| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: intel-vbtn: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion
Since commit e2ffcda16290 ("ACPI: OSL: Allow Notify () handlers to run on
all CPUs") ACPI notify handlers like the intel-vbtn notify_handler() may
run on multiple CPU cores racing with themselves.
This race gets hit on Dell Venue 7140 tablets when undocking from
the keyboard, causing the handler to try and register priv->switches_dev
twice, as can be seen from the dev_info() message getting logged twice:
[ 83.861800] intel-vbtn INT33D6:00: Registering Intel Virtual Switches input-dev after receiving a switch event
[ 83.861858] input: Intel Virtual Switches as /devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.0/PNP0C09:00/INT33D6:00/input/input17
[ 83.861865] intel-vbtn INT33D6:00: Registering Intel Virtual Switches input-dev after receiving a switch event
After which things go seriously wrong:
[ 83.861872] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.0/PNP0C09:00/INT33D6:00/input/input17'
...
[ 83.861967] kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for input17 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
[ 83.877338] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
...
Protect intel-vbtn notify_handler() from racing with itself with a mutex
to fix this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: rt5033: Bring back i2c_set_clientdata
Commit 3a93da231c12 ("power: supply: rt5033: Use devm_power_supply_register() helper")
reworked the driver to use devm. While at it, the i2c_set_clientdata
was dropped along with the remove callback. Unfortunately other parts
of the driver also rely on i2c clientdata so this causes kernel oops.
Bring the call back to fix the driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en : Fix memory out-of-bounds in bnxt_fill_hw_rss_tbl()
A recent commit has modified the code in __bnxt_reserve_rings() to
set the default RSS indirection table to default only when the number
of RX rings is changing. While this works for newer firmware that
requires RX ring reservations, it causes the regression on older
firmware not requiring RX ring resrvations (BNXT_NEW_RM() returns
false).
With older firmware, RX ring reservations are not required and so
hw_resc->resv_rx_rings is not always set to the proper value. The
comparison:
if (old_rx_rings != bp->hw_resc.resv_rx_rings)
in __bnxt_reserve_rings() may be false even when the RX rings are
changing. This will cause __bnxt_reserve_rings() to skip setting
the default RSS indirection table to default to match the current
number of RX rings. This may later cause bnxt_fill_hw_rss_tbl() to
use an out-of-range index.
We already have bnxt_check_rss_tbl_no_rmgr() to handle exactly this
scenario. We just need to move it up in bnxt_need_reserve_rings()
to be called unconditionally when using older firmware. Without the
fix, if the TX rings are changing, we'll skip the
bnxt_check_rss_tbl_no_rmgr() call and __bnxt_reserve_rings() may also
skip the bnxt_set_dflt_rss_indir_tbl() call for the reason explained
in the last paragraph. Without setting the default RSS indirection
table to default, it causes the regression:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0xb79/0xe40
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881c5809618 by task ethtool/31525
Call Trace:
__bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0xb79/0xe40
bnxt_hwrm_vnic_rss_cfg_p5+0xf7/0x460
__bnxt_setup_vnic_p5+0x12e/0x270
__bnxt_open_nic+0x2262/0x2f30
bnxt_open_nic+0x5d/0xf0
ethnl_set_channels+0x5d4/0xb30
ethnl_default_set_doit+0x2f1/0x620 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix UAFs when destroying the queues
The second tagged commit started sometimes (very rarely, but possible)
throwing WARNs from
net/core/page_pool.c:page_pool_disable_direct_recycling().
Turned out idpf frees interrupt vectors with embedded NAPIs *before*
freeing the queues making page_pools' NAPI pointers lead to freed
memory before these pools are destroyed by libeth.
It's not clear whether there are other accesses to the freed vectors
when destroying the queues, but anyway, we usually free queue/interrupt
vectors only when the queues are destroyed and the NAPIs are guaranteed
to not be referenced anywhere.
Invert the allocation and freeing logic making queue/interrupt vectors
be allocated first and freed last. Vectors don't require queues to be
present, so this is safe. Additionally, this change allows to remove
that useless queue->q_vector pointer cleanup, as vectors are still
valid when freeing the queues (+ both are freed within one function,
so it's not clear why nullify the pointers at all). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: apple: fix device reference counting
Drivers must call nvme_uninit_ctrl after a successful nvme_init_ctrl.
