FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the dynamic_binary_buffer_t class (src/dynamic_binary_buffer.hpp). Five methods (append_dynamic_buffer, append_data_as_pointer, append_data_as_object_ptr, memcpy_from_ptr, memcpy_from_object_ptr) use an incorrect bounds check of the form 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size + 1)' instead of the correct 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size)'. This allows writing exactly one byte past the end of the heap-allocated buffer. The class is used pervasively in BGP message encoding/decoding, NetFlow template processing, and Flow Spec NLRI construction. An attacker who can send network traffic (NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, or BGP) to a FastNetMon instance can trigger this overflow, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution by corrupting heap metadata. Notably, the append_byte() method uses the correct bounds check, confirming the inconsistency.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Tue, 26 May 2026 20:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:pavel-odintsov:fastnetmon:*:*:*:*:community:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Tue, 26 May 2026 19:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the dynamic_binary_buffer_t class (src/dynamic_binary_buffer.hpp). Five methods (append_dynamic_buffer, append_data_as_pointer, append_data_as_object_ptr, memcpy_from_ptr, memcpy_from_object_ptr) use an incorrect bounds check of the form 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size + 1)' instead of the correct 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size)'. This allows writing exactly one byte past the end of the heap-allocated buffer. The class is used pervasively in BGP message encoding/decoding, NetFlow template processing, and Flow Spec NLRI construction. An attacker who can send network traffic (NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, or BGP) to a FastNetMon instance can trigger this overflow, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution by corrupting heap metadata. Notably, the append_byte() method uses the correct bounds check, confirming the inconsistency. | |
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-26T18:46:33.597Z
Reserved: 2026-05-22T00:00:00.000Z
Link: CVE-2026-48689
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-05-26T19:16:28.663
Modified: 2026-05-26T20:20:38.970
Link: CVE-2026-48689
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.