expedited() that cleanup_net() guarantees
between the two phases. Providing O(1) RCU grace periods per batch
instead of O(N).
Observed on Linux 6.18 with a workload doing unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)
at ~13/sec sustained: cleanup_net() and the netns_wq rescuer kthread
both stuck in xfrm_policy_fini()'s synchronize_rcu(), >300k struct
net accumulated in the cleanup queue, Percpu in /proc/meminfo climbed
to 130+ GB on 256-CPU hosts, and memcg OOMs followed. setup_net and
__put_net counts were balanced, ruling out a refcount leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in is_ap_in_tkip() IE loop
The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that
enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload:
- pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that
i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the
buffer causes an OOB read.
- For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12,
which requires pIE->length >= 16. For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares
pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12. Neither requirement
is checked.
Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each
data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the
pattern established in update_beacon_info(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: wean fast IN from emulator_pio_in
Use __emulator_pio_in() directly for fast PIO instead of bouncing through
emulator_pio_in() now that __emulator_pio_in() fills "val" when handling
in-kernel PIO. vcpu->arch.pio.count is guaranteed to be '0', so this a
pure nop.
emulator_pio_in_emulated is now the last caller of emulator_pio_in.
No functional change intended. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify
rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify() in drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/
octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c queues a sender-controlled REP_EVENT_NOTIFY
request body verbatim, and rvu_rep_up_notify() then forwards
event->pcifunc (the nested body field, distinct from the
AF-normalised header pcifunc) into rvu_get_pfvf(), rvu_get_pf() and
the AF->PF mailbox device index without any bounds check.
A VF attached to a PF that has been put into switchdev
representor mode reaches this path: the VF mailbox handler
otx2_pfvf_mbox_handler() forwards every message id including
MBOX_MSG_REP_EVENT_NOTIFY to AF without an allowlist, and the AF
dispatcher rewrites only msg->pcifunc, leaving struct
rep_event::pcifunc attacker-controlled. The sibling
rvu_mbox_handler_esw_cfg() refuses requests whose header pcifunc
is not rvu->rep_pcifunc; this handler has no equivalent gate.
An out-of-range body pcifunc selects an &rvu->pf[]/&rvu->hwvf[]
element past the allocated array and, for RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE,
turns into a six-byte attacker-chosen OOB ether_addr_copy() target
inside the queued worker; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds write
in rvu_rep_wq_handler.
Reject malformed requests at the handler entry by gating on
is_pf_func_valid(), which is already the canonical PF/VF range check
in this driver; expose it via rvu.h so callers in rvu_rep.c can use
it instead of open-coding the same range arithmetic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix memory leak in hci_le_big_terminate()
hci_le_big_terminate() allocates iso_list_data via kzalloc_obj but
returns 0 without freeing it when neither pa_sync_term nor big_sync_term
flags are set after evaluating the PA and BIG sync connection state.
This early-return path was introduced when hci_le_big_terminate() was
refactored to take struct hci_conn instead of raw u8 parameters, adding
PA/BIG flag evaluation logic. The existing kfree() on hci_cmd_sync_queue
failure does not cover this path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops
When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.
Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:
- SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().
- SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.
Fix both macros by:
- Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
added instruction.
- Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3)
fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword
it decodes are never split across parity blocks.
This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 &&
v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each
call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs <<
DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes.
Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a
block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate
through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On
the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first
block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be
needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer.
Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for
certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of
buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with
block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected:
fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15]
fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229]
fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195]
fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89]
Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: revert commit_mutex usage in reset path
It causes circular lock dependency between commit_mutex, nfnl_subsys_ipset
and nlk_cb_mutex when nft reset, ipset list, and iptables-nft with '-m set'
rule run at the same time.
Previous patches made it safe to run individual reset handlers concurrently
so commit_mutex is no longer required to prevent this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_counter: serialize reset with spinlock
Add a global static spinlock to serialize counter fetch+reset
operations, preventing concurrent dump-and-reset from underrunning
values.
The lock is taken before fetching the total so that two parallel
resets cannot both read the same counter values and then both
subtract them.
A global lock is used for simplicity since resets are infrequent.
If this becomes a bottleneck, it can be replaced with a per-net
lock later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix delayed allocation of a cell's anonymous key
The allocation of a cell's anonymous key is done in a background thread
along with other cell setup such as doing a DNS upcall. In the reported
bug, this is triggered by afs_parse_source() parsing the device name given
to mount() and calling afs_lookup_cell() with the name of the cell.
