{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-48150", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-05-20T23:12:43.030Z", "datePublished": "2026-05-27T16:58:18.979Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-05-27T16:58:18.979Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Budibase: Workspace-scoped builder escalates to global admin via /api/public/v1/roles/assign", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-915", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "baseScore": 9, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "Budibase", "product": "budibase", "versions": [{"version": "< 3.39.0", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-05-27T16:58:18.979Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, /api/public/v1/roles/assign is guarded by the builderOrAdmin middleware, which passes any user who is a builder for the app id in the x-budibase-app-id header. That check admits both global builders and workspace-scoped builders (builder.apps set but builder.global unset). The controller then spreads the request body into the SDK call, and the SDK grants builder.global=true or admin.global=true on whichever user ids the caller supplies. Bob, a workspace-scoped builder with an API key, promotes himself or any other user to global admin with one POST. The whole flow is tenant-wide privilege escalation from an app-level role, available to anyone with an Enterprise license that unlocks the EXPANDED_PUBLIC_API feature. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

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