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Search Results (6 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-6720 | 1 Tigera | 3 Calico, Calico Cloud, Calico Enterprise | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-41185 | 1 Tigera | 3 Calico, Calico Cloud, Calico Enterprise | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| When Calico is configured with the Azure IPAM plugin, the Calico CNI binary mutates the incoming CNI configuration to attach subnet information before delegating to the IPAM plugin. After mutating, the Azure IPAM helper logs the entire unmarshaled configuration map (stdinData) at INFO level to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on every CNI ADD and DEL invocation — once per pod scheduled or terminated on the node. When the cluster is deployed using token-based Kubernetes authentication, this log entry contains the ServiceAccount token, client key, and certificate authority in plaintext. Any principal with read access to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on a node can read these logs and extract the credentials, which grant cluster-wide Calico networking admin privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2026-41184 | 1 Tigera | 1 Calico | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In Calico, the install-cni init container logs the rendered CNI configuration to standard output. When the configuration template uses the __SERVICEACCOUNT_TOKEN__ placeholder (Canal/Flannel-Calico deployments), the installer substitutes the live Kubernetes ServiceAccount bearer token before logging, exposing the token to any authenticated user with pods/log permission in the namespace with calico-node. The token holds patch privileges on pods/status, enabling annotation-based attacks against cluster workloads. The default kubeconfig-based authentication path is not affected. This is a direct regression of TTA-2018-001. | ||||
| CVE-2024-33522 | 1 Tigera | 3 Calico, Calico Cloud, Calico Enterprise | 2026-04-15 | 6.7 Medium |
| In vulnerable versions of Calico (v3.27.2 and below), Calico Enterprise (v3.19.0-1, v3.18.1, v3.17.3 and below), and Calico Cloud (v19.2.0 and below), an attacker who has local access to the Kubernetes node, can escalate their privileges by exploiting a vulnerability in the Calico CNI install binary. The issue arises from an incorrect SUID (Set User ID) bit configuration in the binary, combined with the ability to control the input binary, allowing an attacker to execute an arbitrary binary with elevated privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2022-28224 | 1 Tigera | 2 Calico, Calico Enterprise | 2025-09-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| Clusters using Calico (version 3.22.1 and below), Calico Enterprise (version 3.12.0 and below), may be vulnerable to route hijacking with the floating IP feature. Due to insufficient validation, a privileged attacker may be able to set a floating IP annotation to a pod even if the feature is not enabled. This may allow the attacker to intercept and reroute traffic to their compromised pod. | ||||
| CVE-2023-41378 | 1 Tigera | 3 Calico Cloud, Calico Enterprise, Calico Os | 2024-11-21 | 7.5 High |
| In certain conditions for Calico Typha (v3.26.2, v3.25.1 and below), and Calico Enterprise Typha (v3.17.1, v3.16.3, v3.15.3 and below), a client TLS handshake can block the Calico Typha server indefinitely, resulting in denial of service. The TLS Handshake() call is performed inside the main server handle for loop without any timeout allowing an unclean TLS handshake to block the main loop indefinitely while other connections will be idle waiting for that handshake to finish. | ||||
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