The normal key lookup then tries to use the key description on the
anonymous authentication key as the reference for request_key() - but it
may not yet be set and so an oops can happen.
This has been made more likely to happen by the fix for dynamic lookup
failure.
Fix this by firstly allocating a reference name and attaching it to the
afs_cell record when the record is created. It can share the memory
allocation with the cell name (unfortunately it can't just overlap the cell
name by prepending it with "afs@" as the cell name already has a '.'
prepended for other purposes). This reference name is then passed to
request_key().
Secondly, the anon key is now allocated on demand at the point a key is
requested in afs_request_key() if it is not already allocated. A mutex is
used to prevent multiple allocation for a cell.
Thirdly, make afs_request_key_rcu() return NULL if the anonymous key isn't
yet allocated (if we need it) and then the caller can return -ECHILD to
drop out of RCU-mode and afs_request_key() can be called.
Note that the anonymous key is kind of necessary to make the key lookup
cache work as that doesn't currently cache a negative lookup, but it's
probably worth some investigation to see if NULL can be used instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Fix NULL pointer dereference in cs35l41_get_acpi_mute_state()
Return value of a function acpi_evaluate_dsm() is dereferenced without
checking for NULL, but it is usually checked for this function.
acpi_evaluate_dsm() may return NULL, when acpi_evaluate_object() returns
acpi_status other than ACPI_SUCCESS, so add a check to prevent the crach.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: mediatek: mt8195: Set ETDM1/2 IN/OUT to COMP_DUMMY()
ETDM2_IN_BE and ETDM1_OUT_BE are defined as COMP_EMPTY(),
in the case the codec dai_name will be null.
Avoid a crash if the device tree is not assigning a codec
to these links.
[ 1.179936] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 1.181065] Mem abort info:
[ 1.181420] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 1.181892] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1.182576] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1.182964] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1.183367] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1.183983] Data abort info:
[ 1.184406] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 1.185097] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 1.185766] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 1.186439] [0000000000000000] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 1.187239] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1.188029] Modules linked in:
[ 1.188420] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 70 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4-next-20250226+ #85
[ 1.189515] Hardware name: Radxa NIO 12L (DT)
[ 1.190065] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 1.190808] pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1.191683] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
[ 1.192170] lr : mt8195_mt6359_soc_card_probe+0x224/0x7b0
[ 1.192854] sp : ffff800083473970
[ 1.193271] x29: ffff800083473a10 x28: 0000000000001008 x27: 0000000000000002
[ 1.194168] x26: ffff800082408960 x25: ffff800082417db0 x24: ffff800082417d88
[ 1.195065] x23: 000000000000001e x22: ffff800082dbf480 x21: ffff800082dc07b8
[ 1.195961] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000013 x18: 00000000ffffffff
[ 1.196858] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 005000f2b5503510 x15: 0000000000000006
[ 1.197755] x14: ffff800082407af0 x13: 6e6f69737265766e x12: 692d6b636f6c6374
[ 1.198651] x11: 0000000000000002 x10: ffff80008240b920 x9 : 0000000000000018
[ 1.199547] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.200443] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080808080000000 x3 : 303933383978616d
[ 1.201339] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80008240b920 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.202236] Call trace:
[ 1.202545] __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140 (P)
[ 1.203029] mtk_soundcard_common_probe+0x3bc/0x5b8
[ 1.203644] platform_probe+0x70/0xe8
[ 1.204106] really_probe+0xc8/0x3a0
[ 1.204556] __driver_probe_device+0x84/0x160
[ 1.205104] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x130
[ 1.205630] __device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x170
[ 1.206189] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xf8
[ 1.206672] __device_attach+0xa8/0x1c8
[ 1.207155] device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x30
[ 1.207681] bus_probe_device+0xb0/0xc0
[ 1.208165] deferred_probe_work_func+0xa4/0x100
[ 1.208747] process_one_work+0x158/0x3e0
[ 1.209254] worker_thread+0x2c4/0x3e8
[ 1.209727] kthread+0x134/0x1f0
[ 1.210136] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 1.210589] Code: 54000401 b50002c6 d503201f f86a6803 (f8408402)
[ 1.211355] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| Use after free in Views in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Insufficient policy enforcement in SVG in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Integer overflow in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Heap buffer overflow in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Forms in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Inappropriate implementation in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Type Confusion in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