Split the allocation side out to make the error handling boundary easier
to navigate. The apple driver had been doing this wrong, leaking the
controller device memory on a tagset failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: add missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses
Currently, it's possible to pass in a modified CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to
a global function as an argument. The adverse effects of this is that
BPF helpers can continue to make use of this modified
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR from within the context of the global function,
which can unintentionally result in out-of-bounds memory accesses and
therefore compromise overall system stability i.e.
[ 244.157771] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.161345] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810914be68 by task test_progs/302
[ 244.167151] CPU: 0 PID: 302 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O E 6.10.0-rc3-00131-g66b586715063 #533
[ 244.174318] Call Trace:
[ 244.175787] <TASK>
[ 244.177356] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
[ 244.179531] print_report+0xce/0x670
[ 244.182314] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x200/0x3e0
[ 244.184908] kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
[ 244.187408] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.189714] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.192020] bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.194264] bpf_prog_b02a02fdd2bdc5fa_global_call_bpf_dynptr_data+0x22/0x26
[ 244.198044] bpf_prog_b0fe7b9d7dc3abde_callback_adjust_bpf_dynptr_reg_off+0x1f/0x23
[ 244.202136] bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x2c7/0x570
[ 244.204744] ? 0xffffffffc0009e58
[ 244.206593] ? __pfx_bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x10/0x10
[ 244.209795] bpf_prog_33ab33f6a804ba2d_user_ringbuf_callback_const_ptr_to_dynptr_reg_off+0x47/0x4b
[ 244.215922] bpf_trampoline_6442502480+0x43/0xe3
[ 244.218691] __x64_sys_prlimit64+0x9/0xf0
[ 244.220912] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
[ 244.223043] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 244.226458] RIP: 0033:0x7ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.228582] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8f 1d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 244.241307] RSP: 002b:00007ffa3e9c6eb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012e
[ 244.246474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffa3e9c7cdc RCX: 00007ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.250478] RDX: 00007ffa3eb162b4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffa3e9c7fb0
[ 244.255396] RBP: 00007ffa3e9c6ed0 R08: 00007ffa3e9c76c0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 244.260195] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffffffffffffff80
[ 244.264201] R13: 000000000000001c R14: 00007ffc5d6b4260 R15: 00007ffa3e1c7000
[ 244.268303] </TASK>
Add a check_func_arg_reg_off() to the path in which the BPF verifier
verifies the arguments of global function arguments, specifically
those which take an argument of type ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR |
MEM_RDONLY. Also, process_dynptr_func() doesn't appear to perform any
explicit and strict type matching on the supplied register type, so
let's also enforce that a register either type PTR_TO_STACK or
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR is by the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/admgpu: fix dereferencing null pointer context
When user space sets an invalid ta type, the pointer context will be empty.
So it need to check the pointer context before using it |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: cs-amp-lib: Fix NULL pointer crash if efi.get_variable is NULL
Call efi_rt_services_supported() to check that efi.get_variable exists
before calling it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Have format file honor EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED
When eventfs was introduced, special care had to be done to coordinate the
freeing of the file meta data with the files that are exposed to user
space. The file meta data would have a ref count that is set when the file
is created and would be decremented and freed after the last user that
opened the file closed it. When the file meta data was to be freed, it
would set a flag (EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) to denote that the file is freed,
and any new references made (like new opens or reads) would fail as it is
marked freed. This allowed other meta data to be freed after this flag was
set (under the event_mutex).
All the files that were dynamically created in the events directory had a
pointer to the file meta data and would call event_release() when the last
reference to the user space file was closed. This would be the time that it
is safe to free the file meta data.
A shortcut was made for the "format" file. It's i_private would point to
the "call" entry directly and not point to the file's meta data. This is
because all format files are the same for the same "call", so it was
thought there was no reason to differentiate them. The other files
maintain state (like the "enable", "trigger", etc). But this meant if the
file were to disappear, the "format" file would be unaware of it.
