{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-31709", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2026-03-09T15:48:24.133Z", "datePublished": "2026-05-01T13:56:06.522Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-05-01T13:56:06.522Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2026-05-01T13:56:06.522Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl\n\nbuild_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a\nserver-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the\nchmod/chown security descriptor.\n\nThe original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before\nreading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate\nheader-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on\npdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.\n\nA malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a\nheader, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive\nreplace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated\nextent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.\n\nFactor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to\nvalidate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator\nbefore the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same\nvalidator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on\nwhat constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL."}], "affected": [{"product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": ["fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c"], "versions": [{"version": "bc3e9dd9d104ca1b75644eab87b38ce8a924aef4", "lessThan": "b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git"}, {"version": "bc3e9dd9d104ca1b75644eab87b38ce8a924aef4", "lessThan": "0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git"}]}, {"product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "affected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": ["fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c"], "versions": [{"version": "5.12", "status": "affected"}, {"version": "0", "lessThan": "5.12", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}, {"version": "7.0.2", "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}, {"version": "7.1-rc1", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"}]}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"operator": "OR", "negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "5.12", "versionEndExcluding": "7.0.2"}, {"vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "5.12", "versionEndExcluding": "7.1-rc1"}]}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a"}], "title": "smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl", "x_generator": {"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"}}}}

{}

{"cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl\n\nbuild_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a\nserver-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the\nchmod/chown security descriptor.\n\nThe original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before\nreading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate\nheader-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on\npdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.\n\nA malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a\nheader, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive\nreplace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated\nextent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.\n\nFactor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to\nvalidate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator\nbefore the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same\nvalidator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on\nwhat constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL."}], "id": "CVE-2026-31709", "lastModified": "2026-05-01T15:24:14.893", "metrics": {}, "published": "2026-05-01T14:16:20.950", "references": [{"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a"}, {"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8"}], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"}

{}

{}