This caused a race that could be trigger via the user_events test (that
would create dynamic events and free them), and running a loop that would
read the user_events format files:
In one console run:
# cd tools/testing/selftests/user_events
# while true; do ./ftrace_test; done
And in another console run:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
# while true; do cat events/user_events/__test_event/format; done 2>/dev/null
With KASAN memory checking, it would trigger a use-after-free bug report
(which was a real bug). This was because the format file was not checking
the file's meta data flag "EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED", so it would access the
event that the file meta data pointed to after the event was freed.
After inspection, there are other locations that were found to not check
the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag when accessing the trace_event_file. Add a
new helper function: event_file_file() that will make sure that the
event_mutex is held, and will return NULL if the trace_event_file has the
EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag set. Have the first reference of the struct file
pointer use event_file_file() and check for NULL. Later uses can still use
the event_file_data() helper function if the event_mutex is still held and
was not released since the event_file_file() call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: list_lru: fix UAF for memory cgroup
The mem_cgroup_from_slab_obj() is supposed to be called under rcu lock or
cgroup_mutex or others which could prevent returned memcg from being
freed. Fix it by adding missing rcu read lock.
Found by code inspection.
[songmuchun@bytedance.com: only grab rcu lock when necessary, per Vlastimil] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tcp: Disable TCP-AO static key after RCU grace period
The lifetime of TCP-AO static_key is the same as the last
tcp_ao_info. On the socket destruction tcp_ao_info ceases to be
with RCU grace period, while tcp-ao static branch is currently deferred
destructed. The static key definition is
: DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(tcp_ao_needed, HZ);
which means that if RCU grace period is delayed by more than a second
and tcp_ao_needed is in the process of disablement, other CPUs may
yet see tcp_ao_info which atent dead, but soon-to-be.
And that breaks the assumption of static_key_fast_inc_not_disabled().
See the comment near the definition:
> * The caller must make sure that the static key can't get disabled while
> * in this function. It doesn't patch jump labels, only adds a user to
> * an already enabled static key.
Originally it was introduced in commit eb8c507296f6 ("jump_label:
Prevent key->enabled int overflow"), which is needed for the atomic
contexts, one of which would be the creation of a full socket from a
request socket. In that atomic context, it's known by the presence
of the key (md5/ao) that the static branch is already enabled.
So, the ref counter for that static branch is just incremented
instead of holding the proper mutex.
static_key_fast_inc_not_disabled() is just a helper for such usage
case. But it must not be used if the static branch could get disabled
in parallel as it's not protected by jump_label_mutex and as a result,
races with jump_label_update() implementation details.
Happened on netdev test-bot[1], so not a theoretical issue:
[] jump_label: Fatal kernel bug, unexpected op at tcp_inbound_hash+0x1a7/0x870 [ffffffffa8c4e9b7] (eb 50 0f 1f 44 != 66 90 0f 1f 00)) size:2 type:1
[] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c:73!
[] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[] CPU: 3 PID: 243 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-virtme #1
[] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[] Workqueue: events jump_label_update_timeout
[] RIP: 0010:__jump_label_patch+0x2f6/0x350
...
[] Call Trace:
[] <TASK>
[] arch_jump_label_transform_queue+0x6c/0x110
[] __jump_label_update+0xef/0x350
[] __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x3c/0x60
[] jump_label_update_timeout+0x2c/0x40
[] process_one_work+0xe3b/0x1670
[] worker_thread+0x587/0xce0
[] kthread+0x28a/0x350
[] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
[] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[] </TASK>
[] Modules linked in: veth
[] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[] RIP: 0010:__jump_label_patch+0x2f6/0x350
[1]: https://netdev-3.bots.linux.dev/vmksft-tcp-ao-dbg/results/696681/5-connect-deny-ipv6/stderr |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_snp_shutdown_locked
Fix a null pointer dereference induced by DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.
Return from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() if the psp_device or the
sev_device structs are not initialized. Without the fix, the driver will
produce the following splat:
ccp 0000:55:00.5: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
ccp 0000:55:00.5: sev enabled
ccp 0000:55:00.5: psp enabled
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
CPU: 262 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1+ #29
RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 <4c> 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x6f/0xb0
? __die+0xcc/0xf0
? page_fault_oops+0x330/0x3a0
? save_trace+0x2a5/0x360
? do_user_addr_fault+0x583/0x630
? exc_page_fault+0x81/0x120
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
? __sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
__sev_firmware_shutdown+0x349/0x5b0
? pm_runtime_barrier+0x66/0xe0
sev_dev_destroy+0x34/0xb0
psp_dev_destroy+0x27/0x60
sp_destroy+0x39/0x90
sp_pci_remove+0x22/0x60
pci_device_remove+0x4e/0x110
really_probe+0x271/0x4e0
__driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x24/0x120
__driver_attach+0xc7/0x280
? driver_attach+0x30/0x30
bus_for_each_dev+0x10d/0x130
driver_attach+0x22/0x30
bus_add_driver+0x171/0x2b0
? unaccepted_memory_init_kdump+0x20/0x20
driver_register+0x67/0x100
__pci_register_driver+0x83/0x90
sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
sp_mod_init+0x13/0x30
do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x290
? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
? __lock_acquire+0xd90/0xe30
? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
? __create_object+0x66/0x100
? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
? __create_object+0x66/0x100
? parameq+0x1b/0x90
? parse_one+0x6d/0x1d0
? parse_args+0xd7/0x1f0
? do_initcall_level+0x180/0x180
do_initcall_level+0xb0/0x180
do_initcalls+0x60/0xa0
? kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
do_basic_setup+0x41/0x50
kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x230
? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x50
? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 00000000000000f0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 <4c> 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix soft lockup under heavy CEQE load
CEQEs are handled in interrupt handler currently. This may cause the
CPU core staying in interrupt context too long and lead to soft lockup
under heavy load.
Handle CEQEs in BH workqueue and set an upper limit for the number of
CEQE handled by a single call of work handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wan: fsl_qmc_hdlc: Convert carrier_lock spinlock to a mutex
The carrier_lock spinlock protects the carrier detection. While it is
held, framer_get_status() is called which in turn takes a mutex.
This is not correct and can lead to a deadlock.
A run with PROVE_LOCKING enabled detected the issue:
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
...
c204ddbc (&framer->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: framer_get_status+0x40/0x78
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{4:4}
2 locks held by ifconfig/146:
#0: c0926a38 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devinet_ioctl+0x12c/0x664
#1: c2006a40 (&qmc_hdlc->carrier_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: qmc_hdlc_framer_set_carrier+0x30/0x98
Avoid the spinlock usage and convert carrier_lock to a mutex. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix null reference error when checking end of zone
This patch fixes a potentially null pointer being accessed by
is_end_zone_blkaddr() that checks the last block of a zone
when f2fs is mounted as a single device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (ltc2991) re-order conditions to fix off by one bug
LTC2991_T_INT_CH_NR is 4. The st->temp_en[] array has LTC2991_MAX_CHANNEL
(4) elements. Thus if "channel" is equal to LTC2991_T_INT_CH_NR then we
have read one element beyond the end of the array. Flip the conditions
around so that we check if "channel" is valid before using it as an array
index. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: qcom: icc-bwmon: Fix refcount imbalance seen during bwmon_remove
The following warning is seen during bwmon_remove due to refcount
imbalance, fix this by releasing the OPPs after use.
Logs:
WARNING: at drivers/opp/core.c:1640 _opp_table_kref_release+0x150/0x158
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. X1E80100 CRD (DT)
...
Call trace:
_opp_table_kref_release+0x150/0x158
dev_pm_opp_remove_table+0x100/0x1b4
devm_pm_opp_of_table_release+0x10/0x1c
devm_action_release+0x14/0x20
devres_release_all+0xa4/0x104
device_unbind_cleanup+0x18/0x60
device_release_driver_internal+0x1ec/0x228
driver_detach+0x50/0x98
bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc
driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20
bwmon_driver_exit+0x18/0x524 [icc_bwmon]
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x184/0x264
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x118
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xe8
do_el0_svc+0x20/0x2c
el0_svc+0x34/0xdc
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
--[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix TTLM teardown work
The worker calculates the wrong sdata pointer, so if it ever
runs, it'll crash. Fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix invalid memory access while processing fragmented packets
The monitor ring and the reo reinject ring share the same ring mask index.
When the driver receives an interrupt for the reo reinject ring, the
monitor ring is also processed, leading to invalid memory access. Since
monitor support is not yet enabled in ath12k, the ring mask for the monitor
ring should be removed.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.1.1-00209-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: wow: fix GTK offload H2C skbuff issue
We mistakenly put skb too large and that may exceed skb->end.
Therefore, we fix it.
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffc09e9a9d len:416 put:204 head:ffff8fba04eca780 data:ffff8fba04eca7e0 tail:0x200 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4747 Comm: kworker/u4:44 Tainted: G O 6.6.30-02659-gc18865c4dfbd #1 86547039b47e46935493f615ee31d0b2d711d35e
Hardware name: HP Meep/Meep, BIOS Google_Meep.11297.262.0 03/18/2021
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x5d/0x60
Code: c6 63 8b 8f bb 4c 0f 45 f6 48 c7 c7 4d 89 8b bb 48 89 ce 44 89 d1 41 56 53 41 53 ff b0 c8 00 00 00 e8 27 5f 23 00 48 83 c4 20 <0f> 0b 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44
RSP: 0018:ffffaa700144bad0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: 0000000000000140 RCX: 14432c5aad26c900
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffaa700144bae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffaa700144b920
R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffffbc28fbc0 R12: ffff8fba4e57a010
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffbb8f8b63 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fba7bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007999c4ad1000 CR3: 000000015503a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x1f/0x70
? die+0x3d/0x60
? do_trap+0xa4/0x110
? skb_panic+0x5d/0x60
? do_error_trap+0x6d/0x90
? skb_panic+0x5d/0x60
? handle_invalid_op+0x30/0x40
? skb_panic+0x5d/0x60
? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? skb_panic+0x5d/0x60
skb_put+0x49/0x50
rtw89_fw_h2c_wow_gtk_ofld+0xbd/0x220 [rtw89_core 778b32de31cd1f14df2d6721ae99ba8a83636fa5]
rtw89_wow_resume+0x31f/0x540 [rtw89_core 778b32de31cd1f14df2d6721ae99ba8a83636fa5]
rtw89_ops_resume+0x2b/0xa0 [rtw89_core 778b32de31cd1f14df2d6721ae99ba8a83636fa5]
ieee80211_reconfig+0x84/0x13e0 [mac80211 818a894e3b77da6298269c59ed7cdff065a4ed52]
? __pfx_wiphy_resume+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 1a793119e2aeb157c4ca4091ff8e1d9ae233b59d]
? dev_printk_emit+0x51/0x70
? _dev_info+0x6e/0x90
? __pfx_wiphy_resume+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 1a793119e2aeb157c4ca4091ff8e1d9ae233b59d]
wiphy_resume+0x89/0x180 [cfg80211 1a793119e2aeb157c4ca4091ff8e1d9ae233b59d]
? __pfx_wiphy_resume+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 1a793119e2aeb157c4ca4091ff8e1d9ae233b59d]
dpm_run_callback+0x3c/0x140
device_resume+0x1f9/0x3c0
? __pfx_dpm_watchdog_handler+0x10/0x10
async_resume+0x1d/0x30
async_run_entry_fn+0x29/0xd0
process_scheduled_works+0x1d8/0x3d0
worker_thread+0x1fc/0x2f0
kthread+0xed/0x110
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in: ccm 8021q r8153_ecm cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii dm_integrity async_xor xor async_tx lz4 lz4_compress zstd zstd_compress zram zsmalloc uinput rfcomm cmac algif_hash rtw89_8922ae(O) algif_skcipher rtw89_8922a(O) af_alg rtw89_pci(O) rtw89_core(O) btusb(O) snd_soc_sst_bxt_da7219_max98357a btbcm(O) snd_soc_hdac_hdmi btintel(O) snd_soc_intel_hda_dsp_common snd_sof_probes btrtl(O) btmtk(O) snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_dmic uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc uvc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common snd_sof_pci_intel_apl snd_sof_intel_hda_common snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_sof_intel_hda soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation snd_sof_intel_hda_mlink soundwire_cadence snd_sof_pci snd_sof_xtensa_dsp mac80211 snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_sof snd_sof_utils soundwire_bus snd_soc_max98357a snd_soc_avs snd_soc_hda_codec snd_hda_ext_core snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_soc_da7219 snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core veth ip6table_nat xt_MASQUERADE xt_cgroup fuse bluetooth ecdh_generic
cfg80211 ecc
gsmi: Log Shutdown
---truncated--- |
